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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation demonstrates that Leo Strauss, in The City and Man, continues his 
response to Carl Schmitt’s arguments concerning the affirmation of the political, as 
outlined by Strauss in his 1932 article on Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political.  In 
affirming the political, Strauss spoke of the “theologico-political problem”, or the  
question regarding who, or what, should rule society.  Strauss outlines six criteria in his 
1932 “Comments”, which he argues can be found in Schmitt’s The Concept of the 
Political, as essential for the recovery of the political.  In raising the question of the 
political, both Schmitt and Strauss return to the fundamental question regarding how 
one should live.  In so doing, Strauss rejects Schmitt’s reliance on conflicting faiths and 
returns to the Socratic description of the best regime (politeia), understood as the best 
way of life, that is devoted to contemplation, peace and justice.  In his argument in The 
City and Man, Strauss satisfies the six criteria outlined in his “Comments”: (1) the 
acceptance of moral evil within human nature; (2) the problem of opposition among 
groups; (3) the possibility of a non-neutral, transprivate obligation; (4) the need for a 
content that determines the distinction between friend and enemy; (5) a content that 
leads to a quarrel over the question of “what is Right?” and (6) that the political must 
address “the order of human things from a pure and whole knowledge”.  This thesis 
demonstrates that Strauss’s 1964 book, The City and Man, indirectly addresses 
Schmitt’s general criteria, using an interpretation of Thucydides’s, Aristotle’s and 
Plato’s best regime – which is linked to the pursuit of wisdom, or the philosophic life – 
to provide a transpolitical standard that opposes Schmitt’s insistence on “concrete” 
experience, that relies on historical destiny, and faith, as the guide to political life.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Introduction 
 
1. The Objectives of the Study 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to demonstrate that Leo Strauss, in The City and 
Man, continues his 1932 response to Carl Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political 
regarding the recovery of the political.  It demonstrates that Strauss discusses six criteria 
in his 1932 “Comments”, which Schmitt outlines as essential for the successful recovery 
of the political.  This thesis shows that those criteria are present, but not developed, in 
Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political and that Strauss fully responds to them in his 
arguments in The City and Man, which was published in 1964.  Furthermore, the thesis 
shows that the structure and content of, The City and Man, convey his answer to 
Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political, especially regarding the best regime as 
described by Strauss’s interpretation of Aristotle, Plato and Thucydides.   
 
Both Strauss and Schmitt define the political as “the order of the human things” that 
refers to the ordering principle, which determines fundamentally different ways of life.1  
According to Strauss, this ordering of the human things is equivalent to the regime 
(politeia), or to the question regarding the best way of life.2  For Strauss, there are only 
two alternatives that represent the best way of life.  These are the life dedicated to 
perfecting one’s reason, i.e. the philosophic life, and the life dedicated to biblical faith, 
                                                 
1 Strauss, Leo, “Notes on Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political”, in Meier, Heinrich, Carl Schmitt 
and Leo Strauss – The Hidden Dialogue, Lomax, Harvey J., trans., University of Chicago Press, U.S.A., 
1995, pp. 91, 115, 118 & 119.  Strauss is quoting Schmitt. 
2 Ibid., p. 118.  Strauss implies that the question of “what is right” is akin to the best political order. 
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which means the life devoted to obeying the commandments of the Bible.3  This thesis 
demonstrates that Schmitt is a Christian political theologian and that his recovery of the 
political meant a return to faith, while Strauss, as a political philosopher, preferred 
Socratic philosophy as the foundation of his recovery of the political.  These two 
fundamental alternatives can be reduced to “faith”, represented by Jerusalem, and 
“reason”, represented by Athens.  Strauss sometimes used the expression “the 
theologico-political problem” to indicate the problem regarding who or what should rule 
a community.  The ultimate theologico-political problem, for Strauss, is whether biblical 
faith (Jerusalem) or reason (Athens) should be the highest authority for human beings.  
It is not the objective of this thesis to demonstrate the superiority of Athens over 
Jerusalem, but to show that Strauss gives his mature response, regarding the meaning of 
the political, to Schmitt in The City and Man.  The structure and content of that book 
provide evidence that Strauss is responding to Schmitt’s concept of the political.  
However, it is important to recognize the dispute, as it motivates Strauss’s answer to 
Schmitt, particularly since Strauss thought that Socratic political philosophy offered a 
better guide to practical political life.  This is crucial, since Schmitt, having failed to 
comprehend the nature of tyranny, supported the Nazi regime, because he did not 
possess knowledge of the best regime.  Strauss saw Schmitt’s active support of the 
Nazis as evidence of the failure of Schmitt’s recovery of the political.  
 
In outlining, and knowing, Aristotle’s, Plato’s and Thucydides’s best regimes, as a way 
of life of the wise, Strauss attempts to provide an alternative universal order to 
Schmitt’s reliance on historical necessity and faith, as the foundation of the political.  In 
                                                 
3 Strauss, Leo, “Progress or Return? The Contemporary Crisis in Western Civilization”, p. 116 & 
“Jerusalem and Athens”, in Strauss, Leo, Jewish Philosophy and the Crisis of Modernity, Green, Kenneth 
Hart, editor, The State University of New York Press, Albany, U.S.A., 1997, pp. 396 & 403. 
  
 
3
his 1963 lecture on Plato’s Symposium, Strauss had stated clearly his interpretation of 
the political.  He states: 
 
“The political in the political is the phenomenon which the 
Greeks called politeia (the title of Plato’s Republic in the 
original).  The word means, loosely explained, something 
like constitution.  The politeia designates the character of 
the government, the powers of the government.  Secondly, 
however, and this is the more important meaning, politeia 
designates a way of life.  The way of life of a society is 
decisively determined by its hierarchy – its stratification, 
as it is now called.  The most massive form of this 
stratification is expressed by this question: Which type of 
men predominate in broad daylight and with a view to 
compel power and obedience and respect?  Which habits 
are fostered and admired by the society as a whole  as it 
expresses itself in its actions as a society? Which moral 
taste is operating through the political order?  We see 
immediately, on the basis of our present day experiences, 
that there is a variety of such regimes.  The conflict among 
them is only a conflict in the minds of men.  Thus the 
question arises of what is the best regime”. 4   
 
                                                 
4 Strauss, Leo, On Plato’s Symposium, Benardete, Seth, editor, University of Chicago Press, U.S.A., 
2001, pp. 8 & 9. 
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As Strauss relates, the most important characteristic of the politeia is that it signifies a 
way of life.  Strauss had already stressed the importance of the regime in Natural Right 
and History, confirming his definition of the regime as the politeia, or “the way of life 
of a society, rather than its constitution”, being “the source of all laws”.  In the same 
book he argues that, for Plato and Aristotle, the regime (politeia) includes “certain 
habits or attitudes as most respectable” to those who rule.  Although Schmitt does not 
use the word, politeia, both thinkers were ultimately concerned with the most 
authoritative opinions that a society respects.  According to Strauss, the conflict among 
the different ways of life raised the question regarding the question, who or what should 
rule society? 5   
 
This thesis demonstrates that The City and Man is a theologico-political treatise that 
attempts to answer the question regarding who or what should rule society, taking into 
consideration the six criteria found in Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political.  In 
arguing that The City and Man is a theologico-political treatise, that has a subtle 
structure, this thesis shows that Strauss addresses the question, “how is one to live?” 
especially relating to the meaning theology has in political life.  For Strauss and 
Schmitt, ruling presupposes an answer to the question regarding the best way of life that 
is based on the highest authority – the divine.  In The City and Man, Strauss follows 
Socrates and defines the divine as nature, whereas Schmitt ultimately defines the divine 
as the Christian God. This explains why Strauss and Schmitt make a connection 
between theology, defined as what is  said about the divine, and the question regarding 
the political rule.  What links Strauss to Schmitt is the issue of the divine and its 
influence on politics, since the divine is the highest authority for human beings, or the 
                                                 
5 Strauss, Leo, Natural Right and History, University of Chicago Press, 7th Impression, with Leo 
Strauss’s new “Preface”, U.S.A., 1971, pp. 136 & 137. 
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regime.6  In attempting to understand the divine, both Schmitt and Strauss begin with 
the most authoritative opinions of society in the quest for knowledge of “the order of 
human things”. 7  
 
This thesis shows how Strauss answers Schmitt’s attempt to restore the political as one 
based on conflicting faiths, which are part of human destiny, defined as historical 
necessity.  In challenging Schmitt’s reliance on faith as the foundation of the political, 
Strauss calls for a return to nature and classic natural right, or natural justice, blaming 
Schmitt for remaining within the horizon of liberalism in accepting much of Hobbes’s 
political theory.  Strauss argues that Schmitt believes that it is impossible to transcend 
the “systematics of liberal thought”, because no other system has replaced liberalism.8  
According to Strauss, Schmitt also relies on historical fate, implying that he accepts 
historicism where thinkers cannot transcend the “concrete situation” of their particular 
age, or moment in time.  By destiny, or historical fate, Schmitt means that history, as a 
series of historical events, provides the mysterious revelation of God’s divine 
providence that cannot be fully understood by any human being.  In contrast, Strauss 
argues that the best regime is timeless, because it is “natural”, and hence universal, 
rather than being based on a unique historical situation.  In response to Schmitt, Strauss 
defines “nature” as what comes to light through the examination of authoritative 
opinions that can be accessed at all times and in all places.  He defines these opinions as 
the pre-theoretical description of things available to common sense, which are always 
fundamentally political in the moral sense.  The most authoritative opinions include “the 
divine law”, or the ancestral customs, found in all societies.  Hence, Strauss and Schmitt 
                                                 
6 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, Midway Reprint, U.S.A., 1977, p. 241.   
7 Strauss, Leo, “Notes on Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political”, in Meier, Heinrich, Carl Schmitt 
and Leo Strauss – The Hidden Dialogue, Lomax, Harvey J., trans., op. cit., pp. 91 & 119. 
8 Ibid., pp. 93, 117 & 119. 
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share a similar interest in “the divine law”, but unlike Schmitt, Strauss follows Socrates 
in questioning the authoritative opinions of the city.  According to Strauss, the problem 
of deciding what is the best way of life is solved by Socrates asking the question in 
terms of what is the highest good for human beings.  This then leads to a discussion of 
existing regimes, or ways of life, and finally to the question of the best regime that 
Socrates argues replaces the endless conflicting opinions, or beliefs, that all claim to be 
true.  The best regime turns out to be the equivalent of the best way of life, or the 
philosophic life.  More importantly, for Strauss, because the best regime is just, and can 
be demonstrated (rationally) to be the best way of life, he suggests that it offers a better 
guide to political life than Schmitt’s reliance on potentially conflicting faiths.9  
 
In partial agreement with Schmitt, Strauss begins his response to Schmitt by taking 
seriously morality, which represents the authoritative opinions held by society.  It is 
these revered opinions that form the basis of Strauss’s investigation into what 
constitutes the best regime, or what it means to live the best way of life.  This is why 
Strauss concludes The City and Man by raising the question regarding god, because it is 
the fundamental belief of the pre-philosophic city and underpins the most authoritative 
opinions.  The gods are the authorities that the superstitious city takes most seriously.  
The authority of god is also the theme of Schmitt’s concept of the political that comes to 
light as political theology.  Thus, in partial agreement with Schmitt, Strauss concludes 
The City and Man: 
 
“For what is ‘first for us’ is not the philosophic 
understanding of the city but that understanding which is 
                                                 
9 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., pp. 25, 31, 44, 48 & 49. 
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inherent in the city as such, in the pre-philosophic city, 
according to which the city sees itself as subject and 
subservient to the divine in the ordinary understanding of 
the divine or looks up to it.  Only by beginning at this 
point will we be open to the full impact of the all-
important question which is coeval with philosophy 
although the philosophers do not frequently pronounce it – 
the question quid sit deus”.10 
 
In turning to the authoritative opinions of society about the gods, Strauss indicates that 
he raises the issue of rule, because the gods, or the divine authorities, rule human beings 
by demanding obedience.  This link between the gods and their ruling of society is 
another way to express the “theologico-political problem”, or who or what should rule 
the community.  According to Strauss, whatever, or whoever, rules has to be 
authoritative and provide for stable, moderate government.  Thus, Strauss is not 
concerned with the question whether biblical revelation refutes philosophy, but whether 
political philosophy provides a better guide to political life than Schmitt’s concept of 
the political, which is based on historical necessity that includes divine providence.   
 
This thesis demonstrates that, for Strauss, the best regime, that is according to nature 
and can exist in all places and at all times, provides a rational model for political life, 
even though the best regime may never be adopted by the most civilized society. 11  
Given that only the philosophers can fully comprehend the best regime, but refuse to 
partake in political life, and given that few people recognize the philosophers, Strauss 
                                                 
10 Ibid., p. 241. 
11 Ibid., pp. 17, 25 & 49. 
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does not think the best regime will ever be implemented by modern societies.  This 
simply means, for Strauss, that “the best regime” only exists in speech and is not likely 
to come into being.12  In The City and Man, Strauss openly states, “. . . the best regime 
is not possible”, but this does not imply that it cannot be used to judge various existing 
regimes.13  According to Strauss, the best regime exists in the souls of the best human 
beings and is better described as a way of life that involves the search for the truth 
behind all things.  As an unending quest that focuses on the highest questions relating to 
justice, wisdom and other virtues, Strauss understands the best regime as one that comes 
to light as a life of discussion and a search for wisdom, and hence, emphasizes 
moderation as opposed to political action.  However, Strauss argues that the best regime 
has been lost in the historical discussion that occurred from Machiavelli to the present 
day, which emphasized the “opposition between goodness and virtue”.  By this paradox 
Strauss means that virtue was no longer associated with perfection through 
understanding the best regime, but with the unlimited human desires that stressed the 
“insoluble conflict between the good of the individual and the common good”.  Thus, 
virtue became associated with the self-preservation of both the individual and society. 14  
In his “Introduction” to The City and Man, Strauss tells the reader how this came 
about.15   
 
Both Strauss and Schmitt thought that Western Civilization in the twentieth century was 
in decline, because the political, defined as the quest for the best life, had become 
submerged in concepts such as “economics” and “culture”.  In essence, the political had 
disappeared as a theme of social science.  Strauss states that he had “seen that the 
                                                 
12 Ibid., pp. 49, 124, 125 & 127. 
13 Ibid., p. 131. 
14 Ibid., p. 88. 
15 Ibid., p. 7. 
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modern mind had lost its self-confidence or its certainty of having made decisive 
progress beyond pre-modern thought”.  Strauss goes on to say, “I saw that it was turning 
into nihilism or what is in practice the same thing, fanatical obscurantism”.16  In the 
“Introduction” of The City and Man, Strauss refers to this problem as “the crisis of the 
West”, where the West has “become uncertain of its purpose”.  One major reason 
Strauss gives for this, in The City and Man, is that political philosophy has become 
“ideology”.  By this, Strauss means that political philosophy is no longer the recognized 
leader of the social sciences, but “has been replaced by the history of political 
philosophy”.  Strauss calls this “an absurdity”, as it replaces “a doctrine which claims to 
be true by a survey of more or less brilliant errors”.  This means, for Strauss, that 
readers of philosophic works no longer attempt to read those works, particularly those 
written by political philosophers, as their authors intended them to be read.  Strauss’s 
complaint is that readers already think they know beforehand that those works are not 
true, in contradiction to the views of the authors.17  Thus, Strauss argues that the crisis 
of Western Civilization has something to do with “culture” or, more specifically, with 
the rejection of “high culture”, described as “the highest possibilities” of human 
thought.  In his “Introduction” in The City and Man, Strauss traces the development of 
culture, described as “the comprehensive culture” that was synonymous with Western 
Civilization, to culture in the plural, meaning the acceptance of many cultures that were 
traditionally seen as barbaric.  Strauss attacks what he sees as cultural relativism that no 
longer recognizes “the culture of the mind”.  Furthermore, he argues that “the 
fundamental riddles” confronting human beings have not been solved, believing that 
Platonic political philosophy, in asking the fundamental question, “what is something?”, 
offers an alternative way of clarifying those riddles.  Given that the crisis is linked to 
                                                 
16 Strauss, Leo, “Preface to the American Edition” - in Strauss, Leo, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes – 
Its Basis and Its Genesis , Sinclair, Elsa M., trans., University of Chicago Press, U.S.A., 1973, p. xv. 
17 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., pp. 2, 3 & 8. 
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cultural relativism, Strauss addresses the development of “culture” in one of the key 
divisions in his chapter on Aristotle in The City and Man.  This thesis demonstrates that 
the issue of “culture” is a common thread between Strauss’s “Comments” and his final 
response to Schmitt in The City and Man.18  
 
2. Strauss’s and Schmitt’s Art of Writing 
 
In the 1930s, Strauss had turned to the writings of Thomas Hobbes, because, “Hobbes’s 
political philosophy is the first peculiarly modern attempt to give a coherent and 
exhaustive answer to the question of man’s right life, which is at the same time the 
question of the right order of society”. 19  It was while pursuing his interest in Hobbes 
that he became interested in Schmitt’s ideas on Hobbes.  In his 1965 “Preface” to the 
German translation of his 1936 Hobbes book, Strauss reminds readers that Schmitt had 
stated in The Concept of the Political: 
 
“. . . that Hobbes is ‘by far the greatest and perhaps the 
only truly systematic political thinker’.  Schmitt’s 
judgment about the greatness and the significance of 
Hobbes, a judgment which corresponded to my feelings or 
taste at that time, strengthened, understandably, my 
interest in Hobbes”.20  
 
                                                 
18 Ibid., pp. 1 - 3.  Strauss’s emphasis. 
19 Strauss, Leo, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes – Its Basis and Its Genesis , Sinclair, Elsa M., trans., 
op. cit., p. 1. 
20 Strauss, Leo, “Preface to Hobbes Politische Wissenschaft” in Strauss, Leo, Jewish Philosophy and the 
Crisis of Modernity, Green, Kenneth Hart, editor, op. cit., p. 453. 
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It was through Hobbes, and his reading of mediaeval political philosophy, that Strauss 
deepened his understanding of Hobbes’s teachers, Aristotle, Plato and Thucydides.  In 
reading the political works of those authors as the authors understood themselves, 
Strauss concluded that they used a peculiar form of writing that was designed to say one 
thing to some readers and another thing to others.  Strauss called this the art of esoteric 
writing.  Esoteric writing simple means the art of writing between the lines, or using 
various techniques to hide one’s true thought on an issue.  In his book, Persecution and 
the Art of Writing, Strauss argues that esotericism “is based on the assumption that 
there is a rigid division of mankind into an inspired or intelligent minority and an 
uninspired or foolish majority”. 21  Strauss outlines some of the techniques used to 
attract those inspired readers.  They include: contradictions, the use of structured 
chapters, omissions of something crucial to an argument, intentional sophisms and 
ironical statements, the importance of passages found in the centre of chapters, or 
books, “blunders” that are intentional, but would “shame an intelligent school boy”, and 
a hidden structure of a book.22  According to Strauss, those books that contained such 
techniques were written to attract “young men who might become philosophers”.  
Strauss thought that the art of reading and writing was linked to the art of thinking, or 
the philosophic life.  Thus, the art of writing, for Strauss, was connected to the question 
of the political, or the best way of life for the wise.  This thesis demonstrates that Strauss 
uses some of those techniques of writing to disguise the fact that he is responding to 
Carl Schmitt throughout much of The City and Man.23 
 
Some commentators on Strauss’s works have demonstrated that he does not reveal 
everything he knows to the general public and that he is a prudent writer.  Larry 
                                                 
21 Strauss, Leo, Persecution and the Art of Writing, The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, U.S.A., 1952, p. 59. 
22 Ibid., pp. 25, 30, 36, 74 & 75. 
23 Ibid., p. 36.  
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Peterman demonstrates that Strauss’s book, Thoughts on Machiavelli, is very carefully 
written, noticing the author’s careful arrangement of his chapters and crucial omissions 
of details from Machiavelli’s books that require explanation, or what he lists as 
Strauss’s “numerological patterns, garbled quotations, pregnant silences, [and] 
deliberate self-contradictions”.  Peterman’s explanation for Strauss’s literary style is 
that it serves “an educational purpose”.  Peterman argues that Strauss’s literary style is 
the connection between the political and the “purely theoretical”, meaning that Strauss 
recognizes the importance of orthodoxy and the unsettling tendency of philosophic 
(theoretical) investigation.  This thesis demonstrates that The City and Man is a 
carefully written book, which is structured as a reply to Schmitt.  Strauss divides some 
of the sections, in chapter one, using an obscure method that has been overlooked by 
some scholars, while he uses a book title and favourite Schmittean words to highlight 
that he is responding to Schmitt’s arguments.  In dividing his book into seventeen 
sections, Strauss has the reader reflect on the use of that number and how its use might 
contribute to the theme of his reply to Schmitt’s concept of the political.24 
 
Strauss knew that the number seventeen represented “nature” for the mediaeval 
philosopher, Maimonides, suggesting that Strauss’s purpose in providing seventeen 
divisions in The City and Man was to highlight “nature” as his fundamental alternative 
to Schmitt’s concept of the political as destiny.25  Strauss had warned readers of 
philosophic writings that they must look to the individual texts for instruction on how 
the book must be read.26  It is no accident that Strauss dedicates a whole section to the 
                                                 
24 Peterman, Larry, “Approaching Leo Strauss: Some Comments on Thoughts on Machiavelli”, The 
Political Science Reviewer, vol. 16, Fall 1986, pp. 322 & 324. 
25 Strauss, Leo, Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy, University of Chicago Press, U.S.A., 1983, p. 
223. 
26 Strauss, Leo, “How to Begin to Study The Guide of the Perplexed”, in Maimonides, Moses, The Guide 
of the Perplexed, Vol. 1, Pines, Shlomo, trans., University of Chicago Press, U.S.A., 1974, p. xxx.   
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art of writing and reading in The City and Man, allocating thirteen paragraphs in his 
sixth division, “On Plato’s Republic”, to the issue of how to read a Platonic dialogue.  
Strauss also devotes much of the longest chapter – the third chapter of The City and 
Man – to the question of how to read Thucydides’s history.  Strauss’s art of writing, 
which he uses in his “Comments”, and in The City and Man, is central to discovering 
his response to Schmitt.27 
 
Seth Benardete provides the only guide to Strauss’s technique of writing in The City 
and Man, arguing that Strauss has carefully written and structured the book.  He warns 
of Strauss’s irony that is always “incompatible with science”, but “at home in political 
philosophy”. 28  This is significant because Strauss dedicates the beginning of his second 
chapter, “On Plato’s Republic”, to a discussion regarding the use of irony in works that 
are dedicated to one or two readers.29  Benardete also provides one hint for readers of 
Strauss’s The City and Man in the form of a quotation from Strauss’s Thoughts on 
Machiavelli, calling it a “golden sentence”.  It reads, “The problem inherent in the 
surface of things, and only in the surface of things, is the heart of things (Thoughts on 
Machiavelli, p. 13)”.  Benardete’s point is that Strauss’s hidden messages can be found 
in the surface meaning of the words that appear in the text.30   
 
It was the German scholar, Heinrich Meier, who first explored Strauss’s hidden 
dialogue with Schmitt.  He argues that Schmitt responded to Strauss’s criticism, after 
Strauss had read Schmitt’s 1927 edition of The Concept of the Political, by making 
numerous changes to subsequent editions.  Meier lists a number of changes, ranging 
                                                 
27 See Appendix 1 for a complete summary of Strauss’s 17 divisions of his book. 
28 Benardete, Seth, “Leo Strauss’ The City and Man”, The American Political Science Reviewer, vol. 8, 
Fall 1978, pp. 2 & 5. 
29 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., pp. 51 – 53. 
30 Benardete, Seth, “Leo Strauss’ The City and Man”, op. cit., p. 1.   
  
 
14
from a restatement on Hobbes to deleting inverted commas around key words.  These 
changes did not include any footnotes referring to Strauss.  Schmitt continued to make 
changes after Strauss’s “Comments” appeared in 1932, culminating in the third edition 
of The Concept of the Political, published in 1933.31  Having joined the Nazi Party in 
1933, Schmitt could not afford to recognize Strauss’s improvements to his concept of 
the political, given that Strauss was a Jew.  In recognizing Meier’s work on the hidden 
dialogue between Strauss and Schmitt, this thesis builds upon that scholarship by 
continuing the investigation into Strauss’s response to Schmitt’s definition of the 
political, that eventually takes the form of Strauss’s 1964 “theologico-political treatise”, 
The City and Man.   
 
Meier also demonstrates that Schmitt knew how to read Strauss and took note of 
Strauss’s suggestions from the “Comments”. 32  There is also evidence that Schmitt 
knew how to write and read extremely carefully, providing evidence that Strauss 
suspected that Schmitt would  read, and understand the purpose of, The City and Man.  
Ernst Hüsmert and Piet Tommissen suggest that Schmitt was an accomplished satirical 
writer, who wrote poems under the pseudonym of “Erich Strauss”, or sometimes, “Erich 
Strauß”.  Schmitt borrowed the Christian name, “Erich”, from his former Bonn 
University colleague, Erich Kaufmann, and used Leo Strauss’s surname.  In writing 
such poems, it could be interpreted that Schmitt hoped that Strauss would respond to his 
overtures of friendship, and forgive him for his 1933 mistake.  Nevertheless, there is no 
                                                 
31 Meier, Heinrich, Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss – The Hidden Dialogue, Lomax, Harvey J., trans., op. 
cit., pp. 17 & 18. 
32 Ibid., pp. 61 & 62 (footnote 64). 
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evidence that Strauss read the poems, and even if he had read them, there is no evidence 
that he responded to them. 33 
 
3. The Six Criteria Discovered 
 
In demonstrating that Strauss responds to Carl Schmitt in The City and Man, this thesis 
investigates three works: Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political, Strauss’s “Comments” 
on Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political and The City and Man.  All three are linked to 
Strauss’s understanding of the theologico-political problem and Strauss’s transcendence 
of the political through his interpretation of the best regime.  Strauss agrees with some 
of Schmitt’s arguments on the political in The Concept of the Political, but more 
importantly, he outlines six criteria that he sees in Schmitt’s book that must be satisfied 
for the successful recovery of the political.  In demonstrating that there is evidence that 
Strauss is referring to Schmitt in The City and Man, it is necessary to identify a 
connection between that book and Strauss’s “Comments” on Schmitt’s work, The 
Concept of the Political.  In the “Comments”, Strauss outlines the criteria as: 1) one 
must affirm the political in recognizing the “dangerousness of man” as the “ultimate 
presupposition of the position of the political”.  This means that human beings must be 
demonstrated as being “evil”, in terms of “moral baseness”, and therefore in need of 
government (rule);34  2) The political requires “a concrete opposition”, i.e. it 
                                                 
33 Tommissen, Piet, “ Über die satirischen Texte Carl Schmitts”, Beismann, Volker & Klein, Markus 
Josef, editors, Politische Lageanalyse - Festschrift für Hans-Joachim Arndt zum 70. Geburstag am 15. 
Januar 1993, San Casciano Verlag, Germany, 1993, pp. 339 – 380.  See Kiesel, Helmuth, editor, Ernst 
Jünger - Carl Schmitt Briefe 1930-1983, Klett-Cotta Stuttgart, Germany, 1999, pp. 708 – 715.  See also 
Hüsmert, Ernst, Carl Schmitt Jugendbriefe – Briefschaften an seine Schwester Auguste 1905 bis 1913, 
Akademier Verlag, Berlin, Germany, 2000, pp. 369 – 374. 
34 Schmitt, Carl, The Concept of the Political, Schwab, George, trans., University of Chicago Press, 
U.S.A., 1996, pp. 58 – 61, 64 & 65.  Although I keep my summary of Strauss’s criteria, I footnote where 
the same criteria appear in Schmitt’s book.  See also Strauss’s “Comments”, pp. 105 – 107, 108 – 111. 
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presupposes the “dire emergency” (“Ernstfall”), or “the potential for war”; 35  3) The 
political, when expressed as “decision”, must have “the character of transprivate 
obligation”, meaning a public obligation, which is “removed from all arbitrary, private 
discretion”.  It cannot be neutral; 36  4) It follows that this decision has a content that is 
decisive and not neutral in determining who is a friend and who is an enemy;37  5) The 
political presupposes the existence of “the quarrel over the right faith”, or the battle 
concerning “what is right”38 and  6) The political must articulate “the order of human 
things from a pure and whole knowledge”. 39  For convenience these six criteria can be 
listed as: (i) Evil, (ii) Ernstfall, (iii) Decision, (iv) Content, (v) Right and (vi) Order.  
Since Strauss’s works are often cryptic, it is necessary to interpret his summary of the 
six criteria for the affirmation of the political. 
 
(i) Evil 
 
In turning to the first criterion, the necessity of moral evil, Strauss argues that the 
Socratics: Plato, Aristotle and Xenophon were very aware of the dangerousness of 
human beings (the natural acquisitiveness of human beings) that Machiavelli, Hobbes 
and Locke took as the foundation of their respective political doctrines.40  In agreement 
with Schmitt, Strauss accepts the overall goodness of the presence of evil in the world, 
both in natural catastrophes and in human, moral weakness.41  However, he challenges 
                                                 
35 Ibid., pp. 26, 27, 33 & 35.  Cf. “Comments” pp. 96, 97 & 116.  Strauss’s emphasis. 
36 Ibid., pp. 28, 29, 67 & 68.  Cf. “Comments” pp. 116 - 118.  Strauss’s emphasis. 
37 Ibid., pp. 65, 67 & 68.  Cf. “Comments” pp. 99 & 113. 
38 Ibid., pp. 65, 67 & 68.  Cf.  “Comments” pp. 114 & 118. 
39 Ibid., pp. 1, 37 & 67.  Cf. “Comments” pp. 91, 115 & 119.  Strauss’s emphasis. 
40 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., pp. 17, 23 & 88. 
41 In Strauss, Leo, Thoughts on Machiavelli , University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Edition, U.S.A., 1978, 
p. 299, Strauss states, “the opinion that there occur periodic cataclysms in fact took care of any 
apprehension regarding an excessive development of technology or regarding the danger that man’s 
inventions might become his masters and destroyers.  Viewed in this light, the natural cataclysms appear 
as a manifestation of the beneficence of nature”. 
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Schmitt’s requirement that the exception must be based on Original Sin, or what 
Schmitt saw as the universal presence of evil.  In accepting the Platonic idea of human 
evil, but in remaining silent regarding the necessity of Original Sin, Strauss argues that 
the best regime is possible for individual human beings, who perfect their reason and 
become good individuals, whether as philosophers or noble and good people (“hoi 
kaloikagathoi - hoi aristoi”).   
 
In contrast to Schmitt’s emphasis on the exception as evil, Strauss’s definition of the 
political emphasizes both good and bad, especially the goodness of the political 
philosopher, as well as the idea of the good that is the goal of the best regime and the 
goodness of friendship that exists among noble and good people (“hoi kaloikagathoi - 
hoi aristoi”).  In opposing Schmitt, Strauss argues that in Plato’s opinion, “the cessation 
of evil” requires the rule of philosophers as kings rather than the hope of the divine 
intervention of a god or gods.  However, Strauss is adamant that philosophers will never 
rule their societies, thus admitting that evil will be a constant factor in political life.42  In 
The City and Man, Strauss does not take up a discussion concerning the possibility of 
miracles, preferring to rely on Plato’s conclusion that chance and nature play important 
roles in determining outcomes.  He does so because nature and chance provide a better 
guide to political life than either biblical faith, or the belief in miracles.43   
 
In drawing attention to Schmitt’s concept of the political, Strauss is grateful for 
Schmitt’s recovery of Hobbes’s “state of nature”.  For Strauss, it was Schmitt who 
provided a window into the Greek understanding of nature through Hobbes’s “state of 
nature”, or what Strauss calls, “the secret, humble beginning, to undamaged, noncorrupt 
                                                 
42 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., pp. 122 - 124. 
43 Ibid., pp. 117, 122 – 129. 
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nature” that distinguishes between good and bad.  Strauss had praised Schmitt for 
recovering the importance of “the state of nature” for the study of politics.  Strauss uses 
“the state of nature”, as a means to return to the Greek idea of nature that provides a 
timeless, universal standard.  In this way, Strauss uses nature, defined as “a pure and 
whole knowledge”, as his alternative to Schmitt’s concept of the political that highlights 
the potential conflict among friends and enemies, based on warring faiths.  Strauss 
argues that he challenges Schmitt’s interpretation of an historical providence, defined as 
destiny, by providing an alternative universalism that includes the distinction between 
good and evil.  In this way, the thesis demonstrates the importance, and significance, of 
Schmitt’s affirmation of the political as Hobbes’s “state of nature” and how “the state of 
nature” is connected to the evil nature of human beings.44 
 
(ii) Ernstfall 
 
In the second criterion, Strauss attempts to satisfy Schmitt’s extreme situation, where 
potential war and opposition call for a response that Schmitt calls the “dire emergency” 
or “Ernstfall”.  Schmitt argues that groups, or nations, are always in the extreme 
situation, or Ernstfall.  In replying to Schmitt, Strauss asserts that Schmitt remains 
“trapped in the liberal system”, because he does not argue that there is only one true end 
worth fighting for.  In following liberalism, Schmitt denies that nature points to only 
one end, or perfection, for all human beings.  In dismissing ends as the result of mere 
belief, Schmitt makes potential fighting an end in itself, causing Strauss to conclude that 
Schmitt's criterion only stresses fighting as such, and not what is being fought for.  In 
contrast, in The City and Man, Strauss presents reasons why the Spartans went to war 
                                                 
44 Strauss, Leo, “Notes on Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political”, in Meier, Heinrich, Carl Schmitt 
and Leo Strauss – The Hidden Dialogue, Lomax, Harvey J., trans., op. cit., pp. 99, 115 & 119. 
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with the Athenians, while he has Socrates’s warrior class, in Plato’s Republic, fight for 
the best regime against potential invaders.  According to Strauss, by following the 
liberalism that he criticizes, Schmitt falls into contradiction and confusion that is best 
seen in Strauss’s example highlighting the absurdity of Schmitt’s concept of the 
political as mere fighting.  In defending the political as orientated to a potential fight, 
Strauss demonstrates that Schmitt remains neutral on the issue of what is being fought 
over, arguing that Schmitt would then admire dangerousness for its own sake.  Strauss’s 
example, to refute Schmitt’s apparent neutrality, is the Roman general, Luscinus 
Fabricius, who, when informed by a Greek philosopher that pleasure was the greatest 
good, replied, “If only Pyrrhus and the Samnites shared this philosopher's opinion as 
long as we are at war with them!”.  Strauss’s point is that people do not fight for their 
own dangerousness, but for the sake of being rescued from danger and that peace is 
consequently superior to war.  Strauss’s solution to the requirement of the Ernstfall is to 
propose the best regime, where the philosopher, or the wise ruling under good laws, can 
recognize, and deal with, threats to the highest ends of the best society. 45 
 
(iii) Decision 
 
Criterion three means that the political must have a content that is expressed as a 
decision.  The decision needs to include “a transprivate obligation”, which means that 
the obligation must be a public one.  The decision must not be neutral and it must be 
made in the context of the Ernstfall, or dire emergency, that leads to potential war.  
Both Strauss and Schmitt suggest that a decision needs to be based on a commitment 
that transcends the personal views, or the tastes, of an individual, unless it is founded on 
                                                 
45 Ibid., p. 107. 
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an authority, such as divine right or natural right that claims to be universal and true.  In 
making a decision for a return to nature and the best regime that is not neutral, Strauss 
takes a position that creates “a concrete opposition” to Schmitt’s decision to rely on 
faith in God as the foundation of the political.  
 
(iv) Content 
 
In criterion four, Strauss and Schmitt define “content” as what the ruling class of a 
society looks up to, be it the divine right of kings, equality and freedom or nature.  Both 
thinkers argue that the most important decisions are founded on a content that is 
decisive and not neutral for a group, city or nation.  However, in turning to the regime, 
or what a community looks up to, such as honour, nature, the gods or God, Strauss 
subtly provides Schmitt with an order of things that can lead to the question regarding 
the best regime, founded on nature and knowledge.  In recovering the theoretical perfect 
regime, or best regime, that is according to nature, Strauss implies that one can then 
judge the content of any regime, particularly those that aim at tyranny. 
 
Harry Neumann is helpful in explaining Schmitt’s doctrine of nations battling over life 
and death issues, which arise from radically different ways of life.  Schmitt would have 
admired the war of content that took place in the battle of Verdun, in World War One, 
where the French and German armies were decidedly not neutral in determining the 
enemy and the friend concept.  Winston Churchill noted the stupidity and waste of lives 
in this battle, but few realized that it was the decisive battle of World War One.  In 
Schmittean terms, the battle represented two nations facing off in a desperate war that 
was between the French way of life and the German way of life, or The French 
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Republic opposed to the Prussian Monarchy.  According to Neumann, all the battles 
after Verdun, including those fought during World War Two, lacked the horrific 
intensity at Verdun.  Neumann’s Schmittean explanation is that France and Germany 
never recovered from the loss of troops at Verdun, explaining why each side refused to 
use tactics, or strategy, to avoid such carnage.  It was noticed by some, such as 
Churchill, that the Germans could have used Verdun troops in the East to defeat Russia 
first, but the battle between the French way of life and the German way of life remained 
more important than considered strategy. 46 
 
Although Schmitt might admire the moral dedication and seriousness that were 
demonstrated at Verdun, Strauss goes further in The City and Man, arguing that one can 
use a hierarchy of ends to judge such political action.  According to Strauss, the best 
way of life (“the best regime” based on nature) provides a standard, and content, to 
judge such political actions that represent battles of faith.  Strauss, with his emphasis on 
nature and the best regime, would agree that the battle of Verdun was a senseless waste 
and that both sides could have employed their troops more intelligently.  Even as an ex-
German, and an ex-Prussian, Strauss, in arguing for a rational standard of human rights 
(natural justice), would agree with Churchill that the worse regime was the Kaiser's, for 
making militarism the content for the decisionism that was a cause of World War One.47   
 
(v) Right 
 
In criterion five, Strauss rejects the modern expression “ideology” in the battle over 
what constitutes the right faith.  For both Strauss and Schmitt, ideology does not address 
                                                 
46 Neumann, Harry, Liberalism, Carolina Academic Press, U.S.A., 1991, pp. 291 – 295. 
47 Strauss, Leo, “German Nihilism”, Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy, vol. 26, no. 3, 
Spring 1999, especially pp. 362 & 363. 
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the issue of the battle over the right faith, or the right way of life.  Strauss addresses 
ideology in his “Introduction” of The City and Man.  According to Strauss, the word is 
convenient for social scientists, but it is a word associated with a particular view that all 
value systems are relative, except ideology itself.  Ideology, for Strauss, is not relative 
as it is the absolute standard that remains constant.  Strauss argues that its use may be 
limiting in truly understanding faiths, or contents, that claim to be the truth, since 
ideology already denies that any faith, or content, is the truth, except the implied true 
faith in the final truth of ideology.  Strauss’s objection to ideology is that it inhibits a 
serious search for truth, since those familiar with its meaning already know that all 
faiths are wrong, or not true.  Strauss uses it because it is a familiar term, but for 
Schmitt, it is an expression of our very forgetting of the political - as he defines it.  
Schmitt argues that ideology is “neutral” to any decision taken by a group because it 
denies the decisive content of faith – i.e. its perceived truth.  According to Schmitt and 
Strauss, it would be false to understand Britain and the United States fighting for an 
ideology in World War Two, especially since ideology holds that no way of life is 
superior to any other.  However, in transcending Schmitt’s historicism, Strauss argues 
that what constitutes the battle over what is right must be universal and apply to all 
places and to all times.  Strauss’s answer to the necessity of including “Right” takes the 
form of natural right, or natural justice, that is articulated in the best regime, and hence, 
in the best way of life.  The right way of life turns out to be contemplation, or 
philosophizing.  In returning to this standard of right, as seen through the eyes of the 
political philosopher, or noble and good rulers (“hoi kaloikagathoi - hoi aristoi”), 
Strauss argues that one can recognize, and minimize, the evils that befall modern states, 
especially the evil of militarism.  
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(vi) Order 
 
The key words in criterion six are “pure and whole knowledge” in articulating “the 
order of human things”.  Strauss’s immediate response to this criterion is that Schmitt 
cannot find the answer by turning to historicism, described as “concrete political 
existence”, or what Strauss calls “the situation of the age”. 48  Instead, Strauss calls for a 
return to original nature, demonstrating that Plato recognized that nature had provided 
two necessary parts to the soul, the idea of good and bad.49  In short, Strauss’s 
affirmation of morality is based on nature that allows for natural goodness, as opposed 
to Schmitt’s concept of the political that begins with the universal evil of all human 
beings, caused by Original Sin.  Thus, the key to Strauss’s “order” is that it is natural 
and includes the criterion of the “dangerousness of man” in terms of “moral baseness”, 
without having to fall back on biblical sin.  However, in rejecting Original Sin, but in 
accepting the possibility of natural evil, Strauss agrees with Schmitt that human nature 
does not change; hence, the propensity of human beings to disagree and fight among 
one another.  This explains Strauss’s heavy emphasis on Thucydides’s history of Greek 
warfare in The City and Man.  Yet, Schmitt denies nature and the possibility of human 
beings becoming good and self sufficient through their own efforts, because of his 
Christian belief in Original Sin.  The knowledge and order of the political, for Schmitt, 
is the battle of faiths, or in Schmitt’s own case, his acceptance of historical providence 
and biblical revelation.  In contrast, Strauss argues throughout his book, The City and 
Man, that Socrates spoke of good and evil, contrary to the other natural philosophers, 
                                                 
48 Strauss, Leo, “Notes on Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political”, in Meier, Heinrich, Carl Schmitt 
and Leo Strauss - The Hidden Dialogue, Lomax, Harvey J., trans., op. cit., p. 119.  
49 Plato, The Laws, Pangle, Thomas L., trans., Basic Books, U.S.A., 1980, p. 295, Book 10, 896e7.  
Plato’s Athenian Stranger tells Kleinias and Megillus that the soul is found in all things in motion and is 
represented by two things, the “good” and “another capable of doing the opposite”, i.e. the bad. 
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who saw no cosmological support for the political described as good and evil.  Strauss 
argues that Socrates agreed with the early philosophers that there was no cosmological 
support; however, in his new approach to philosophy, Strauss argues that Socrates 
examined the most authoritative opinions (pieties) and discovered that there was 
something in the soul, or in human nature, that was universal (divine).  According to 
Socrates, the nature of human beings was characterized by a possession of universal 
reason that pointed to a concern with the good and with justice.  This initially led to 
Socrates recognizing the conflicting answers to the best way of life, and hence to the 
question, which one is the best and represents the most reasonable order?  Since all 
claimed to be true, they raised the question of truth and the question regarding the best 
order.  Strauss argues that the claim of many regimes to be the right regime raises the 
question of the good and the best regime.  According to Socrates, the best regime has to 
be discovered by the use of reason, thus satisfying Schmitt’s criterion that it must be 
connected to knowledge, or rather a quest to know the whole.  In this way, the 
philosophic life, for Strauss, then becomes the order of the human things, defined as 
discussion, or dialectics.  Although Strauss stresses Socratic scepticism regarding the 
possession of “the truth”, he implies that his interpretation of Socratic political 
philosophy does not rule out the possibility that his interpretation of classical political 
science can recognize dysfunctional “faiths”, such as Nazism, Stalinism and other forms 
of modern tyranny.  
 
4. Strauss’s Silence on Schmitt 
 
Strauss rarely publicly responded to contemporary thinkers, the most notable exceptions 
being: Alexandre Kojève, Martian Heidegger and Carl Schmitt.  Strauss only openly, 
  
 
25
and publicly, responded to Schmitt in detail before he joined the Nazi Party in 1933.  
The fact that Schmitt was addressed in 1932 suggests that Strauss had good reason for 
publicly outlining Schmitt’s arguments regarding the political in the “Comments”.  
Until Schmitt’s entry into the Nazi Party in 1933, Schmitt and Strauss were on friendly 
terms.  Schmitt even helped Strauss secure a scholarship to leave Germany.  Both 
shared a deep interest in the political writings of Thomas Hobbes and political theology.  
However, after 1933, there is no evidence that Strauss communicated with Schmitt and 
only rarely does Strauss refer to him by name in his later writings.  One can easily 
speculate why Strauss – a Jew - refused to forgive Schmitt for his pro-Nazi writings and 
Nazi collaboration, because he must have felt bitterly betrayed.  Furthermore, most of 
Strauss’s Jewish family, and relatives, were murdered by the Nazi regime and Strauss 
himself was very lucky to have escaped their fate.  It was Schmitt’s recommendation of 
Strauss for a Rockefeller scholarship that contributed to preserving Strauss’s life.  When 
safely in the United States, in 1941, Strauss gave a seminar where he referred to writers, 
such as “Carl Schmitt”, who had unintentionally, or intentionally, undermined liberal 
democracy through their criticism of it and consequently had helped pave the way to 
German militarism and the rise of Hitler.50 
 
Although Strauss recognized the challenge of political theology, there are only five 
occasions where he mentions Schmitt by name after 1933.  The first was in a footnote in 
Strauss’s 1935 book, Philosophy and Law, indicating the “Comments” on Schmitt’s The 
Concept of the Political that focuses on the importance of the political. 51  The second 
appears in his chapter, “The New Morality”, in The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 
                                                 
50 Strauss, Leo, “German Nihilism”, op. cit., pp. 362, 372 & 373.  The first third of the seminar is 
addressed to Schmitt, given Strauss’s use of Schmittean terms such as “Ernstfall”. 
51 Strauss, Leo, Philosophy and Law - Contributions to the Understanding of Maimonides and His  
Predecessors, Adler, Eve, trans., State University of New York Press, U.S.A., 1995, p. 42. 
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published in 1936.  Using a footnote, Strauss calls attention to the “Comments” as an 
explanation regarding the reasons why the bourgeois have forgotten the terrors 
associated with Hobbes’s state of nature.52  The third took the form of an oral 
admonishment that Strauss did not publish.  Strauss argued in a graduate seminar, given 
in the United States on February 26th 1941, that, during the Weimar Republic, young 
students needed good teachers, who articulated their students’ youthful “aspirations” by 
using “positive” “language”, and not just “destructive” speeches.  In condemning 
Schmitt, Strauss states that the young “found such teachers in that group of professors 
and writers who knowingly or ignorantly paved the way for Hitler (Spengler, Moeller 
van den Bruck, Carl Schmitt, Alfred Bäumler, Ernst Jünger, [and] Heidegger)”.53  
Strauss’s fourth mention of Schmitt is found in Strauss’s new “Preface” to his 1965 
German publication, Hobbes Politisch Wissenschaft (The Political Philosophy of 
Hobbes).54  This took place one year after the publication of The City and Man.  
Strauss’s last mention of Schmitt appears again in 1965, in Strauss’s English translation 
of his Spinoza book, where he included his original 1932 “Comments” on Schmitt’s 
The Concept of the Political after the appendix.   
 
When Strauss did mention Schmitt’s name, it was mainly to distance himself from 
Schmitt.  In the new “Preface” of the German translation of his Hobbes book, Strauss 
argues that it was Julius Ebbinghaus’s discussion of Hobbes, in his 1922 lecture on “the 
Reformation and the Enlightenment”, that “caused” him “to take notice” of Hobbes.55  
                                                 
52 Strauss, Leo, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes – Its Basis and Its Genesis , Sinclair, Elsa M., trans., 
op. cit., p. 122. 
53 Strauss, Leo, “German Nihilism”, op. cit., p. 362. 
54 Strauss, Leo, Hobbes Politische Wissenschaft, Luchterhand, Hermann, Verlag, Neuwied am Rhein und 
Berlin, Germany, 1965.  The “Preface” is found in Strauss, Leo, Jewish Philosophy and the Crisis of 
Modernity, Green, Kenneth Hart, editor, op. cit., pp. 453 – 455. 
55 Ebbinghaus was a German lecturer at Freiburg, who introduced Strauss to the works of Thomas Hobbes 
in the summer of 1922. 
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Strauss’s purpose in mentioning Schmitt is to clarify the origins of his interest in 
Hobbes.  It was Ebbinghaus, and not Schmitt, who had shown Strauss Hobbes’s 
“originality” and “unconventional way” and how Hobbes’s teaching had become 
“vital”.  We learn that Strauss’s “study of Hobbes” began with his investigations into 
the supposed success of Spinoza’s seventeenth century “biblical criticism”.  Strauss 
states his relationship with Schmitt regarding their shared interest in Hobbes: 
 
“Carl Schmitt, in quite unconscious opposition to 
Ebbinghaus, asserted in his essay, ‘The Concept of the 
Political’ (‘Der Begriff des Politischen’ Archiv für 
Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 1927) that Hobbes is 
‘by far the greatest and perhaps the only truly systematic 
political thinker’.  Schmitt’s judgment about the greatness 
and the significance of Hobbes, a judgment which 
corresponded to my feelings or taste at that time, 
strengthened, understandably, my interest in Hobbes”. 56  
 
However, Strauss draws attention to his fundamental difference with Schmitt.  Strauss 
was not a Hobbesian, whereas, Strauss makes it clear from Schmitt’s use of the 
superlative that he thought Schmitt was a Hobbesian, although he indicates in his 
“Comments” that Schmitt did not fully understand Hobbes.  It also establishes that their 
association “at that time” was based on their shared “interest” in Hobbes’s “greatness” 
and Hobbes’s “significance”.  Still, Strauss admits that Schmitt’s judgement confirmed 
his earlier opinion concerning Hobbes’s work, demonstrating Strauss’s respect for 
                                                 
56 Strauss, Leo, Jewish Philosophy and the Crisis of Modernity, Green, Kenneth Hart, editor, op. cit., p. 
453. 
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Schmitt’s intellectual discernment regarding the significance of Hobbes at the time.  
Whereas Schmitt remained a Hobbesian of sorts, Strauss’s “fate” led him to England 
and gave him access to the sources of Hobbes’s political writings, in particular Plato’s, 
Aristotle’s and Thucydides’s political works, which became the foundation of The City 
and Man.57   
 
In the same “Preface”, Strauss announces his philosophic interest in theology that 
turned him to “true politics”, again confirming his 1934 footnote about the “theologico-
political” theme of his later investigations.  By “true politics”, Strauss means returning 
to what is first for us, or the authoritative opinions that form the moralities of societies 
and their claims of being the best way of life.  This explains why he says that he “did 
not write about Hobbes as a Hobbesian”.  Strauss gives two reasons for this, one stated, 
the other obscure: the first is that Hobbes’s “famous clarity is limited to his conclusion, 
while his presuppositions are shrouded in obscurity” and secondly, Strauss indicates 
that one should read Kant’s original quotation (see below) that Strauss uses in speaking 
of “true politics”.  In drawing attention to Hobbes’s obscure premises, Strauss implies 
that Schmitt’s works are those where the “presuppositions are shrouded in obscurity”.58  
Strauss confirms this observation in his “Comments” on Schmitt’s book, The Concept 
of the Political, by exposing Schmitt’s hidden premises and judgements.  However, 
Strauss’s reference to Kant’s statement regarding “true politics” is puzzling, given that 
Strauss is not a Kantian. 
 
The expression, “true politics”, comes from Kant’s Perpetual Peace, which states:  
 
                                                 
57 Ibid., pp. 453 & 454. 
58 Ibid., p. 454.   
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“Thus true politics can never take a step without rendering 
homage to morality.  Though politics by itself is a difficult 
art, its union with morality is no art at all, for this union 
cuts the knot which politics could not untie when they 
were in conflict.  The rights of men must be held sacred, 
however much sacrifice it may cost the ruling power”. 59   
 
In reading Kant, Strauss’s point is that morality and politics should be inseparable, but 
more importantly, Strauss implies that morality must include natural right, or justice, if 
it is to be the true morality.  However, unlike Kant, Strauss understands “true politics” 
to be truly just (moral) because it is based on nature that can be located at all times and 
in all places.  Nature replaces the “sacred”. 60  This is why he returns to the best regime, 
in The City and Man, that is not only the best way of life, but also the most just way of 
life.  This contrasts with Schmitt’s political theology that does not recognize natural 
right as essential for the recovery of the political.  Strauss implies from Kant that 
avoiding the moral, or justice, leads to political instability and disaster.  Furthermore, in 
linking morality to “true politics”, Strauss indicates how “true politics”, or what he calls 
the political, is discovered.  Morality, or the sacred opinion of society, is where Strauss 
begins his investigation of the best way of life, described as the best regime that is 
according to nature.  Strauss argues that the political philosopher must begin with the 
most sacred opinions of society in order to discover the best regime.  Hence, for Strauss, 
“true politics” is linked to the best regime that includes the most moral way of life – the 
philosophic life.  Thus, Strauss demonstrates to the reader the importance of political 
philosophy that is linked to morality and right.  The implication, for Strauss, is that, had 
                                                 
59 Kant, Immanuel, On History, Beck, Lewis White, editor, Beck, Lewis White & Anchor, Robert E., 
trans., Bobbs-Merrill, U.S.A., 1963, p. 128. 
60 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., pp. 5 & 7. 
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Schmitt accepted this connection between politics and right, particularly Strauss’s 
interpretation of natural right that is synonymous with the best regime, he would never 
have joined the Nazi regime in 1933 and supported a regime that abused “the rights of 
men”.  
 
Apart from these exceptions, further evidence that Strauss did not mention Schmitt’s 
name, while presenting his arguments, is found in Strauss’s semi-autobiographical 
“Preface” to his Spinoza book, written in 1962.  Strauss begins the paragraph that 
contains a quotation from Schmitt arguing, “It is safer to try to understand the low in the 
light of the high than the high in the light of the low”.  By this, Strauss means that the 
“latter one necessarily distorts the high, whereas in doing the former one does not 
deprive the low of the freedom to reveal itself fully as what it is”.  Strauss then explains 
that the Weimar Republic was inspired by classical German thought, not all of which 
supported liberal democracy.  Strauss argues that Hegel’s Philosophy of Right provided 
Germany with a constitutional monarchy, based on “the rights of man”.  It is within the 
context of mentioning Hegel and that “the government is in the hands of highly 
educated civil servants appointed by an hereditary king” that Strauss states, “It has been 
said, not without reason, that Hege l’s rule over Germany came to an end only on the day 
Hitler came to power”.  The author of that statement is Carl Schmitt, but Strauss chose 
not to mention his name.61  In refusing to use Schmitt’s name, Strauss directs our 
attention to his argument, and not to his historical role as a former Nazi, and Catholic 
Christian, thus avoiding any prejudice that might accompany the argument.  Strauss 
does this by adding the conjunction, “But”, after Schmitt’s statement, arguing that 
Rousseau was responsible for Hege l’s philosophy.  Hence, Strauss criticizes Schmitt’s 
                                                 
61 The statement is found in Schmitt, Carl, Staat, Bewegung Volk: Die Dreigliederung der Politischen 
Einheit, Hanseatische, Derlagsanstalt, Hamburg, Germany, 1935, pp. 31 & 32.   
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statement by presenting his interpretation of the philosophical and political forces that 
were the cause of the failure of Weimar.  Strauss argues that it was Rousseau who 
“prepared” classical German philosophy, particularly German romanticism, which was 
“that extreme reaction to the French Revolution”.  In answering why Hitler came to 
power, Strauss goes back to the Holy Roman Empire and the “humiliation” that 
Germany felt when it was deprived of that Empire in 1806.  It was the German longing 
for a return of the middle ages that “pointed towards a third Reich”, according to 
Strauss, noting that Catholic Christianity “was the bond of society” of the Mediaeval 
Reich.  Strauss then reminds readers, “The action most characteristic of the middle ages 
is the Crusades”, which ended “in the murder of whole Jewish communities”.  He also 
says that the Weimar Republic gave political rights to the Jews for the first time.62  
Here, Strauss warns Schmitt that a return to the political, defined as conflicting faiths, 
has a devastating effect on minority groups that also base their legitimacy on revelation.  
Given Schmitt’s desire to see faith become the bond of German society, it appears that 
Strauss is still responding to Schmitt’s political theology outlined in The Concept of the 
Political.63 
 
As early as 1935, Strauss had connected the political with religion.  In indicating the 
relationship religion and the political had with culture, Strauss mentions Schmitt, even 
though Strauss knew that Schmitt was a member of the Nazi Party.  However, Strauss 
relegates Schmitt’s name to a footnote at the beginning of chapter one in his 1935 book, 
Philosophy and Law, showing how he will eventually address the issue of the political.  
In the body of the text, Strauss argues that religion is “one crux of philosophy of 
                                                 
62 Strauss, Leo, Spinoza's Critique of Religion, Sinclair, E. M., trans., Schocken Books Inc., New York, 
U.S.A., 1965, p. 2.  Strauss also points out that the German longing for the Middle Ages was linked to 
“the Holy Roman Empire ruled by a German” – p. 2. 
63 Schmitt, Carl, The Concept of the Political, Schwab, George, trans., op. cit., pp. 29, 65, 67 & 68.  These 
issues will be demonstrated in chapter three. 
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culture”,64 but Strauss chose to keep the other “crux” (“the political”) in his second 
footnote, rather than in the body of the text.  He states:  
 
“The other crux of philosophy of culture is the fact of the 
political (cf. my “Anmerkungen zu Carl Schmitt, Der 
Begriff des Politischen”, . . .) If ‘religion’ and ‘politics’ 
are the facts that transcend ‘culture’, or, to speak more 
precisely, the original facts, then the radical critique of the 
concept of ‘culture’ is possible only in the form of a 
‘theologico-political treatise’, - which of course, if it is not 
to lead back again to the foundation of ‘culture’, must take 
exactly the opposite direction from the theologico-political 
treatises of the seventeenth century, especially those of 
Hobbes and Spinoza.  The first condition for this would 
be, of course, that these seventeenth-century works no 
longer be understood, as they almost always have been up 
to now, within the horizon of philosophy of culture”. 65 
 
In agreement with Schmitt, Strauss argues that religion and politics have been replaced 
by the unity of culture that has obscured the tension between them.  Strauss suggests 
that his first task was to understand the “theologico-political treatises” of Spinoza and 
Hobbes, not from the viewpoint of “culture”, but as political works.  In Philosophy and 
Law, Strauss already shows his answer to the political question regarding the best way 
                                                 
64 Strauss, Leo, Philosophy and Law - Contributions to the Understanding of Maimonides and His 
Predecessors, Adler, Eve, trans., op. cit., p. 42. 
65 Ibid., footnote “2”, p. 138.  Strauss’s emphasis .  Notice that Strauss mentions Schmitt’s name as the 
author of The Concept of the Political following the first sentence of the quotation, only because 
Schmitt’s name appears in the title of Strauss’s “Comments” (“Anmerkungen”). 
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of life.  He argues that Aristotle and Plato agree that “the specific perfection of man 
consists in pure contemplation and understanding”, the very thing he fully demonstrates 
in The City and Man.66  
 
5. The Significance of the Thesis 
 
While many commentators on Schmitt and Strauss have written about their differences 
and similarities regarding the political, no one has demonstrated that Strauss’s book, 
The City and Man, is a reply to Schmitt’s concept of the political.  This is because 
scholars have overlooked the six criteria that Strauss outlines for the successful recovery 
of the political, as well as underestimating Strauss’s art of writing.  In discovering 
Strauss’s art of writing and in examining the structure of The City and Man, this thesis 
demonstrates that Strauss’s book is a considered reply to Schmitt.   
 
Furthermore, few commentators have discovered the partial agreement that both 
thinkers have on the friend and the enemy concept in Strauss’s The City and Man.67  No 
one has discovered that Schmitt takes his definition of the political, i.e. the friend and 
enemy problem, from Book One of Plato’s Republic and that Strauss partly agrees that 
Schmitt’s definition of the division between friend and enemy is characteristic of 
political life.  In The Concept of the Political, Schmitt reduces the political to the 
conflict between friend and enemy, borrowing from Polemarchus’s definition of justice.  
Socrates refutes three definitions of justice in the Republic: giving back what is owed 
(Cephalus’s definition), helping friends and harming enemies (Polemarchus’s 
definition) and justice as the advantage of the stronger (Thrasymachus’s definition).  
                                                 
66 Ibid., p. 132. 
67 Shadia B. Drury is one writer who does see the connection.  See Drury, Shadia B., Leo Strauss and the 
American Right, St. Martin’s Press, N.Y., U.S.A., 1997, pp. 87 – 96. 
  
 
34
Although Strauss admits, in The City and Man, that the Socratic best city will have 
external enemies, he notes that Socrates refutes Polemarchus’s (practical) definition of 
justice as helping friends and harming enemies.  In transcending Schmitt’s friend and 
enemy concept, and in finally defining justice, Strauss makes it clear that Socrates 
argues that the philosopher harms no one.  Yet, it must be remembered that Strauss’s 
presentation of Plato’s best regime transcends the world of politics that we experience.  
It is found only in speech, and only in the speeches of a few people, like Plato, 
Thucydides and Aristotle, who understood it.  However, in the context of existing cities, 
Strauss clearly argues that the political problem cannot be solved in any final way for 
those cities, without a transcendence of the political through philosophy.  As Strauss 
points out, cities cannot philosophize, or become philosopher cities.  There is no 
transcendence for the cities or nations.  In terms of Schmitt’s emphasis on groups, the 
only group that is able to transcend politics is a group of philosophers.  Thus, on the 
political level, as found in the first Book of Plato’s Republic, Strauss agrees with 
Schmitt that the division between friend and enemy is natural.  This is why Strauss 
indicates that only Polemarchus’s definition, of helping friends and harming enemies, is 
included in Socrates’s perfect city that is described as the city ruled by philosopher-
kings.  Furthermore, according to Strauss, evil is a part of human nature, and 
consequently cities, or nations, are bound to clash over boundaries or other interests.  
Thus, Strauss’s partial agreement, and fundamental disagreement, with Schmitt, 
motivates Strauss to continue his response to Schmitt’s concept of the political.68   
 
The reason many commentators fail to see Strauss’s response to Schmitt is because 
Strauss is rarely read in the same manner that he outlines in his suggestions on how to 
                                                 
68 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., pp. 11 & 12, 70 – 73. 
  
 
35
read significant books on political theory.  The fact that Strauss dedicates an entire sixth 
division of The City and Man to the art of reading and writing, as well as concentrating 
on how Thucydides wrote his history, suggests that The City and Man requires a careful 
reading.  In this book, that takes the form of a “theologico-political treatise”, Strauss 
outlines the importance of “the literary question” as: 
 
“One must postpone one’s concern with the most serious 
questions (the philosophic questions) in order to become 
engrossed in the study of a merely literary question.  Still, 
there is a connection between the literary question and the 
philosophic question.  The literary question, the question 
of presentation, is concerned with a kind of 
communication.  Communication may be a means for 
living together; in its highest form, communication is 
living together.  The study of the literary question is 
therefore an important part of the study of society . . . The 
literary question properly understood is the question of the 
relation between society and philosophy”. 69 
 
The expression, “the relation between society and philosophy”, is similar to the title of 
The City and Man.  According to Strauss, the city is the home of stability through the 
belief in the gods, or cherished opinions, whereas, “philosophy is subversive” and is 
“transpolitical, transreligious and transmoral, but the city is and ought to be moral and 
religious”.  In choosing his title carefully, Strauss indicates that the literary question is 
                                                 
69 Ibid., p. 52.  Strauss’s  emphasis. 
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connected to the political and theological problem.  Strauss’s caution in writing is 
through his realization that very few people are able to live the philosophic life – a life 
that includes questioning the revered opinions of the community.70   
 
In The City and Man, Strauss outlines his definition of  “good writing”.  He states: 
 
“But ‘good writing’ is only the genus of which the 
Platonic dialogue is a species.  The model for the good 
writing is the good conversation . . . If the good writing 
must imitate the good conversation, it would seem that it 
must be addressed primarily to one or more men known to 
the author”.71   
 
Since Strauss knows exactly what constitutes “good writing”, and given that he 
carefully structures his book, he can address The City and Man to Schmitt as well as to 
the general reader.  Therefore, Strauss indicates that reading his books requires the same 
concentration that Socrates taught in the Phaedrus, where Strauss recalls the art of 
“good writing” as that which complies with “logographic necessity”, or what he defines 
as recognizing that “every part of the written speech must be necessary for the whole”.  
This means that every detail in some philosophic books has been chosen carefully.  
Strauss argues that good writers do this in order “to talk to some readers and to be silent 
to others”.  This is another reason why he specifically addresses Schmitt’s arguments, 
while refusing to mention him by name in The City and Man.72 
                                                 
70 Strauss, Leo, “A Giving of Accounts: Jacob Klein and Leo Strauss”, in Strauss, Leo, Jewish Philosophy 
and the Crisis of Modernity, Green, Kenneth Hart, editor, op. cit., p. 463. 
71 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., p. 54.  
72 Ibid., pp. 53, 54 & 60. 
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6. The Structure of the Thesis 
 
The thesis comprises nine chapters and includes an Appendix that outlines Strauss’s 
structure of The City and Man.  As an introduction, Chapter One  outlines the 
objectives of the thesis in relation to the structure, and art of writing, that Strauss uses in 
The City and Man, as well as outlining the six criteria that must be satisfied, if the 
political is to be successfully recovered.  
 
Chapter Two investigates the relevant literature concerning Strauss’s relationship with 
Schmitt under the headings: “The Political as Propaganda”, “The Political as History”, 
“The Political as Religion” and “The Political as Knowledge”.  These categories were 
chosen because they illuminate the various theoretical perspectives that commentators 
have used in linking Strauss and Schmitt.  Although all commentators do add useful 
insights on how to read Strauss, most have missed Strauss’s post 1933 response to 
Schmitt’s concept of the political.  Nearly all of them have overlooked the importance 
of the structure and Strauss’s art of writing, in The City and Man, which provide crucial 
evidence that Strauss is addressing Schmitt’s arguments concerning the political.   
 
Chapter Three outlines Schmitt’s arguments relating to the recovery of the political 
found in The Concept of the Political.  These arguments can be divided into six criteria 
that are essential for the recovery of the political.  This chapter attempts to elucidate 
Schmitt’s reliance on Plato and Hobbes for his definition of the political as the conflict 
between friend and enemy and his rediscovery of “one’s own form of existence” that is 
similar to the regime, or way of life.  In drawing attention to political theologians, and 
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Original Sin, together with his discussion of Oliver Cromwell’s divine faith, Schmitt 
outlines the essence of the political defined as the potential conflict over differing faiths.  
This also includes an argument supporting the case that Schmitt accepted Original Sin 
as the foundation of his return to political theology, which understands human beings as 
morally evil, rather than merely dangerous like amoral animals.  The chapter also 
demonstrates Schmitt’s preference for historical providence, referred to as “destiny”.  In 
turning to history, Schmitt believes that any natural transcendence of the political is 
impossible as changing events determine the content of the political.  This means, for 
Schmitt, that in the final analysis, nothing can escape the political, defined as the 
potential for conflict. 
 
Chapter Four outlines Strauss’s interpretation of Schmitt’s recovery of the political 
under the same six criteria that Schmitt outlines in his book, The Concept of the 
Political.  This chapter demonstrates that Strauss understood Schmitt’s political 
theology as the basis of the political, but chose to rely on Plato’s political philosophy as 
a guide to political action.  It demonstrates that Strauss knew, in 1932, that his answer to 
Schmitt must take the form of a “theologico-political treatise” that recognized the 
centrality of the question who, or what, should rule.  Strauss shows, in his “Comments”, 
that the key to Schmitt’s complaint against non-political liberalism pointed in the 
direction of the founder of liberalism, Thomas Hobbes, and the importance of Hobbes’s 
doctrine of “the state of nature”.   
 
Chapter Five examines Strauss’s “Introduction” where he defends political philosophy 
as a reasonable alternative to ideology and the history of political philosophy.  It shows 
how Strauss also outlines the problems associated with a return to political philosophy, 
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particularly in having to address the concept of culture, as defined in the plural.  In 
recognizing the structure of the first chapter on Aristotle in The City and Man, this 
chapter demonstrates that Strauss raises the issue of culture as religion, or conflicting 
faiths, and is able to continue his response to Schmitt in presenting Aristotle’s 
discussion of regimes within the context of political philosophy.  Chapter five outlines 
Strauss’s structure of The City and Man, which includes seventeen divisions that use 
sub-titles and a full stop and a dash to indicate those divisions.  Discovering Strauss’s 
divisions aids in understanding the themes that Strauss introduces, such as the theme of 
the city and culture in the second division.  It also points out how the sixth division, 
dedicated to the art of good writing, actually occurs in the first chapter on Aristotle, and 
near a subtle reference to Schmitt’s book, Legality and Legitimacy.  In explaining the 
structure of The City and Man, this chapter also highlights Strauss’s method of writing 
that demonstrates his indirect manner of addressing Schmitt’s failure to recognize 
tyranny.  It also shows how Strauss begins to address the six criteria for the affirmation 
of the political through the investigation of culture and the recovery of its equivalent – 
the city or polis.  It illustrates the comprehensive nature of the polis and its connection 
to the regime, or politeia, as well as the limitations of Strauss’s use of the polis as a 
solution to the political.   
 
Chapter Six describes Strauss’s response to Schmitt’s call for the affirmation of the 
political by arguing that nature and human nature provide a reasonable, and universal, 
basis for understanding political life.  In particular, chapter six shows that “nature” is 
the basic foundation of criterion six that addresses “the order of human things”.  
Strauss’s discovery of “order” requires a return to a whole and pure knowledge that also 
calls for a distinction between “the divine law”, as the ancestral laws traceable to the 
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gods and “the divine law”, based on the philosophic laws of nature.  This chapter 
examines the difference between the two forms of divine law within the context of 
Strauss’s analysis of Thucydides’s history.  For Strauss’s understanding of Plato, 
Aristotle and Thucydides, “nature” guarantees the possibility of philosophy.  Strauss’s 
return to classical political philosophy is dependent on the reasonableness of his 
demonstration that “nature” is neither a romantic myth nor a noble lie.  This chapter also 
discusses Strauss’s unique interpretation of the Socratic ideas, that come to light 
through asking “what is?” questions.  According to Strauss, Socrates posing the 
question, “what is something?”, eventually led to a coherent account of the things being 
investigated.  It further demonstrates that Strauss’s response to Schmitt’s rejection of 
culture finally leads to Strauss’s discovery of Socrates’s second sailing that took 
seriously the authoritative conventions, or nomos, of the city.  Socrates used these 
opinions as the beginning of a rational discussion regarding various topics, but in the 
end he transcended those opinions.  Unlike Schmitt, who accepts faith, or conflicting 
faiths, as final authorities that underpin the political, Strauss looks for the most cohe rent 
opinion that can be discovered from the most authoritative opinions regarding the 
political. 
 
In recovering nature, especially human nature, according to Strauss, classical political 
philosophy discovers the universal behaviour of human beings that do not change from 
place to place or in different times.  In this way, Strauss endeavours to overcome 
Schmitt’s reliance on historical necessity in the form of historical providence.  Strauss 
uses Thucydides’s reflections on war to respond to Schmitt’s reliance on historical 
providence.  In partial agreement with Schmitt on group pieties, Strauss argues that 
Thucydides is closer to the initial religious experiences that citizens have about the 
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gods, but Strauss provides a foil to Schmitt’s understanding of the political as 
conflicting pieties, or faiths, by giving an alternative that relies on the concept of nature.  
 
Chapter Seven demonstrates the climax of Strauss’s comprehensive response to 
Schmitt’s criteria, beginning with the recovery of nature through the presentation of the 
best regime and concluding that the best regime only exists in speech.  In responding to 
the six criteria for the affirmation of the political, this chapter demonstrates Strauss’s 
interpretation of the Socratic best regime and why Strauss agrees with Socrates 
concerning the necessity of war and its effect on the best regime.  It discovers Strauss’s 
three Platonic definitions of justice, the central one being Polemarchus’s definition of 
helping friends and harming enemies.  It shows, that in opposition to Schmitt, Strauss 
stresses Socrates’s definition of justice, which states that the philosopher harms no one, 
while at the same time helps his, or her, friends.   
 
Chapter Eight shows Strauss’s discovery of the best regime in Thucydides’s The 
Peloponnesian War that meets Schmitt’s definition of the political regarding the 
potential for war among groups.  Even in turning to “the greatest motion” – war – where 
necessity dominates political life, Strauss associates the best way of life with peace and 
with the wisdom of Thucydides.  In continuing his argument that the best regime is 
found in speech, Strauss demonstrates that Thucydides’s best regime resides within the 
speeches of wise speakers, such as Hermocrates and Diodotus, or even in the unwise 
speech of Athenagoras.  Strauss further shows that the best regime partly resides in 
Thucydides’s own comments on the virtues of Athens and Sparta and Thucydides’s 
preference for an Alcibiades- led polity.  Strauss also argues in his analysis of 
Thucydides’s history, that Thucydides includes the recognition of natural right (justice).  
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More importantly, this chapter demonstrates that Strauss makes it clear that “Rest, not 
motion, peace, not war, is good” and that the pinnacle of civilization is wisdom.  This 
chapter shows how Strauss argues that Thucydides’s wisdom, which “grasps the limits 
of all human things” and “the nature of all human things”, provides a better guide for 
political action than Schmitt’s doctrine of the division between friend and enemy based 
on conflicting faiths.73   
 
Chapter Nine addresses the conclusions that can be drawn from the thesis as a whole.  
It includes a short summary of the investigation, drawing together all the evidence 
presented and the implications of Strauss’s response to Schmitt within the context of 
Strauss’s theologico-political enterprise.  It points out the implication of Strauss’s 
recovery of the best regime, arguing that Strauss provides practical guidance to actual 
political life in discerning bad regimes.  The theoretical implications are also addressed, 
particularly relating to the reason why many commentators on Strauss and Schmitt have 
failed to examine Strauss’s “Comments” and The City and Man.  The conclusion also 
addresses the limitations of the thesis, especially relating to the problem of 
demonstrating Strauss’s subtle response in addressing Schmitt’s concept of the political.  
Finally, the conclusion suggests that further research into Strauss’s other books may 
reveal a continued response, by Strauss, to Schmitt’s political theology. 74   
                                                 
73 Ibid., pp. 156, 157 & 160.  In his lecture, “German Nihilism”, Strauss equates civilization with 
“learning” and “the conscious culture of reason”.  Thus, “science and morals” are “the pillars of 
civilisation” – see Strauss, Leo, “German Nihilism”, op. cit., p. 366.  Strauss’s emphasis. 
74 Strauss, Leo, Socrates and Aristophanes, Midway Reprint, U.S.A., 1980, 1st published in 1966 by the 
University of Chicago Press. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Introduction 
 
The literature regarding Strauss’s writings, especially The City and Man and Schmitt’s 
The Concept of the Political, can be divided into four categories: 1) “The Political as 
Propaganda”; 2) “The Political as History”; 3) “The Political as Religion” and 4) “The 
Political as Knowledge”.  The category of Propaganda includes the use of noble lies, as 
well as misleading arguments that present something unacceptable under the guise of 
what is politically acceptable.  The History category includes the historical 
circumstances that have influenced, and determined, the actions and writings of those 
living in specific places and times.  The Religious category includes theology, as well as 
belief grounded on a divine being, or the faith in a transcendent god, or biblical 
revelation.  Finally, the Knowledge category refers to the philosophic search for human 
knowledge and divine knowledge.  The list is stated in an ascending hierarchy of themes 
that reflect Schmitt’s six criteria that were articulated by Strauss in his “Comments”.  
 
Although this review of the literature does not attempt to refute, or disprove, the 
scholarly claims and arguments made by various commentators, it does endeavour to 
demonstrate that many commentators on Strauss have concentrated on the most obvious 
themes in his writings, but have not been aware of the importance of Strauss’s 
confrontation with Schmitt’s concept of the political.  Part of the problem is that Strauss 
does not address Schmitt by name in The City and Man, while many of Strauss’s 
arguments, or references to Schmitt’s concepts, are subtly presented.  In addition, 
Strauss’s book contains explanations concerning how great writers wrote their books to 
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educate young thinkers, or to keep controversial arguments hidden from ideologues, but 
few commentators are aware that he uses the same writing technique in The City and 
Man.  Even Heinrich Meier, who first discovered a hidden dialogue between Schmitt 
and Strauss, has overlooked the continuation of Strauss’s mature answer to Schmitt’s 
concept of the political in The City and Man.  However, Meier does note that, in a 1965 
essay, Schmitt used a footnote to a book that does mention Strauss’s name on the cited 
page.  Meier also suggests that Strauss made a hidden reply to Schmitt’s 1938 book on 
Hobbes’s Leviathan in an essay, published in 1954, called, “On the Basis of Hobbes’s 
Political Philosophy”.75 
 
1. The Political as Propaganda 
 
A number of commentators have noticed Strauss’s careful manner of writing.  Laurence 
Lampert’s criticism of Leo Strauss’s legacy is that it is “compromised by his lack of 
boldness on behalf of philosophy at a decisive moment in history”.  Lampert suggests 
that Strauss’s “intellectua l uncleanliness”, and his style of “obfuscation”, aided 
“irrational” readers, because he “prepared as he thought best for the coming night, the 
eventual collapse of philosophical inquiry in the modern world”.  Lampert places more 
emphasis on Strauss’s “rhe toric”, or public pronouncements, or what Lampert calls “a 
public Platonism”, 76 which gave “heart to a school of patriots in a land that took itself to 
be founded on what is almost literally an updated version of the lie of noble origins, 
even while it was committed to the pursuit of comfortable self-preservation in the best 
                                                 
75 Meier, Heinrich, Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss: The Hidden Dialogue, Lomax, Ha rvey J., trans., op. 
cit., p. 62.  According to Meier, Strauss used Hobbes as a mask to give “a natural explanation of the 
Biblical religion”, and hence, refute Schmitt’s belief that “Jesus is the Christ” – see Strauss, Leo, “On the 
Basis of Hobbes’s Political philosophy” in What is Political Philosophy? And Other Studies, University 
of Chicago Press, U.S.A., 1988, pp. 188 & 189. 
76 Lampert, Laurence, Leo Strauss and Nietzsche, University of Chicago Press, U.S.A., 1996, p. 184. 
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modern way”.  Here, he refers to Strauss’s influence over American conservatives, who 
believe that the American regime was founded on biblical revelation and classical 
political philosophy.77   
 
Lampert claims to see through Strauss’s religious propaganda and finds that Strauss 
indicts Christianity as a threat to philosophy as it “trapped philosophy within a 
dogmatism that left no room for doubt about the immutable character of its fundamental 
beliefs and that subjected philosophy to a higher authority”. 78  Instead of investigating 
Strauss’s connection with Carl Schmitt, Lampert highlights the Nietzschean side to 
Strauss’s understanding of the political, arguing that Strauss introduces new gods into 
the world in the same manner that “Platonic Socrates” had introduced them.  He implies 
that Strauss does so in the role of a “revolutionary theologian”, not just in using Socratic 
“reasoning about the gods”, but also in borrowing the Socratic invention of “rational 
gods”.79  For Lampert, the key to understanding Strauss’s works lies with Strauss’s 
emphasis on Thrasymachus’s art of rhetoric in Plato’s Republic.80  Lampert argues that 
Strauss learned the central importance of the art of propaganda from Thrasymachus’s 
ability to manipulate the ordinary citizens through their passions relating to anger and 
shame.81  
 
Lampert concludes that Socrates is able to win over Thrasymachus by demonstrating his 
superior rhetoric that cleverly refutes Thrasymachus’s arguments.  The special 
relationship between Socrates and Thrasymachus leads Lampert to argue that Socrates 
spends the greater part of the Republic educating Thrasymachus.  Lampert also stresses 
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how Strauss draws attention to Socrates becoming friends with him in Book Ten, in the 
context of a discussion on poetry.  For Strauss, according to Lampert, poetry is also a 
euphemism for religion, meaning that Platonic propaganda supports the immortality of 
the soul and the existence of just gods for political purposes.82  For Lampert, Strauss 
argues that Socrates and Thrasymachus were never enemies in the first place, because 
they were not believers in the justice of the city, and in thus recognizing each other, they 
decided to compromise.  Socrates promises not to practise philosophy in public and not 
to corrupt the young, while in return, Lampert argues, Thrasymachus will persuade the 
city that the private pursuit of philosophy “is not vicious”. 83  Strauss demonstrates that 
Thrasymachus replaces the poets and becomes the conspicuous ruler of the city “by 
making his art ministerial to philosophy”.  Lampert argues that Strauss claims that the 
“key” evidence supporting that role is Socrates’s declaration of friendship with 
Thrasymachus.  Socrates was able to enlist his skill in making a case for the philosophic 
life that protected it and even made it an official activity within the city. 84  As Lampert 
points out, Strauss argues that Thrasymachus’s alliance was transferred from the many 
superstitious people, or the “common people” (hoi polloi), to the “men of excellence”.85   
 
Although Lampert misses the importance of Schmitt’s political theology for Strauss, he 
is useful in drawing attention to Strauss’s art of writing.  A prime example of Strauss’s 
political propaganda, according to Lampert, was his famous argument that takes sides 
with religion over philosophy as the best life.  Lampert sees this as evidence of Strauss’s 
“large ‘Keep Out’ sign” that a reader finds when trying to enter the life of philosophy.  
Nevertheless, Lampert sees a little sign “in quite small print” that says, “unless”, you 
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want “comfortless conclusions of philosophy and the deep pleasures of the 
philosopher”. 86  Lampert argues that Strauss’s interpretation of the Republic shows that 
the poets were allowed to return to Socrates’s perfect city (the city in speech) in Book 
Ten.  This new political, or philosophic, enlightenment was to represent a new poetic 
piety, having not only the goal of the good and civic mindedness at the forefront, but 
also subordinating pre-Socratic poetry to philosophy. 87  In short, for Lampert, the most 
important political lesson that Strauss had learned was that, “Platonic political 
philosophy is the permanent solution to philosophy’s political problem, a permanent 
solution characterized by its capacity for change, its ability to adapt its defenses to the 
world in which it finds itself”.88  This means, according to Lampert, that the political 
was the propaganda that protected Strauss’s “Epicurean and Platonist” pursuit of the 
pleasures associated with learning for learning’s sake.  For Lampert, Strauss needed his 
“walled garden”, because his task involved the dangerous activity of introducing new 
divinities.  He concludes that Strauss only “whispered the results” of his discovery of 
the “idiocies of revealed religion”, complaining that few readers are ever able to 
transcend Strauss’s propaganda.89   
 
Although Lampert is helpful in highlighting Strauss’s use of Thrasymachus in Strauss’s 
understanding of the Republic, he fails to address the central importance of the best 
regime, natural right, and nature, that is fundamental in Strauss’s The City and Man.  In 
concentrating on Strauss’s Nietzschean side, Lampert misses the historical importance 
of Strauss’s confrontation with Schmitt in the 1930s to say nothing of Strauss’s defence 
of nature, natural right, the best regime and the ancestral customs of society, that is 
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evident throughout The City and Man.  Lampert also misses the fundamental issue of 
the theologico-political problem.  Nevertheless, Lampert’s discovery of Strauss’s 
manner of writing lends evidence to this thesis that Strauss’s The City and Man is an 
esoteric book that provides an alternative perspective to revealed religion.  The reason 
Lampert fails to discover Strauss’s relationship with Schmitt, is that Lampert’s aim is to 
confirm that the mature Strauss was a Nietzschean, a claim that Strauss denied in a 
private letter to Karl Löwith. 90   
 
Some commentators, such as Stanley Rosen, recognize the importance of Strauss’s open 
friendship with the philosopher, Alexandre Kojève.  However, Rosen does not allude to 
Strauss’s earlier relationship with Schmitt and there is no footnote to Schmitt, or to 
Strauss’s “Comments” on Schmitt’s book, The Concept of the Political.  According to 
Rosen, Strauss and his Hegelian friend, Kojève, were both atheists, “who wish to be 
gods”.91  Rosen’s fundamental premise that explains the rest of his analysis is to be 
found in the following statement, “My thesis is that Strauss is himself a Nietzschean, 
but not quite”. 92  By calling Strauss a Nietzschean of sorts, Rosen argues that Strauss’s 
project was ultimately based on an act of the will, indicating that it originated in 
Strauss’s will to power.  Rosen further argues that political philosophy is simply “in the 
genuine sense” only “philosophical propaganda”, because it is based on “an act of the 
will”, implying that the conflict between philosophy and religion is “ultimately 
moral”. 93  By “moral”, Rosen means that the conflict is political, each claiming to be the 
authority guiding those who rule.  By this understanding, Rosen summarizes Strauss’s 
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goal as one that contributes to “a world that is safe for philosophy” and that “the task of 
his worshippers (disciples) is to fill in the details”. 94  Thus, it appears that Strauss’s 
political philosophy, according to Rosen, is political rhetoric aimed at preserving the 
quest to find the truth regarding the best way of life.  Rosen’s evidence is merely to 
quote a statement from Strauss’s book On Tyranny.  The crucial part of Strauss’s 
statement that Rosen states is:  
 
“In what then does political philosophy consist? In 
convincing the city that the philosophers are not atheists, 
that they do not profane all that the city regards as sacred, 
that they respect that which the city respects, that they are 
not subversive, and finally that they are not irresponsible 
adventurers but good citizens, and even the best of the 
citizens.  That is the defense of philosophy which was 
always and everywhere necessary, regardless of the 
political regime . . .”. 95  
 
Rosen agrees that as far as Strauss’s writings are concerned, one could only refute 
religion if it were possible to become wise, or “genuinely divine”, but, according to 
Rosen, Strauss did not think that was possible.  The implication is that biblical 
revelation is Strauss’s only serious alternative to classical metaphysics.96   
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Rosen calls Strauss’s political teachings on “classical (or Straussian) political 
philosophy propaganda”. 97  In addressing Strauss’s claim that he thought that 
philosophy was always “coeval” with the question, “quid sit deus?” (“what is a god?”), 
Rosen interprets this to mean that Strauss denied that the “archetypical citizen (the 
philosopher) of Athens is also a resident of Jerusalem”.  By choosing political 
philosophy, Rosen argues that Strauss followed Jehudah Halevi in the latter’s blunt 
statement on the choice between Athens and Jerusalem.  Rosen reports Halevi’s 
comment as, “According to the Bible, the beginning of wisdom is fear of the Lord; 
according to the Greek philosophers, the beginning of wisdom is wonder.  We are 
compelled at the very beginning to make a choice, to take a stand”.  Strauss’s choice, 
according to Rosen, was with philosophy and wonder.  This may be so in The City and 
Man, but Rosen fails to mention that Strauss always left open the possibility that 
biblical revelation was true.98 
 
In presenting his duality, Rosen argues that Strauss denied that one could be both a 
follower of Athens (reason or philosophy), and a follower of Jerusalem (Faith), arguing, 
“No competent student of Leo Strauss was ever in doubt as to his teacher’s choice”, 
meaning that Strauss chose Athens.  Rosen once asked Strauss whether Descartes was 
“a believer” and Strauss replied “with passion” that “philosophers are paid not to 
believe”.  On another occasion Strauss retorted, “Believe!  Believe!  As Lessing said, 
‘how I wonder what that word means!’ ”. 99  Rosen concludes that he is certain that, 
“Strauss tacitly identified himself with Socrates”. 100  However, Susan Orr, in “Strauss, 
Reason, and Revelation: Unraveling the Essential Question” sees more in common 
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between Strauss’s alternatives, Jerusalem and Athens, in both reflecting the desire to 
possess wisdom and justice.101  Orr also argues that Strauss reminds readers that “to 
understand ourselves and to illuminate our trackless way into the future, we must 
understand Jerusalem and Athens” and that Strauss leaves it open as to which city we 
choose for guidance.102  She argues that Strauss’s piety included his investigating only 
the human things, and not the divine things, that relate to divine revelation.  What Rosen 
and others forget is that Strauss’s project was to recover, not only Socratic political 
philosophy, but also Jerusalem. 103 
 
In opposing Rosen’s thesis, Werner J. Dannhauser argues that Strauss “opposed and 
even denounced dogmatic atheism” in his essay entitled, “An Epilogue”.  Dannhauser 
points out the overlapping rationality in Strauss’s defence of Jerusalem and the fact that 
Athens is “not rigidly rational” and “Jerusalem is not rigidly irrational”.104  Although he 
thinks that Strauss “chose Athens over Jerusalem”, Dannhauser argues that Strauss did 
not intend that the tension between Athens and Jerusalem be abolished, admitting that 
Jerusalem is “an enemy over whom there is no final and conclusive victory”.  In 
answering why Strauss wrote esoterically, in an age that no longer required esotericism, 
about his choice of Athens, Dannhauser argues that Strauss preferred the “reticence of 
Maimonides” to “the boldness of Spinoza”, because he was “a good Jew”, knowing “the 
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dignity and worth of love of one’s own”.  According to Dannhauser, the only way to 
truth is through love of one’s own and this is why he was so loyal to “things Jewish”. 105   
 
Thus, according to Dannhauser’s understanding, Rosen’s and Lampert’s observations of 
Strauss’s general approach miss the mark.  Nevertheless, their books represent an 
enlightened opinion of Strauss’s works.  Rosen describes Strauss’s act of introducing 
secret and dangerous truths of past thinkers, as fully justified, leaning heavily on 
Maimonides’s claim, that exposing the secrets of the Bible was necessary for “saving 
the law”.  Rosen means that Strauss had discovered a way to preserve philosophy 
through the art of careful writing, while protecting the religious beliefs of others.  Rosen 
points out that Strauss’s secret teachings remain on the surface, or exoteric level.106  He 
implies that Strauss’s impression of “great frankness” is misleading, because philosophy 
is a form of madness and can only be made manifest “in fun”, which leads the reader to 
see a “connection between wisdom and laughter”.107   
 
Rosen argues that Strauss’s political “doctrines like natural right and the philosophical 
significance of the rural gentleman” are merely “exhortations” and “intrinsically 
absurd”. 108  Rosen argues that Strauss’s exoteric, or surface arguments, appealing to 
political conservatives (“rural gentlemen”) were inconsistent, because he aligns 
philosophy with people who did “not look up to philosophy”, thus making Strauss’s 
political agenda impossible to implement.  Furthermore, Rosen claims that Strauss knew 
of this weakness, but made it a crucial part of his attempt to preserve philosophy, or 
what he calls the “fearless and divinely mad nature”.  Rosen argues that Strauss knew 
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that the morality of classical hoi kaloikagathoi - hoi aristoi (noble and good people) had 
little in common with “contemporary populism that passes for conservatism”, but he 
does see Strauss’s political propaganda as aimed at cultivating a “special race of 
academic administrators”, who think themselves wise in educating “conservatives” in 
America, hence taking the spotlight off philosophy. 109  Once again, Rosen’s scepticism 
is not warranted, as Strauss argues, in The City and Man, that noble and good people 
(“hoi kaloikagathoi - hoi aristoi”) need only be decent, or “enlightened statesmen, like 
Pericles who was affected by Anaxagoras”.  According to Strauss’s interpretation of 
Aristotle, “the only serious alternative to the philosophic life” is “the political life”, or 
the life dedicated to the noble.110  
 
Harry Neumann sees Rosen’s scepticism of Strauss’s political teaching as “interpreting 
Strauss’ ignorance (of the good) as so total that it justifies anything or nothing”.  He 
goes on to argue, “This ignorance makes any decision to do anything (including 
philosophy) a matter of arbitrary nihilist will”.  In rejecting Rosen’s scepticism, 
Neumann emphasizes Strauss’s dogmatism.  Neumann thinks that many followers of 
Strauss, including Allan Bloom, Thomas Pangle and Stanley Rosen do not understand 
how “illiberal” Plato and Strauss really were.111  Neumann defends both Schmitt and 
Strauss, claiming that they had much in common with “pious Dorians”, because of their 
“abhorrence of liberalism’s atheism or nihilism, its tyrannic unconcern with 
traditionally accepted standards of legitimacy, [and] its refusal to justify its science 
before the bar of that legitimacy”.  Neumann, who knew the importance of Schmitt’s 
relationship with Strauss, defends Schmitt’s and Strauss’s piety and belief in the divine.  
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He argues that they had much in common.  Neumann is both useful and insightful in 
raising the issue of the similarities found in the views of Schmitt and Strauss.  These 
will be discussed in the third category, “The Political as Religion”. 112 
 
The only comment on Strauss’s obscure writing style in The City and Man is found in 
Seth Benardete’s article, “Leo Strauss’ The City and Man”.  In contrast to other 
commentators, Benardete thinks that “simplicity” is the key ingredient in reading 
Strauss’s book.  He argues that Strauss’s book is “more like Thucydides’ history than 
either Aristotle’s Politics or Plato’s Republic”, because Strauss, like Thucydides, was 
interested in the question, “quid  sit deus” (i.e. what is a god?), which is “the question of 
philosophy”.  Hence, Benardete argues that “the action of The City and Man” is the 
recovery of this question.  Although Benardete does not mention Schmitt, he refers to 
Strauss’s final words of The City and Man, “quid sit deus”, suggesting that it comes 
from Strauss’s book on Spinoza and that it was “paraphrased” from Calvin.  According 
to Benardete, Strauss did not fully appreciate the connection between philosophy and 
the question “what is a god?” when he published his Spinoza book in 1930.  Thus, 
Benardete confirms Strauss’s new orientation towards the question of the divine, 
providing crucial evidence why Strauss would choose to respond to Schmitt in 1964.113   
 
Benardete points out that Strauss’s uncharacteristic method of beginning with Aristotle 
and finishing with Thucydides, in The City and Man, contrasts with his previous book, 
Natural Right and History, that begins with the ancients and ends with the modern 
thinker, Edmund Burke.  In addition, Benardete argues that the central theme of The 
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City and Man is the need for a “common sense understanding of the city”, which turns 
out to be the “most metaphysical of questions”.  This is because the common sense 
opinions of ordinary citizens are linked to the divine.114  By this, Benardete also means 
that Strauss’s argument on the “surface” of his written work is the “very heart” of his 
meaning.  Furthermore, for Benardete, Strauss points out that ideology obliterates the 
difference between the political and the non-political supports for political life, while 
irony is “incompatible with science”.115  He further argues that the problem of justice, or 
natural right, for Strauss, was the problem of the common good.  According to 
Benardete’s understanding of Strauss, it was through the discovery of nature, that 
“knowledge” became the common good.  As such, it defined the essential limits of the 
city, since the city lacked knowledge.  Consequently, it led to the necessity for noble 
lies when applied to ruling the city.  In short, the common good, for Strauss, turns out to 
be the search for knowledge.116 
 
Commenting on the title, The City and Man, Benardete suggests that “and” is both a 
disjunction and a conjunction, implying that Strauss is both separating and pairing 
things throughout the text, as Socrates did in his speeches.  According to Benardete, the 
very word reminds the reader of Socratic dialectics.117  Finally, Benardete highlights “an 
orgy of bloody persecution of guilty and innocent alike” in Athens, after the mutilation 
of the Hermes statues before the invasion of Sicily, that is recorded by Thucydides.  
Benardete argues that, “the meaning of that persecution, according to Strauss”, is “the 
subterranean thread”, which runs through Thucydides’s History.  He thus implies that 
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Strauss’s manner of writing is concerned with piety connected to the gods of the city 
and the dangers in undermining those pieties and gods.118 
 
In summarizing the literature under the category of propaganda, it is evident that 
commentators see Strauss as a careful and thoughtful writer, if not a complex one, who 
chose Athens (political philosophy) over Jerusalem (faith), although he had great 
respect for his Jewish heritage.  The issue of Strauss’s choice of Athens over Jerusalem 
is also relevant to Strauss’s concern with political theology as an alternative to political 
philosophy that is evident in The City and Man.  By reading The City and Man, in the 
manner Benardete suggests, i.e. in observing the surface of the text, one can perceive 
Benardete’s discovery of Strauss’s plan that divides his book into seventeen sections, 
although Benardete overlooks the sixth division that is located in chapter one.  
However, most of the commentators have not connected Strauss’s earlier 1932 
“Comments” to The City and Man, because they have not recognized the historical link 
between 1932 and 1964, seen in the six criteria, that form the basis for the successful 
recovery of the political. 
 
2. The Political as History 
 
A number of commentators base their interpretation of Schmitt’s and Strauss’s works on 
the historical circumstances that influenced, or determined, Schmitt’s and Strauss’s 
ideas.  This section examines the literature that stresses the importance of understanding 
the role of history in the formation of Strauss’s and Schmitt’s concept of the political.  
Some, such as George Schwab, argue that Schmitt’s political goal was purely practical – 
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to “secure peace and stability” in the Weimar Republic.119  He understands that 
Schmitt’s key to the political, the conflict between friend and enemy (Feind and  
Freund), was Schmitt’s attempt to insert “politics into jurisprudence” in Germany, 
because of its disappearance through the works of positivists, such as Hans Kelsen.  
Schwab argues that Schmitt’s understanding of the political recognized that not every 
“antagonism, rivalry or antipathy” leads to, or encompasses, enmity, but that politics, 
historically speaking, was a recorded fact, seen in the Greek, Roman and Christian 
language.120   
 
Shadia B. Drury’s central thesis is that Strauss proposed to “re-theologize the 
political”121 through a radicalization of Schmitt’s concept on conflict and war, based on 
his friend and enemy theory. 122  She argues that this enterprise was dependent on the 
premise that German history influenced Strauss’s “political thought”. 123  She states in 
her “Preface”: 
 
“Haunted by his experience of Nazi Germany, Strauss 
rejects American liberalism as a dangerous, if not 
disastrous state of affairs in which the likes of Hitler could 
emerge victorious.  This experience is related to the major 
themes of his political thought – the preoccupation with 
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nihilism, the emphasis on religion, and the role of 
intellectuals in politics”. 124   
 
Drury recognizes an unbroken historical thread in Strauss’s radical view of Schmitt’s 
concept of the political, which extends from Strauss’s inability “to liberate himself from 
the conception of the political by which his people were so tragically victimized”, to his 
later years in the United States.  However, Drury narrows Strauss’s response to Schmitt 
in purely historical terms, failing to see how other categories might aid in the discovery 
of Strauss’s response to Schmitt in 1964.  Although Strauss and Schmitt identify 
liberalism with Weimar, they also thought that Western liberalism, defined as separation 
of state and religion, had not solved the problem of prejudice, and potential war, 
regarding groups within society. 125  
 
In contrast, Robert Howse argues that Strauss specifically addresses Schmitt in Natural 
Right and History in 1953, but fails to perceive the continued response in 1964.  He 
recognizes Strauss’s arguments in, Natural Right and History, from the “Comments” 
and observes that “Strauss fails to cite Schmitt by name”.  Howse argues that the book 
was dedicated to Schmitt’s “decisionist thought”. 126  In turning to the historical 
circumstances, Howse blames the McCarthy persecution in the early 1950s for Strauss’s 
refusal to mention Schmitt by name.  He points out that the “McCarthyite terror” had 
reached its “height” in 1954 - a year after the publication of Natural Right and History - 
and that Strauss had warned that, “men like Senator Joseph McCarthy” were one of the 
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principal dangers to freedom and American democracy. 127  Howse argues that Strauss’s 
objection was with Heidegger’s “right-wing nihilism” and “anti-political vocabulary” 
and its affect on American conservatives.  He mentions Karl Löwith’s observation that 
Schmitt’s decisionism and content were derived from existentialism, particularly from 
“Being” (“Dasein”) itself.128  Howse’s referral to Löwith is correct, as Löwith states in 
his autobiography that Schmitt’s “decisionism” “corresponds to Heidegger’s 
existentialist philosophy, in which the ‘capacity-for-Being-a-whole’ of individual 
authentic existence is transposed to the ‘totality’ of the authentic state, which is itself 
always particular”. 129 
 
John P. McCormick suggests that “nuances possibly initiated by changing historical 
contexts” shaped Schmitt’s and Strauss’s writings.130  His thesis is that both thinkers 
were engaged in a “new reconstructed-Hobbesian bargain suggested by the 
aestheticization of violence” that in turn “mandates that subjects give obedience to the 
state with no qualifications whatsoever”. 131  McCormick argues that Heinrich Meier’s 
claim, that Schmitt’s friend and enemy concept was based on the fact that Schmitt was a 
life long (Catholic) political theologian, is contradicted by historical evidence.  
McCormick points to the historical fact that the Roman Catholic Church 
excommunicated Schmitt in 1926, because of his second marriage, a fact, he claims, 
Meier did not even acknowledge.  McCormick also cites other historical evidence of 
Schmitt’s “denunciations of the Church both before and during his affiliation with 
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National Socialism”.  Thus, he rejects Meier’s thesis that the foundation of Schmitt’s 
concept of the political relies on the premise that Schmitt was a political theologian in 
1927 when The Concept of the Political was published.132  
 
In agreement with Drury, McCormick argues that Strauss’s “Comments”, and Schmitt’s 
arguments regarding the political, were shaped by historical forces at work within 
Germany at the time, giving rise to the claim that both thinkers were engaged in “the 
aestheticization of violence”.  In short, he argues that the political instability in Weimar 
Germany contributed to their political doctrines that were not based on norms, or 
morals, but on “the secular aestheticization of politics”, because their “writings of the 
dwindling days of the Weimar Republic decisively outweighs and subverts any 
normative inclinations that they may have harbored”. 133 
 
However, in consistently following his own logic of historical determinism, McCormick 
argues that Strauss changed his mind, or became “more fully disenchanted with 
Hobbes”, after he had emigrated to the United States and published his book on 
(universal) natural right, in 1953, called Natural Right and History.  McCormick argues 
that “Strauss amends Schmitt’s project” by turning to the classical Christian and Judaic 
traditions, without any reflection on their validity.  Furthermore, McCormick argues that 
Strauss turns to classical virtues through “his own formative inclinations in light of 
ensuing historical events”. 134  According to McCormick, Strauss’s disenchantment was 
over Hobbes’s premise that all authority derives from “the fear of death”. 135  His 
implication is that, in becoming a citizen in the stable and free liberal democracy of the 
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United States, Strauss decided to moderate Schmitt’s concept of the political and its 
“aestheticization of violence” to fit into the American ethos.  Nevertheless, McCormick 
sees Strauss’s American experience of the political as essentially nihilistic.  He argues 
that Strauss tried hiding the “amoral truths of the political”, particularly “the ultimate 
amorality of political action”, using the rhetoric of the good and right as “impenetrable 
ruminations”, having learned from Schmitt about the need for relying on myths, 
particularly “the more sublime myth-making of the likes of Plato as a resource”.  He 
contends that Strauss had learned from Schmitt, and the Weimar years, not to publicize 
dangerous truths that could be misused, and hence, provide a recipe for disaster in a 
liberal democratic regime.136 
 
The most critical commentaries on Strauss’s relationship with Schmitt come from John 
P. McCormick and Shadia Drury, who recognize the special relationship and experience 
that Schmitt and Strauss shared from the Weimar period and how this is linked to 
Strauss’s later work.  However, both McCormick and Drury do not see Strauss’s 
ongoing response to Schmitt’s concept of the political in The City and Man.  Part of the 
problem is that many critics, while recognizing this special relationship, see Strauss’s 
and Schmitt’s works only in terms of their historical context and circumstances.  In 
accepting the historicist position, they suggest that historical factors forced Strauss and 
Schmitt to write as they did.  The reason they overlook the key arguments in The City 
and Man is that both McCormick and Drury are overly concerned with fitting Strauss 
into an historical setting.  In addition, Drury also draws attention to Strauss the Jew.  
She understands Strauss’s arguments regarding the political as the result of the Jewish 
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suffering at the hands of the Nazis,137 whereas McCormick sees Strauss changing his 
opinion concerning the political after he had left Weimar Germany and settled in the 
United States.138  As representative of mainstream critical literature, this approach does 
not take into account that The City and Man is fully consistent with Strauss’s aims 
during his “Weimar” period.  These commentators have failed to discover Strauss’s six 
criteria for the affirmation of the political, as interpreted from Schmitt’s book, The 
Concept of the Political, and published as “Comments” in 1932.  In failing to perceive 
Strauss’s understanding of the political, they do not appreciate the significance of 
Strauss’s interpretation of Aristotle and Plato’s best regime, Strauss’s concern with 
natural justice and the link between philosophy and the divine law, or ancestral customs.   
These themes are particularly evident in the context of Strauss’s satisfying of the six 
criteria for the recovery of the political that are found in The City and Man.   
 
The reason why some scholars have over-emphasized historical factors is that very few 
have applied Strauss’s own reading technique to his books.  Heinrich Meier established 
that there was a dialogue between Strauss and Schmitt during the Weimar years, but 
only Robert Howse and Meier have discovered Strauss’s response to Schmitt in 
Strauss’s later writings.  Howse argues that Strauss responds to Schmitt’s concept of the 
political in Natural Right and History, although Howse also notes that Strauss does not 
mention Schmitt’s name.  Nevertheless, Howse falls back on historical circumstance 
arguing that Strauss was prompted to respond to Schmitt’s decisionism through the 
“McCarthyite terror” that took place in the United States in the 1950s.  Howse argues 
that Strauss saw leaders, such as Senator Joseph McCarthy, as a threat to “intellectual 
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freedom”, because they used Schmittean means to identify the internal enemy, i.e. those 
“unAmerican” people branded as “outsiders within”.139 
 
In reply to the criticism that Strauss ignored history altogether in reading the classic 
text, Lampert argues that it is “absurd” that anyone could think that Strauss relied on 
original Greek texts that an auditor had written after listening to the speeches of 
Socrates or Aristotle.  Lampert argues that Strauss overcame this absurdity by 
recognizing the historical tradition “within Western philosophy”, having learned from 
“Montaigne, Bacon, Descartes, and Lessing” to confirm the reliability of the texts that 
he studied, particularly those on Plato and Aristotle.140  Strauss was able to perceive an 
historical thread that confirmed the authenticity of the classical writings.  He did so by 
reading St. Augustine’s works and the mediaeval, Platonic works of Jewish 
(Maimonides) and Islamic (Alfarabi and Averroes) scholars.  Nasser Behnegar 
emphasizes Strauss’s statement from The City and Man that stresses the need for 
history, “Far from being merely one of the innumerable themes of social science, 
history of political philosophy, and not logic, proves to be the pursuit concerned with 
the presuppositions of social science”. 141 
 
In addition to McCormick and Drury, Paul Gottfried argues that the importance of 
history, for Schmitt and Strauss, goes further than the Weimar Republic.  Gottfried links 
Schmitt’s concept of the political to Hobbes’s notion of human nature being 
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“contentious”, or “man’s natural bellicosity”.  Having observed this historical fact, 
Schmitt then requires an active sovereign, who responds to democratic situations similar 
to that faced by Germany in the 1930s.  Gottfried argues that Schmitt’s book, The 
Concept of the Political, addressed the issue of the “unchanging foundation of all 
political relationships”, i.e. the foundation of Schmitt’s “legal concept of the challenge 
of the exception and his neo-Hobbesian definition of sovereignty”.  The key to 
Schmitt’s idea of the political, according to Gottfried, is not represented by a category, 
such as religion or economics, but by “the intensity” of human “association or 
dissociation”.142  Gottfried interprets this definition of the political as one of fate, where 
those who try to escape it are overtaken by the political; yet, he agrees with Strauss’s 
observation that there was a “Hobbesian dimension in Schmitt’s critique of liberalism”.  
Following the historical Hobbes, this simply meant that Schmitt had defended the 
concept that human beings were evil by nature.143  Nevertheless, Gottfried argues that 
Schmitt did not welcome politics as the activity of war, but in following Hobbes, 
exploded the idea that war can be made redundant.144   
 
While Gottfried does not address Strauss’s response to Schmitt in The City and Man, 
his argument, that Schmitt aims at something trans-historical in the “unchanging 
foundation of all political relationships”, does raise an important issue in understanding 
Strauss’s trans-historical solution.  This issue is whether the best regime, or the regime 
ruled by philosopher-kings, is Strauss’s trans-historical answer to the definition of the 
political and whether it is still relevant as an answer to Schmitt’s reliance on destiny, or 
historical providence.  Still, Gottfried voices reservations concerning our freedom from 
                                                 
142 Gottfried, Paul Edward, Carl Schmitt – Politics and Theory, Greenwood, Press, U.S.A., 1990, pp. 62 & 
63.  Gottfried’s emphasis.  The last two Gottfried quotes are from Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political. 
143 Ibid., p. 65.  Gottfried argues that “present-day Straussian critic Heinrich Meier”, sees “the 
providential faith in history shaping his [Schmitt’s] thoughts” – p. 85. 
144 Ibid., pp. 79 & 80. 
  
 
65
our specific fate as the political that ties us to local loyalties and faiths.  Gottfried’s 
dilemma in understanding fate, and the universalism of the political, is further addressed 
by Harry Neumann.  
 
Neumann, in his article, “Political Theology? An Interpretation of Genesis (3:5,22)”, 
argues that Schmitt’s concept of the political, grounded in history, is based on the 
premise that Schmitt is a political theologian.  According to Neumann, this grounding 
undermines Schmitt’s claim to have recovered the universality of the political, since 
Schmitt’s theology, and hence the political, is based on individuality (personal faith) 
that does not lend itself to universality.  Furthermore, it follows that Schmitt’s 
“individual (religious) experience” of “racial catholicism”, which Neumann sees as the 
centre of Schmitt’s understanding of the political, is founded on Schmitt’s acceptance of 
“the Incarnation”, that is “a particular experience, not a universal law or principle”.     
According to Neumann, Schmitt states that his whole faith is based on “a historical 
event”.  Neumann implies that Schmitt’s “appeal to individual (religious) experience” 
lends itself to the individual experiences that characterize historicism.145  However, 
Neumann does not fully explain Schmitt’s historicism that is connected to his “radical 
catholicism”, but relegates the discussion to a footnote by Strauss, directing the reader 
to Strauss’s Natural Right and History.146   
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In addition, Neumann directs the reader to another footnote to Schmitt’s Glossarium.  
The Glossarium translation of the footnote reads, “For me, Christianity is primarily not 
a doctrine, nor a moral, nor even (pardon) a religion; it is a historical event”, which 
provides further evidence of Schmitt’s historicism.  In the same footnote, Neumann 
argues that Schmitt agreed with Hegel in rejecting the Jewish Law tradition.  The result 
of Schmitt’s reliance on history, according to Neumann, was that Schmitt, in rejecting 
“universal law or principle” for “a particular experience”, finally accepted an amoral 
god.  However, an amoral god cannot be the foundation of the political that is 
synonymous with the moral.  Therefore, in Neumann’s opinion, Schmitt’s final 
understanding of the political is just “human experience with pointless desire for a 
nonexistent happiness, its ‘natural’ fulfillment”.  Such an interpretation, according to 
Neumann, cannot supply “the nonarbitrary, eternal moral standards, implied in all 
serious political conflict”.  The result, according to Neumann, was that Schmitt, in 
rejecting “universal law or principle” for “a particular experience”, concluded by 
accepting  “a god beyond good and evil”.  Neumann also points to a contradiction in 
Schmitt’s argument, calling Schmitt’s crucified “incarnated god” an “accurate image of 
this pointlessness”, as Christ offers no political guidance to His people on earth. 147   
 
Neumann’s demonstration of Schmitt’s historicism proves useful, but his thesis does not 
sufficiently draw out Schmitt’s initial definition of the political as that of the distinction 
between friend and enemy that has its source in Plato’s Republic, i.e. in Polemarchus’s 
definition of helping friends and harming enemies.  As with some other commentators, 
he fails to perceive the historical continuity of Schmitt’s arguments regarding the 
political that connects Strauss’s Weimar period with his American experience.  Like all 
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the other commentators, he completely overlooks Strauss’s later response to Schmitt in 
The City and Man.  However, Neumann’s discussion does show how important history, 
and historicism, were to Schmitt, especially with regards to Schmitt’s theoretical 
foundation that underpins his political theology.  
 
Catherine Zuckert provides a comprehensive historical account of Strauss’s affirmation 
of the political, but unlike some commentators on Schmitt and Strauss, she argues that 
both thinkers had turned to the political through a decision “based on choice, not 
necessity”. 148  She denies that the understanding of the political of both thinkers was 
determined by historical circumstances and influences.  Zuckert argues that Strauss 
taught that political thinkers of the past were free to reject the dominant teachings of 
their times.  On this premise, Zuckert sketches the historical development in Strauss’s 
writings, beginning with his early agreement with Friedrich Nietzsche’s assessment of 
the failure of the modern enlightenment to move beyond “comfortable  self-
preservation”, which finally contributed to the total loss of “all nobility” that was 
connected to “ancient life”.  Zuckert argues that Strauss saw the “crisis of our times” as 
the culmination of Nietzsche’s denial that “human beings can know what is right or 
wrong”, or that the crisis was a moral one.149   
 
Zuckert argues that Strauss had discovered that the founders of the modern 
enlightenment, Machiavelli and Hobbes, had instituted new moral and political orders 
for human beings that had done away with “any suprahuman goals or standards by 
which their (human) efforts could be judged”.150  She argues that Strauss had learned 
from Hobbes’s political philosophy that the “new morality” of Hobbes’s teaching was 
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based on ancient political thought, specifically, Thucydides’s and Aristotle’s 
understanding of the human passions, in an attempt to make morality more effective.  In 
Hobbes’s attempt to establish “a just political order”, she argues that Strauss saw that 
classical aristocratic emphasis on honour, including the connection between honour and 
war, or injustice, had led Hobbes to abandon honour and substitute it with fear of 
violent death as the basis of the best political order.151  According to Zuckert, Strauss 
argues, that the political problem of groups of human beings going to war is caused by 
the human attachment to “their own bodily existence” and the love of their own specific 
families.  Disagreements arise as to what constitutes the best way of life, or “the best 
way of doing things”, and this leads to factionalism and fighting.152  She argues that 
Strauss confirmed his suspicions that this problem was inherent in liberal democracy in 
his review of Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political in 1932 and that Strauss’s response 
to Schmitt was the beginning of Strauss’s understanding of the political.  In turning to 
the question of Schmitt’s and Strauss’s agreement on the importance of the political, she 
thinks that both Strauss and Schmitt had seen the problem of liberal democracy as being 
a “moral and political” one, rather than a philosophical, or a scientific crisis.  Zuckert 
argues that this is what Strauss learned from reading Schmitt’s The Concept of the 
Political.   
 
According to Zuckert, Schmitt and Strauss understood that, if the political is threatened, 
the “seriousness of life is threatened”, meaning that the moral life is threatened.153  In 
addition, she suggests that both thinkers had noted modern liberalism’s failure to rid the 
world of conflict through toleration and peace, since both agreed that “war is 
unavoidable” and that individuals form groups, or factions, in order to fight effectively 
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those who threaten them and their specific ways of life.154  Strauss’s solution to the 
problem of war, according to Zuckert, was to emphasize the “rule of law”.  For Schmitt, 
the fundamental political problem was the emphasis on humanitarianism and its 
fundamental goal in achieving world peace at all costs by abolishing war and conflict 
altogether.  In addition, she argues that both thinkers rebelled at the humanitarian goal 
to eliminate all inequality and do away with the concept of rulers and ruled.  She points 
out that Schmitt thought that the idealistic goals of liberal democracy directly led to the 
war to end all wars  - World War One.155  In direct contrast to Schmitt’s diagnosis, she 
further argues that Strauss also learned about “Platonic politics” from his historical 
studies, through reading the Jewish thinker, Maimonides.  According to Strauss, 
Maimonides, in following Plato, realized that the philosophic life (the life dedicated to 
the pursuit of truth) was impossible for the vast majority of people, thus informing 
Strauss that the law must become all-powerful in guiding the majority.  Hence, for 
Strauss, the law joins “the interests of the few with the interests of the many”, thus 
providing a link between the unreflective people and the few philosophers, rather than 
“establish a certain order or rank”.  Finally, she argues, Strauss’s understanding of the 
political, defined as “Platonic politics”, was “a better solution to the contemporary crisis 
than either Nietzsche’s attempt to synthesize master and slave morality or Schmitt’s 
embrace of the one pole in opposition to the other”. 156  
 
In regard to the historical relevance of Schmitt’s and Strauss’s understanding of the 
political, Zuckert, in contrast to Drury and McCormick, argues that Strauss did call for a 
return to the political philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, but did so with great caution.  
She argues that Strauss thought that the task was both “tentative and experimental” and 
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she makes it clear that Strauss did not think that, “classical political philosophy will 
supply us with recipes for today’s use”. 157  She argues that, Strauss’s relevance for 
political science resides in his insight into the political problem, or the limits of politics.  
Thus, she points out, Strauss emphasizes the gulf between the city and philosophy, or 
between the many who are not wise and the wise few.  Zuckert sees Strauss’s arguments 
regarding the political as historically relevant, given that she claims that “the Western 
intellectual tradition” has become “a political issue”, since many classical political 
philosophers are now being charged with racism, sexism and elitism, implying that they 
are exclusionary in their political and theoretic arguments.  Thus, she concludes that the 
mere fact that the political has historically surfaced again, in the form of criticism about 
the justice and goodness of the classical understanding of the political, is useful in 
raising the fundamental question regarding the nature of the political and the nature of 
both the good and the just.158  
 
Although Zuckert is helpful in providing a general, historical sketch that focuses on 
Strauss’s discovery of the significance of Schmitt’s understanding of the political and 
Strauss’s later discoveries in Hobbes, Machiavelli, the mediaeval philosophers and 
finally Plato and Aristotle, she fails to discover the decisive response that Strauss 
addresses to Schmitt in The City and Man.  In fairness to Zuckert, she is more 
concerned with sketching out a general summary of the works of Strauss within a book 
devoted to four other Western philosophers, than in examining the historical importance 
of Schmitt’s arguments supporting his concept of the political.  Her goal was not an 
intensive analysis of one of Strauss’s books, but rather an introduction to Strauss’s 
project in reviving political philosophy.  Zuckert, like all other commentators, fails to 
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examine The City and Man as a book that addresses Strauss’s life- long activity – the 
theologico-political problem.  However, Harry V. Jaffa, a student of Strauss, does 
attempt to explain what Strauss means by the theologico-political problem. 
 
Although Jaffa fails to mention Schmitt, or Strauss’s Comments on Schmitt’s The 
Concept of the Political, he does attempt an historical sketch of Strauss’s understanding 
of the political, or the politico-theological problem.  He defines it as Strauss’s attempt to 
restore:  
 
“. . . the authority of the moral order common to 
philosophy and the Bible, and restoring with it the 
conviction that human life could be well lived only by 
devotion to the ‘high’.  Recognition of what was truly the 
‘high’, moreover, would engender modesty and humility, 
and therewith moderation.”159   
 
Jaffa reminds readers that Strauss’s life- long intellectual occupation was focused upon 
the theologico-political problem.  According to Strauss, “revelation” specifically refers 
to the singular God who is completely “separate from the universe He created” and 
hence, all efforts to rationally explain “the first cause” (God) fail.  This moderates 
reason’s claim to know final causes and promotes a quest for knowledge that refuses to 
abandon reason and revelation for the autonomous “human will as the sole authority”. 160  
Jaffa explains Strauss’s presentation of the theologico-political problem as specifically, 
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the “Jewish problem”, where “the Jewish problem is the most manifest symbol of the 
human problem insofar as it is a social or political problem”.  Jaffa implies that any 
perceived human solution is a contradiction as no nationalism, or culture, appears in 
Jewish orthodoxy.  Jaffa continues, “From the moment of the establishment of 
Christianity, the political problem became the theological-political problem”, suggesting 
that the establishment of Christianity was not consistent with reason and revelation 
expressed as the divine law.  According to Jaffa’s understanding of the theologico-
political problem, “Judaism was (and remains) essentially Law, whereas Christianity is 
essentially Faith”, the latter leading to “The separation of – and tension between – the 
divine law and the human law”.  He argues that “Christianity, and the idea of the City of 
God, brought into being a cosmopolitan world”, which later led to our “candid [secular] 
world”. 161  In explaining how the modern secular world developed, Jaffa argues that 
under the Holy Roman Empire, the old distinction “between fellow citizens and aliens 
(or barbarians)” was substituted by, “the distinction between the faithful and infidels or 
heretics”, since under Christianity everyone could become citizens “of the City of God”.  
He argues that the polis, that Plato and Aristotle described, lost its independence with 
the all-conquering Roman Empire.162  Thus, with the success of one city - the city of 
Rome - it was inevitable, according to Jaffa, that all the pagan gods be replaced by one 
God, especially when it was expected that, “every ancient city could see the triumph of 
Rome as a triumph of the Roman gods”.  The exception, he argues, was Israel, because 
the Jewish people “by reason of their monotheism could not accept any victory or defeat 
in this world as final”.  Later, he argues, the biblical Law of the Jews was replaced by a 
separation between Caesar’s rule and “rendering unto Caesar only the things that are 
Caesar’s, and to God the things that are God’s” that was a prelude to the theologico-
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political problem.  He argues that the universal teaching of Christianity was not able to 
provide the necessary “friendship” and “political loyalt ies” that bound communities 
together in the traditional cities, thus causing the separation of the divine law and 
human law.  According to Jaffa’s interpretation of Strauss, the political problem then 
became the theologico-political problem, which has remained “the centre of his life and 
work”.  Jaffa argues that for Strauss, “The separation of – and tension between - the 
divine law and the human law constituted an absolutely novel problem”.163  Thus, 
Christianity, based on “Faith” and a “Trinity”, that is not essentially a monotheism, only 
complicated the original Jewish religion with its main emphasis on “Law”.  In addition, 
he argues that the new idea of having “one living God for all mankind would dominate 
the political consciousness within which Western man would seek political 
salvation”. 164  Jaffa argues that “the establishment of Christianity was inconsistent with 
both reason and revelation” and led to “theological despotism” when the “religious 
establishment” tried by “practical means”, or by political methods, to solve “the 
theoretical questions on the nature of faith and its relation to reason”.  According to 
Jaffa, modern ideology attempted the same solution that transformed itself into 
“wisdom” leading to “Hitler and Stalin” – i.e. “ideological despotism”, as both the 
Nazis and Communists tried to “resolve the mystery of human life by political means”.  
By this, he argues, Strauss means that the human problem becomes “the Jewish 
problem”.  The chief characteristic of the issue is that the problem canno t be resolved on 
the level of freedom from contradictions.  He argues that Strauss’s understanding of the 
theologico-political problem, means “Political moderation is rooted in the refusal to 
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resolve the mystery of life by political means”, 165 and that Strauss’s stance on the 
blessedness of the American regime is as follows:  
 
“Our respect for the rights of others constitutes an 
essential element of our duty to God, our primary duty, 
and the duty antecedent to our rights.  Only by seeing that 
our respect for others is required by our duty to God can 
there be government which combines majority rule with 
minority rights”. 166 
 
Jaffa’s explanation of Strauss’s historical understanding of the political could be 
plausible, if one assumes that by “revelation” Strauss means biblical revelation.  In The 
City and Man, Strauss never uses the word “revelation”.  In his “Preface” to the English 
translation of his Spinoza book, Strauss speaks of the “victory of any orthodoxy”, 
meaning the victory of any religion, when referring to “the self-destruction of rational 
philosophy”.  Strauss points out that “Jewish orthodoxy” was undermined because it 
was based on a claim to “a superior rationality (Deut., 4:6)” with regards to other 
religions.167  Here, Moses advises the chosen people to keep God’s commandments, 
since they are “your wisdom and your understanding in the sight of the nations, which 
shall hear all these statutes, and say, Surely this great nation is a wise and understanding 
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people”. 168  In criticizing modernity’s reliance on human will and not on rationality, 
Strauss concludes that “the will to power was said to be a fact”, but he suspected that 
“the self-destruction of reason” might be “the inevitable outcome of modern rationalism 
as distinguished from pre-modern rationalism, especially Jewish-medieval rationalism 
and its classical (Aristotelian and Platonic) foundation”, leading Strauss to conclude that 
it “would be unwise to say farewell to reason”.  By a return to “reason”, Strauss implies 
that a recovery of (rational) Orthodox Judaism is also possible.169  Jaffa’s comments on 
the theologico-political problem are helpful in establishing how Christianity became the 
core of the political problem for Strauss, adding evidence that Strauss saw political 
theology as the most serious opponent of political philosophy.  However, unlike Drury 
and McCormick, Jaffa does not mention Strauss’s relationship with Schmitt and 
Strauss’s response to his arguments.  Jaffa joins Drury and McCormick in failing to 
perceive the continuation of Strauss’s indirect response to Schmitt’s arguments as late 
as 1964, when Strauss’s lectures on Plato, Aristotle and Thucydides were finally 
published in The City and Man.  
 
The literature on the historical background of Schmitt and Strauss’s political writings is 
useful in understanding how history is important to both thinkers.  Neumann is helpful 
in pointing out Schmitt’s reliance on historicism that complements his political 
theology.  Zuckert sketches a history of Strauss’s development as a thinker that 
demonstrates his interest in revelation as discovered in mediaeval Jewish and Arab 
philosophers.  As a consequence, one can conclude that Strauss’s respect for political 
theology increased because of his historical studies into mediaeval philosophy that 
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Bible’s emphasis. 
169 Strauss, Leo, Spinoza's Critique of Religion, Sinclair, E. M., trans., op. cit., pp. 30 & 31. 
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focused on the divine law.  Strauss’s choice of the historian, Thucydides, in The City 
and Man, continues his interest in the divine law (ancestral piety) that is essential in 
understanding the pre-philosophic cities.  Drury and McCormick are helpful in pointing 
out the historical circumstances that possibly influenced both Schmitt and Strauss, 
contrary to Strauss’s own argument that a thinker can be understood without having to 
know the historical context in which that thinker lived.170  Finally, the literature on 
history does provide historical evidence that, from the very beginning of their 
relationship, Strauss and Schmitt had a common interest in the connection between 
theology and the political.   
 
3. The Political as Religion 
 
Among the commentators, who have  focused attention on Strauss’s interest in religion 
throughout The City and Man, is Allan Bloom.  He argues that the central thesis in The 
City and Man is Strauss’s final defence of the political that focuses on the execution of 
Socrates for impiety.  By this, Bloom suggests that Strauss learned that the art of 
esoteric writing was essential for philosophic books, given the dangers resulting from 
philosophic inquiry.  These dangers, caused by a philosopher’s activity, included the 
possible destruction of a society’s orthodox beliefs in the gods of the city, as well as the 
following indignation that could result in the persecution of the offending 
philosopher.171  Furthermore, Bloom argues that Strauss knew that esotericism was 
necessary because “there is only a tiny number of men who can potentially philosophize 
and hence understand the teachings of philosophy”. 172  He also argues that Strauss’s 
                                                 
170 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., pp. 50 – 62, 141 – 145. 
171 Bloom, Allan, Giants and Dwarfs, Simon & Schuster, N.Y., U.S.A., 1990, p. 245.   
172 Ibid., p. 252.  Bloom argues that Strauss believed “that philosophy might disappear utterly from the 
world, although he thought nature supported it”. 
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book was an examination of what philosophy was in its original form and what the city 
was, before it was “reinterpreted for the sake of philosophy”.  Bloom argues, “Strauss 
found that the harmony of reason and revelation was Maimonides and Farabi’s public 
teaching, while the private teaching was that there is a radical and irreducible tension 
between them”.  In other words, Strauss’s final understanding of the political presented 
in The City and Man, according to Bloom, was “the quarrel between the divine city and 
the natural one, the most notable incident of which was the execution of Socrates”. 173  
Hence, in contrast to Jaffa and his students, Bloom argues that “Leo Strauss was a 
philosopher”174 and that “The problem for the philosophers is primarily religion”, rather 
than a particular religion.  Unlike Jaffa, Bloom does not distinguish between biblical 
religion and all other religions and he also fails to mention, or draw attention to, what 
might be learned from Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political.175 
 
Father Ernest L. Fortin reminds readers in his article, “The Regime of Separatism: 
Theoretical Considerations on the Separation of Church and State”, that Strauss’s two 
interests in life were “God and politics”.  In recognizing Strauss’s legacy in restoring 
political philosophy to a respected position within the academy, Fortin defines Strauss’s 
two interests: 
 
“By ‘God’ he meant the realm of speculative wisdom, 
once thought to be the preserve of the gifted and 
                                                 
173 Ibid., pp. 244 - 250.  On p. 236, Bloom suggests that the theologico-political problem for Strauss was 
its manifestation in “the most terrible persecutions” of the Jews and the fact that the “most profound 
philosophic figure [Heidegger] of this century was a Nazi”.  He argues that Strauss only clarifies what 
was not solved, or “had become obscure”.  
174 Ibid., p. 239. 
175 Bloom, Allan, The Closing of the American Mind, Simon & Schuster, N.Y., U.S.A., 1987, p. 276.  
Bloom states, “Ancient political philosophy was almost entirely in the service of philosophy, of making 
the world safer for philosophy” – p. 276. 
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inquisitive few who are tortured in their flesh by the 
distinction between truth and untruth and take greater 
delight in exploring the mysteries of the universe or the 
human soul than in performing such notable deeds as 
might win the acclaim of their fellow human beings.  By 
‘politics’ he meant the realm of practical wisdom, which 
finds its most perfect expression in what the Greeks called 
the polis, the self-sufficient human association and the one 
most favorable to the exercise of the noble virtues that 
characterize life at its human, as distinguished from its 
divine, best”. 176  
 
Although Fortin does not raise the issue of the best regime, he sees how the political is 
connected to Strauss’s recovery of the polis where citizens can live decent lives as close 
to the divine as humanly possible.  Fortin argues that these two “fundamental 
alternatives” – God (philosophy) and politics - were Strauss’s teaching regarding 
“generous souls” wishing to aim at “the highest goals”, while also understanding that 
the two alternatives of “human excellence” were in “latent and at times open tension” 
with regards to the pursuit of their “different directions” and “different ends”.  He 
admits that Strauss is “more pious in speech than Aristotle had been” through speaking 
of “God” rather than “the theoretical life as the alternative to the life of gentlemanly 
statesmanship”.  Fortin notes that Strauss knew the dangers of philosophy and the 
respect that philosophers must exercise in dealing with the city, in order not to “disrupt 
its life”, while even improving the city’s way of life.  Although Fortin fails to mention 
                                                 
176 Fortin, Ernest L., Collected Essays, Vol. 3, Human Rights, Virtue, and the Common Good: Untimely 
Meditations on Religion and Politics, Benestad, Brian J., editor, Rowman & Littlefield, U.S.A., 1996, p. 
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Carl Schmitt, he does note the “apolitical character” of Christianity in comparison to the 
other mainstream religions.  He notices Fustel de Coulanges’s observation of the 
political changes that radical Christianity brought about in elevating the private over the 
public, but Fortin does not examine Strauss’s The City and Man and the importance of 
“the holy city” for Strauss’s understanding of Thucydides.177   
 
In addressing Schmitt’s unorthodox Christianity, Neumann agrees with Heinrich Meier 
in labelling Schmitt a political theologian because of Schmitt’s “radical Catholicism”, 
which was essentially “apolitical”; yet, he criticizes Meier for not drawing attention to 
the connection that “Platonic Judaism” has with the goodness of law.  Neumann’s 
description of Strauss’s political philosophy as “Platonic Judaism” is based on his 
reading of Strauss’s “Preface to Spinoza’s Critique of Religion”.  Neumann draws 
attention to Strauss’s claim that “Official Judaism was legalistic and hence 
rationalistic”.  According to Strauss, official Judaism was the ordinary priestly Judaism 
that contrasts with the inspired revelation of various prophets of Judaism.  Strauss 
argues that official Judaism was supported by “philosophical rationalism”, which was 
represented by Plato’s idea “of a God as an artificer who makes the universe by looking 
up to the unchangeable lifeless ideas”.  According to Strauss, in Liberalism Ancient and 
Modern, “official Judaism asserted that God has created the world and governs it sub 
ratione boni” (“by reason of the good”), because God is an “artificer who makes the 
universe by looking up to the unchangeable, lifeless ideas”.  Strauss then accuses 
Spinoza of rebelling against the legalistic God of official Judaism, preferring the 
Christian interpretation “of the God who will be what He will be”, or the mysterious 
                                                 
177 Ibid., pp. 2 & 3. 
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God that is “the absolutely free and sovereign God of the Bible”.  Strauss calls this God 
one that is “simply beyond good and evil”.178   
 
Using Strauss as his authority, Neumann sees Schmitt’s God as the same as Spinoza’s, 
arguing that the “ultimate authority” in Schmitt’s political theology is “divine will, not 
inherent goodness”.  In contrast to God represented as a mysterious “divine will”, the 
Platonic God of official Judaism was a static God of “inherent goodness”.  Thus, 
Neumann argues that Schmitt’s God is “dictatorial” whose “will is law”.  In Neumann’s 
opinion, Schmitt’s Christianity is an extremist piety that takes the form of “a tyrannic 
theology” that Neumann labels “Spinozist-Christian Judaism”, which opposes Strauss’s 
“official Platonic Judaism”. 179  According to Neumann, Schmitt’s interpretation of the 
Christian God asserts that “individualism is primary”, since the omnipotent God “is not 
bound by law”.  Furthermore, Schmitt’s God stresses punishment for evil, rather than 
the Platonic Judaic teaching regarding law as “a positive good, ultimately the greatest 
good”.  This comes from Schmitt’s acceptance of Spinoza’s view on God, Neumann 
argues.  Neumann believes that Schmitt’s religion comes very close to nihilism as 
Schmitt’s “real enemy compels the always terrifying confrontation with one’s 
nothingness, a shocking awakening for the sinful”.  The only thing that saves Schmitt 
from nihilism, or what Neumann defines as atheism, is Schmitt’s faith in the “unique 
historical event” of the “Incarnation” – i.e. the embodiment of God in Christ as an 
experience rather than a universal law.  Neumann sees Strauss’s “experiences of law 
                                                 
178 Neumann, Harry, “Political Philosophy or Self-Knowledge?  Comments on Schmitt and Meier”, 
Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy, vol. 24, no. 1, Fall 1996, pp. 117 & 118.  See Strauss, 
Leo, Liberalism Ancient and Modern, Basic Books Inc., New York, U.S.A., 1968, p. 242. 
179 Ibid., p. 118. 
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essentially as a positive good, ultimately the greatest good”, in contrast to Schmitt’s 
stress on the terror of individual nihilism. 180   
 
In pointing to the importance of Schmitt’s and Strauss’s reliance on religion, Neumann 
argues that “All mankind’s serious political fights are over what constitutes man’s true 
God, his natural perfection or happiness”.  This explains Strauss’s preference for Plato’s 
natural right that points to “a natural good or perfection towards which his life naturally 
tends”181 that challenges Schmitt’s God that calls for a “piety of desperation”. 182  
According to Neumann, these views, which appear in a religious context of a battle over 
the highest good (god), represent “mankind’s two main alternatives with respect to self-
knowledge and, therefore, with respect to serious thought about anything”.  By “self-
knowledge”, Neumann means Schmitt’s need “for omnipotent saviors”, or what 
Neumann calls Schmitt’s “Spinozist-Christian Judaism”, that contrasts with Strauss’s 
emphasis on the divine law, or “Platonic Judaism”.183   
 
In his book, Liberalism, Neumann argues that Strauss “prudently” did not explicitly 
state that Schmitt’s unorthodox Christianity, based on Original Sin, was his major 
defect in not fully understanding the political.  According to Neumann, Strauss blames 
Schmitt for relying on orthodox Christian dogmas, such as the “corruption of man’s 
nature through original sin”, that prevented “Schmitt’s theology from being really 
political”.  However, Neumann does not explain why Schmitt’s acceptance of “original 
                                                 
180 Ibid., pp. 119 - 120. Neumann’s analysis is based on Strauss’s Liberalism Ancient and Modern, op. 
cit., pp. 242 & 243. 
181 Ibid., p. 122. 
182 Ibid., p. 121. 
183 Ibid., p. 130.  Neumann agrees with Meier that Schmitt’s concept of the enemy is “the external 
representation of one’s internal questionableness, he who casts one’s very being into doubt”, p. 120. 
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sin” leads to his theology not “being really political”.184  Nevertheless, Neumann 
considers Schmitt to be “a political theologian”, rather than a “Nietzschean or 
Heideggerian historicist”, or a Nazi, nihilist, atheist, or legal positivist.185  In arguing 
that Schmitt is a religious moralist, Neumann sees him as “potentially philosophic, as in 
a way, all pious or political men are”,  unlike those “pseudo” liberals, who lack self-
knowledge in honestly facing their nihilism.186   
 
Neumann also argues that one can learn from Schmitt’s general approach to his political 
understanding, since the fundamental key to Schmitt’s understanding of the political lies 
in his statement, “citing Donoso Cortez”, that “Without theology, no morality, and 
without morality no politics”.187  In emphasizing Schmitt’s Christian faith, Neumann 
points out that Schmitt often quoted I Thessalonians (5:3) against those who would 
moralize and politicize “universal peace and security”, because “when they shall say 
peace and security, then sudden destruction shall come upon them . . . and they shall not 
escape”. 188  For Neumann, Schmitt defines the political as unavoidable, because “All 
men are pious and, therefore, political, whether they realize it or not” and that the law, 
army and police are evidence of “the belligerent determination to legitimate one’s gods” 
and force others to obey, since “The practice of politics has not changed since Cain, the 
founder of the first city, and Romulus, the founder of Rome”. 189  Neumann argues that 
                                                 
184 Neumann, Harry, Liberalism, op. cit., p. 93.  Neumann seems to believe that the Platonic idea of the 
good and the natural perfection of the philosopher disappear, if all human beings are deemed evil through 
“original sin”. 
185 Ibid., p. 92. 
186 Ibid., p. 95. 
187 Neumann, Harry, “Political Theology?  An Interpretation of Genesis (3:5, 22)”, op. cit., p. 78. 
188 Neumann, Harry, Liberalism, op. cit., p. 263. 
189 Neumann, Harry, “Eternal and Temporal Enemies: Carl Schmitt’s Political Theology”, Political 
Communication, vol. 9, 1992, p. 280.  On p. 283, he claims Schmitt thinks “agnosticism (skepticism 
about whether God exists) is impossible” even in terms of “intellectual honesty”.  He continues, “Men 
either are atheist or political-theological (defenders of some cherished morality, even of the dishonest 
effort to make atheism politically respectable, to have an atheist god)”.  For Schmitt, “atheism is the worst 
crime”. 
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Schmitt’s attempt to establish a “Christian political theology” failed, because “A 
humble, crucified god provides no support for the elitism inseparable from politics”.  
Neumann further argues that it was Schmitt’s “Jew-hatred” that prevented him from 
recovering the Jewish/Platonic political theology that establishes faith in the law and a 
respect for the role of eros in providing for natural happiness.  Schmitt’s belief in 
Christ, and the fate of Christ in the hands of the Jews, had much to do with his dislike of 
the Jewish religion, Neumann concludes.190   
 
Neumann also notes that Schmitt “called Strauss the only philosopher among his 
critics”, because of Strauss’s preference for mediaeval Jewish philosophy that took 
seriously the piety of Orthodox Judaism. 191  Therefore, Neumann argues that Strauss 
was closer to Schmitt than to his Hegelian friend, Alexandre Kojève, since Schmitt was 
“potentially philosophic, as in a way, all pious or political men are”.  According to 
Neumann, all Schmitt needed to do to become philosophic was “seriously” to 
“question” his “politics or piety”.  Neumann argues that it was Strauss’s intention to 
warn Schmitt of the “pseudo-liberal obfuscation of liberalism’s nihilism”, or the 
“abyss”, brought about by “Spinozist-Christian Judaism”, which teaches that there is 
nothing higher than universal experience, that is both unique and individual. 192   
 
 
Susan Shell, in her article on Strauss and Schmitt called “Taking Evil Seriously: 
Schmitt’s Concept of the Political and Strauss’s True Politics”, argues that Strauss and 
Schmitt agreed on posing the political as a solution to the moral weakness of liberalism, 
but that the “fundamental criticism of Schmitt grows out of the latter’s failure to reflect 
                                                 
190 Neumann, Harry, “Political Theology?  An Interpretation of Genesis (3:5, 22)”, op. cit., pp. 81 & 87 
(footnote 12). 
191 Neumann, Harry, Liberalism, op. cit., pp. 94 & 95.  Neumann’s authority is Meier, H., Carl Schmitt, 
Leo Strauss und Der Begriff Politischen, Stuttgart, 1988, p. 16. 
192 Ibid., p. 95.  Neumann thinks that Schmitt “knew what Strauss was about”, see p. 94. 
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adequately on the distinction between human evil and guiltless or animal 
dangerousness”. 193  The key to Schmitt’s failure, according to Shell, is that he did not 
recognize the fact that humans  are evil, meaning that they are morally depraved, 
although he did realize that humans needed to arrange organized protection from others, 
or in short, that they needed to be ruled.  Yet, she also argues that Schmitt spoke of his 
definition of evil with “sympathy”, because he argued that human evil was 
“dangerousness” and this needed to be encouraged to overcome the lack of seriousness 
in modern life.194  According to Shell, Strauss rejects Schmitt’s Nietzschean call for a 
tightrope walker willing to make danger the theme of life.  Nevertheless, Shell points 
out that Strauss thought that Schmitt and he (“we”) had “stumbled on by chance”, the 
“necessary connection between politics and theology”.  Although Strauss fails to 
mention Schmitt in the last paragraph of the first chapter of his 1935 book, Philosophy 
and Law, Shell suggests that Strauss includes Schmitt in referring to the plural “we”.  
She also reminds readers that Strauss thought that what could be learned from Schmitt 
was distinct from following Schmitt’s opinion on Hobbes.195  
 
Shell explains that both Schmitt and Strauss converged on Hobbes as the thinker, who 
had established the foundations of the political (“the state of nature”) that underpinned 
the concept of culture.  According to Shell, “the state of nature”, defined as the war 
among individual human beings, was a polemical notion that was negated by Hobbes, 
whereas Schmitt affirmed the state of nature, defining it “unpolemically”, as a war 
among groups, which were “divided into friend and foe”.  Furthermore, Shell sees 
                                                 
193 Shell, Susan, “Taking Evil Seriously: Schmitt’s Concept of the Political and Strauss’s True Politics”, 
in Deutsch, Kenneth L. & Nicgorski, Walter, editors, Leo Strauss: Political Philosopher and Jewish 
Thinker, op. cit., pp. 185 & 186. 
194 Ibid., pp. 188 & 189.  Shell’s emphasis. 
195 Ibid., p. 186.  Strauss did not agree with Schmitt’s claim that Hobbes “believed in the divinity of 
Christ”. 
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Schmitt resisting “evaluating the political, because he holds all such evaluations to be 
mere normativities, or fictions in contradistinction to the political, which deals with life 
and death – hence with the real”.  Thus, it appears that Schmitt’s concept of morality 
was “subjective”, according to Shell, primarily because the dangerousness of humans 
(i.e. the political) takes the place of judgement and “is man’s inescapable destiny”, 
meaning that the “political simply is”.  She further indicates that Schmitt contradicted 
himself in asserting that the political “is not simply inescapable”, since “Schmitt 
promotes the political”, admitting that it is threatened by a world of entertainment.196  In 
addition, she argues that, unlike Strauss, Schmitt did not take his bearings on the 
political from how “ordinary citizens understand it”, and consequently, the statement 
that humans need “dangerous foes” is rendered absurd, as dangerousness is a “defect” 
and not a virtue.  Furthermore, Shell argues that Schmitt takes his bearing from the 
“exception or the extreme” rather than from Strauss’s “typical case” that is “the essence 
of virtue”.197  Shell implies that she agrees with Strauss’s argument in his “Comments” 
that the last thing anyone wants is dangerous enemies.  Given that Schmitt did not return 
to a pre-Hobbesian understanding of evil, and that Schmitt treats “humanitarian-pacifist 
morality to be morality”, Shell argues, in agreement with Strauss, that Schmitt remained 
trapped in “the liberal- individualistic opinion that relegates the moral to the private 
realm of mere normativities”. 198   
 
Shell explains why Schmitt viewed the political as the “exception or the extreme”, by 
returning to Strauss’s 1935 book, Philosophy and Law.  Here, Shell relates how Strauss 
argues that “ancient and medieval philosophy” always understood the “extreme on the 
                                                 
196 Ibid., p. 188. 
197 Ibid., pp. 188 – 191.  
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basis of the typical”, but “modern philosophy . . . understands the typical on the basis of 
the extreme”. 199  By the modern “extreme”, Strauss meant “the right of necessity” that 
became the right of self-preservation, whereas the traditional “extreme” was located in 
Socratic philosophy that emphasized human perfection. 200  Shell quotes Strauss in 
explaining mediaeval philosophy’s Platonic goal, “Alfarabi is not concerned with the 
state in general but with the state directed to the proper perfection of man, with the 
‘excellent state’, the ideal state”. 201  According to Shell’s reading of Strauss, the net 
result of the modern approach was the ability to ignore the original question of virtue 
and whether it could be taught, because it was seen as a “trivial” question.  In ignoring 
whether virtue could be taught, Strauss argues, modernity then accepted the “extreme 
(‘theological’) virtue of love” that became “the ‘natural’ (‘philosophical’) virtue”. 202  
According to Strauss, this was part of the radical, modern project that was based on 
Socrates’s (“the founder of the philosophic tradition”) criticism of “the natural ideal of 
courage”.  Strauss had pointed out that in the “extreme” life of the philosopher, the 
virtue of courage was still included, whereas modern philosophy excluded courage 
altogether.203  Shell implies that Schmitt sides with the extreme case, i.e. the “natural 
necessity” of self-preservation that leads to potential war, because he loses sight of the 
                                                 
199 Ibid., pp. 188 & 189 (footnote 25). 
200 Strauss, Leo, Philosophy and Law - Contributions to the Understanding of Maimonides and His 
Predecessors, Adler, Eve, trans., op. cit., p. 136.  Shell does not spell out everything, but requires the 
reader to check with Strauss’s works. 
201 Shell, Susan, “Taking Evil Seriously: Schmitt’s Concept of the Political and Strauss’s True Politics”, 
in Deutsch, Kenneth L. & Nicgorski, Walter, editors, Leo Strauss: Political Philosopher and Jewish 
Thinker, op. cit., p. 185.  See Strauss, Leo Philosophy and Law - Contributions to the Understanding of 
Maimonides and His Predecessors, op. cit., p. 125.  Here, Strauss also says, “the only context in which 
prophecy proper can be understood radically is that of politics.  Here ‘politics’ and ‘political’ are to be 
understood in the Platonic sense”.  Strauss then equates the political with the best regime. 
202 Ibid., pp. 188 & 189 (footnote 25).  In footnote 24, Shell mentions a private letter that Strauss wrote in 
1932 to Schmitt where Schmitt, according to Strauss, lost sight of the political. Schmitt believed that 
groupings were the natural tendency of human beings, hence, only demonstrating that it was the 
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be attacked for “losing sight of the political in the decisive sense”.   
203 Strauss, Leo, Philosophy and Law - Contributions to the Understanding of Maimonides and His 
Predecessors, Adler, Eve, trans., op. cit., p. 136.  Again, Shell does not spell this out. 
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political through his agreement with Hobbes in severing “the connection between 
reason and the claim to rule”. 204 
 
Shell observes that “Strauss’s final (public) word on Schmitt” was in Strauss’s new 
preface to the German edition of his Hobbes book.  In that preface, Shell argues, Strauss 
indicates that it was “philosophic interest in theology” that linked him not with Carl 
Schmitt, but with Kant’s “true politics”.  She notes that Strauss states that it “explains” 
his direction even at the time of writing the preface.  In contrast to Strauss’s praise of 
Kant, Schmitt, as late as 1927, still called Hobbes “by far the greatest and perhaps the 
only truly systematic thinker”.  At that time, she points out, Strauss became more 
interested in Hobbes, without turning into an Hobbesian liberal.  The reasons why 
Strauss did not embrace Hobbes’s theory on natural right, were his devotion to a 
“philosophic interest in theology” and his investigation into “the preliberal moral 
horizon within which Hobbes founded liberalism”.  Yet, in opting for Kant’s “true 
politics”, she argues, Strauss “was no Kantian”.  By this, Shell means that Strauss took 
“the moral law” very seriously.  The connection between Strauss and Schmitt, she 
argues, focused on the status of “the moral” that must take seriously moral evil.  Shell 
believes that Schmitt accepted the liberal view that the moral is “merely private and 
hence not genuinely binding”.  She concludes that Strauss thought that one must 
recognize “the primacy of duty for political life, and hence an understanding of the 
significance of Law in its original premodern sense”.  Schmitt, she points out, adopted 
“the neo-Kantian view of law as an abstract universal norm”, just as he accepted the 
liberal morality of his time that emphasized “private and hence nonbinding ideals”.205 
                                                 
204 Shell, Susan, “Taking Evil Seriously: Schmitt’s Concept of the Political and Strauss’s True Politics”, 
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The literature on religion confirms the importance, for Strauss, of political theology as a 
fundamental alternative to political philosophy.  Bloom sees that the key problem for 
philosophers is religion.  From Bloom’s observations, one could expect that Strauss 
would address religion in one of his mature works.  Although the commentators fail to 
see Strauss’s continued response to Schmitt in The City and Man, all realize that Strauss 
took seriously the challenge of religion to philosophy.  Neumann is particularly helpful 
in observing that Strauss’s response to Schmitt represents “mankind’s two main 
alternatives with respect to self-knowledge”, namely political philosophy and political 
theology, while Shell points out Schmitt’s and Strauss’s 1930s discovery of the 
connection between politics and theology.  Finally, most commentators note the threat 
that philosophy poses to society and the necessity for philosophers to write prudently, in 
order to protect the traditional beliefs of the community.  Neumann demonstrates that 
Strauss was cautious in openly criticizing Schmitt’s Christianity, even though Strauss 
knew it was the basis of Schmitt’s foundation of the political.  This helps expla in why 
Strauss was so reticent to mention Schmitt, and Schmitt’s unorthodox Christianity, in 
The City and Man.  The literature also provides evidence supporting this thesis that 
Strauss did write a theologico-political treatise that deals with the issue of whether 
religion, or political philosophy (reason), is the best answer to the question, “who, or 
what should rule?”.  For both Schmitt and Strauss, the question of rule points to the 
importance of knowledge as the highest authority in the order of the human things, as 
spelt out in the sixth criteria that requires “pure and whole knowledge”.  It is now 
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necessary to examine the literature that explores Strauss’s and Schmitt’s discussion of 
the political as knowledge.206  
 
4. The Political as Knowledge 
 
Since both Strauss and Schmitt argue that the political is “the order of the human 
things” that is based on “a pure and whole knowledge” it is important to examine the 
literature that elucidates what both thinkers mean by “knowledge”. 207  From the 
literature it appears that knowledge, especially self-knowledge, is a key concept for both 
Schmitt and Strauss.  Strauss’s return to classical rationalism represents his preference 
for Socratic political philosophy that is characterized by a return to nature, and the best 
regime, that can be outlined using human reason found within the soul.  Schmitt also 
places emphasis on divine knowledge, which for commentators such as Meier, implies 
knowing the enemy from within one’s soul.  Schmitt presents the political as something 
that can be explained, and hence understood, although ultimate knowledge resides with 
a mysterious God that remains intertwined with history. 
 
Nasser Behnegar argues that Strauss’s return to political philosophy was a return to 
“classical rationalism” that seemed to be “the true standard of rationalism”.208  In 
explaining the issue of classical rationality, Behnegar points to Strauss’s concern with 
common sense, particularly with the knowledge of “the fully conscious form of the 
common sense understanding of political things”.  He argues that Strauss meant by 
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common sense, not looking at “political life through the medium of a tradition of 
political philosophy”, but seeing the political as “directly connected to political life”.  
Thus, for Strauss, this excludes any need for a scheme, theory or method, since ordinary 
citizens never see their own actions as part of philosophic speculation.  It was this 
simplistic reflection of the political phenomena, which appears in “assemblies and 
councils”, that Strauss strived to reflect, thus excluding the sophisticated concepts, such 
as, “the state of nature” and “the civil state”.  According to Behnegar, the “awareness of 
concrete experiences that precedes all scientific understanding” is exactly “what 
existentialism seeks”, but fails to achieve, because existentialism begins with abstract 
notions and then tries to move to the concrete, or existential foundations.209  The 
“commonsense moral opinions” are a way to “knowledge”, according to Strauss, 
because these opinions contradict one another and hence, “point beyond themselves 
toward the consistent account of the matter at hand”. 210  Furthermore, he argues that 
Strauss taught that political life could not be subject to philosophy as politics required 
“practical skill that provides guidance” and not an abstract description of how politics 
work.  Nevertheless, he thinks that Strauss thought that the “only serious alternative to 
the philosophic life” for serious people, was “the political life”, because “the home of 
opinion” was “politics”.  According to Behnegar, the correct definition of political 
philosophy is not “the philosophic treatment of politics, but the political, or popular, 
treatment of philosophy”.  He argues:  
 
“The decisive importance of classical political philosophy 
for Strauss consisted in its ability to show that moral-
                                                 
209 Ibid., p. 106. 
210 Ibid., p. 107.  Behnegar thinks the modern emphasis on “institutions” misses the mark, as “institutions 
depend on the human beings who inhabit them”.  On p. 108, he thinks that the question should focus on 
the characters of those who wish to rule, therefore addressing the fundamental question, “Who should 
rule?” at the same time being guided by the idea of the good.  
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political life understood in its own terms necessarily points 
to the philosophic life as the best human life and that it 
does this without first assuming that the universe is 
intelligible”. 211   
 
He presents Strauss arguing that classical rationalism begins with examining the 
political questions raised in normal political life, such as “What is the best regime?”, 
“What is a good human being?”, and “Who should rule?”.212  In other words, Behnegar 
thinks that Strauss’s final answer concerning the political demonstrates a knowledge of 
what is highest in human beings, through giving readers an insight into their “higher and 
lower desires”.  Unfortunately, Behnegar does not list what those desires are and how 
they form a part of a hierarchy of ends.213   
 
Behnegar argues that Strauss thought Machiavelli substituted the Socratic understanding 
of “the best regime” and “the most fundamental political controversy: What type of 
human being should rule?” for the less problematic concept of “legitimate government” 
that developed duties from natural right based on commonly recognized terrors, such as 
the fear of “violent death”.214  He argues that Strauss saw that modern thinkers, 
including Hobbes and Locke, had failed to “meet the challenge of biblical morality” and 
had, in a way, no longer remained philosophers.  Furthermore, he points out that Strauss 
concludes that they “accepted on trust the view that political philosophy or political 
science is possible or necessary”. 215  In summarizing Strauss’s legacy, Behnegar 
                                                 
211 Ibid., p. 110. 
212 Ibid., p. 108.   
213 Ibid., p. 110. 
214 Ibid., p. 112. 
215 Ibid., p. 114.  See Strauss, Leo, Natural Right and History, op. cit., p. 167, from Strauss’s division on 
Hobbes. 
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stresses that Strauss’s emphasis on knowing meant “Understanding”, rather than the 
possession of solutions to fundamental problems.  In quoting Strauss’s ultimate 
observation, he concludes that “we must say that Strauss’s legacy is his contribution to 
“the recovery of the permanent problems”. 216 
 
Meier is the most prolific commentator on Schmitt’s and Strauss’s description of the 
political.  In his book, The Lesson of Carl Schmitt, he directly addresses Schmitt’s 
definition of the political, in a chapter called, “Politics, or What is Truth?”.  Meier 
points out that from the three definitions that Schmitt gives, the central definition of the 
political concerns “knowledge”, which is the foundation of the distinction between 
friend and enemy.217  Meier argues that the specific knowledge, to which Schmitt 
referred, was “man’s knowledge of himself, of the insight into what he is and what he 
ought to be”.  He further argues that to reach the fundamental premise behind Schmitt’s 
The Concept of the Political means grasping the book as “a piece of his political 
theology”, implying that the self-knowledge he requires is whether one is either a 
political philosopher or a political theologian.  Furthermore, Meier reminds readers that 
Schmitt’s definition of the political is not an “exhaustive definition”, or a “summary”, 
but merely a “simple criterion of the political”.  He concludes that Schmitt believed that 
the political was “essentially self-knowledge”,218 because the foundation of the political 
is the question “what is right” that presupposes knowledge of the right way of life, or 
whether political philosophy is superior to political theology. 219  He explains that many 
commentators have failed to see how Schmitt viewed the political as “total” and not just 
                                                 
216 Ibid., p. 115.  See Strauss, Leo, Thoughts on Machiavelli, University of Chicago Press, Phoenix 
Edition, U.S.A., 1978, pp. 14 (where Strauss writes of “permanent problems”), 174, 243, 295 & 296. 
217 Meier, Heinrich, The Lesson of Carl Schmitt – Four Chapters on the Distinction between Political 
Theology and Political Philosophy, Brainard, Marcus, trans., University of Chicago Press, U.S.A., 1998, 
p. 26.  My emphasis. 
218 Ibid., p. 27. 
219 Ibid., pp. 40 & 41. 
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a “domain”.  Meier suggests that readers need to gain knowledge of how, and why, 
Schmitt changed the content of his book over the years.  Meier alerts readers that 
Schmitt published his book three times: in 1927, 1932 and in 1933, with crucial changes 
that were the result of Strauss’s criticisms.  Furthermore, Meier claims, “From the start 
to finish what concerns Schmitt is not the independence of the political but rather its 
authoritativeness”, which transcends all other cultures, ideas and ends through the 
“material power” of the “dire emergency” (Ernstfall), where people risk physical 
death. 220  Meier argues that Schmitt’s 1927 concentration on foreign power was related 
to war among peoples and not nations.  Nevertheless, in the 1932 edition, Schmitt took 
up the issue of civil war, or “organized political units”, including religious groups, 
“classes and other human groups” alongside Schmitt’s discussion of external war.221  
Such groups of people could become political in willingly opposing “one enemy”.  For 
Schmitt, there is a distinct possibility that “everything is political” in his definition, 
because Schmitt claimed that the political was “existential” and based on the universal 
fear of death, as well as the fact that politics is “destiny”.  The key, according to Meier’s 
understanding of Schmitt, is to realize that the political is not synonymous with the 
State, nation, or the community, but with the “association and disassociation” posed by 
the dire emergency (Ernstfall), which is the “extreme battle”. 222  According to Meier, 
there were four added sentences to the 1933 edition (two are in italics) and it appears 
that the key word, for Schmitt, was “wholly”, particularly in “grasping man wholly”, 
indicating, for Meier, that all political associations were included in the act of dire 
emergency (Ernstfall), or “violent death”.223   
 
                                                 
220 Ibid., pp. 30 & 31. 
221 Ibid., p. 33.  Meier’s emphasis.  
222 Ibid., pp. 34 & 35. 
223 Ibid., p. 36.  Meier’s emphasis. 
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In an earlier book, Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss – The Hidden Dialogue, Meier 
endeavours to demonstrate that Strauss was Schmitt’s superior, giving open and hidden 
corrections to the older student, which were noted and taken up by Schmitt, but not 
acknowledged or footnoted.224  Following Strauss’s opinion of Schmitt, Meier argues 
that Schmitt did not transcend liberalism and that Strauss’s interest in Schmitt’s 
Concept of the Political was “to complete the critique of liberalism” and to make more 
powerful Schmitt’s arguments.225  Meier’s evidence of Strauss’s superiority in 
instructing Schmitt focuses on Schmitt’s discussion of the questionable nature of 
culture, which had been divided into a number of independent areas.  Schmitt had 
originally intended his idea of the political to be “independent”, but “not in the sense of 
having its own new domain”, implying a criticism of the reigning doctrine of culture 
that stressed “relatively independent domains”.  According to Meier, in Schmitt’s 1933 
edition, the expression, “relatively independent domains” disappeared and was replaced 
by the word, “independent”, in italics for emphasis.  Meier explains that this small 
change forced the political opposition of friend and enemy into “far deeper opposition” 
than the “oppositions between good and evil, beautiful and ugly etc”. 226  According to 
Meier, Schmitt’s changes signify that the political was not just another liberal 
expression of a relative and independent domain, but that it was the “authoritative” part 
(“unit”), which was “total and sovereign”.227  Typical of Meier’s evidence is his 
attention to Schmitt changing (five times) the appearance of the word, “autonomous”, 
including inverted commas in his 1933 edition, thus indicating for Meier, Schmitt’s 
                                                 
224 Meier, Heinrich, Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss – The Hidden Dialogue, Lomax, Harvey J., trans., op. 
cit., pp. 7, 8, 37, 58 & 61. 
225 Ibid., p. 11.  The question of not footnoting Strauss’s ideas makes sense, as Strauss was a Jew while 
Schmitt became a Nazi in 1933, unbeknown to Strauss. 
226 Ibid., pp. 12 & 13. 
227 Ibid., p. 16.  Strauss uses the word, “fundamental”.  Meier’s emphasis. 
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distancing himself from accepting the premises of modern liberalism, just as Strauss 
suggested.228 
 
According to Meier, Schmitt argues that politics could now reach its peak, if the enemy 
were able to negate “one’s own being, of one’s own destiny”.  For Meier, Schmitt’s 
example of “a peak of great politics” was Schmitt’s mention of Cromwell in his war 
with Catholic Spain, since this special enemy was a “providential enemy”.  This fateful 
enemy had the effect of dissolving all other classifications and Meier argues that 
Schmitt saw that Cromwell’s religious claim was more powerful than Lenin’s war 
against the middle classes, or any other secular war for that matter.229  In The Lesson of 
Carl Schmitt, Meier concludes that, for Schmitt, politics reaches “its absolute form” 
“only when it reaches the intensity of the battle of faith”, and this means having reached 
“the peak of great politics”, where “faith fights errant faith”.230   
 
According to Meier, Strauss also reminded Schmitt of the concept of human nature, or 
more specifically about the state of nature, that Hobbes had in mind.   Meier also argues 
that Strauss moved beyond Schmitt’s problem of the “dire emergency”, which defines 
the political, by showing that Hobbes was the founder of liberalism and “the author of 
the ideal of civilization” and the very genesis of the modern problem of the 
“depoliticized and neutralized” world state.  Meier argues that Strauss forced Schmitt to 
return to the founder of liberalism – Hobbes - in order to get to the very heart of the 
problem of the political, further pointing out that this message can be found in Strauss’s 
only footnote in his essay on Schmitt’s book, The Concept of the Political.  Meier also 
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229 Ibid., pp. 28 & 29.  Meier’s emphasis. 
230 Meier, Heinrich, The Lesson of Carl Schmitt – Four Chapters on the Distinction between Political 
Theology and Political Philosophy, Brainard, Marcus, op. cit., trans., p. 60.  Meier’s emphasis. 
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argues that Schmitt acted on Strauss’s suggestion, because in the first edition of 
Schmitt’s book on the political, Schmitt spoke of Hobbes as, “by far the greatest and 
perhaps the sole truly systematic political thinker”.  However, in the 1933 edition, 
Schmitt wrote that Hobbes was only, “a great and truly systematic political thinker”.  
Apparently, for Meier, Schmitt made other numerous crucial changes in his later 
editions, following Strauss’s critique.231 
 
At the centre of his book, Meier argues that Strauss’s fundamental view on the issue of 
Schmitt’s understanding of the political was that Schmitt condemns a universal world 
state dedicated to an easy life of modern comforts; however, Meier argues that 
Schmitt’s answer to what constitutes the right life, required a return to political 
theology.  Meier stresses that Strauss thought that “Schmitt’s last word was not the 
affirmation of the political in the sense of affirmation of fighting as such, but the order 
of the human things”, and hence, that Schmitt, who accepts “metaphysical opposition” 
was not a “follower of Nietzsche”. 232  According to Meier, Strauss crystallized 
Schmitt’s political teaching that the question “put to man” was the choice of whether to 
“obey God or Satan” and that this was the “ultimate foundation in the inevitability of 
this question”.  In short, Meier demonstrates that Strauss used Schmitt to show that 
there was a huge “gulf” between political philosophy and political theology, a division 
that could not be obliterated, transcended or synthesized.233  Later, Meier argues that 
Schmitt was less polemical and thus, more open in clarifying his link to political 
theology in his work, Glossarium.  Here, Schmitt argues that political theology was 
based on “revelation”, which means “obedience to the highest authority, understanding 
                                                 
231 Meier, Heinrich, Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss – The Hidden Dialogue, Lomax, Harvey J., trans., op. 
cit., pp. 34 & 35. 
232 Ibid., pp. 64 & 65. 
233 Ibid., pp. 42 & 43. 
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itself consequently as an historical action in the state of probation and judgement”. 234  
Again, Meier confirms Schmitt’s historicism that underlies his concept of the political.  
In returning to nature, Strauss provides an alternative view of the order of the human 
things that can be grasped by reason, and hence, knowledge.  In addition, Meier argues 
that political philosophy and political theology could not refute each other and that the 
political must always consist of the cho ice between the two ways of life, a necessary 
choice, if we were to remain serious human beings.235  What was crucial for Schmitt, 
following Meier’s analysis, was that the political, in the final analysis, had “its deepest 
foundation in original sin”, but Meier, in demonstrating Strauss’s preference for 
political philosophy, argues that Strauss never used, or raised, the issue of “original sin” 
in their dialogue.236   
 
Meier relies on evidence from Schmitt’s book, Political Theology, to support his 
argument tha t Schmitt chose theology as the foundation of his concept of the political.  
However, in The Concept of the Political, Meier focuses on Schmitt’s argument 
concerning theologians and politicians being “disturbing” to a peaceful world.  Meier 
interprets this to mean, “Theologians and politicians will never be superfluous”, because 
it would mean accepting a greater “faith” in the possibility of the elimination of “the 
ultimate distinction and division of men, the distinction between the redeemed and the 
unredeemed, the chosen and the unchosen”.  Accordingly, “politics needs theology not 
to realize a goal but to provide a foundation for its own necessity”.  In this way, Meier 
                                                 
234 Meier, Heinrich, “The Philosopher as Enemy: On Carl Schmitt’s Glossarium,” Graduate Faculty 
Philosophy Journal, vol. 17, nos. 1 & 2, 1994, p. 329.  Meier’s emphasis.  This work comprises his notes 
from 1947 – 51 and Meier claims that, “it contains the entire Schmitt”, p. 328. 
235 Meier, Heinrich, Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss – The Hidden Dialogue, Lomax, Harvey J., trans., op. 
cit., pp. 41 - 43.  
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sees Schmitt’s concentration on “faith” as “the impregnable bastion of the political”. 237  
Meier also argues that Schmitt’s knowledge of evil was not that of Hobbes’s “innocent 
evil”, as seen in the innocent (amoral) behaviour of animals, but the more blameworthy 
biblical evil (“original sin”), based on free will.  This is Schmitt’s final meaning of 
immorality. 238  Lastly, this leads to Meier’s claim that, whereas Schmitt was concerned 
with the “enemy and enmity”, particularly in defining self identity, Strauss was more 
concerned with his friends and that his friends necessarily exposed his true identity.  
Meier means that friends are useful in undertaking the study of philosophy and form an 
essential part of, what Plato calls, the good life that is dedicated to learning and 
knowing.  The implication is that Strauss’s emphasis was on the good, much more than 
on the bad.239   
 
In summary, Meier argues that Strauss’s “Comments” on Schmitt’s political work drew 
Schmitt out of his polemical reticence, allowing his hidden theological foundations to 
come to light.  Meier explains that Schmitt concealed his theological foundations 
because he opposed his enemy – liberalism - knowing that the enemy would turn his 
writings about “metaphysical truth” into endless “discussion”.  As a consequence, 
Schmitt, in highlighting the metaphysical truth of liberalism, thus escaped the prospect 
of having “faith” become the subject of an “eternal competition of opinions”.  Most 
importantly, Meier argues that Schmitt’s “salvation” from the “relativism of private 
matters”, was grounded in “revelation” and in “Providence” and that was what 
constitutes his emphasis on “pure and whole knowledge”.  Hence, any questions about 
                                                 
237 Ibid., pp. 53 – 55.  Meier’s emphasis. 
238 Ibid., p. 56.  Meier’s emphasis. 
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natural human qualities and the human need to join “exclusive groups”, was not 
Schmitt’s final understanding of the political.240 
 
In contrast to Meier, Robert Howse argues that “Schmitt’s last word is not theology, or 
any transcendent basis for human seriousness – his last word is the eternal relation of 
protection and obedience, the unrestrained rule of the strong over the weak”. 241  Howse 
argues that Schmitt “adds to Machiavellianism a secularised Christian dimension” in the 
form of “the demand of probity of intellectual and moral (not just physical) courage”. 242  
He interprets Schmitt’s decisionism as affirming a person’s will to power, as the basis 
of the political, while “nothingness” formed the morality underlying all decisions.  He 
further argues that Schmitt’s friend and enemy distinction was grounded on the concrete 
and the existential, thus denying natural justice, or what is recognized as natural right 
(“legitimacy”).243  In contrast to Meier, Howse argues that Schmitt relied on 
Machiavelli and that in 1932, “Strauss took at face value Schmitt’s declared debt to 
Hobbes”, because Strauss had not realized that Machiavelli, not Hobbes, was “the 
deepest source of modernity”.  Howse believes that, unlike Hobbes’s recognition of the 
exception and his attempt to produce a society that was “secure against the exception”, 
Schmitt and Machiavelli “admired and embraced the exception”.  He argues that 
Schmitt differed from Machiavelli’s “lion and fox” type of ruthless and amoral 
domination and that Schmitt preferred “the resolve and honesty of overt and self-
confident dictatorship, not domination as such”, thus favouring a domination that 
combines the character of Caesar and Martin Luther.  In agreement with Meier, Howse 
thinks that Schmitt denied any possibility of re-establishing natural right.  Howse 
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suggests that Strauss’s chapter on classic natural right in Natural Right and History is 
where “Strauss had occasion to revisit many of Schmitt’s arguments in light of classical 
principles, albeit without naming him”.  In contrast to Strauss’s “Comments” that 
emphasized Schmitt’s concern with morality, Howse implies that Schmitt rejected 
natural right because he understood human beings as being “beyond good and evil”.244  
Thus, Howse concludes that, in 1932, Strauss did not “recognize the position underlying 
Schmitt’s amoralism” that came from Machiavelli, because Strauss had not understood 
Machiavelli as the founder of modern political philosophy.  In lacking this insight, 
Howse believes that Strauss only saw Schmitt as merely an inconsistent Hobbesian.  
Nevertheless, Howse does not explain why Strauss chose to publish his “Comments” in 
1965, in his “Preface” to the English translation of his Spinoza book, without any 
revisions whatsoever.245  
 
Howse argues that Strauss’s engagement with Schmitt that called for an “horizon 
beyond liberalism” is knowledge of “classic natural right” and not Drury’s and 
Holmes’s claim that Strauss presented a virulent anti- liberal solution.  He argues that the 
guide to politics, for the classics, was “human perfection or excellence”, giving rise to 
“closed societies”, hence qualifying Schmitt’s concept of the division into friends and 
enemies.246  Howse argues that Strauss articulates “the best regime” that is “consistent 
with decisionism, not discussion”, where the wise should rule.  However, Howse 
reminds readers that the wise, according to Strauss, do not want to rule and that the 
unwise, appealing to natural right (“wisdom”) and “the lowest desires of the many”, will 
“persuade the multitude of his right” and hence, obtain power.  He further points out 
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that Strauss had argued that the wise prefer discussing fundamental problems rather than 
making Schmittean decisions.  He interprets Strauss’s political solution as knowledge, 
to encompass a “democratic constitutionalism” based on “Persuasion” that incorporates 
general rules formulated by philosophy. 247  In a final statement on Strauss’s counter to 
Machiavelli’s decisionism, Howse argues that classic natural right affirms a hierarchy of 
ends opening up “a bench-mark and an unclosable space for discussion” of whatever 
decision needs to be made.  It does so, according to Howse, with knowledge “in light of 
the hierarchy of ends” that conform to “the strict requirements of justice”. 248 
 
The literature discussed in this division of “The Political as Knowledge” has shown how 
knowledge is fundamental in understanding Schmitt and Strauss regarding the question 
of the political.  Behnegar points to Strauss’s emphasis on knowledge that comes to 
light as a common sense approach to understanding the political, particularly in 
examining the opinions, or the moralities, or various societies.  He also connects the 
best regime with the question, “who, or what, should rule?” suggesting that the standard 
is the philosopher, who is dedicated to knowledge of the highest questions.  More 
importantly, Behnegar, Howse and Meier all agree that Strauss opposes Schmitt’s 
concept of knowledge, be it theological or historical, because Strauss remains a 
philosopher who believes that questioning and discussing are more dominant than 
decision making.  Finally Meier is useful in revealing Schmitt and Strauss’s shared 
interest in learning, which led to their “hidden” dialogue in the 1930s that highlighted 
the difference between political philosophy and political theology.  The fact that their 
earlier responses were mostly “hidden” helps explain why Strauss fails to mention 
Schmitt in The City and Man.  Furthermore, in highlighting the responses, Meier firmly 
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establishes that, for Strauss, the only alternative to political philosophy is political 
theology.  Although Meier fails to see Strauss’s continued response to Schmitt in The 
City and Man, he does see the fundamental opposition between the two ways of life.  
For Strauss, the problem involved in the political rule of political theology as opposed 
to political philosophy is the reason why he must address Schmitt’s political theology 
again in 1964.  Only when Strauss has a more mature knowledge of classical political 
philosophy does he once again address Schmitt and the challenge of political theology. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the relevant scholarship relating to 
Strauss’s connection to Schmitt under the categories of propaganda, history, religion 
and knowledge, to simplify the emphasis of the various commentators.  While much of 
the literature in this review demonstrates a particular theme, or premise, used to build an 
argument concerning Strauss’s and Schmitt’s definition and use of the political, most of 
the literature fails to combine all four themes and hence misses Strauss’s response to 
Schmitt in The City and Man.  However, nearly all of the literature found in all 
categories demonstrates, that for Strauss, religion was, and is, the greatest challenge to 
political philosophy.  As a substantial amount of the literature shows, this challenge was 
particularly evident in Strauss’s early relationship with Schmitt.  The purpose of the 
literature review is not to refute the current scholarship – scholarship that is helpful, 
rather than a hindrance – but to demonstrate the gap in the current scholarship that has 
failed to discover Strauss’s 1964 response to Schmitt.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
SCHMITT’S THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter three outlines Schmitt’s six criteria that form the basis of his affirmation of the 
political as found in his The Concept of the Political.  They include: 1) the recognition 
of evil in human beings; 2) the presence of “dire emergency” (Ernstfall), or the 
potential for war; 3) that a decision regarding the Ernstfall must be transprivate, 
meaning that it must be a public decision and cannot be neutral; 4) that the decision 
must have a content that is decisive and not neutral in determining who is a friend and 
who is an enemy; 5) the presence of the question concerning the right way of life and 6) 
evidence of the regimes, or “the order of human things from a pure and whole 
knowledge”. 249   
 
1. Evil 
 
In demonstrating that human beings are evil, Schmitt argues that the political is 
universal and that human beings clash over what they understand constitutes the best 
way of life.  He points out that the political enemy is viewed as “the other, the stranger” 
and that only “the actual participants can correctly recognize, understand, and judge the 
concrete situation and settle the extreme case of conflict”.  Schmitt argues that the 
discovery of a “concrete” definition of the political requires “discove ring and defining 
                                                 
249 Meier, Heinrich, Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss – The Hidden Dialogue, Lomax, Harvey J., trans., op. 
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the specifically political categories”, stating that the political has “its own criteria”. 250  
He concludes that the independent category, or “autonomy”, that defines the political as 
revealed in the “specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can 
be reduced”, is equivalent to the relationship between friends and enemies.  Schmitt 
immediately blurs the autonomy of the political as “friend and enemy”, by arguing that 
it is like the “relatively independent criteria of other antitheses”.  The crucial first 
example he gives of other antitheses that are “relatively independent” is the one relating 
to “good and evil in the moral sphere”.  In saying that some categories are only 
“relatively independent”, Schmitt leaves open the possibility that some are dependent, 
implying that they are dependent on the political.  Schmitt’s caution belies the fact that 
he intends to make the political the universal category over the economic, the moral and 
the aesthetic.  In singling out the moral category, rather than the aesthetic or economic 
categories, Schmitt suggests that the political and the moral are connected.  
Furthermore, prior to giving his friend and enemy definition, Schmitt states, “Let us 
assume that in the realm of morality the final distinctions are between good and evil”, 
again indicating his central interest in the issue of evil and its link to morality. 251 
 
Schmitt soon qualifies his first definition of the political – the conflict between friend 
and enemy - by arguing that it is only “a criterion” and is not meant to be 
“exhaustive”. 252  He argues that “the friend and enemy concepts” are not metaphoric, 
abstract, or symbolic and not “normative”, because they are found in “the concrete 
situation” where “actual participants can correctly recognize, and judge, the concrete 
situation and settle the extreme case of conflict”.  By a “concrete situation”, Schmitt 
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means the activity of human beings in an historical context.  According to Schmitt, only 
“actual participants can correctly recognize, understand, and judge the extreme case of 
conflict”.  Only under those conditions can one comprehend whether an “adversary 
intends to negate his opponent’s way of life” and force one “to preserve one’s form of 
existence”.  In speaking of ind ividuals, Schmitt refers specifically to the “nations”, or a 
“collectivity of people”, that “continue to group themselves according to the friend and 
enemy antithesis”.  In the final paragraph of chapter two, Schmitt mentions “evil” as the 
emotional response to this threat, while suggesting that evil intensifies the political, the 
political being the “most intense of the distinctions and categorizations”.  A few 
sentences later, in discussing the “autonomy” of other categories, Schmitt again 
mentions evil, this time referring to “the morally evil”.  For a second time, Schmitt links 
morality with evil, but Schmitt does not repeat key words, such as “ugly” or “the 
morally good”, which he used in referring to other categories in the last paragraph, 
implying that his repetition of “evil” is a subtle way of highlighting its fundamental 
connection with the political.253 
 
Schmitt’s definition of the political is restricted to the extreme situation, where the 
dangerous threat of conflict, or war, remains coeval with groups, or nations.  What 
distinguishes a friend from an enemy, according to Schmitt, is the existence of different 
faiths (forms of existence) in absolute values that produce a “conflict of loyalties”. 254  In 
short, he argues that the dangerousness of human beings is evident with the “real 
possibility of physical killing” and in the “negation of the enemy”, that arises over the 
                                                 
253 Ibid., pp. 26, 27 & 28.  In partly following Heidegger, Schmitt had earlier made the argument in “The 
Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations (1929)” that, “All essential concepts are not normative but 
existential”, see Schmitt, Carl, “The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations (1929)”, Telos, no. 96, 
Summer 1993, p. 134. 
254 Ibid., p. 41. 
  
 
106
conflict of ways of life.255  There also seems to be a connection between Schmitt’s 
definition of the political as the extreme case, or potential war among groups, and the 
notion that all human beings are evil.  However, he initially argues that an enemy need 
not be “morally evil” or “aesthetically ugly”, but only needs to be “the other, the 
stranger” in “a specially intense way”.  In determining the enemy as a threat to one’s 
“form”, or way of life, the reader is reminded of the Greek idea of the regime 
(politeia)256.  This will be crucial to Strauss’s refutation of Schmitt’s concept of the 
political as seen in the central chapter of The City and Man, entitled, “On Plato’s 
Republic”, or the best regime, that emphasizes the best life as one dedicated to 
contemplation, peace and friendship.   
 
Schmitt admits that it is “remarkable” that, “all genuine political theories presuppose 
man to be evil, i.e., by no means an unproblematic but a dangerous and dynamic being”.  
Schmitt’s list of “genuine political” theorists only includes modern thinkers, such as 
Machiavelli, Hobbes, Cortés and Hegel and not Plato and Aristotle.257  Schmitt calls the 
enemy, “the other, the stranger” to stress the “alien” “form of existence” that threatens 
to “negate his opponents way of life”.  For Schmitt, the conflicting ways of life, which 
lead to potential war, provide evidence of the evil nature of human beings.258  Having 
already suggested a link between the political and the moral, through using the moral 
category as his prime example of other categories, Schmitt then seems to connect 
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human evil with the biblical doctrine of Original Sin.  In the seventh chapter, he first 
mentions “theologian”, in stating:  
 
“A theologian ceases to be a theologian when he no longer 
considers man to be sinful or in need of redemption and no 
longer distinguishes between the chosen and the 
nonchosen.  The moralist presupposes a freedom of choice 
between good and evil”.259   
 
Once again, Schmitt demonstrates the connection between morality (the “moralist”) and 
the political, since he now uses it in the context of theology that implies Original Sin.  
Schmitt’s reference to a “theologian” appears third in his list of four examples: 
“educator”, “jurist”, “theologian” and “moralist” and is situated prior to his mention of 
“moralist”.  He again seems to imply that there is a connection between morality and 
theology. 260  He goes on to argue, “The fundamental theological dogma of the evilness 
of the world and man leads, just as does the distinction of friend and enemy”, to a lack 
of “optimism of a universal conception of man”. 261  Here, Schmitt seems to separate 
himself from “theological dogmas of sin”, especially the concept of “original sin” 
supported by Donoso Cortés.  In denying “original sin”, Schmitt appears to deny the 
connection that morality has with theology, or what can be conveniently called “moral 
theology”, in spite of his original discussion that implied a connection between morality 
and theology.  In fact, in footnote thirty-three, and in the context of his mention of 
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theology, “original sin”, and Cortés, Schmitt uses the words, “moral theology”. 262  
Furthermore, Schmitt had previously discussed the link that the “political” had with the 
“moral”.  Thus, if a careful reader substitutes “political” for “moral”, the result would 
be “political theology”, the very profession of the thinker, Cortés, whom Schmitt turns 
to in the context of mentioning “the fundamental theological dogma of the evilness of 
the world”.  Although Schmitt seems to avoid wanting to be identified with political 
theology in writing for a liberal audience, he allows readers to make a connection from 
the moral to the political and then to the theological and Original Sin through his 
arguments and examples.263  Schmitt, in an earlier book, Political Theology, describes 
Donoso Cortés as the “Catholic philosopher of the state, one who was intensely 
conscious of the metaphysical kernel of all politics”.  This also describes Schmitt, 
because by “metaphysical”, he means the realm of the divine, or what is held to be 
divine by groups or nations.  In prescribing dictatorship as the solution of the 1848 
revolution in Europe, Cortés, as a political theologian, opposed the end of European 
monarchy by emphasizing “the absolute sinfulness and depravity of human nature”, or 
Original Sin, and hence, the need for dictatorial rule.  Cortés’s definition of Original Sin 
excluded the possibility of natural goodness within the human soul.  In this way, he 
opposed the atheistic movements that were beginning to dominate Europe in the 
nineteenth century.  He condemned the bourgeois liberals of his time as “the discussing 
class”, because they avoided making decisions.  Schmitt points out that Cortés only saw 
liberals in terms of their theology, which meant, for Cortés, their worship of “freedom 
of speech”.  Cortés’s solution to the political problem is very similar to Schmitt’s.  Both 
assumed “the extreme case”, both were extremely critical of modern liberalism and both 
emphasized “the decisive bloody battle” over conflicting faiths.  Cortés and Schmitt 
                                                 
262 Ibid., p. 64. 
263 Ibid., p. 65. 
  
 
109
also point to Original Sin as the foundation of the political.264  In his 1932 “Comments” 
on Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political, Strauss singles out Schmitt’s book, “Political 
Theology”, and mentions Cortés in the context of referring to that book, indicating that 
he considers that Schmitt and Cortés are political theologians, who assume Original Sin 
as fundamental in understanding the political.265  
 
In the context of the only mention of “original sin”, in The Concept of the Political, 
Schmitt states, “The methodical connection of theological and political presuppositions 
is clear”, but at the same time draws attention to Machiavelli’s and Hobbes’s 
“pessimism”.  Schmitt denies that “an anthropological optimism” is possible in the field 
of the political, because of “the real possibility of enmity”, although he always distances 
himself from the theologians.266  Schmitt’s authorities seem to be Machiavelli and 
Hobbes, who avoid the “theological interference” that turns the concept of the political 
into “moral theology”.  However, in his footnote thirty-two, in the same context, 
Schmitt draws attention to another political theologian, Friedrich Julius Stahl.  Stahl 
was a German jurist and contemporary of Cortés, having joined Cortés in an attack on 
the rising influence of Hegelianism in the 1840s.  Stahl, in his role as a political 
theologian, saw that Hegelianism was the enemy of the tradition that supported 
Christianity.  In drawing attention to Stahl’s political theology, Schmitt states, “. . . 
whereas Stahl, in accordance with theology, puts at the top of his thought the sinfulness 
of man”, again suggesting that his own definition of evil is the theological one relating 
to Original Sin, especially since Schmitt mentions “original sin” in the context of 
referring to Cortés and Stahl.  Cortés and Stahl were both political theologians who 
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understood the political from the fundamental premise of Original Sin.  Nevertheless, 
Schmitt turns to Hobbes by recognizing the argument that “the truth, the good, and the 
just bring about the worst enmities, finally the war of all against all”.  He concludes, 
“For Hobbes, truly a powerful and systematic political thinker, the pessimistic 
conception of man is the elementary presupposition of a specific system of political 
thought”. 267  Whether Schmitt agrees with Hobbes’s non-biblical definition of evil as 
innocent evil, or amoral evil, as seen in the behaviour of animals, has to be balanced 
with Schmitt’s judgement that Hobbes is a Christian who “belonged to a Christian 
people” where “Jesus is Christ”. 268   
 
In examining the section where Schmitt raises the issue of good and evil in the context 
of the necessity of theologians, Schmitt argues that “moralists presuppose a freedom of 
choice between good and evil”, but in an immediate footnote Schmitt suggests that 
when theology becomes “moral theology”, the “freedom-of-choice aspect prevails and 
weakens the doctrine of the radical evilness of man”. 269  Schmitt implies that only 
biblical theology, posing as morality, avoids the problem of “moral theology”, thus 
firmly establishing “the radical evilness of man”.  This interpretation is supported by 
Schmitt’s next sentence, which appears after the citation of footnote thirty-three.  
Schmitt states very clearly, that “in the final analysis”, the political is “determined by 
the real possibility of enmity” and that “political conceptions and ideas cannot very well 
start with an anthropological optimism”. In the very next paragraph he turns to the 
political theologians, Cortés and Stahl and “The fundamental theological dogma of the 
evilness of the world and man”.  Therefore, from the above evidence it is possible to 
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conclude that the first criterion of the political, for Schmitt, requires that all human 
beings must be considered evil.  Whether he means that human beings are evil in the 
biblical sense, Schmitt does not explicitly say, but he clearly argues that human beings 
are evil in the dangerous sense and require rule.270 
 
2. Ernstfall 
 
For Schmitt, the political comes to light through asking the fundamental question, who 
“decides the extreme case and determines the decisive friend-and-enemy grouping?”.  
Schmitt argues that Otto von Bismarck’s successful decision in declaring wars on behalf 
of the German Reich “in the extreme case” foreclosed any opposition from the Church, 
or labour unions, because that would have placed them as enemies.  Furthermore, 
Schmitt saw that the last thing that these groups wanted was a civil war, confirming his 
argument that, in this case, it was the state, defined as the “political entity”, which was 
the “decisive entity” of the political, “regardless of the sources from which it derives its 
last psychic motives”.  Schmitt argues that either “It exists or it does not exist”, but the 
essential characteristic of the “political entity” is the jus belli, or what Schmitt calls “the 
real possibility of deciding in a concrete situation upon the enemy and the ability to 
fight him with the power emanating from the entity”.  Schmitt is also adamant that there 
is “only one political entity – one political community” and it is created by the “ever 
present possibility of a friend-and-enemy grouping”.  This fundamental division, or 
grouping, is the result of the clash of different ways of life, or what Schmitt calls the 
fight for “its existence, independence and freedom”.  According to Schmitt, in the case 
of the state, it then can demand that its members be ready to die for the state and kill its 
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enemies, although “the normal state consists above all in assuring total peace within the 
state and its territory”. 271  Schmitt also argues that as long as there is a political entity, 
which has “power over the physical life of men”, it can “declare an enemy” and even 
launch into civil war.  Schmitt implies that civil wars are the result of the division of 
groups into friends and enemies, which represent alternative views on what constitutes 
the best way of life, or what is right.  Schmitt does not go into any details in examining 
whether civil war, like the American Civil War, best characterizes the political, but he 
maintains that, in a constitutional state, civil war dissolves the state “as an organized 
political entity” and that “the battle” is determined “by the power of weapons”.  He 
concludes that civil wars determine “the future fate of this entity” (the state).272 
 
Schmitt understands the Ernstfall as the potential for “combat”, which is separate from 
the questions of war (war being “the existential negation of the enemy”), weapons and 
technology.  Schmitt denies that the political “favors war”, revolution, militarism, 
imperialism or pacifism. 273  War is the possibility that accompanies the political, 
defined as ways of life, each of which claim to be the best way of life.  He argues, “That 
the extreme case appears to be an exception does not negate its decisive character but 
confirms it all the more”. 274  In The Concept of the Political, Schmitt’s evidence points 
to politicians who are at war throughout their whole lives, but he is certain that war is 
“neither the aim nor the purpose nor even the very content of politics”.  It is merely a 
“present possibility” seen in the groupings of nations, or political entities, according to 
friend and enemy groupings, which often change.  In turning to Carl von Clausewitz, 
Schmitt argues that the “military battle itself is not the ‘continuation of politics by other 
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means’ as the famous term of Clausewitz is generally incorrectly cited”.  Schmitt points 
out that, in Clausewitz’s book, On War, Clausewitz argues that “the political decision” 
regarding who is the enemy has already been made, prior to the battle.  Schmitt agrees 
with Clausewitz’s claim that war is “a mere instrument of politics”, but argues that 
Clausewitz sees war as the only instrument, because it is based on the ultimate reason of 
“the friend-and-enemy grouping”.  Thus, in interpreting On War, Schmitt presents 
Clausewitz agreeing that politics remains “the brain” and the “logic” of “war”, defined 
as the “friend-and-enemy concept”.275   
 
Furthermore, Schmitt argues that as long as “the extreme case appears to be an 
exception”, i.e. the exception defined as “the real war”, the political is not negated.  For 
Schmitt, “the real war” also presupposes “the decision”, regarding the identity of an 
enemy who threatens one’s way of life.  Without providing any evidence, Schmitt 
claims that “wars today have decreased in number and frequency”, although they have 
increased in “ferocity”.  Schmitt’s observation seems to focus on “real” wars among the 
European nations in the 1900s that highlight his friend and enemy grouping.  In 
accepting that wars still occur, he argues that, given the infrequency of wars, those that 
do occur demonstrate “the exceptional case”.   In calling these wars exceptional, he 
argues that they provide “decisive meaning” in exposing the political, “which exposes 
the core of the matter”.  His point is that exceptional wars demonstrate the “political 
grouping of friend and enemy”, and hence, the conflict over ways of life.  In the same 
context, Schmitt argues that in “a completely pacified globe”, the world would be 
without politics, since the friend and enemy distinction would disappear, but he does not 
further discuss such a possibility.  He only contends that a peaceful world state might be 
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interesting with regards to “competitions and intrigues of every kind”, but would not 
entail human beings killing other human beings.276   
 
In refuting the claim that wars are caused by morality, religion and other “antitheses”, 
Schmitt argues that those domains just “intensify” the political friend and enemy 
groupings.277  In the same context, and in his final paragraph of chapter three, on the 
pacifist attempt to extinguish war, Schmitt uses the term, “Krieg”278 (war), fifteen times, 
turning pacifism on its head, arguing that the war to abolish all wars is the logic behind 
pacifism at its most political.  Schmitt believes that if pacifists were extremely hostile to 
war, thinking that a final war “of humanity” would end all future wars, then the 
“political energy” would be sufficient to group people “according to friend and enemy”.  
He stresses that when the will of pacifists to abolish war is sufficiently strong, “it has 
become a political motive”, even if it means that war is only viewed as an “extreme 
possibility”.  According to Schmitt, the political motive affirms “war and even the 
reason for war”.  This last quotation contains the central (eighth) mention of war; 
however, Schwab’s translation of the German “den Sinn” as “reason” misses its literal 
meaning – i.e. instinct, sense or disposition.  Schmitt comes close to arguing that the 
potential for war is part of human nature, or at least that war and evil are part of the 
human problem.279  In emphasizing the pacifist hostility that could lead to “a war on 
war”, under the guise that it is “the absolute last war of humanity”, Schmitt argues that 
it still confirms his friend and enemy division.  Furthermore, it would be an “inhuman” 
and an “intense” war, he argues, where the enemy is degraded into “moral and other 
categories and is forced to make of him a monster” that must be “utterly destroyed”.  In 
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identifying the enemy as a “monster”, Schmitt argues that the country identified as 
monstrous, is not merely compelled to retreat into its “borders only”, but has to be 
totally eliminated.  Schmitt’s point is that the Ernstfall is connected to the “possibility” 
of war and that war is still a possibility even in peaceful times.  If this were not so, he 
stresses, then his definition of the political, as the “antithesis” of friend and enemy, is 
not true.280 
 
In chapter five, in addressing the dire emergency (Ernstfall), Schmitt returns to the state 
as the political community that has “power” of life and death over other humans.  In the 
centre of the chapter,281 Schmitt comments that the political comes into focus with the 
“readiness of combatants to die” and that concrete opposition is beyond a “normative 
meaning”, residing only in the “existential threat to one’s life”.  By “existential”, 
Schmitt means “in a real combat situation” that can be clearly observed in political life, 
implying that the “threat” is a fact of life.  He then produces the clearest expression of 
his definition of the political, prefacing it as “Concretely speaking”, that the physical 
killing of human beings is motivated by the dire emergency, caused by “an existential 
threat to one’s own way of life”.  The political is not invoked if the threat is only against 
one’s life, unless the threat of death accompanies a threat to one’s “form” or way of life.  
As mentioned before, by using the word “concrete”, Schmitt means that the threat 
occurs in the world of our everyday, historical experiences.  Thus, Schmitt implies, only 
when one’s regime (politeia) is threatened with negation, within history that acts as 
“destiny”, can a people “repel” the enemies and “fight them physically”.  Thus, Schmitt 
seems even to sanction suicide bombing by groups, such as the Japanese during World 
War Two.  Schmitt might argue that the Japanese saw the Americans as a threat to their 
                                                 
280 Schmitt, Carl, The Concept of the Political, Schwab, George, trans., op. cit., p. 36.   
281 Schmitt, Carl, Der Begriff des Politischen, Text von 1932 mit einem Vorwort und drei Corollarien, op. 
cit., p. 49. 
  
 
116
way of life, which was symbolized by the Emperor and his link to the divine.  A similar 
argument could be made concerning Muslim terrorists, even justifying the event of 
September the eleventh, 2001 in New York.  Muslim extremists see America as a threat 
to their religious way of life, although the modern, Western educated terrorists may be 
more motivated by nihilism than religious zeal in their determination to preserve their 
pre-Western religious life.282   
 
Schmitt accuses people who advance the cause of humanity as a justification for war, as 
those who want “to cheat”, since “Humanity is not a political concept” and that 
“Humanity as such cannot wage war because it has no enemy, at least on this planet”.  
He points out those who cheat know that humanity is not a political grouping, or a 
society, or even a way of life, but an expression just like justice.  Schmitt presents 
humanity as a “universal concept”, similar to natural justice, or “a system of relations 
between individuals” that denies the possibility of friend and enemy grouping and 
hence, the possibility of war.  He argues that dishonest nations use the concept of 
humanity as a weapon to justify their wars, in the form of humanity driven wars, which 
pronounce against those outlaws of humanity.  According to Schmitt, these wars lead to 
“the most extreme inhumanity”, because they deny that the enemy is a human being.  
For Schmitt, the concept of friend and enemy presupposes that the participants are 
human beings.  Schmitt argues that wars are declared in the name of humanity, abusing 
the term in the same way as other terms, such as, “peace, justice, progress, and 
civilization” are misused “in order to claim these as one’s own and to deny the same to 
the enemy”.  Schmitt refers to the “eighteenth-century humanitarian concept of 
humanity” as “a polemical denial of the then existing aristocratic- feudal system and the 
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privileges accompanying it”. 283  Significantly, in his first mention of “natural law” 
(“naturrechtlichen”)284 in his book, Schmitt clearly identifies “natural law” with 
humanity in the same category as other universal doctrines, such as the “liberal-
individualistic” doctrine, branding them unpolemical.  By unpolemical, Schmitt means 
that natural law is not connected to a unique historical (“concrete”) situation, such as the 
feudal system, but aspires to be “universal” and to apply in all historical situations.  As 
an historicist, Schmitt denies natural law’s universal claim.  However, he also indicates 
that natural law is “a system of relations among individuals” that precludes any 
grouping of friend and enemy and that it can only exist if the potential for war is 
terminated.285  In further relying on his acceptance of historicism, Schmitt argues that 
“State and politics cannot be exterminated” because of historical “destiny”.286   
 
3. Decision 
 
Schmitt’s definition of the political only includes friends and enemies who have formed 
groups of people as a “collectivity”, and hence the enemy is only ever a “public 
enemy”.287  For Schmitt, the most significant group is the nation and he argues that it is 
usually the nation that decides who will be an enemy and who will be a friend.288  In 
this way, Schmitt’s decisionism has the character of public obligation that transcends 
individual, private opinion, but the group obligation is determined by the concrete 
historical situation of the age.  Schmitt denies the public authority of natural right, or 
universal justice, that transcends all concrete historical situations.  In chapter five, 
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Schmitt discusses the justice of war for the first time.  He argues that, it is “generally 
recognized” since the time of Grotius, that justice has nothing to do with the concept of 
war, as all “ideals or norms of justice” cannot be the “justification of war”, since they 
are “blendings of some sort of abstractions or norms”.  For Schmitt, the only 
“justification of war” is when a group, or nation, is called upon to fight against a “real 
enemy”, not “for ideals or norms of justice”.  A “real enemy” is one who threatens one’s 
way of life, according to Schmitt.  In refuting the most popular non-political category 
(economics) that points to a decision to fight, he argues that the economic motivation to 
die in battle for the future good of trade and industry is “sinister and crazy”, similar to 
the “fraud” of having human beings kill one another so that war would disappear.289 
 
Although aware of Hobbes’s natural right teaching, but ignoring his idea of the potential 
war among individuals in the state of nature, Schmitt defines the political, i.e. the 
enemy, in terms of “public enemy” and a “collectivity of men, particularly a whole 
nation”.  Schmitt’s authority is Plato’s Republic.  In his ninth footnote, in chapter three, 
Schmitt refers to Plato’s Republic, Book Five, where Plato speaks of a public enemy 
and not a private enemy.  In supporting his argument, Schmitt asserts that Plato 
distinguished the “public enemy” (“polemios”) from the “private one” (“ekhthros”).  For 
Schmitt’s interpretation of Plato, only in “Real war” (“polemos”), where the enemy is 
the “Barbarian”, can there be “those who are by nature enemies”. 290  If one consults The 
Republic, Socrates is describing the guardians of the perfect, communist society, who 
must be told lies about their natural (collective) foreign enemy, (“polemios”).  Socrates 
also says that when the Greeks fight Greeks “we’ll say they are by nature friends”, 
implying that what unites the Greeks is their common belief in the gods.  However, 
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Schmitt does not remind readers that the gods of Plato’s perfect city are not the Olympic 
gods, but are the Platonic ideas, and he does not allude to the fact that “the philosophers 
rule as kings”. 291  In opposition to Schmitt’s pessimistic doctrine, we learn that Socrates 
tells Glaucon that the guardians will correct other Greeks “in a kindly manner”, not 
through “slavery or destruction”. 292  This contrasts with Schmitt’s addition of civil wars 
to his concept of the political, defined as the potential for war.  Furthermore, Schmitt is 
silent on Glaucon’s doubt that Socrates’s perfect “regime” can “come into being”, or is 
“ever possible”, and he ignores the fact that Glaucon was to become a victim in a civil 
war that aimed at restoring Athens to its former greatness.  Thus, for Strauss, Schmitt 
does not understand Hobbes and he does not understand the intention of Plato’s 
Republic to demonstrate the ultimate limitation of the friend and enemy concept.  
Schmitt’s friend and enemy concept is guided by a new awareness of the importance of 
history, and hence, his references to destiny, or fate, and not to the best regime, or the 
best way of life, which transcends the political, is Schmitt’s final answer regarding the 
foundation of the friend and enemy concept.293 
 
In the same ninth footnote, Schmitt refers to a civil disturbance, or rebellion, as “stasis”, 
as distinct from war (polemos), arguing that Plato means, “a people cannot wage war 
against itself”.  Schmitt clearly refers to “stasis” as the faction that leads to civil war in 
the ninth footnote, arguing that “conflicts among the Hellenes are for him discords 
(stasis)”.  Schmitt’s emphasis on discord is drawn out by the context – a context that 
distinguishes between the Greek word for public enemy (polemios) and the private 
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enemy (ekhthros).  In the immediate context of his citation from Plato, Schmitt argues 
that the biblical teaching, “love your enemies (Matt. 5:44; Luke 6:27)” only mentions 
the Greek for private enemy, thus justifying the morality of the Crusades, particularly 
Christians killing Muslims.  For Schmitt, the Christian Bible only insists on loving 
private enemies, leaving open the possibility of fighting, and killing, public enemies.  
While this may be linguistically correct, Schmitt fails to discuss Church doctrine and 
how Christians perceive the meaning of that commandment.  Instead, Schmitt attempts 
to make the decision in the extreme case, one that does not require personal hatred.  In 
the “most intensive and extreme antagonism”, he argues, it is not necessary that “the 
public enemy” be personally hated.294 
 
4. Content 
 
The disappearance of God, or the divine, does not occur in a secular state, according to 
Schmitt, as he argues that the “juridic formulas of the omnipotence of the state are, in 
fact, only superficial secularizations of theological formulas of the omnipotence of 
God”.  In a note to this sentence, Schwab reminds readers of Schmitt’s claim in 1922, 
that all the major ideas dealing with the modern theory of state were theological and 
secular by nature.295  The revealing claim in Schmitt’s Political Theology, that occurs in 
the third chapter, entitled, “Political Theology”, begins, “All significant concepts of the 
modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts”.  He further argues that 
this was partly due to “their historical development”, giving the example that “the 
                                                 
294 Schmitt, Carl, The Concept of the Political, Schwab, George, trans., op. cit., pp. 28 & 29.  He argues 
that this interpretation of private enemies led to the Christian defence of Europe against “the Saracens or 
Turks” and that Christians “need not” “hate personally” their enemies.  Schwab points to Schmitt’s 
“Politische Theologie II: Legende von der Erledigung jeder Politischen Theologie (Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot, 1970), pp. 117 - 118”. 
295 Ibid., p. 42.  See the footnote * for Schwab’s comment. 
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omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver”.  Here, Schmitt draws attention to 
the divine foundation of the political, described as the state and its omnipotent laws.  In 
attempting to recover political theology, Schmitt tries to demonstrate the link between 
the modern state and the authority of theology, particularly in the state’s demand for 
unconditional obedience.296  
 
Schmitt had some personal experience of modern warfare and the issue of unconditional 
obedience.  The Concept of the Political was dedicated to his fallen comrade in arms, 
“my friend, August Schaetz of Munich”, who died in the “assault on Moncelul” in 
1917.297  Although Schmitt’s definition of the political does not cover individual 
friends, Schmitt implies that Schaetz and he were part of a political group – the state of 
Germany – having performed their duty in return for the protection of the state against 
external enemies.  As Schmitt states in the context of citing Thomas Hobbes’s 
Leviathan, “No form of order, no reasonable legitimacy or legality can exist without 
protection and obedience”.  He then tells readers that the ultimate justification for such 
loyalty is based on “human nature”, but more significantly, it is based on “divine right”.  
Here, Schmitt links the modern state with God.  Given Schmitt’s belief that Hobbes was 
a Christian, it is possible that Schmitt’s ultimate “content” of the political is biblical 
revelation itself, because he believes that the answer to the question, “what is right?” is 
linked to the divine, or to the Christian God, described as the omnipotent God.298   
 
                                                 
296 Schmitt, Carl, Political Theology - Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, Schwab, George, 
trans., op. cit., p. 36. 
297 Schmitt, Carl, The Concept of the Political, Schwab, George, trans., op. cit., p. 19. 
298 Ibid., p. 52.  Schmitt’s mention of “omnipotent laws” indicates an attack on Judaism that emphasizes 
God’s laws.  Schmitt seems to prefer a Christian God, who transcends the laws, demanding that 
obedience implies only faith in God.  This explains Schmitt’s reliance on faith, as the foundation of the 
battle between friends and enemies. 
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The problem in grasping Schmitt’s “content” regarding the political is that he does not 
want his concept of the political reduced to a dogmatic statement, even though he 
requires that a definition be spelt out in “a simple and elementary statement”.  He 
stipulates that his definition of the political is an “appropriate point of departure”, but 
the direction seems to be to religion, suggesting that the content is one based on the 
faith in the superiority of one’s way of life.299  In Schmitt’s own case, the content seems 
to be based ultimately on Christian faith, but it is also related to historical situations that 
produce a conflict among faiths.  This is evident in Schmitt’s argument that, “all 
political concepts, images and terms have a polemical meaning”.  By “polemical”, 
Schmitt means that all political concepts are dependent on particular conflicts that are 
“bound to a concrete situation”; otherwise, they are “empty and ghostlike abstractions”.  
Schmitt includes the following concepts as polemical: “state, republic, society, class as 
well as sovereignty, constitutional state, absolutism, dictatorship, economic planning, 
neutral or total state”.  He argues that these expressions are “incomprehensible” unless 
people are “affected, combated, refuted, or negated” by such concepts, indicating his 
reliance on historicism, as those concepts only become real in “a concrete situation”. 300 
 
Schmitt points out that the content of “the political concept of battle in liberal thought 
becomes competition in the domain of economics and discussion in the intellectual 
realm”.301  Even with liberalism’s invention of society and other autonomous domains, 
Schmitt argues, the content of the state and the political will not be “exterminated” by 
mere “definitions and constructions”.  He even argues that economic “antagonisms can 
become political”, demonstrating that the political can spring from any “domain”.  He 
concludes that “economics has become political and thereby the destiny”.  As one who 
                                                 
299 Ibid., p. 19. 
300 Ibid., pp. 30 & 31. 
301 Ibid., p. 71. 
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sees faith as the foundation of the political, and the role of historical necessity as an 
essential part of the content of the political, Schmitt argues that we cannot escape from 
“the logic of the political” seen in “newly emerging friend-and-enemy groupings” that 
seem “non-political and apparently even antipolitical”. 302 
 
5. Right 
 
Schmitt’s central argument that illuminates his definition of the political, as “the quarrel 
over the right faith”, is located in his discussion of Oliver Cromwell’s battle with 
Catholic Spain.  It is found in Schmitt’s note to verify historical evidence that  “concrete 
human groupings” fight other such groupings “in the name of justice, humanity, order, 
or peace”.  The Cromwell example is to provide further evidence that Schmitt’s concept 
of the political is grounded on the premise that groups are potentially at war with one 
another because they have different faiths, resulting in differences over what they 
consider the right way of life.  These he considers “high points”, seen in “moments” 
where the group clearly recognizes “the enemy”.  According to Schmitt, the person who 
“surpassed” all others in terms of identifying the enemy was Oliver Cromwell, when he 
spoke against “papist Spain” in 1656.  Schmitt claims that Cromwell states that the 
“first lesson of nature” is “Being and Preservation”.  In Schmitt’s argument, the “being” 
Cromwell had in mind was England’s “National Being”.  Cromwell saw the enemies of 
England trying to negate it, or “so make it not to be”, meaning to destroy England’s way 
of life.  Schmitt is very careful to draw attention to Cromwell’s repetition of “Being”, 
while stressing the role that God plays in Cromwell’s speeches.  Schmitt recalls that 
Cromwell warns England that the Spaniards are the enemy because “his [the Spanish] 
                                                 
302 Ibid., pp. 78 & 79. 
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enmity is put into him by God”.  In addition, Schmitt points out that Cromwell argued 
that the Spanish enemy was not an “accidental” enemy, but both a “natural” and a 
“providential enemy”.  He further argues that Cromwell’s “providential” authority 
relating to an enemy was the biblical authority concerning God’s curse against the 
garden serpent for its part in corrupting Eve: “I will put enmity between your seed and 
her seed (Gen. III: 15)”.  Here, Schmitt clearly wants his readers to remember Original 
Sin through Adam and Eve’s desire to be gods, possessing the knowledge of good and 
evil, and the role of the divine (God) as the authority fo r determining what is right.  
Cromwell’s authority, concerning what is right, is a nation’s faith in a biblical God.  
Hence, Schmitt demonstrates that groups, or nations, clash as enemies through their 
various beliefs in what constitutes the right way of life.  They do so because they are 
also tied to destiny through the doctrine of Original Sin that implies the inescapable 
problem of evil.303  
 
Regarding the potential battle of faiths, Schmitt is more lucid in his book, Political 
Theology, where he grounds his concept of the political on a group’s claim to the right 
faith.  As explained previously, Schmitt points to the Spanish thinker, Donoso Cortés, 
who called for a dictatorship to arrest the anarchy developing out of the “proletarian 
revolution of 1848”. 304  According to Schmitt, Cortés polemically radicalised the 
teaching of Original Sin to mean, “the absolute sinfulness and depravity of human 
nature”305 in an attempt to form a dictatorship to solve the indecision of the middle 
                                                 
303 Schmitt, Carl, The Concept of the Political, Schwab, George, trans., op. cit., pp. 67 & 68.  Schmitt is 
clearly discussing the right faith, because he dismisses “the fanatical hatred of Napoleon felt by the 
German barons Stein and Kleist” and Lenin’s “annihilating sentences against bourgeois and western 
capitalism” as the best examples of the political (“enmity”). 
304 Schmitt, Carl, Political Theology - Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, Schwab, George, 
trans., op. cit., p. 56. 
305 Ibid., p. 57. 
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classes in their avoidance of making a decision based on faith. 306  In a revealing line, 
Schmitt states, “Donoso Cortés in his radical intellectuality saw only the theology of the 
foe”, and then discusses Cortés’s definition of the bourgeoisie as a group whose 
“religion resides in freedom of speech and of the press”.  In reducing a group’s goal to 
that of religion reminds readers of Schmitt’s view in recognizing the conflict of groups 
as one based on conflicting faiths that make claims of being the right faith.  From the 
Cromwell example, and Schmitt’s discussion of Cortés and Stahl in both books, 
Political Theology and The Concept of the Political, Schmitt leaves himself open to be 
labelled a political theologian. 307  With the publication in 1991 of Schmitt’s Glossarium, 
J. Harvey Lomax argues that it “became virtually impossible intelligently to resist” 
Meier’s thesis that Schmitt is a political theologian.  In the Glossarium, Schmitt reveals 
his Christian faith, and thus, his identity as a political theologian:  
 
“To be sure, I have not changed.  My freedom regarding 
ideas is unlimited because I remain in contact with my . . . 
center, which is not an ‘idea’ but a historical event: the 
incarnation of the Son of God.  For me Christianity is not 
primarily a doctrine or a morals or even (forgive me) a 
religion; it is a historical event”. 308  
 
                                                 
306 Ibid., p. 59.  In contrast to Cortés’s definition of Original Sin, Schmitt points out the Council of 
Trent’s dogma on Original Sin as one described as, “distortion, opacity, or injury”, leaving “open the 
possibility of the natural good”. 
307 Ibid., p. 62.  See Schmitt, Carl, The Concept of the Political, pp. 61, 65, 70 & 106 for Cortés and pp. 
63, 64 (footnote 32), 65 & 70 for Stahl. 
308 Lomax, Harvey J., “Carl Schmitt, Heinrich Meier, and the End of Philosophy”, Interpretation: A 
Journal of Political Philosophy, vol. 28, no. 1, Fall 2000, p. 52.  See Schmitt, Carl, Glossarium – 
Aufzeichnungen der Jahre 1947 – 1951, von Medem, Eberhard Freiherr, editor, Duncker and Humblot, 
Berlin, Germany, 1991, p. 283. 
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This explains Strauss’s partial agreement with Schmitt’s concept of the political that 
focuses on faiths, or what Strauss identifies as authoritative opinions that remain the 
religious views of a society.  
 
As already mentioned, Schmitt does argue that there are political theories, which claim 
that the world is not a good place and that priests, theologians and politicians are 
necessary.  If they are necessary, then according to Schmitt, there exists the necessity 
for human beings to rule others.  In discussing the foundations of “various domains of 
human thought” Schmitt centres on theologians.  The reason behind the theologians’ 
negative view of the world – meaning the need for rule and hence, politics - is that 
Donoso Cortés, Friedrich Julius Stahl and others believe in the doctrine of Original Sin.  
Hence, the presence of biblical evil demands that an elite must rule.  Although Schmitt 
distances himself from their belief in Original Sin, he summarizes his own view of the 
political as:  
 
“The fundamental theological dogma of the evilness of the 
world and man leads, just as does the distinction of friend 
and enemy, to a categorization of men and makes 
impossible the undifferentiated optimism of a universal 
conception of man.  In a good world among good people, 
only peace, security, and harmony prevail.  Priests and 
theologians are here just as superfluous as politicians and 
statesmen”. 309 
 
                                                 
309 Schmitt, Carl, The Concept of the Political, Schwab, George, trans., op. cit., p. 65. 
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Here, Schmitt implies Original Sin is essential to his understanding of the political, 
although, in bowing to his liberal readers, he argues that he does not want his definition 
to remain attached to Original Sin for practical reasons, because “theological 
inferences” end up being confused as “moral theology”, the very thing liberals would 
avoid, especially if they accept positivism that avoids judgements regarding morals or 
values.  In the same context, Schmitt drops the topic of theology, and theologians, and 
mentions Machiavelli, Hobbes and Fichte, calling the centrally located Hobbes, “truly a 
powerful and systematic political thinker”.  Schmitt seems to accept Hobbes’s doctrine 
concerning the “pessimistic conception of man”, or what Schmitt identifies as “the 
distinction of friend and enemy”, that “is the elementary presupposition of a specific 
system of political thought”.  Schmitt does not spell out what kind of human weakness 
Hobbes had in mind, although it seems to agree with Schmitt’s concept of the 
political. 310  However, Schmitt’s observation of Hobbes’s pessimism leads the reader 
back to Schmitt’s most open theological confession (the claim of “divine right”) in the 
context of mentioning Hobbes’s Leviathan where he concludes: 
 
“No form of order, no reasonable legitimacy or legality 
can exist without protection and obedience . . . human 
nature as well as divine right demands its inviolable 
observation”. (Schmitt)311 
 
As explained previously, for Schmitt, Hobbes’s greatness was in his recognition that 
each group claims to possess “the truth, the good and the just”, or what constitutes 
“right”.  However, from the above quotation, Schmitt maintains “right” must be linked 
                                                 
310 Ibid., p. 65. 
311 Ibid., p. 52.  My emphasis. 
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with the divine to constitute a faith (“its inviolable observation”).  Ironically, the net 
result of such “divine” claims by various groups leads to far worse enmity, finally 
leading to the war against everyone and hence, the necessity of a state that provides 
protection against attacks, particularly protection against foreign countries, in return for 
total obedience.  However, the state is still based on “divine right”, or faith, rather than 
on nature, or reason, as Schmitt’s discussion of the political reveals.312  Later, he praises 
Hobbes for seeing “more clearly than anyone else” that “the sovereignty of the law 
means only the sovereignty of men who draw up and administer this law”.  The “rule of 
a higher order”, according to Schmitt’s understanding of Hobbes, means that there is an 
“order” where “certain men of this higher order rule over men of the lower order”.  It is 
these select people who determine the rightness of the “content”, or “the high points of 
politics”, and make the decision that determines “how and by whom it should be 
applied”.  Cromwell’s religious stance against Catholic Spain is Schmitt’s prime 
example.  Thus, Schmitt clearly argues that, in affirming the political, one must always 
recognize the quarrel over the correct faith that raises the question, “what is right?”. 313   
 
6. Order 
 
Although Schmitt does not openly admit his own unorthodox Catholic faith, as “the 
order of human things” in The Concept of the Political, he indicates his agreement with 
Hobbes’s Christianity in The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes, where 
Schmitt reaffirms Hobbes’s commitment to “the proposition that ‘Jesus is Christ’, a 
commitment that led both, the enlightened and believers, to regard him as a hypocrite 
                                                 
312 Ibid., p. 52.  Schmitt’s inclusion of “human nature”, in the quotation, points to the dangerousness (evil) 
of human beings.  
313 Ibid., p. 67.  This discussion takes place in Schmitt’s refutation of “so called natural law, or the law of 
reason”.  Strauss will recover natural right in The City and Man. 
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and a liar”.314  If Schmitt does not locate his own faith in the historical understanding of 
Catholicism, then it is understandable why he speaks of the political in such a bellicose 
manner.  Whatever his own personal views, Schmitt addresses “the order of the human 
things”, as essential for the affirmation of the political.  This means that he raises the 
question of what a society looks up to, as well as the question, what is right?  Schmitt 
summarises the meaning of the order of human things as follows: 
 
“Only the actual participants can correctly recognize, 
understand, and judge the concrete situation and settle the 
extreme case of conflict.  Each participant is in a position 
to judge whether the adversary intends to negate his 
opponent’s way of life and therefore must be repulsed or 
fought in order to preserve one’s own form of 
existence”. 315 
 
The “order” is directly related to the “form”, or regime, which describes a way of life, 
that comes to light from an historical “moment”.  What distinguishes Schmitt’s 
emphasis on the regimes, or order, is Schmitt’s focus on the foundation of the political 
as the conflict of faiths among groups, or peoples, within historical contexts.316 
 
Schmitt’s interpretation of Plato’s Republic, in support of his concept of the political, 
invites further investigation regarding “the order of the human things”.  Schmitt’s 
definition of potential conflict between friend and enemy reminds a reader of Socrates’s 
                                                 
314 Schmitt, Carl, The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes: Meaning and Failure of a 
Political Symbol, Schwab, George & Hilfstein, Erna, trans., op. cit., p. 83.  Schmitt says Hobbes 
“belonged to a Christian people”, implying that he shared the group’s faith. 
315 Schmitt, Carl, The Concept of the Political, Schwab, George, trans., op. cit., p. 27.  My emphasis. 
316 Ibid., p. 38. 
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conversation about the best regime within the context of a definition of justice, proposed 
by the non-Athenian Polemarchus, in Book One of Plato’s Republic.  In raising the 
issue of the political in Plato’s most famous political work, Schmitt fails to mention that 
the context was jus tice, which is reaffirmed in its subtitle – “On the Just”.  Polemarchus, 
through Socrates’s guidance, introduced a second definition of justice, that one should 
do good to one’s friends and harm to one’s enemies – a definition similar to 
Schmitt’s.317  Polemarchus’s father, Cephalus, had proposed that justice was giving 
back what one takes from another.  Socrates refuted this and Cephalus promptly left the 
conversation to his son, Polemarchus.  Although Polemarchus’s, and Schmitt’s, concept 
of the political was refuted by Socrates, it was the only definition taken up in Socrates’s 
construction of the best city, indicating that Socrates thought that it was public-spirited 
and practical in facing enemy cities that stood opposed to the best city.  Given that few 
people can be philosophers, Socrates knew that the other cities would not pursue virtue 
as their chief goal, leaving open the possibility of war and conflict.  This explains why 
Strauss addresses Schmitt, because Schmitt is partially right in presenting the problem 
of war between groups divided by enmity and friendship.  Schmitt’s definition appears 
more persuasive when Strauss argues that only the philosopher lives the truly just life 
and that the philosophers never rule.318  Although Schmitt does not mention specific 
names from Plato’s Republic, the Polemarchus argument is the very polemical argument 
that Schmitt uses to restore the concept of the political, but without relying on Plato’s 
doctrine of the best regime, or the harmless nature of the philosopher.  In Schmitt’s The 
Concept of the Political, “destiny”, or his historicism connected to divine providence, 
replaces the role of Plato’s best regime in highlighting the status of the political.  In 
accepting history, Schmitt argues that the political is inescapable.  This explains why 
                                                 
317 Plato, The Republic of Plato, Bloom, Allan, trans., op. cit., p. 8 (332d). 
318 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., pp. 73, 124, 125 & 127.  
  
 
131
Schmitt fails to note Socrates’s refutation of Polemarchus’s definition, or the fact that 
the perfect city in Plato’s Republic cannot exist on earth.  As already mentioned, Plato 
solves the political problem that relates to the potential clash among friends and 
enemies through transcending the political, by posing the philosophic life as the best 
regime, and the best way of life, that exists at all times and in all places.  Significantly, 
Schmitt does not include an argument in support of human nature or nature, as readers 
see in Strauss’s presentation of Plato in The City and Man, since Schmitt’s concept of 
the political is discovered on historically based faith, not nature or reason.  However, in 
case his readers mistake his seeming bellicosity, Schmitt argues that his definition does 
not support militarism, pacifism or imperialism and he denies any claim that his 
definition idealizes victorious wars or “successful revolution”.  By remaining on the 
level of the “concrete”, or the historical, Schmitt believes he has overcome the problem 
of judging what is ultimately right.319  For Schmitt, “the order of human things from a 
pure and whole knowledge” means to locate the political in the divine that makes its 
appearance in history.  This purity of knowledge, for Schmitt, is grounded in his belief 
in a mysterious, historical providence.320 
 
Unlike Strauss, Schmitt does not return to “nature” in its political form of natural right 
and the best regime, as the answer to criterion five, “what is right?”.  Schmitt rarely 
mentions natural law, identifying it with “the law of reason”, and arguing that it is 
essentially liberal in character and universal.  Schmitt rejects the natural law doctrine, 
only recognizing its misuse by those who argue tha t “humanity” (a non-political term) is 
based on “natural law”.  He reduces “natural law” to “a system of relations among 
                                                 
319 Schmitt, Carl, The Concept of the Political, Schwab, George, trans., op. cit., pp. 32 & 33. 
320 Strauss, Leo, “Notes on Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political”, in Meier, Heinrich, Carl Schmitt 
and Leo Strauss – The Hidden Dialogue, Lomax, Harvey J., trans., op. cit., pp. 91 & 119.  Strauss’s 
emphasis.  On p. 119, Strauss adds Schmitt’s words, “from a pure and whole knowledge”.   
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individuals” and not groups, therefore excluding it from his definition of the political as 
the potential conflict between groups.  Schmitt identifies the weakness of modern 
natural law and scholastic natural law theory, because they claim universality and brook 
no exceptions that are necessary for decisions in active, “concrete” political life.  In 
contrast to natural law, as an appeal to a higher law, Schmitt claims he follows Hobbes 
in arguing that “the sovereignty of the law” only belongs to human beings who make 
and administer the law.  The flexibility and “higher order” only comes about when 
“certain men” of a “higher order” rule over “men of a lower order”.  In posing natural 
right that can be applied in all places and times through the wisdom of philosophers, 
Strauss answers Schmitt’s reason for the dismissal of natural law, and hence, “the law of 
reason”.  Nevertheless, in his cont inued acceptance of historicism, Schmitt remains 
consistent in rejecting natural law, and natural right, that comes to light in Aristotle and 
Plato’s best regime.  Despite his Catholicism, Schmitt rejected Thomistic natural law, 
dismissing natural law as part of the problem, and not part of the solution, to the 
affirmation of the political. 321   
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated how Schmitt argues that six criteria need to be present 
for the successful affirmation of the political.  Schmitt seems to propose a concept of 
evil that takes Original Sin as the foundation of the dangerous nature of human beings.  
Although Schmitt uses Polemarchus’s friend and enemy definition, he also turns to 
Hobbes’s state of nature as the concrete situation of human beings, although he defines 
those in the potential state of war as part of groups, or nations, rather than individuals.  
                                                 
321 Schmitt, Carl, The Concept of the Political, Schwab, George, trans., op. cit., pp. 55, 66 & 67. 
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Ultimately, Schmitt’s decisionism is connected to the order of the human things, defined 
as the “form” of one’s existence, because the regime points to various ways of life 
claiming to be right.  For Schmitt, the knowledge and purity of the claim is founded on 
the group’s faith, especially its faith in the content of a divine authority that transcends 
personal preferences.  In addressing Schmitt’s arguments in The Concept of the 
Political, the reader can learn how Strauss sees Schmitt as a worthy opponent, who 
knew the importance of regimes being defined as ways of life, but refused to be guided 
by the best regime and natural right.  In recognizing Schmitt’s unorthodox biblical faith 
as the core of his concept of the political that requires rule, the reader then can begin to 
see the fundamental battle between Schmitt’s concept of the political and Strauss’s 
Socratic reply to Schmitt in The City and Man that also raises the issue of rule.  
Strauss’s comprehensive answer to Schmitt takes the form of a similar dualism to 
Schmitt’s concept of friend and enemy, by drawing attention to the potential political 
conflict between the philosopher and his, or her, society, and hence the title of the book, 
The City and Man. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
LEO STRAUSS’S “COMMENTS”  
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter four will demonstrate how Strauss explains Schmitt’s six criteria, as found in 
The Concept of the Political.  Strauss recognizes that Schmitt’s affirmation of the 
political is linked to the classical idea of the regimes.322  Strauss argues that there are 
two answers to Schmitt’s political – a movement towards faith or a return to the origins 
of Hobbes’s understanding of nature.  This chapter will demonstrate that Strauss 
outlines six criteria, which he finds in Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political, including 
1) the necessity of moral evil; 2) the existence of the Ernstfall; 3) the requirement of 
decision; 4) the meaning of content; 5) the claim of Right; and 6) “the order of things 
from a pure and whole knowledge”.   
 
1. Evil 
 
In the final, paragraph of his 1932 “Comments”, Strauss declares what a reader can 
learn from Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political, namely, a “radical critique of 
liberalism” that gains “a horizon beyond liberalism”.323  Agreeing with Schmitt, Strauss 
states:  
 
“What is needed rather is to replace ‘the astonishingly 
consistent systematics of liberal thought’, which is 
                                                 
322 The regime is identified with a class of citizens that rule society.  
323 Strauss, Leo, “Notes on Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political”, in Meier, Heinrich, Carl Schmitt 
and Leo Strauss – The Hidden Dialogue, Lomax, Harvey J., trans., op. cit., p. 119.  This is Schmitt’s 1932 
edition of The Concept of the Political. 
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manifest within the inconsistency of liberal politics, by 
‘another system’ (70), namely, a system that does not 
negate the political but brings it into recognition”. 324   
 
In examining Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political, Strauss not only points to Plato 
and “nature” as a way to transcend modern liberalism, but he also outlines Schmitt’s six 
criteria for the successful recovery of the political.  The first, and most important, is the 
acceptance of “the view of human evil as moral baseness”. 325  In the final sentence of 
paragraph twenty-seven Strauss concludes, “The affirmation of the political is 
ultimately nothing other than the affirmation of the moral”.326  The moral is also 
connected to the order of things and hence, Strauss agrees with Schmitt that a quest to 
affirm the political must address “the order of the human things”, although Strauss adds 
Schmitt’s words “a pure and whole knowledge” to the latter.327  Strauss’s addition of 
Schmitt’s words “a pure and whole knowledge”,  partly in italics, indicates that Strauss’s 
final response must have the characteristics of knowledge rather than of faith.  In 
keeping with human knowledge, Strauss examines Schmitt’s concept of the political, 
emphasizing Schmitt’s argument that the political is “real”, and “necessary, because it is 
given in human nature”. 328  By this, Strauss recognizes that the link between “human 
nature” and the political must begin with the “ultimate controversy”, whether human 
beings are “by nature good or evil”.  In raising Schmitt’s discussion of evil, Strauss adds 
the idea of the good as well.329   
 
                                                 
324 Ibid., p. 93.  Strauss’s emphasis.  
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Strauss draws attention to Schmitt’s “polemic against liberalism”, in which Schmitt 
seems to blame liberalism as the cause of the negation of the political.  However, 
Strauss warns readers that it is a red herring.  Strauss argues that Schmitt’s true purpose 
is recognizing the political, meaning to recognize what is the best way of life, or what 
Strauss calls, the question of “what is right” that ignites “the life-and-death quarrel: the 
political”.330  For Schmitt, the political, which comes to light through human activity, is 
connected to human beings in the state of potential war over conflicting faiths.331  In 
raising the question, “what is right?” in the context of mentioning Plato, Strauss uses 
“faith” three times, the first being “the quarrel over the right faith”, indicating Schmitt’s 
understanding of the political as faith-based battles.332  However, Strauss forces Schmitt 
into the category of the political philosopher, by making Schmitt’s concept of the 
political a matter for discussion.  According to Strauss, Schmitt wanted to avoid 
discussion by going beyond abstractions that are evaluative, such as, “all ideals” and 
“all normative prescriptions”, which Schmitt considers “fictions”.  In questioning 
Schmitt’s claim that the political is historical “destiny” and cannot be avoided, Strauss 
challenges Schmitt to go back to nature, or more specifically to the original “state of 
nature”, as an introduction to the philosophic life that transcends the political, defined as 
the potential war among human beings.333 
 
As mentioned previously, Strauss begins paragraph nineteen in agreement with Schmitt 
stating, “The ultimate controversy is whether man is by nature good or evil”.  In using 
the word, “nature”, Strauss already points to “nature”, rather than to biblical faith, as his 
                                                 
330 Ibid., pp. 114 & 115. 
331 Ibid., p. 103.  Strauss’s emphasis. 
332 Ibid., p. 114.  Strauss again refers to “faith” in the context of speaking of “the battle of decision 
between the ‘spirit of technicity’, the mass faith . . . and the opposite spirit and faith, which, as it seems, 
still has no name”.  Here, Strauss confirms the importance of Schmitt’s battle of the faiths. 
333 Ibid., p. 103.  Strauss’s emphasis. 
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response to Schmitt’s call for “content” within the political.  In the same paragraph, 
Strauss identifies Schmitt’s liberal definition of good and evil to mean that human 
beings are “dangerous”, but not in “a specifically moral or ethical sense”.  Here, Strauss 
admits that Schmitt’s definition is not his “last word” on the dangerous nature of human 
beings, suggesting that Schmitt means that evil exists in a more fundamental sense.334  
Strauss’s recognition of Schmitt’s true meaning of evil is evident in the penultimate 
paragraph, where Strauss accuses Schmitt of “entanglements” in his polemics against 
liberalism, which admit that all political expressions are polemical.  Strauss knows that 
Schmitt originally contradicts himself regarding the issue of human evil, because 
Schmitt admits that no one can escape the systematics of liberal thought.335  In addition, 
Schmitt implies that evil is only found in (individual) “concrete political existence”, 
which means that Schmitt accepted an historicist position that locates evil in varying, 
individual historical contexts, implying that evil is not a universal concept that can 
transcend those individual, historical contexts.  Strauss’s purpose in writing his 
“Comments” is to force Schmitt to acknowledge the trans-historical concept of Original 
Sin that provides a more consistent view of the political, focusing on biblical revelation 
as the best way of life.  Furthermore, in forcing Schmitt to accept Original Sin, Strauss 
makes Schmitt’s argument, concerning the need for humans to be ruled, much 
stronger.336   
 
In demonstrating that Schmitt defines evil as biblical evil, which is “the ultimate 
presupposition of the position of the political”, Strauss has to show that Schmitt 
contradicts himself.  In paragraph twenty-one, Strauss points out that, for Schmitt, the 
                                                 
334 Ibid., p. 105.  My emphasis.  In drawing attention to “contradiction” and entanglements, Strauss 
indirectly points to Schmitt’s contradictions and entanglements, as Strauss believes that Schmitt does not 
see any escape from the logic of liberalism. 
335 Ibid., pp. 93 & 119. 
336 Ibid., pp. 105 & 118.  In both the 18th & 34th paragraph, Strauss uses the word “entangled” twice. 
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“necessity of the political” that “is as certain as man’s dangerousness”, is only a 
“supposition”, or an “anthropological confession of faith”.337  Given that Strauss 
emphasizes Schmitt’s words, “supposition” and “faith”, while speaking of “destiny”, he 
raises the problem of Schmitt’s interpretation of faith as the foundation of the political.  
Strauss argues that Schmitt bases his entire argument on a belief that can easily be 
refuted by an opposing belief that does not presuppose “man’s dangerousness” and 
hence, undermines Schmitt’s case in affirming the political.  In a similar manner, most 
of Strauss’s “Comments” attempt to make Schmitt’s position clearer and more 
powerful, since Strauss raises the question why Schmitt affirmed the political in the first 
place.  In answering this question, Strauss argues that he exposes Schmitt’s own hidden 
moral stance that is ultimately based on biblical revelation. 338   
 
In supporting his argument that Schmitt believes recognizing moral evil is necessary for 
the affirmation of the political, Strauss points out that Schmitt’s investigation into the 
human condition is of a higher rank than an investigation into the modern state.  
Schmitt’s grouping of states into friends and enemies implies, for Strauss, “only the 
condition of state” and not its “constitutive principle”.  In his 1932 letter to Schmitt, 
Strauss argues that an investigation into the “constitutive principle” of the state cannot 
be made in terms of the political “as destiny”, where humans separate into factions 
because of “human nature”, as this represents only the “condition of the state”.  Strauss 
argues that “the order”, or the “constitutive principle”, and hence the political, is related 
to the Greek polis and not to the modern state, “as the etymology (political-polis) 
already proves”.  Without giving Schmitt the complete answer, Strauss wants him to 
admit that the political, as the regime (politeia), or the way of life, is the “constitutive 
                                                 
337 Ibid., p. 106.  Strauss’s emphasis. 
338 Ibid., p. 118.  
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principle” of the state.339  As will be demonstrated in chapter five of this thesis, Strauss 
investigates the “constitutive principle” of the political in The City and Man, by 
recovering the Greek city (polis) and its politeia (regime) that is the key to the 
“etymology” of “the political-polis”.  This turning to the classical definition of the 
regimes links Strauss’s “Comments” to his recovery of Aristotle and Plato’s best 
regime, as well as to Thucydides’s best regime, in The City and Man.340   
 
Strauss, in his “Comments”, counters Schmitt’s hidden preference for Original Sin by 
citing Plato; however, Strauss’s choice of dialogues concentrates on the theme of the 
“good”, as well as the bad, leaving open the prospect of some good human beings.  
Strauss refers to two dialogues, but not to Plato’s Republic as Schmitt had done, 
regarding private and public enemies.  Strauss intends to bypass Schmitt’s polemics 
regarding friend and enemy and focus on the fundamental cause of conflict – i.e. on the 
issue concerning “the good” and “the just”.  Strauss chose not to quote the two 
references to Plato, but in reading what Plato says, it is possible to see that Strauss links 
the notion of evil, and hence conflict, to the question of justice and goodness: 
 
Euthyphro: 7C – D.  
Socrates:  Then what would we differ about and what 
decision would we be unable to reach, that we would be 
enemies and angry at each other?  Perhaps you have 
nothing ready to hand, but consider while I speak whether 
it is these things: the just and the unjust, and noble and the 
shameful, and good and the bad.  Isn’t it because we differ 
                                                 
339 Ibid., p. 125.  See the second letter dated September 4th 1932. 
340 Ibid., p. 125.  From Strauss’s personal letter to Schmitt, dated September 4th 1932. 
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about these things and can’t come to a sufficient decision 
about them that we become enemies to each other, 
whenever we do, both I and you and all other human 
beings? 
Euthyphro:  Yes, this is the difference, Socrates, about 
these things.  
Socrates:  What about the gods, Euthyphro?  If they do 
differ at all, wouldn’t they differ because of these same 
things? 
Euthyphro:  Most necessarily.341 
 
In the Phaedrus 263A, Strauss points to the lack of agreement that people have over the 
same issue.   
Socrates:  When one says the name of iron or silver, do we 
not all have the same thing in mind? 
Phaedrus:  Yes, very much so. 
Socrates:  What then of just or good?  Are not different 
people carried in different directions, and do we not part 
ways with each other and even with ourselves?  
Phaedrus: Yes, absolutely.342 
 
In stressing the idea of “the good” that is linked to justice (a political virtue), Strauss 
demonstrates his disagreement with Schmitt’s definition of the political that only 
                                                 
341 Plato and Aristophanes, Four Texts on Socrates: Plato’s Euthyphro , Apology, and Crito and 
Aristophanes’ Clouds, Wes t, Thomas G. & West, Grace Starry, trans., Cornell University Press, U.S.A., 
1984, p. 49.  My emphasis. 
342 Plato, Plato Gorgias and Phaedrus, Nichols, James H., trans., Cornell University Press, U.S.A., 1998, 
pp. 196 & 197.  My emphasis. 
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concentrates on moral evil.  As noted previously, the most striking difference between 
Schmitt and Strauss, on the topic of good and evil, is that Strauss fails to cite Plato’s 
Republic in his “Comments”, given that Schmitt adapts his friend and enemy concept 
from Polemarchus’s view of justice in Book One, namely, helping friends and harming 
enemies.  One could argue that in 1932, Strauss did not have the mastery of the 
Republic that he demonstrates in 1964 in writing The City and Man.  Whatever 
Strauss’s limitations, he does suggest Plato as an alternative view concerning the 
definition of the political as the potential for war among groups or nations, although 
Strauss also seems to include the potential for conflict among individuals as well.  The 
key point Strauss makes, in referring to Plato’s dialogues, is that evil can be seen as the 
result of a conflict over what constitutes our perception of the good, and unlike Schmitt, 
who ignores justice, Strauss suggests that the claims to justice lead people into conflict. 
 
Nevertheless, one of Strauss’s immediate purposes in his “Comments” is to clarify, and 
strengthen, Schmitt’s premise of the political, that human beings are not only 
dangerous, but also morally evil, and hence, in need of government (rule).  In raising the 
issue of rule, Strauss prepares the groundwork for a discussion on regimes and the 
logical question that arises from the competing claims of the regimes – what is the best 
regime?  For there to be rule, or government, Strauss argues that Schmitt must accept 
the view that human beings are evil in terms of “moral baseness”, in order to affirm “the 
core of the political idea”. 343  He argues that only by a “return to the view of human evil 
as moral baseness”, that is “the core of the political idea”, can Schmitt become 
consistent in his demand for “the morally demanding decision (Politische Theologie)”.  
This is one of only two citations in the “Comments” that Strauss cites from Schmitt’s 
                                                 
343 Strauss, Leo, “Notes on Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political”, in Meier, Heinrich, Carl Schmitt 
and Leo Strauss – The Hidden Dialogue, Lomax, Harvey J., trans., op. cit., p. 110. 
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Political Theology.  Here, Strauss intends readers to make a connection between 
political theology and moral decisionism, particularly through highlighting the moral by 
using italics and mentioning Schmitt’s book on political theology, thus implying that the 
only way Schmitt can be cons istent in his presentation of the political is to admit he is a 
political theologian who accepts Original Sin.  Thus, Strauss seems to suggest to 
readers, that Schmitt’s true understanding of the political, as a Christian political 
theologian, is one that accepts evil defined as Original Sin.  In doing so, Strauss shows 
readers of the “Comments” that Schmitt’s fundamental position is not that of a modern 
liberal, or a Hobbesian, because a modern liberal and a Hobbesian believe that evil is 
merely amoral, “innocent” (animal) evil that cannot be condemned.  In mentioning 
Plato, in contrast to biblical revelation (Schmitt’s political theology), Strauss indicates 
that his position is radically different from Schmitt’s and goes to the heart of the 
problem regarding the question of the right way of life – either biblical faith or Greek 
rationalism (Jerusalem or Athens).344   
 
Strauss was already aware of this debate between philosophy (Athens) and faith 
(Jerusalem) between 1925 and 1928, when writing his book on Spinoza’s Theologico–
Political Treatise.  This is clearly demonstrated in Strauss’s “Preface” to the 1965 
German translation of his book on Hobbes.  In the “Preface”, Strauss wrote that he had 
recognized “the reawakening of theology” in his Spinoza studies and “Since then the 
theological-political problem has remained the theme of my investigations”. 345  It is 
important to note that “the theme” was Strauss’s life- long pre-occupation of his 
                                                 
344 Ibid., p. 110.  Strauss’s emphasis.  Strauss mentions the two Platonic dialogues towards the end of the 
“Comments”, i.e. after mentioning Schmitt’s book, Political Theology that highlights “the core of the 
political idea” as “the morally demanding decision”, thus appearing as an alternative to Schmitt’s 
position. 
345 Strauss, Leo, “Preface to Hobbes Politische Wissenschaft”, in Strauss, Leo, Jewish Philosophy and the 
Crisis of Modernity, Green, Kenneth Hart, editor, op. cit., p. 453.  Strauss’s emphasis.  Strauss had 
discovered Hobbes during his investigations of Spinoza. 
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“investigations” that began in the mid 1920s.  Strauss states that his first articulation of 
the theme was in his 1932 “Comments”, and that he chose to re-publish it “at the end of 
this volume”, i.e. in Strauss’s 1965 English translation of his book on Spinoza that 
appeared one year after the publication of The City and Man.  Strauss wrote, in the first 
paragraph of his 1965 “Preface”, that his new approach to his historical studies was in 
response to the  “theologico-political predicament”, meaning who, or what, should rule 
society. 346    
 
The “theologico-political problem”, for Strauss, is coeval with the problem of what, or 
who, should rule human beings – either biblical wisdom or Socratic wisdom.  In his 
Spinoza “Preface”, Strauss openly admits that his response to Schmitt’s The Concept of 
the Political, in the form of the “Comments”, was his first public expression of a 
“change in orientation”, which led him to become “ever more attentive to the manner in 
which heterodox thinkers of earlier ages wrote their books”, implying that he 
recognized the significance of the conflict between philosophy and society. 347  
Whatever Strauss means by the theologico-political problem, he intended readers to see 
a connection between his original “Comments” article on Schmitt’s The Concept of the 
Political and his books published in the 1960s.  As mentioned previously, Strauss 
republished the “Comments” in English in his 1965 Spinoza book one year after the 
publication of The City and Man, and two years after Schmitt republished The Concept 
of the Political, with various changes that Meier suggests came from Strauss’s 1932 
                                                 
346 Strauss, Leo, Spinoza's Critique of Religion, Sinclair, E. M., trans., op. cit., p. 1.  The “Comments” – 
Strauss’s own translation of the title, appears on pp. 331 – 351.  Schmitt also re-published his book, The 
Concept of the Political in 1963. 
347 Ibid., p. 31.  The “Comments” article is placed after the “Appendix” and is the last thing to appear.  
Schmitt republished his The Concept of the Political in 1963, one year before Strauss published The City 
and Man, indicating the ongoing responses between Schmitt and Strauss. 
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“Comments”.348  Strauss’s “Preface” to his English translation of his Spinoza book was 
written in 1962 (the same year Strauss began writing The City and Man) and was 
published in 1965. 
 
In returning to the “Comments”, Strauss argues that Hobbes knew that “the natural evil 
of man” must be “persistently fought” against.  Strauss, in agreement with Schmitt, 
argues that modern liberalism has overlooked this primary root of the political – “the 
evil nature of man” - through the acceptance of modern “natural-scientific neutrality” 
(value-free social science), and through the acceptance of the premise that human 
beings were originally good.  For Strauss, this latter premise of “original goodness” 
came from a belief in “God’s creation and providence”.  Given these developments, 
Strauss argues that the final outcome was a belief in the “improvement of nature” that 
Strauss suggests is “unjustified by man’s experience of himself”.  Strauss further argues 
that “a supposed deeper insight into history” (historicism), that is equivalent to an 
insight “into the essence of man”, has aided in our forgetting Hobbes’s “the state of 
nature”.  Strauss means that as times change, so do our conceptions of human nature 
and the state of nature.  However, for Hobbes, the “state of nature” exists always, and 
remains the potential for war among evil individuals.  Nevertheless, the root cause of 
the disappearance of “the state of nature” Strauss blames on Hobbes’s “negation of the 
state of nature”, where a return to the idea of nature is understood as being impossible.  
He concludes that the hope of “an improvement of nature” led to our ignorance of 
Hobbes’s “unliberal nature of man. 349  In 1932, Strauss did not specifically identify the 
response to the problem of the recovery of nature, but he does hint in the “Comments” 
                                                 
348 Meier, Heinrich, Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss - The Hidden Dialogue, Lomax, Harvey J., trans., op. 
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349 Strauss, Leo, “Notes on Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political”, in Meier, Heinrich, Carl Schmitt 
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that “the opposite spirit and faith” to “an antireligious, this worldly activism”, or the 
“spirit of technicity”, cannot be identified as it “still has no name”.  Unfortunately, 
Strauss does not spell out  what he means by this statement, although the context 
suggests that the nameless “faith” is Schmitt’s groping for an affirmation of the political 
that is founded on biblical revelation. 350 
 
Strauss argues that, initially, Schmitt followed “Hobbes, Spinoza, [and] Pufendorff” in 
describing human beings as “evil”, meaning that they are only passionate “beasts”, since 
they are not responsible for their “drives (hunger, cupidity, fear, [and] jealousy)”.  In 
short, Strauss concludes that the modern expression of evil means “human inferiority” 
or “animal power”, which is the amoral behaviour typical of animals.  In Hobbes’s case, 
Strauss argues that his selection of “innocent” evil, that was “not meant in the moral 
sense”, was the logical result of his denial of biblical “sin”, in order to give human 
beings freedom “without obligations”.  Once again, Strauss suggests that there is a 
connection between “moral evil” and biblical “sin”, or what Strauss fails to cite as 
Original Sin.  However, instead of openly calling Schmitt a political theologian, who 
accepts Original Sin, Strauss turns to Schmitt’s favourite thinker, Hobbes, in order to 
show Schmitt the limitations of Hobbes’s doctrine on evil.351  Strauss argues that 
Hobbes’s definition of innocent evil implies that some “goodness” can result from 
“innocent” evil.  Without citing a reference to Hobbes, Strauss argues that Hobbes 
believes that the “beast” (a human being) can be educated, because a “beast can become 
astute through injury”.  If the “beast” is innocent, as Hobbes concedes, then Strauss 
maintains there can be no limit on its education, since all limits just become “mere 
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supposition”, or what Strauss usually calls “faith”. 352  The consequence of Hobbes’s 
theory, for Strauss, is that it forms the basis for a faith in progress, the very thing 
Schmitt denies in The Concept of the Political.353  This belief in progress is referred to 
on four occasions, in the “Introduction” of The City and Man, the last stating that “an 
unchangeable human nature might set absolute limits to progress”.  Thus, Strauss’s 
purpose in the “Comments” is to use Hobbes to force Schmitt to accept the supposition 
that moral evil is connected to Original Sin. 354   
 
In mentioning evil twenty-three times in one paragraph of his “Comments”, Strauss 
indicates his intensity in elucidating Schmitt’s position as a political theologian.  Strauss 
wants him to draw the conclusion that evil, as “understood morally”, is his true premise.  
Strauss’s intention becomes clearer when a reader realizes that Strauss makes his rare 
reference to Schmitt’s book, “Politische Theologie” (Political Theology), that speaks of 
“the morally demanding decision” as “the core of the political idea”.  Only if he accepts 
moral evil, Strauss then concludes, can Schmitt “remain in harmony with himself”.355  
In indicating what that decision is based upon, Strauss cites his second, and final, 
reference to “Politische Theologie” that occurs in the context of “Donoso Cortés”, 
suggesting that Schmitt’s position falls into the category of political theology, rather 
than political philosophy, because Schmitt accepts the doctrine of Original Sin as the 
foundation of the political.  Cortés  is central to understanding Schmitt’s book, Political 
Theology, and Schmitt discusses him throughout that book.  Furthermore, Schmitt’s 
mention of Cortés in The Concept of the Political, i.e. in the context of the only mention 
of “original sin”, seems to be overlooked by Strauss.  Strauss chose not to mention 
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353 Schmitt, Carl, The Concept of the Political, Schwab, George, trans., op. cit., pp. 65, 78 & 79. 
354 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., p. 7.   
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“original sin” in his “Comments”.  This is not unusual for Strauss.  One of Strauss’s 
techniques of writing is to fail to mention an obvious point, thus forcing the reader to 
deduce from the context what Strauss sees as important.  In reminding readers of 
Schmitt’s affinity with Original Sin, Strauss purposely decides not to mention “original 
sin” in the same context where he cites his only mention of “Donoso Cortés”, and in the 
same context of his rare mention of political theology.  Given Schmitt’s attention to the 
role of Cortés, as a political theologian and one who despised liberals, as seen in 
Schmitt’s Political Theology, and given Strauss’s crucial mention of Schmitt’s Political 
Theology in the “Comments”, it appears that Strauss wants readers of the “Comments” 
to conclude that Schmitt is a political theologian who accepts Original Sin. 356 
 
In explaining Schmitt’s use of polemical arguments, Strauss suggests that Schmitt’s 
arguments were rhetorical in the sense of being controversial and designed to confront 
the reader, rather then presenting logical deductions, or rational arguments.  Strauss 
argues that Schmitt’s use of polemical arguments is the result of his belief that he 
cannot escape the “horizon of liberalism”.  Furthermore, he implies that Schmitt’s 
polemics are designed “to clear the field for the battle of decision” between political 
theology and political philosophy. 357  Strauss also knows that the word comes from the 
Greek, “polemos” meaning war, and so provides an appropriate term to use in the 
context of Schmitt’s concept of the political.  Thus, in paragraph thirty-four, Strauss 
affirms Schmitt’s statement that, “all political concepts, ideas and words have a 
polemical meaning”.  However, Strauss shows that Schmitt “violates” this statement by 
not taking Hobbes’s “state of nature” as polemical, as Hobbes intended.  In this manner, 
Strauss demonstrates that Schmitt does not have a grasp of Hobbes’s doctrine regarding 
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“the state of nature”. 358  It is through his literal acceptance of Hobbes’s polemical 
definition of evil, according to Strauss, that Schmitt becomes entangled in the logic of 
Hobbes’s liberalism.  In demonstrating Schmitt’s complete admission of defeat at the 
hands of his liberal enemies, Strauss reminds readers of Schmitt’s claim that “the 
astonishingly consistent . . . systematics of liberal thought has still not been replaced in 
Europe today by any other system”.359  However, Strauss argues that the whole of his 
“Comments”, or “what can be learned from Schmitt” is the “urgent task” of “gaining a 
horizon beyond liberalism”.360  Strauss does this by forcing Schmitt to accept a pre-
Hobbesian concept of evil – Original Sin – as the beginning of that transcendence of 
liberalism, especially given that Strauss believes that Hobbes was “the founder of 
liberalism”.361 
 
Strauss’s private comment to his Christian friend, the theologian Eric Voegelin, is 
further evidence that Strauss wants Schmitt to take moral evil seriously.  It is this 
fundamental premise that sets the political theologians (Schmitt and Voegelin) and the 
political philosopher (Strauss) apart, although all begin with morality.  Strauss, in a rare, 
private admission to Voegelin, reveals his fundamental understanding behind some of 
his work.  Strauss states that his premise is “very simple: philosophari necesse est”  (“it 
is necessary to philosophize”).  Strauss continues, “philosophy is radically independent 
of faith” and that “the root of our disagreement lies presumably in the second thesis”. 362  
Thus, in his “Comments”, Strauss confirms that the quarrel that “has no name” is the 
quarrel among political theologians and political philosophers regarding the question, 
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what is more authoritative for political life – faith, or the best regime?  Political 
theologians, such as Schmitt, begin with “faith”, whereas, philosophers (literally, lovers 
of wisdom), commence with questions and wonder.  In short, Strauss demonstrates how 
to clarify Schmitt’s position, so that he can remain consistent in his own faith that 
successfully affirms a concept of the political defined as destiny that also includes moral 
evil.  By focusing on Schmitt’s concept of the political, Strauss also provides readers 
with an indication of what is required to find an alternative understanding of the 
political that does not presuppose the premise of faith, and hence, Original Sin.  
According to Strauss, Schmitt’s legacy is that he points to an understanding of Hobbes’s 
“state of nature” that allows one to raise the question, “what is the political?” in the 
context of an investigation into nature and the nature of things that can satisfy the sixth 
criterion, defined as an “order of human things based on pure and whole knowledge”. 363   
 
2. Ernstfall 
 
In countering Schmitt, Strauss argues that Hobbes did not intend the word, 
“dangerousness”, to be anything but polemical.  As part of Hobbes’s “state of nature”, 
or war against all individuals, it was used to scare readers into accepting the benefits of 
peace that civilization offered. According to Strauss, Schmitt affirms “man’s 
dangerousness” and thus the political, by making “dangerousness” the true foundation 
of the political.  Unlike Hobbes, Schmitt makes “dangerousness” the basis of the 
political, not peace and civilization.  In avoiding a return to Original Sin, and in trying 
to avoid value-free social science, Schmitt argues that this “dangerousness” has “no 
normative meaning”, having only a “concrete”, or historical meaning.  This becomes the 
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historical necessity that forms the basis of Schmitt’s understanding of providence and 
destiny that denies any escape from the political.  Strauss discerns in Schmitt’s 
argument that a concrete opposition forms “in time of danger”, i.e. during a “dire 
emergency” (Ernstfall) where “a totality of men” fight.364  Previously, Strauss had 
argued that what makes the political “fundamental” and “authoritative” for Schmitt, is 
“the real possibility of physical killing”, meaning that “war is the dire emergency” 
(Ernstfall).365  However, Strauss knows that Schmitt is a polemical writer and that these 
polemical statements are intended to raise the question, “what is right?” i.e. what is the 
right way of life?  This is confirmed in paragraph twenty-four, where Strauss asks 
Schmitt whether the clash of “a fighting totality of men” affirms the “dangerousness of 
its enemies?”.  However, Strauss demonstrates the absurdity of Schmitt’s argument by 
simply asking, whether human beings “wish for dangerous enemies?”.  In answering 
Schmitt that human beings do not desire to have dangerous enemies, Strauss reminds 
him of C. Fabricius’s reply to a claim that a Greek philosopher had recently discovered 
that “pleasure is the greatest good”.  At the time, the Romans were at war with Pyrrhus 
and the Samnites.  Upon hearing the latest discovery, the Roman general replied, “If 
only Pyrrhus and the Samnites shared this philosopher’s opinion as long as we are at 
war with them!”.  Thus, Strauss argues that no nation wants to have dangerous enemies 
for its own sake, because common sense demonstrates that all nations threatened with 
danger demand their “own dangerousness” not for the sake of “dangerousness”, but “for 
the sake of being rescued from danger”.  In making dangerousness a neutral “content”, 
Strauss accuses Schmitt of admiring “evil” for its own sake, while acting in the same 
manner as the neutral liberals he condemns.366  Strauss’s point is to force Schmitt to 
recognize that his polemic style of writing leads to entanglements that Schmitt cannot 
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unravel.  Furthermore, Strauss also attempts to expose Schmitt’s true intention in 
returning to Hobbes’s argument concerning evil, and that means also understanding pre-
Hobbesian evil by defining evil in a biblical sense, or in a Platonic sense.  Thus, in 
accepting moral evil, Strauss and Schmitt could then account for the extreme situation 
(Ernstfall) or the potential for war, and hence, the need for rule.367  
 
3. Decision  
 
In his claim to “affirm” the political, Strauss argues that Schmitt is silently passing a 
moral judgement in direct contradiction to his claim that the political is not “normative”.  
Strauss establishes that Schmitt is not neutral in his book on the political.  As Strauss 
points out, “the political is removed from all arbitrary, private discretion; it has the 
character of a transprivate obligation”.368  Subsequently, Schmitt’s moral condemnation 
of an apolitical world hinges on his argument that human life would be reduced to 
“entertainment”, meaning that it would be bad for human beings.  A world dominated 
by entertainment would be a world without “seriousness”, Schmitt argues.  It is here 
that Strauss reveals Schmitt’s hidden value-judgement, which indicates Schmitt’s moral 
disapproval of such a superficial “neutral” world.  Strauss draws the reader’s attention 
to Schmitt’s comment on the possible apolitical, or neutral, world, by emphasizing a key 
word in Schmitt’s comment that such a world would be “perhaps very interesting”.  By 
qualifying the interesting nature of an apolitical world, by saying “perhaps”, Strauss 
argues that Schmitt was questioning whether a “human being worthy of the name” 
                                                 
367 Ibid., p. 107.  According to Strauss, the expression, “state of nature” was “at home with Christian 
theology” as it was the opposite of “the state of grace”.  See Strauss, Leo, Natural Right and History, op. 
cit., p. 184. 
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would be truly interested in such a world.369  Strauss draws attention to Schmitt’s 
hidden judgement, or his concealed “nausea” at the thought of an apolitical world state.  
According to Strauss, Schmitt’s hidden moral condemnation of such a world is truly an 
“affirmation of the political”, which is “nothing other than the affirmation of the 
moral”. 370  Strauss, in following Schmitt, had already established that the moral is the 
“affirmation of the political” and the “political is the affirmation of the state of nature”, 
which denies any neutrality, since all human beings are in potential war with one 
another.  However, Strauss’s purpose in forcing Schmitt to reconsider the state of nature 
is not just to recover it, but also to show that it forces the reader back to “a pure and 
whole knowledge”, which points to “the order of the human things”, i.e. either to an 
order that is according to nature, or to an order that is found on Original Sin. 371  
 
The problem of the political for Schmitt, according to Strauss, is how to reconcile the 
affirmation of the moral with liberal morality, defined by Schmitt as “humanitarian 
morality”.  Strauss argues that Schmitt “remains trapped in the view that he is 
attacking” in accepting “his opponents’ view of morality”, as “humanitarian-pacifist 
morals to be morals”. 372  Strauss concludes his essay referring to the “necessary result” 
of Schmitt’s “entanglement”, as one of “no accidental failure but the necessary result of 
the principle that all concepts of the spiritual sphere . . . are to be understood only in 
terms of concrete political existence”.373  Thus, Schmitt’s fundamental error is his 
acceptance of historicism (“concrete political existence”) that underscores his concept 
                                                 
369 Ibid., p. 112.  Strauss’s emphasis.  In his book, Persecution and the Art of Writing, op. cit., p. 78, 
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to indicate an esoteric meaning. 
370 Strauss, Leo, “Notes on Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political”, in Meier, Heinrich, Carl Schmitt 
and Leo Strauss - The Hidden Dialogue, Lomax, Harvey J., trans., op. cit., pp. 112 & 113.  Strauss’s 
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of the political as conflicting faiths.  In his final analysis, Strauss calls Schmitt’s liberal 
position, one “with the opposite polarity”.  By this statement, Strauss argues that 
Schmitt was tolerant, just like the liberals, but in contrast to liberalism, his affirmation 
of the political led to “serious convictions”. 374 
 
Nevertheless, Strauss indicates a way out for Schmitt.  In addressing the third criteria of 
a non-neutral decision, Strauss examines Schmitt’s discussion of culture, arguing that 
“sovereign” ancient culture is “always the culture of nature” and that nature “obeys the 
order that nature gives itself”.  Regardless of whether nature means nurturing or 
fighting, he argues, culture still remains “the culture of nature” and that we now accept 
culture to mean “the culture of human nature”, because it is the “presupposition of 
culture”.  Strauss further argues that the investigation into culture reveals that the 
foundation of “culture” is that all humans are by nature social.  According to Strauss, 
this “status naturalis” has been forgotten, and completely covered over, in modern 
times.  Strauss’s reason is that the “status civilis”, or what is now called civilization, has 
contributed to our forgetting the original state of nature that lurks behind Hobbes’s 
political theory.  Furthermore, Strauss argues that Hobbes’s teaching about the “status 
civilis”, was intended by Hobbes to be the opposite to “the state of nature”, or “status 
naturalis”.  Strauss also indicates that, for Hobbes, “the state of nature” was the “status 
belli”, which meant that, “the nature of war, consisteth not in actual fighting; but in the 
known disposition thereto” that was the polemically intended state of war among all 
individuals.  The key to understanding Hobbes’s “state of nature”, for Strauss, was in 
recognizing that its introduction was “polemical”, meaning that Hobbes was using it to 
persuade his readers that peace within society was the only alternative to it.  Strauss 
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argues that Schmitt denies that peace is the goal for civilization, because he changes 
Hobbes’s doctrine of “the state of nature”. 375   
 
Nevertheless, although Schmitt changed some of Hobbes’s arguments regarding the 
“state of nature”, Strauss believes that Schmitt should be credited with having re-
discovered “the state of nature” in the twentieth century.  He argues that Schmitt’s 
concept of the political is the “status naturalis”, because it is the “genuinely political 
status”, particularly since Schmitt argued that the political was not discovered in actual 
fighting, but in “a behavior that is determined by this real possibility”.  Strauss defends 
Schmitt’s restoration of the political as “a status of man”, but only as the “natural, the 
fundamental and extreme, status of man”.  For Strauss, Schmitt identified the political 
as “a status of man”, which means “the status as the natural”.  In other words, the 
“status of man” cannot remain neutral, but depends on “the status” of nature, as the 
direction for any investigation of criterion six, regarding “the order of the human 
things”, allowing Strauss to recover Socratic natural right, the best regime that is 
according to nature.  In this way, Strauss is able to begin to answer the question, what is 
right? (criterion five) and provide a decisionism that is not neutral (criterion three).  The 
key is that Schmitt’s arguments led to nature as something transprivate and not neutral; 
however, Schmitt fails to complete that connection, in Strauss’s view.  Thus, the 
significance of Strauss’s stress on a nature that is not neutral is twofold: it raises the 
question of human nature in terms of good and evil - criterion one - and therefore raises 
the question in criterion two regarding “a concrete opposition” – either biblical faith or a 
return to Socratic political philosophy.  Furthermore, nature provides for a “transprivate 
obligation” (criterion three) and the beginnings of a content that is not neutral, or 
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arbitrary, in determining who is a friend and who is an enemy (criterion four).  Nature 
becomes a standard for Strauss’s solution to right, as seen in his recovery of Socratic 
natural right and the best regime.376 
 
4. Content 
 
In returning to Schmitt’s polemic against liberalism, Strauss uses the term, “polemic” to 
indicate that Schmitt is masking his speech by using acceptable arguments, which 
suggest a deeper issue.  Strauss exposes Schmitt’s polemical statement that people 
group together because they form friend and enemy distinctions, by demonstrating 
Schmitt’s non-polemical intention underlying that statement.  He argues that the 
“seriousness” of Schmitt’s statement is that potential conflict among groups, and 
nations, results over the question of what constitutes the best way of life, or what each 
group, or each nation, perceives as right or just.  More importantly, Strauss spells out 
that the political has something to do with the quarrel “over the just and the good”.  For 
Strauss, what is just and good is that which is according to nature.377  This is what 
Strauss means by “content” in his fourth criterion for the affirmation of the political.378   
 
Harry Neumann’s discussion of the battle at Verdun in World War One exposes the 
meaning behind Schmitt’s concept of “content”.  According to Neumann, Schmitt’s 
concept of the political, as the division between friend and enemy over conflicting ways 
of life, comes to light when nations, or groups, have reached their peaks spiritually.  
Neumann does not rule out civil wars, such as the American Civil War, as examples of 
nations fighting among themselves over what constitutes the best way of life.  In 
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following Schmitt, Neumann argues that the particular ferocity and fanaticism of the 
battle of Verdun reflected the content of the issue at stake, i.e. “the French Republic” 
versus “the Prussian monarchy”.  In describing those pieties, he calls the former, “one 
officially dedicated to the universal rights of man”, and the latter, a need for an 
“aristocratic duty to Prussia’s throne and Reich”.379  What also distinguished the battle 
at Verdun, according to Neumann, was its Prussian flavour, arguing that “the French at 
Verdun subordinated humanitarian, global considerations to the demands of Duty! 
Honor! Country!”. 380  Had not the German and French commanders been relieved, they 
would have “bled their armies white rather than yield an inch”.  He concludes that the 
battle, which accounted for the death of nearly one million soldiers, did not have to be 
fought.381     
 
Neumann argues that Churchill noted that the Germans ignored sound strategy in not 
turning to the East and defeating the Russians first and, at the very least, demanding a 
peace that included gains in the East.  However, Neumann argues that sensible strategy 
was over-ruled by the Prussian desire to “humble their greatest foe”.  He points out that 
the French were also extremely determined to avenge their humiliating defeat by Prussia 
in 1870.382  Neumann argues that the French army “never recovered from Verdun and 
from the disastrous Nivelle-Mangin offensive (1917) inspired by Verdun”. 383  
Furthermore, the consequence of the clash between the Prussian way of life and the 
French way of life was the disappearance of Prussia “in the contemporary world”. 384  
For Strauss, both regimes claim to represent the good and just way of life, but in 
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adopting the best regime, Strauss criticizes regimes, such as Prussia’s, because they 
focused only on militarism and not the good life that is concerned with peace, natural 
justice and philosophy. 385  However, for Strauss, Schmitt’s preoccupation with war does 
not imply that Schmitt is a warmonger, or war lover, because Schmitt stresses that “no 
legitimacy or legality” can “justify men’s killing one another for its own sake”.  They 
do so, according to Schmitt, because they remain in “the state of nature” as described by 
Hobbes, meaning that the potential for war is caused through their support of different 
faiths.386   
 
The content of Hobbes’s “state of nature” is central in understanding Schmitt’s concept 
of the political.  In Natural Right and History, Strauss points out that, prior to Hobbes, 
“the term ‘state of nature’ was at home in Christian theology rather than in political 
theology”.  Part of it was divided into “the state of fallen nature”, but, according to 
Strauss, Hobbes dropped it to avoid having to accept Original Sin.387  Strauss argues in 
his “Comments” that Hobbes did not want to “recognize any primary obligation of 
man”, that comes from biblical sin, because he wanted to present a human being as free 
“by nature”, so that “the fundamental political fact was natural right as the justified 
claim of the individual”.  Not duty to God, but the right of self-preservation becomes 
the essence of the political for Strauss’s understanding of Hobbes.388  However, it is not 
always clear that Schmitt intended his presentation of “the state of nature” to mean a 
return to Christian theology.  In his “Comments”, Strauss points out that Schmitt does 
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not understand Hobbes’s arguments regarding “the state of nature”.  There are four 
significant content changes that determine Schmitt’s friend and enemy definition.  
Instead of having Hobbes’s individuals in a state of potential war with one another, as 
Hobbes presents in his “the state of nature”, Schmitt replaces the individuals with 
groups (“totalities”) and nations.  Strauss also notes that Schmitt takes seriously the 
possibility of “the state of nature”, whereas Hobbes had presented it “as in itself 
impossible”.  According to Strauss, Hobbes had only “polemically” proposed “the state 
of nature” to get everyone to civilization and peace, as quickly as possible.  Strauss calls 
this movement, the “negation” of “the state of nature”.  Strauss implies that Hobbes 
used “the state of nature”, as equivalent to the fear of violent death and a means to avoid 
civil war.  This was the motivation for developing the modern state and peaceful 
civilization.  In addition, Hobbes did not divide his individuals into friends and enemies, 
because everyone was subjected to potential enmity.  In short, Strauss demonstrates that 
Schmitt’s concept of the political is flawed, especially because “totalities”, or groups, 
often form alliances, while other “totalities” remain neutral.  Thus, Strauss makes clear 
that in Hobbes’s “state of nature”, which was the basis of the political, no one remained 
neutral and friendship was impossible.  In contradiction to Hobbes (Schmitt’s preferred 
thinker) Schmitt argues that, “all political behavior is oriented toward friend and 
enemy”.  Furthermore, in contrast to Hobbes, Strauss highlights Schmitt’s demand that 
the various “totalities” must be ready to die for their nations, or groups, whereas Hobbes 
argued that the state was formed to guarantee the preservation of life for each 
individual.  Since self-preservation was the original right in the state of nature, and that 
“the state of nature” does not disappear, individuals only owe “conditional obedience” 
to the state, according to Hobbes.389  Schmitt had indicated in his Concept of the 
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Political that obedience was to be total in return for protection. 390  Once again, Strauss 
demonstrates the absurdity of Schmitt’s arguments that seek to affirm the political that 
are supposed to follow Hobbes’s arguments, raising the possibility that Schmitt is 
merely using Hobbes to return to the doctrine of Original Sin.  However, in recognizing 
that the “state of nature” is never totally negated, Strauss also reminds readers that 
Hobbes had argued that nations still remain in “the state of nature” in their dealings with 
one another.  In this regard, Schmitt’s concept of enmity among nations is correct, 
particularly if the reader accepts that Schmitt accepts universal evil that comes from 
accepting Original Sin.  Yet, according to Strauss, Schmitt overlooks Hobbes’s 
polemics against “individuals”, not groups.391  Thus, Strauss shows that Schmitt 
changes Hobbes’s political teaching regarding natural right, or the justice in a citizen 
deserting his, or her, post when threatened with death.  As Strauss observes, Hobbes had 
taught that “death is the greatest evil” and that the right of every individual was to 
preserve his, or her, life at whatever cost.392  The purpose behind Schmitt’s changes, 
according to Strauss, was Schmitt’s intention to make the foundation of the political, i.e. 
the “state of nature” not a polemical abstraction, but something that was “possible”, in 
contrast to Hobbes’s intention that it was “in itself impossible” and was meant only 
polemically.  Thus, Strauss shows the inconsistency, and absurdity, in Schmitt’s attempt 
to ground his concept of the political on Hobbes’s political philosophy, unless Schmitt 
wanted to ground it on Original Sin. 393  Schmitt must have been aware of his misuse of 
Hobbes, as he had warned his readers in The Concept of the Political that he was 
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familiar with polemics.394  Furthermore, in rejecting Hobbes’s polemical argument 
concerning “the state of nature”, Schmitt turns to “the whole history of humanity up to 
the present” to demonstrate “the unpolemical description of the political”, as found in 
“the state of nature”.  What Strauss makes clear is that Schmitt’s rejection of natural 
law, and natural right, causes him to misrepresent Hobbes, whose foundation of the 
political was a universal natural right – the right to self-preservation.  In short, Schmitt 
has no place for trans-neutral nature, the best regime, and natural rights, but only the 
individual concrete situations that dominate history. 395  
 
5. Right 
 
Strauss argues that Schmitt admits that his understanding of the nature of a human being 
“is destiny”, or what appears as historical necessity. 396  Strauss suggests that Schmitt’s 
faith in “destiny”, or historical providence, means that human beings cannot escape the 
political, because the political is related to Schmitt’s acceptance of historicism.  Thus, it 
is Schmitt’s faith in historical “destiny” that causes him to deny the possibility of 
transcending liberalism and to become “entangled” in contradiction.  Schmitt’s 
acceptance of historicism is why he dismisses nature, natural law, natural right and the 
best regime as answers to the question, “what is right?”.  As universal concepts they 
contradict Schmitt’s belief that right can only be specific to concrete situations of the 
age.  This is why Schmitt questions the concept of humanity and any universal rights 
that are connected to it. 
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As already noted, Schmitt argues that the expression, “humanity”, is not a political term.  
Strauss’s “Comments” provides an interpretation of Hobbes that explains the origin of 
humanity, particularly the modern natural right to self-preservation.  He argues that 
Hobbes was the founder of the modern expression “humanity”.  For Strauss, it means 
the “subject or object of planning” based on Hobbes’s single humanity of “partnership 
in consumption and production”, called “civilization”.  The principles of “planning” that 
Strauss believes Hobbes outlines are: defending against external enemies, preserving 
internal peace within the state, and encouraging the just acquisition of material goods by 
individuals through “work and frugality”, rather than through “victorious wars”.  The 
acquisition of material goods is further encouraged by “mechanics and mathematics” 
with the purpose of society being the enjoyment of “innocuous freedom”.  In summing 
up Hobbes’s natural right (humanity), as the “securing of life”, i.e. as a claim predating 
and overriding the state, Strauss argues that Hobbes is “the founder of liberalism” – the 
very thing Schmitt misunderstands.397  This discussion of modern humanity, as a 
response to Schmitt’s arguments regarding humanity, becomes significant in Strauss’s 
The City and Man, where he outlines Aristotle’s and Plato’s humanity that comes to 
light as the natural justice of the philosopher.  Strauss also outlines Thucydides’s 
arguments for humanity as the peak of Greekness, but in contrast to Hobbes, Strauss 
sees Thucydides’s humanity as the equivalent to wisdom, or contemplation of the 
truth.398  In reply to Schmitt’s dismissal of humanity as a political concept, Strauss 
argues that he has found an answer to Schmitt’s failure to find a standard for humanity 
(natural right) that is both universal and able to adapt to the extreme case of war, 
without being relative to individual concrete historical situations.  Strauss’s articulation 
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of that standard, and answer to the question, “what is right?” is found in his outline of 
the best regime in The City and Man.  The crucial point is that Strauss continues his 
response to Schmitt’s arguments in The City and Man.399   
 
Strauss argues that Schmitt’s concept of friend and enemy groupings “owes its 
legitimation to the seriousness of the question of what is right”.  Schmitt argues that if 
someone “relinquished asking the question what is right?”, described as “the life-and-
death quarrel: the political”, then that person “relinquishes being a man”.  Thus, in 
quoting Plato’s Euthyphro and Phaedrus, Strauss indicates what he understands by the 
underlying meaning of Schmitt’s definition of the right faith, as well as indicating the 
Platonic direction he will take, i.e. the question of “the good” and natural justice.  By 
turning to Platonic dialogues, Strauss also implies that the question must become one of 
discussion and search rather than one of faith. 400  In providing an alternative to 
Schmitt’s concept of the political, Strauss seems to suggest, ironically, that the new 
“spirit and faith” that replaces the “antireligious, this-worldly activism” in “the battle 
for decision between the spirit of technicity” and a new spirituality that “has no name”, 
is a return to Socratic philosophy – an opposite spirit to “faith” altogether.  Strauss 
seems to announce that a return to the classical idea of the regimes, and natural justice 
that is based on nature, provides a better guidance for the political life, particularly in 
judging what is right regarding the activities of nations or states.  Strauss also may be 
indicating that political theology and political philosophy are “Ultimately, two 
completely opposed answers to the question of what is right” because they “confront 
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each other, and these answers allow of no mediation and no neutrality”.  This means 
that they represent “the order of the human things” from the biblical perspective (faith) 
that takes into consideration Original Sin, and the Socratic alternative that is based on 
reasoned, human discussion and search.  However, Strauss’s most urgent task, in 
writing the “Comments”, was to gain an horizon beyond liberalism through “an 
adequate understanding of Hobbes”. 401 
 
6. Order 
 
In raising the question of “the order of the human things” in the first paragraph of the 
first division of his “Comments”, Strauss begins to come to the basis of Schmitt’s 
concept of the political.  As already demonstrated, Strauss’s understanding of Schmitt 
involves recognizing the problem of good and evil by initially raising the question, 
“what is right?”.  In answering the question of right, Strauss turns to the question of 
justice and the good found in Plato’s philosophy.  Strauss also suggests that Schmitt 
must accept Original Sin as his final understanding of evil.  The fundamental question 
of the right order, which is either the life dedicated to the recovery of nature or a return 
to Original Sin, is the link that connects Strauss’s response to Schmitt throughout 
Strauss’s “Comments” and The City and Man.  In his only mention of “original sin” in 
The City and Man, Strauss notes that it might not be possible to know the things that are 
just by nature if one accepts Original Sin. 402  This is why Strauss argues in his 
“Comments” that “what ultimately matters to Schmitt is not the battle against 
liberalism”, but the question regarding the best way of life.  The reason why the 
question of natural right, or natural justice, is connected to “the order of the human 
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things”, is that Strauss relates “order” to the moral question of how human beings live.  
Thus, what joins Schmitt and Strauss together is their emphasis on the regime (politeia), 
or the most authoritative opinions held by a group or nation.  What ultimately separates 
the two thinkers is Schmitt’s historicism, his emphasis on faith and Original Sin, as well 
as his rejection of natural right that is essential for Aristotle and Plato’s best regime.403   
 
Strauss’s two citations to Plato, in his “Comments”, show that the question Schmitt 
raises is related to ends as well as means.  In transcending the concrete situation of 
Weimar in 1932, Strauss demonstrates that human beings, and groups, disagree over 
issues relating to justice and what constitutes the highest end, or the best way of life – 
i.e. what constitutes the good.  Although Strauss does not include a full quotation of the 
parts of the two dialogues, he expects his readers to contemplate them as part of his 
analysis of Schmitt’s arguments.  In the context of his discussion on the dialogues, 
Strauss points out that in our liberal society, we are used to “agreement at all costs”, but 
the price is high, since the philosophic question of “what is right”, or what is “the right 
faith”, is lost, as is the question regarding the best “human order”.  The implication of 
this loss, for both Strauss and Schmitt, is its necessary effect on the political and the 
moral seriousness of the citizen.  As Strauss interprets Schmitt’s friend and enemy 
concept, “the grouping of humanity into friends and enemies – owes its legitimation to 
the seriousness of the question of what is right”.  However, Strauss’s comprehensive 
answer in The City and Man - already glimpsed in the “Comments” through his 
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references to Plato - resides in the contemplative life that stresses peace, philosophic 
discussion, natural justice and friendship in contrast to Schmitt’s emphasis on enmity.404   
 
In turning to the sixth criterion as the natural order of the human things, based on 
knowledge, Strauss turns to Hobbes, particularly to his concept of “the state of nature”.  
In addressing “the order of the human things”, Strauss argues that, “Schmitt restores the 
Hobbesian concept of the state of nature to a place of honor”, but only as a way back to 
the Greek concept of nature, and possibly, a way for Schmitt to return to the doctrine of 
Original Sin.405  Strauss, in following Schmitt’s thread, argues that Schmitt’s initial 
interpretation of Hobbes’s “state of nature” correctly begins with a discussion of 
modern “culture”.  Strauss agrees with Schmitt’s questioning of the “autonomy” of 
culture.  In using Schmitt’s definition of culture, “as a whole” and as “autonomous”, 
Strauss argues that, although there are many cultures, there is one overriding culture.  In 
referring to Hobbes’s part in the development of culture, Strauss calls it a “sovereign 
creation, the pure product of the human spirit” that exists above the many cultures.  
However, Strauss clarifies Schmitt’s definition of culture, by arguing that the concept of 
culture presupposes something that is “cultivated” and this cultivation “is always the 
culture of nature”.406  In short, culture at its highest is “the order of human things from a 
pure and whole knowledge”. 407  In amplifying Schmitt’s partially correct interpretation 
of Hobbes’s “state of nature”, Strauss calls culture, “the nurture of nature”, “whether of 
the soil or of the human spirit makes no difference”.  According to Strauss, culture is 
                                                 
404 Ibid., pp. 114 & 115.  My emphasis.  The universal tyranny of the universal, homogeneous world state 
later became a serious debate between Alexandre Kojève and Strauss.  See Strauss, Leo, On Tyranny, 
Gourevitch, Victor & Roth, Michael S., editors, The Free Press, U.S.A., 1991, pp. 177 – 212. 
405 Ibid., p. 99. 
406 Ibid., p. 97.  Strauss’s emphasis. 
407 Ibid., p. 119.  Strauss’s emphasis.  This is Strauss’s final statement on “order”.  Strauss’s opening 
sentence of his  “Comments” indicates that Schmitt attempts to answer the question regarding “the order 
of the human things”.  See p. 91.  Cf. also pp. 97, 115 & 118. 
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developed through obeying “the orders that nature itself gives”, but Strauss also argues 
that obeying nature can also include “conquering nature through obedience to nature”, 
depending “on how nature is understood”.  In indicating his disagreement with both 
Hobbes and Schmitt, Strauss argues the “the presupposition of culture is primarily the 
culture of human nature” that presupposes the natural sociability of human beings.408  
Thus, he indicates that the true foundation of the political, and hence “the order of the 
human things”, is found in friendship rather than in enmity. 409  In adding that the 
political must be based on a “human order”, which is based on “pure and whole 
knowledge that cannot be gained from concrete political existence, from the situation of 
the age”, Strauss points to Socrates’s discussions on justice and the good, suggesting 
that the answer lies in the pursuit of philosophy, where the emphasis is on sharing 
knowledge through friendship.  Thus friendship is the true measure of the political, for 
Strauss, rather than enmity, as Schmitt demands.410    
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that Schmitt’s six criteria are listed, and discussed, by 
Strauss in the “Comments”.  It shows that Strauss knew that these criteria must be 
satisfied for the successful recovery of the political, even suggesting that Plato may 
provide an answer to that recovery.  Strauss clearly states Schmitt’s mistakes in 
describing Hobbes’s concept of the political, already suggesting that Schmitt rejects 
nature and natural right as the foundation of the political because of his historicism.  In 
simply focusing on enmity in his political concept, which resides only within 
historically determined faiths, Schmitt fails to transcend modern liberalism and cannot 
                                                 
408 Ibid., pp. 97 & 98.   
409 Ibid., p. 118. 
410 Ibid., p. 119. 
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make claim to universal (“pure and whole”) knowledge, according to Strauss.411  In 
turning to Hobbes’s natural right of self-preservation, Strauss points the way to what he 
later perceived as natural justice and the best regime, found in Plato and Aristotle’s best 
regime, where the philosopher harms no one and the general emphasis is on friendship.  
Only then does Strauss claim to see the limits of the political and the life that transcends 
the political.  This is what Strauss discovers when he calls for “the order of the human 
things from a pure and whole knowledge” that transcends the immediate situation of the 
age.  Even though Strauss wants Schmitt to accept the divine knowledge of Original 
Sin, Strauss argues that this special knowledge of the “whole” is unavailable to Schmitt, 
because he anchors all knowledge in the various faiths that are found in “concrete 
political existence” (Schmitt’s historicism).  Strauss argues that knowledge of the 
“whole” can be glimpsed through “a return to the origin, to undamaged, noncorrupt 
nature” that becomes the universal standard of “Right”, or “order”, for judging various 
faiths, or it can be found in the transcendence of biblical revelation through accepting 
Original Sin.412   
                                                 
411 Ibid., p. 119. 
412 Ibid., pp.  91 & 119. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
THE CITY AND MAN: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE POLIS  
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter five will demonstrate that Strauss begins with Schmitt’s 1932 criticism of the 
concepts of culture and civilization to develop the meaning of the political.  Strauss 
turns to the best politeia based on the order of the human things as his response to 
Schmitt’s concept of friend and enemy.  In conformity with his argument that the 
investigation should begin with what appears most authoritative for social scientists, 
Strauss commences his journey back to the polis, or city, by tracing the historical 
development of the modern concepts, of culture and civilization.  This chapter will use 
three arguments that transcend Schmitt’s concept of the political.  They include: 1) 
Strauss’s arguments for a return to political philosophy; 2) an explanation of Strauss’s 
structure in The City and Man; and 3) Strauss’s arguments for a return to the polis.  
Each of the three is treated in turn.  Generally, Strauss responds to Schmitt’s political 
criteria by writing his book in the form of a theologico-political treatise that is intended 
to rival Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political.   
 
1. Political Philosophy 
 
Strauss gives the impression that his main theme, in the centre of his “Introduction” of 
The City and Man, is the evil of Communism that always takes the form of tyranny.  
Strauss prefaces his discussion on Communism by speaking of “the large majority of 
men on behalf of the large majority of men”, who support “the universal state” that 
guarantees all human beings the “natural right to comfortable self-preservation”, in a 
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society that is based on freedom and equality.  Strauss describes the goal of the 
universal society as one that stresses the common good, which is “the most sacred end”.  
By “sacred end”, Strauss means the most valued, or most revered, end that cannot be 
questioned or changed.  Strauss believes that Communism and “the Western movement” 
share the same political goal, arguing that both aim at creating “the universal prosperous 
society of free and equal men and women”.  However, he concedes that they differ on 
the means to achieve that end, concluding that the difference between Communism and 
the West was seen as one of “kind” and “not only a difference of degree”.  In the middle 
of the discussion, Strauss suddenly substitutes the word “morality” for the word 
“means”.  In the same context of Strauss’s change to “morality”, he announces that no 
violent, or non-violent, change can “eradicate the evil in man”, because of the “malice, 
envy and hatred” that exist in human life.  The point is that Strauss draws attention to 
Schmitt’s definition of the political as groups, such as the Communists, who were 
engaged in murder and conflict over “the most sacred end”.  Strauss also draws 
attention to his and Schmitt’s first criterion for the recovery of the political – that all 
human beings are morally evil.413   
 
For Schmitt, emphasizing only sacred, or highly revered, ends implies that any means in 
achieving those ends are justified; however, unlike Schmitt, Strauss sees morality, 
defined as natural right (justice), as crucial in understanding differences in opinion 
regarding the means of achieving ends that are highly esteemed.  Strauss points out that 
the Communists were prepared to assassinate those who opposed them in the pursuit of 
the most valued end of universal prosperity, whereas “the Western movement” did not 
condone assassination, even though it shared the same revered goal as the Communists.  
                                                 
413 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., pp. 4 & 5. 
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This is how Strauss first introduces political philosophy that takes seriously natural 
justice when examining the means used to achieve what he calls “the most sacred end”.  
What is special about Strauss’s example, using the West and Communism, is that he 
argues that both share the same vision of the perfection of all human beings, thus 
reminding readers of the question regarding the best way of life.  In discerning the 
fundamental difference between the West and Communism, Strauss raises the issue of 
“the choice of means” (“morality”), even pointing out that “The modern project was 
originated as required by nature (natural right), i.e. it was originated by philosophers”.  
Here, Strauss indicates that sacred, or highly revered, ends should be judged in terms of 
natural ends, and that natural right, or natural justice, was an essential part of the natural 
ends that Hobbes and Locke outlined in their works on politics.  Furthermore, he argues 
that the founding philosophers of “the modern project” assumed that human nature did 
not change.  In using the example of modern Communism and “the Western 
movement”, Strauss seems to contrast political philosophy with Schmitt’s political 
theology, which ignores justice and nature.  In drawing attention to the choice of means 
(“morality”) used to achieve the most sacred political end – human happiness, Strauss 
indicates the interconnectedness of morality and natural justice.414  
 
In condemning modern Communism as “the iron rule of a tyrant”, Strauss argues that 
there was a “twofold lesson” for “the Western movement” in “the experience of 
Communism”.  The first involves “a political lesson” and the second a lesson 
“regarding the principles of politics”.  Here, in challenging the sacred goal of 
Communism and Western democracy, Strauss agrees with Schmitt that there is a 
“fundamental cleavage” among states and that, “in the foreseeable future”, there will 
                                                 
414 Ibid., pp. 4 – 7.  Strauss mentions the word “evil” three times in his “Introduction” with its central 
appearance mentioning three human failings: “malice, envy and hatred”.  Strauss concludes that, given 
such human evil, society must “employ coercive restraint”. 
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never be a universal world society, because there will always remain – “a partial or 
particular society whose most urgent and primary task is its self-preservation and whose 
highest task is its self- improvement”.  In agreement with Schmitt, Strauss rules out any 
future world peace because of the absurdity of recognizing that present state boundaries 
are just, as well as the “factual inequality” among nations.  In drawing attention to the 
“particular” regimes, or the various ways of life dedicated to sacred ends, Strauss 
mentions the universal claims of Islam and Christianity as an example of two groups 
that have been forced to coexist with each other for the sake of self-preservation.  In 
choosing religious groups that are based on faith, Strauss seems to agree with Schmitt 
regarding the foundation of the political, as one of conflicting faiths.  However, unlike 
Schmitt, Strauss stresses their coexistence, rather than their potential for war.415  In 
pointing to the need for moderation, and the need to examine, and judge, moralities, 
Strauss reminds readers that one must first recognize “the citizens’ understanding of 
political things”.  The ordinary understanding of political things can be found in the 
moralities that come to light through the moral choices of people, or groups, actively 
engaged in political life.  According to Strauss, the only way to attain the citizens’ 
understanding of moral choice is to return to “classical political philosophy” where a 
“common sense understanding of the political things is primary”. 416  
 
Nevertheless, Strauss warns of the dangers in applying classical solutions to the modern 
world, particularly since he is going to outline the best regime according to Aristotle, 
Plato and Thucydides.  In 1946, Strauss had argued that if one “claims to be a Platonist” 
and publishes books on Plato’s political philosophy, “at this time”, in the United States, 
then the writer “bears more than the ordinary responsibility that is borne by every 
                                                 
415 Ibid., pp. 4 - 7.  My emphasis. 
416 Ibid., pp. 10 & 11. 
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writer”. 417  Strauss was particularly aware of “the misuse of Plato’s teaching by fascists” 
and the political threat to Platonists by over zealous scholars of Plato.418  Like Schmitt’s 
criticism of romantic longings for the classical age, Strauss states:  
 
“We cannot reasonably expect that a fresh understanding 
of classical political philosophy will supply us with 
recipes for today’s use.  For the relative success of modern 
political philosophy has brought into being a kind of 
society wholly unknown to the classics, a kind of society 
to which the classical principles as stated and elaborated 
by the classics are not immediately applicable”. 419   
 
Strauss opens his treatise arguing that his task in recovering the political, as understood 
by Aristotle, Plato and Thucydides, is “not self- forgetting and pain- loving 
antiquarianism, nor self-forgetting and intoxicating romanticism”.420  Strauss states, 
“Only we living today can possibly find a solution to the problems of today”. 421  
However, if readers grasp the original principles of political science, Strauss argues, 
they “may” find them useful through their “wise application”, calling his return to 
                                                 
417 Strauss, Leo, “On a New Interpretation of Plato’s Political Philosophy”, Social Research, vol. 13, no. 
20, 1946, p. 367. 
418 Ibid., p. 364.  Strauss imagines that someone could write a book “on the political problem of our time 
in the guise of a book on Plato’s political philosophy.  While it would be a very bad book if regarded as 
an interpretation of Plato, it might be excellent as a guide amidst the perplexities of our age”.  The City 
and Man is not just a book on Plato’s political philosophy, but Strauss seems to indicate that he was 
aware that interpretations of classical thinkers could also include a political guide. 
419 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., p. 11. 
420 Ibid., p. 1.  Schmitt also had criticised such attempts in his book.  See Schmitt, Carl, Political 
Romanticism, Oakes, Guy, trans., M.I.T. Press, Mass., U.S.A., 1986.   
421 Ibid., p. 11. 
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classical political philosophy, not only compelling, but also “tentative or 
experimental”.422 
  
Strauss argues that political philosophy is “the rightful queen of the social sciences, the 
sciences of man and of human affairs”.  This is where he parts company with Schmitt, 
because Strauss argues that the best guide to political life is not political theology based 
on faith, but political philosophy that is based on reason, natural right and the best 
regime.  Unlike Schmitt, Strauss suggests that, “one cannot understand the 
transformation” of classical political philosophy (no matter how “legitimate”) into 
modern political philosophy without comprehending that “Nature as understood by 
modern natural science and History as understood by the modern historical awareness” 
have caused a “crisis” in modern political philosophy. 423  In contrast, Schmitt argues 
that history is decisive in providing the moments that demonstrate the conflict among 
faiths.  According to Strauss, “the core” of our present crisis is that modern political 
philosophy has become “ideology”, which has undermined “high culture”, or “the 
culture of the mind”.  For Strauss, ideology implies that all human thought is culturally 
specific, denying the historical transcendence of philosophy.  Strauss identified this 
historicist argument as the basis for our modern crisis that has led to the demotion of 
reason, particularly since reason was seen as a product of Western culture.  Given that 
all cultures are now considered equal, and given that Western reason and its specific 
form, science, are parts of one culture among many, science loses its universal 
significance.  Thus, in being only one way of understanding the world, science lost its 
                                                 
422 Ibid., p. 11. 
423 Ibid., p. 1. 
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status as the universal method of determining universal truths.  In his “Introduction”, 
Strauss gives a short history of the demise of modern reason. 424 
 
Strauss states that “Social science has not always been as sceptical or restrained as it has 
become during the last two generations”.  He argues that the change was linked to the 
“modern project”, which sought to conquer “the most powerful natural needs of men” 
that led to the questioning of the premise that there is an “unchangeable human nature”.  
Strauss argues that a universal human nature would “set absolute limits to progress”.  
To avoid such limits, the “natural needs of men” no longer became the guide to the 
modern project, which aimed at conquering nature.  Strauss argues that consequently, 
“reason as distinguished from nature” became the basis of modern philosophy, turning 
into the “rational Ought” in contrast to “neutral Is”.  Strauss explains that the norms, or 
“the Ought”, became “separated from science as the study of the Is”.  In short, the study 
of social science meant the recognition of the difference between facts and values.  
According to Strauss, this led to the “depreciation of reason” that gave greater power to 
human beings, while at the same time offered no guidance in the form of human 
wisdom.  By human wisdom, Strauss means that it was no longer possible to 
“distinguish between the wise or right and the foolish or wrong use of power”, since 
“Science cannot teach wisdom”.425  This is Strauss’s summary of the development of 
positivism and why Strauss saw it as a crisis facing contemporary political scientists.  In 
rejecting both historicism and positivism, and in attempting to recover political 
philosophy, Strauss argues that “the teachings of political philosophers” represent a 
singular “kind of ideology” and that the crisis caused by both positivism and historicism 
“may” offer an “accidental advantage of enabling us to understand in an untraditional or 
                                                 
424 Ibid., pp. 6, 7 & 9. 
425 Ibid., p. 7. 
  
 
175
fresh manner what was hitherto understood only in a traditional or derivative 
manner”. 426   
 
In drawing attention to the polis, Strauss states that “the City and Man” is the theme of 
classical political philosophy.  In the same context of his discussion of ideology and 
culture, Strauss uses a key Schmittean word, “legitimate”, to describe the 
“transformation” of modern political philosophy that no longer places emphasis on the 
naturalness of the city.  Legitimacy, for Schmitt, replaces nature.427  In addition, 
Strauss’s use of the words “legality and legitimacy”, in his first chapter, “On Aristotle’s 
Politics”, is the exact title of a book by Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy.428  In his 
1932 book, Schmitt had targeted value-free jurisprudence that chose to ignore the 
politeia, or the constitution (regime), behind the law of various states, as well as 
ignoring the friend and enemy concept that applied to the German constitution.  Schmitt 
claimed he wanted the Reich government to ban actions that undermined the German 
constitution. 429  In responding to Schmitt, Strauss states in his “Introduction” to The 
City and Man, “But one cannot understand the transformation, however legitimate [of 
classical political philosophy] if one has not understood the original form”. 430  Strauss 
uses the regimes to turn Schmitt’s concept of the political on its head, by recovering 
Aristotle and Plato’s best regime that stresses the centrality of the good, peace, natural 
justice and the superiority of contemplation to the political life.  Strauss also specifically 
                                                 
426 Ibid., p. 9. 
427 Ibid., p. 1.  In The Concept of the Political, Schmitt emphasizes only “the legitimacy or legality” of a 
“form or order” (constitution) and not whether it deviates from the best regime – p. 52.  As seen 
previously in Schmitt’s book, Legality and Legitimacy, “legitimacy” is a key concept for Schmitt.  For 
Schmitt, the concern with legitimacy replaces the traditional theme of the best regime. 
428 Ibid., p. 48.  Schmitt used “legitimacy or legality” in the context of  “protection and obedience” in 
Schmitt, Carl, The Concept of the Political, Schwab, George, trans., op. cit., p. 52.  
429 Schmitt, Carl, Legalität und Legitimität, Fünfte Auflage, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, Germany, 1993.  
See Dyzenhaus, David, Legality and Legitimacy: Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen and Hermann Heller in 
Weimar, Oxford University Press, N. Y., U.S.A., 1999, p. 70.  See also Gottfried, Paul Edward, Carl 
Schmitt – Politics and Theory, op. cit., pp. 58 & 59. 
430 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., p. 1.  My emphasis. 
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uses the word “form” in his chapter on “Aristotle’s Politics”, describing “the politeia 
(the regime), the ‘form’ of the city”.  The highest form of the city turns out to be 
Strauss’s final answer to Schmitt’s criteria – the best regime that is according to nature 
and trans-historical.  This regime will be examined in chapter seven. 431  
 
The “Introduction” also reminds readers of Strauss’s discussion of culture in the 
“Comments”, revealing that The City and Man is a theologico-political treatise, i.e. it is 
a further response to Schmitt and his critique of culture that leads back to “the facts” of 
“religion” and “politics”.  For Strauss, politics and religion have been incorporated into 
the concept “culture”.  This is why Strauss begins The City and Man  by addressing the 
problem of culture.432  In a unique cluster of the word “culture” in the “Introduction”, 
Strauss begins where he left off addressing culture in his “Comments”.  Strauss argues: 
 
“But precisely since the West is the culture in which 
culture reaches full self-consciousness, it is the final 
culture: the owl of Minerva begins its flight in the dusk; 
the decline of the West is identical with the exhaustion of 
the very possibility of high culture; the highest 
possibilities of man are exhausted”. 433 
 
Strauss’s mention of “final culture” sounds much like the Hegelian universal and 
homogeneous state, where “the highest possibilities of man are exhausted”. 434  
However, Strauss makes it clear that the exhaustion of the 1960s gives rise to “an 
                                                 
431 Ibid., p. 45. 
432 Strauss, Leo, Philosophy and Law - Contributions to the Understanding of Maimonides and His 
Predecessors, Adler, Eve, trans., op. cit., footnote 2, p. 138.  Strauss’s emphasis. 
433 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., p. 2.  My emphasis. 
434 Ibid., p. 2. 
  
 
177
accidental advantage of enabling us to understand in an untraditional or fresh manner 
what was hitherto understood only in a traditional or derivative manner”.  Strauss 
reminds readers that previous political philosophers believed that their “teaching” was 
“the true and final teaching regarding political things”, indicating that the current final 
culture is also the result of similar philosophic speculation.  In raising the issue of  “the 
very possibility of “high culture”, Strauss suggests a return to classical political 
philosophy. 435  In doing so, Strauss argues that a reader should suspend his, or her, 
“initial question in favor of the question with which his author is concerned”, or 
examine the author’s subject from the “author’s point of view”. 436 
 
In countering any notion of a “final culture”, Strauss draws attention to the original and 
naïve meaning of “the culture of the mind” that will be associated with the philosophic 
life that is connected to the best regime.  Similarly, Strauss suggests that the highest 
culture has not been discovered, because the “fundamental riddles” have not been 
solved.  Furthermore, in turning to the authority of science, he argues, “natural science”, 
or knowledge, is “susceptible of infinite progress” and that fact rules out the idea of a 
“completion of history”, or a concept of a final culture.  In mentioning the “fundamental 
riddles”, Strauss reminds readers of Socrates’s unending search for knowledge of the 
whole, as well as Oedipus’s conquest of the city, Thebes, through his answer to the 
Sphinx’s riddle – “Man”.  This could be why Strauss chose The City and Man as the 
title of his book, i.e. a reference to Socrates, and that the human things are the link to a 
knowledge of the whole.  Unlike Schmitt’s admiration of concrete, historical 
decisionism, Strauss prefers some Socratic uncertainty regarding the question of the best 
way of life, because such scepticism does not easily translate into political life as 
                                                 
435 Ibid., p. 9. 
436 Ibid., p. 10.   
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absolute rule, or the “iron rule of the tyrant”.437  This also accounts for why Strauss 
preferred Aristotle’s definition of political philosophy that also links Aristotle to Plato 
in agreement regarding the best regime.  Strauss states, “For Aristotle, political 
philosophy is primarily and ultimately the quest for that political order which is best 
according to nature everywhere and, we may add, always”. 438  
 
2. The Structure of The City and Man 
 
In Persecution and the Art of Writing, Strauss warns of the artful methods that some 
writers use to make it difficult for readers to follow their arguments.439  One of those 
techniques relates to the “obscurity of the plan” of the book.  In the case of a theologico-
political treatise, such as The City and Man, Strauss indicates that readers must examine 
the details that appear in the text, if they wish to figure out its structure.440  Seth 
Benardete concluded that Strauss intentionally divides Chapter One, “On Aristotle’s 
Politics”, into five distinct parts, using a dash and a colon to indicate an intended break.  
The five divisions include: “1) Aristotle as the founder of political science (pp. 13-29); 
2) city and culture (pp. 30-35); 3) democracy (pp. 35-41); 4) nature (pp. 41-45) and 5) 
regime (pp. 45-49)”. 441  However, Benardete neglects Strauss’s dash and colon on page 
forty-eight, where Strauss begins to discuss the sixth division on the topic of Platonic 
irony and “good writing”.  Benardete is also unaware that Strauss draws attention to 
Schmitt’s book, Legality and Legitimacy, in the first sentence after that break.442  
                                                 
437 Ibid., pp. 2 & 5.  Strauss’s emphasis. 
438 Ibid., p. 17.  Strauss footnotes Aristotle’s Ethics, 1135a 4-5.  My emphasis.   
439 Strauss, Leo, Persecution and the Art of Writing, op. cit., pp. 7 – 37. 
440 Ibid., pp. 74, 77 (chapter headings), 36 & 184.  See also Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., pp. 
53, 180 & 181. 
441 Benardete, Seth, “Leo Strauss’ The City and Man”, op. cit., p. 2.  For the complete structure, see 
Appendix 1. 
442 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., p. 48.  Strauss writes, “We have come to distinguish between 
legality and legitimacy”, reminding readers of Schmitt’s book. 
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Nevertheless, Benardete is correct in discovering Strauss’s divisions in the first chapter 
of The City and Man, although Benardete offers no explanation why Strauss divided his 
book in this way. 443  In providing readers with seventeen distinct divisions, Strauss 
emphasizes the importance of order in The City and Man, because Strauss knew that 
seventeen was the number representing “nature”, and hence, the ordering principle 
behind his recovery of the best regime.  The significance of nature, for Strauss, is that it 
is his comprehensive answer to Schmitt’s political theology that first appears in 
Strauss’s analysis of Hobbes’s “state of nature”.  One could argue that the whole of The 
City and Man represents an attempt to return to “the order” of nature, thus answering 
the sixth criterion that requires the political to be based on “pure and whole 
knowledge”.  In replying to Schmitt’s demand that the political must be an expression 
of something “concrete”, yet able to be grasped as knowledge, Strauss first turns to the 
common experiences, or opinions, of human beings regarding the city.  The reason 
Strauss gives for beginning his book with Aristotle’s Politics, and not with 
Thucydides’s history, is that Aristotle provides “common sense” arguments supporting 
the comprehensive and natural basis of the city or polis.444  Without the city fully 
explained, Strauss argues, he cannot answer the question of the political, as the words, 
polis and “political”, are interconnected.  Without a full explanation of the polis, Strauss 
cannot establish the best regime that is directly related to the polis.  In recovering the 
polis, Strauss is then able to give an alternative standard to Schmitt’s concept of the 
political that stresses nations and groups that are united by a common faith.  
Furthermore, by returning to the concept of the city, or polis, using Aristotle, Strauss 
prepares the reader for his discussion of Thucydides’s observations of the cities, Athens 
                                                 
443 Benardete, Seth, “Leo Strauss’ The City and Man”, op. cit., p. 2. Benardete discovered that a full stop 
and a long dash, “.—”, separate the different themes. See pp. 29, 35, 41 & 45.  In contradiction to 
Benardete, I suspect that the 6th division occurs on p. 48, not on p. 49, so that the discussion of regimes 
blends into the next chapter, “On Plato’s Republic”. 
444 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., p. 12. 
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and Sparta.  In addition, in satisfying the criteria for the affirmation of the political, in 
The City and Man, Strauss argues that Aristotle’s approach to the study of society was 
extremely “practical”, or concrete, being more moderate than Plato’s, because Aristotle 
recognized the “conditions” imposed on various societies, such as the condition of the 
land and the arts that directly affect politics.  Strauss concludes his second division, 
relating to the city and culture, with the suggestion that the political is connected to the 
intended order of a society, because he argues that the question regarding “the good 
life”, or the question regarding “the good society”, leads one to view the regimes as 
attempts “to answer that question”.445  Strauss also begins with Aristotle because of his 
concern with the visible, concrete cities that also provide a link between the decent 
members of a community “hoi kaloikagathoi - hoi aristoi” (i.e. noble and good people) 
and philosophy.  In his chapter on Plato’s Republic, Strauss argues that philosophers do 
not rule in the cities and that the cities are not open to philosophy, 446 but in turning to 
Aristotle, Strauss provides a practical solution in arguing that civic leaders, such as 
Pericles, who was taught by Anaxagoras, can be influenced by philosophy.  In contrast 
to Plato, Strauss argues that Aristotle writes for “hoi kaloikagathoi - hoi aristoi”, or the 
noble gentry, who are the public–spirited rulers of the city.  According to Strauss, “the  
only serious alternative to the philosophic life is the political life” and the cities can 
become more just, if the noble and good citizens of those cities are influenced by 
philosophy.  For Strauss, “the political life is subordinate to the philosophic life” 447 and 
that only the noble and good citizens, who have some leisure, are open to philosophy 
through poetry.  In arguing for “hoi kaloikagathoi - hoi aristoi” class of public-spirited 
rulers, Strauss suggests an historical answer to the affirmation of the political that 
                                                 
445 Ibid., p. 35.  The full stop and dash represent Strauss’s end of his first division that deals with the 
theme of culture (civilization) and the polis. 
446 Ibid., pp. 124 & 125. 
447 Ibid., p. 28 & 29. 
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replaces the necessity of the philosophers ruling society in order to realize the best 
regime.448 
 
Discovering the hidden structure of Strauss’s chapters on Aristotle and Plato allows 
readers to grasp the significance of the divisions that Strauss makes.  In the second 
division, relating to the city and culture, Strauss takes up where he left off in his 
“Comments” regarding the true nature of culture as one connected to the cultivation of 
the mind.  Strauss also has a fourth division on “nature” in his Aristotle chapter, 
providing Schmitt with an alternative universal order to the one based on religious faith.  
The very next division after the one dedicated to “nature” is devoted to “the regime” 
that finally describes Strauss’s comprehensive answer to Schmitt.  This answer takes the 
form of Aristotle and Plato’s “best regime”.  It is in this division, and the sixth division 
on the art of writing, that Strauss makes the most extensive references to Schmitt’s 
political theology, drawing attention to Schmitt’s support of the Nazis and alluding to 
Schmitt’s book, Legality and Legitimacy.  The whole chapter on Aristotle allows 
Strauss to focus on the notion of culture, which Schmitt and he began to examine in 
their earlier works. 
 
3. The polis 
 
Strauss’s reading of Aristotle’s Politics led him to conclude that the polis is a separate 
class of thing when compared with the modern conceptions, “civilization” and 
“culture”.  The terms, “society”, “civilization”, “culture” and “cultural” are used 
economically in The City and Man and, like Schmitt, Strauss addresses them first.  They 
                                                 
448 Ibid., p. 18.  Strauss refers to Aristotle’s “morally good man”, or “well-bred man” as the “hoi 
kaloikagathoi - hoi aristoi” – pp. 25 – 28, 36, 37 & 39. 
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mostly occur in the first chapter.  Only in addressing them first, according to Strauss, 
can the polis represent a reasonable alternative to them, although it is not possible to 
make the polis a blueprint for a modern solution. 449  In describing Aristotle’s Politics, 
Strauss argues that it was the political philosopher, Socrates, and not the town planner, 
Hippodamus, who raised the fundamental question, “what is political? or rather what is 
the polis?”, indicating that the city and the political are connected.  In taking up the 
issue of culture, Strauss immediately addresses what is “first for us”, as political 
scientists, because what appears dominant in political science is the concept of culture. 
For Strauss, this means that the very first things modern readers immediately hear, using 
their senses, are words such as “culture” and “society” and that they stand as the basis 
of our authoritative opinions regarding political matters.  According to Strauss, in this 
sense, they have replaced the authority of the polis.450   
 
Before discussing the polis as the link to the sixth criterion – the order of the human 
things – it is necessary to follow Strauss’s discussion of the terms, “civilization” and 
“culture”.  Unlike Schmitt’s reliance on Kantian categories, in The City and Man, 
Strauss defines “civilization” as the unity of both “society” and the “state”, while he 
defines, “society”, as the “web”, which comprises individuals striving to obtain the 
“conditions” for individual happiness.  Strauss argues that the “state” merely protects 
the activities of its members within “society” and remains separate from “society”.  
However, in agreement with Schmitt, Strauss argues that “society” has been replaced 
with the more comprehensive doctrine - “culture”, which can be used in the plural.  This 
                                                 
449 Ibid., p. 30.  The words, “civilized”, or “civilization”, appear in three chapters - p. 30 (twice - chapter 
one), p. 126 (chapter two) and p. 231 (chapter three).  The word, “culture” appears on pp. 2, 30, 33, 34, 
35, 38 & 43 (chapter one), p. 153 (chapter three) and p. 230 (chapter three).  It is mentioned three times in 
chapter 3 and on all other occasions it occurs in the first chapter of Strauss’s book.  The word, 
“civilization”, appears only twice in the whole book, once without inverted commas in paragraph 16, p. 
30 and once with inverted commas in the 17th (central) paragraph of the Aristotle chapter, p. 30.   
450 Ibid., p. 19. 
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means that “culture” has also encompassed “civilization”, since “culture”, when defined 
in the plural, rules out any one “culture”, which is superior to all other cultures, 
including Western culture.  Given this premise, the resulting cultural relativism 
including loss of faith in Western Civilization, is what Strauss defines as “the crisis of 
our time, the crisis of the West”.  To avoid the demise of Western culture that represents 
the comprehensive culture, which gives rise to the idea of many equal cultures, where 
the political is not considered the highest element, Strauss attempts to understand the 
polis in relation to the goal of the modern state, particularly with regards to the question 
of the best way of life that was substituted by freedom and equality. 451   
 
According to Strauss, Aristotle argues that the opposite of the polis, or the city-state, is 
not the state itself, but the “tribe” or “nation”, which sounds very much like Schmitt’s 
description of the political as groups, particularly the group that forms a nation.  Unlike 
Schmitt, Strauss notices that tribes and nations were considered “barbarian” when 
compared to the Greek polis, because Aristotle argues that they could not guarantee 
both “civilization and freedom”.452  By civilization, Strauss means “virtue” and 
“education”, rather than the guarantee of peaceful exchange of “goods and services”, 
which defines the role of the modern state.  Strauss believes that Aristotle rejects such a 
role, equating it to Plato’s “city of pigs” in the Republic.  Strauss argues that “society”, 
as understood today, has its roots in the competitive buying and selling that gives rise to 
a community that is equivalent to a market, where the state’s role is both “servant” and 
“protector” to those engaged in exchange within the market-community.  At the same 
time, according to Strauss, virtue and religion are relegated to the private sphere, where 
they become “supra-political”, along with “morality”, “art”, and “science”.  In short, 
                                                 
451 Ibid., p. 1. 
452 Ibid., p. 30. 
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Strauss argues that society and civilization have been replaced by the term, “culture”, 
where culture becomes “the matrix of the state” and the political a “derivative from the 
cultural”.  In this way, he argues, “culture” is seen as more comprehensive than 
“economics” or “society”.  Given the comprehensiveness of culture, he concludes that 
culture is the true substitute of the polis.453   
 
In defining the comprehensive nature of the political, Strauss traces the word, 
“political”, to its historical and etymological connection to the polis, or city, that did not 
separate itself into state and society, or what we mean by “civilization”.  Strauss argues 
that to understand the original meaning of the political, requires a full explanation of the 
polis.  The polis, according to Aristotle, includes both the country and the town, 
although it is “essentially an urban society”.  He emphasizes that the farming class is not 
“the core of the city”, implying that the core is an educated, leisured class.  Strauss also 
admits that the “City can be used synonymously with fatherland”, but he reminds 
readers that there is a difference between the “country” and the “city”.  However, he 
argues that the best access to the polis, for modern readers, is through the concept, 
“country”.  What is very clear, according to Strauss, is that the polis cannot be a viable 
alternative to the modern state.454   
 
In avoiding Schmitt’s reliance on the universalism of modern liberalism, Strauss argues 
that in contrast to “civilization or culture”, the polis, although it antedates the former 
concepts, is equivalent to the modern theoretical unity of state and society and thus, by 
implication, can guarantee both “civilization and freedom”.  Strauss does not advocate 
replacing the modern state with the polis, as a practical alternative to the modern nation, 
                                                 
453 Ibid., pp. 32 & 33.                                                                                                                                                                     
454 Ibid., p. 30, footnote 40. 
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or even an emerging universal homogeneous state.  Strauss thinks that modern 
technology precludes any attempt to revive the polis as a better alternative to the 
modern state.  In following Aristotle, Strauss implies that this is so, particularly because 
the polis is not too large and not too small, and partly because everyone knows one 
another.  Furthermore, the city “is the most comprehensive and the highest society since 
it aims at the highest and most comprehensive good at which any society can aim”.  
According to Strauss, the highest aim of the city is the good represented by 
happiness.455  Strauss also suggests that happiness involves friendship.  In reply to 
Schmitt’s concentration on enmity in his concept of the political, Strauss centres on 
friendship among the citizens, especially the “moral virtue” of the leisured class that is 
natural to the polis.456  Furthermore, for Strauss’s interpretation of Aristotle, the polis is 
the most complete good for both the individual and the group, since it promotes “the 
chief purpose of the city” - “the noble life” - that is according to nature.  The noblest life 
turns out to be contemplation, or philosophy.  In contrast to the modern state’s emphasis 
on protecting life, liberty and property, Strauss says that Aristotle argues that the polis is 
aimed at attaining “the highest good”, that is “happiness”, not in a plural sense, but 
through the “practice of virtue and primarily of moral virtue”.457   
 
To emphasize the connection between the polis and “culture”, Strauss gives the reader a 
short historical account of the development of “culture” in his second division, 
dedicated to the city and culture, by citing Schmitt’s favourite political philosopher with 
                                                 
455 Ibid., p. 31. 
456 Ibid., pp. 26 & 27.  The noble gentry are leisured farmers. 
457 Ibid., pp. 11 & 31.  See Strauss, Leo, “A Giving of Accounts: Jacob Klein and Leo Strauss”, in 
Strauss, Leo, Jewish Philosophy and the Crisis of Modernity, Green, Kenneth Hart, editor, op. cit., p. 465 
– “Strauss: Without cities, no philosophers.  They are the conditions”. 
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the “double face” – Hegel.458  In Hegel’s book, “Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten 
des Naturrechts” (“Scientific Manner of Treatment of Natural Right”), Strauss argues, 
that “Plato’s and Aristotle’s polis” was rendered as “Volk” (“People”), reminding 
readers that “culture” originally was founded on religion, as seen in Hegel’s terms, 
“Volksgeister” (“Folk-spirits”) and “Weltanschauungen” (“World-views”).  Strauss 
presents Hegel arguing, “it is in religion that a nation Volk gives itself the definition of 
what it regards as the truth”.  Strauss’s purpose in mentioning Hegel is to argue that 
Aristotle and Hegel place the divine in a very high place in the city or state.  However, 
in the context of Aristotle’s political philosophy, Strauss argues, “the true concern with 
the divine is the knowledge of the divine, i.e. transpolitical wisdom which is devoted to 
the cosmic gods as distinguished from the Olympian gods”.  In a response directed at 
the Catholic Schmitt, Strauss cites the authority of Thomas Aquinas, stating that he 
encapsulates Aristotle’s position in the expression, “reason informed by faith, not 
natural reason . . . teaches that God is to be loved and worshipped”.  Schmitt denies that 
reason is part of the political, or the best way of life.459   
 
Strauss, in following Aristotle, accepts the importance of the divine law, or sacred 
beliefs, of the city as the essential starting point of political philosophy.  Furthermore, 
Strauss sees reason as essential in judging the competing faiths.  Strauss argues that in 
investigating “the various forms of divine worship”, Aristotle is also “concerned above 
all with the truth of religion”.  Thus, Strauss’s purpose in mentioning the gods, “Thomas 
Aquinas” and “the divine” within the original Hegelian concept of “culture”, is to 
highlight Schmitt’s observation that modern historical development denies any 
                                                 
458 Schmitt, Carl, The Concept of the Political,  Schwab, George, trans., op. cit., p. 61.  According to 
Schmitt, Hegel’s trilogy of thesis/antithesis and synthesis is a political expression of how quantity 
miraculously turns into quality - p. 62. 
459 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., pp. 33 & 34.  The German “Naturrechts” means “natural 
right”. 
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“recognition of an order of rank among the various elements of culture”, including “the 
divine”, which Strauss implies is “the political element” and the “highest and most 
authoritative element in human society”. 460  As Schmitt indicates in his book, The 
Concept of the Political, religion, which focuses on the divine, no longer enjoys a 
privileged place among the modern categories, such as economics.  In turning to the 
divine, defined as conflicting pieties (faiths), Schmitt attempts to restore the sacred as 
the key to understanding group and national politics.461  In contrast to Schmitt, Strauss 
uses the city to recognize the regimes, as “the political order alone as the intended.—”.  
In making his affirmation of the political as practical as possible, by describing it as 
what citizens look up to, Strauss implies that he satisfies Schmitt’s demand that the 
political has to be “concrete” and beyond “norms”, while addressing the sixth criterion 
relating to “the order of the human things”, as the question related to the right way of 
life, based on “a pure and whole knowledge”. 462  
 
Schmitt’s and Strauss’s interest in the categories, such as moral and culture, links their 
original discussion to Strauss’s final response concerning the political in The City and 
Man.  Strauss’s last mention of “culture”, in chapter one, appears in the Aristotle fourth 
division on “nature”, i.e. in the first chapter, where he argues that “culture” defined as 
“derivative issues” has replaced culture as the primary issue.  Prior to mentioning 
culture for the last time, Strauss identifies the modern view that nature is now treated as 
an “enemy”.  He states:  
                                                 
460 Ibid., p. 34. 
461 Schmitt, Carl, The Concept of the Political, Schwab, George, trans., op. cit., pp. 29, 38, 52, 61, 64, 65, 
67, 68, 72 & 78. 
462 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., p. 35.  Notice Strauss ends his “city and culture”, second 
division oddly.  He concludes, “the political order alone as intended.—”.  One immediately asks, “the 
intended” what?  The beginning of the third division on Aristotle’s supposed anti-democratic prejudice 
suggests that the democratic prejudice treats the “good life” and the “good society” as relative conditions 
and not the order of things.   
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“We must reckon with the possibility that the world is the 
work of an evil demon bent on deceiving us about himself, 
the world, and ourselves by means of the faculties with 
which he has supplied us or, which amounts to the same 
thing, that the world is the work of a blind necessity which 
is utterly indifferent as to whether it and its product ever 
becomes known”. 463  
 
The context of this quotation centres on Strauss’s explanation for the premise of modern 
philosophy, which requires “the synthesis of dogmatism and scepticism” that leads to 
hypothesis forming and infinite progress.  Strauss’s description of the determinism of 
modern science reminds readers of historical necessity (“destiny”) that is the basis of 
Schmitt’s concept of the political, especially relating to biblical sin.  However, in 
contrast to Schmitt’s Christian theology, Strauss explains how “blind necessity” now 
rules the world, arguing that it was the “break with the primary, or natural 
understanding of the whole”, that finally led to the replacement of “the primary issues” 
by the “derivative issues”.  Strauss argues that the modern method of science only 
requires knowing “the concepts, which I consciously make and of which I do not claim 
more than that they are my constructs”.  For Strauss, the primary issues are equivalent 
to “the natural understanding of the whole”.  He concludes by arguing that nature has 
been replaced by “the concepts”, hinting at Schmitt’s own rejection of nature and his 
acceptance of Kant’s dismissal of the ideas, shown in Schmitt’s use of the Kantian term 
“concept”, especially in his book title, The Concept of the Political.  In pointing out his 
                                                 
463 Ibid., p. 43.   
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answer to Schmitt’s entanglement with the modern project, Strauss concludes with, 
“This shift may be illustrated by the substitution of ‘culture’ for city”.  Significantly, his 
statement occurs near the centre of Strauss’s fourth division dealing with nature, 
demonstrating the argument that the city and nature are connected.464  After the fourth 
division, in The City and Man, nature as “the primary understanding of the whole”, 
replaces “culture” as the predominant theme of the book, especially in chapter two, 
entitled, “On Plato’s Republic”.  The word, “culture” only appears at the very end of the 
third chapter on Thucydides, in the context of “the interplay of motion and rest” that 
“enables us to understand, as far as in him [Thucydides] lies, the nature of human life or 
to become wise”. 465   
 
Strauss’s final return to “culture” in his Thucydides chapter is to highlight the political, 
in contrast to the modern concept of “culture”.  His third last mention of “culture” 
appears in the context of his demonstrating why Thucydides is “so silent about 
economic and cultural matters”.  Here, Strauss points to the importance, for Thucydides, 
of “the unwritten laws, the divine law, the gods of the city” and the “chaste character of 
his [Thucydides’s] piety”. 466  The last two appearances of the word, “culture”, refer to 
“Athenian culture” and why Thucydides was so “severely political”, while the final 
mention of “Athenian culture” includes inverted commas, indicating Strauss’s 
detachment from the expression.  In short, for Strauss, true culture is learning about the 
highest things, or what he calls Thucydides’s wisdom of human nature, or “divine law”.  
In turning to the question of knowledge, as the basis of culture – as the order of the 
human things - Strauss also refers to the art of writing about “the nature of human life”, 
                                                 
464 Ibid., p. 43. 
465 Ibid., p. 230. 
466 Ibid., p. 153. 
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which he argues is synonymous with “becoming wise”, meaning that the political is  
“inseparable from self-knowledge”, or political philosophy. 467  
 
In introducing the second division relating to culture and the city, in chapter one of The 
City and Man, Strauss makes a connection between the city and the country.  He states, 
“Through our understanding of ‘the country’ we would have a direct access to ‘the city’, 
but that access is blocked by the modern equivalents of the ‘city’ which originate in 
theory”.  Strauss’s statement takes place in the very short seventeenth paragraph, which 
is the exact centre of his chapter on Aristotle.  Strauss’s only other mention of 
“country”, in his Aristotle chapter, takes place in the fifth division on regimes dealing 
with the “the supremacy of the regime”, or politeia, and an hypothetical “Fascist”.  The 
appearance of “country” takes place after Strauss has explained “the modern 
equivalents”, culture and civilization, that have replaced the city.  Towards the end of 
the first chapter “On Aristotle’s Politics”, he mentions the word, “partisan” seven times 
in the context of an allusion to Schmitt’s book, Legality and Legitimacy and an 
hypothetical “Fascist”.  Strauss uses the last mention of partisan as “the partisan of 
excellence”, or the political philosopher, who judges the goodness and badness of 
regimes.  Strauss, in his introduction to Aristotle’s discussion on the change of regimes, 
includes “patriots” along with “partisans”.  Strauss defines the partisan as one who 
recognizes only one city, providing that city is “informed by the regime which he 
favors”.  In contrast, Strauss calls those who serve the city under any regime, patriots, 
who see themselves as good citizens.  According to Strauss, Aristotle disagrees with 
both the partisan and the patriot, since Aristotle argues that a city does not become a 
new city with a change of regime, because the regime is different from the country.  
                                                 
467 Ibid., p. 230.  This wisdom of political things is found in Thucydides’s dualism, motion and rest, 
Athens and Sparta, war and peace and barbarism and Greekness.  Strauss does not mention friend and 
enemy, but it is mentioned especially in the context of Diodotus’s speech – p. 232. 
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Strauss argues that Aristotle means that “a change of regime is much more radical than 
the patriots admit but less radical than the partisans contend”.  In addressing Schmitt’s 
sixth criterion relating to the order of the human things, Strauss attempts to provide 
political scientists, as well as partisans and patriots, with a standard to judge regimes.  
The standard that Strauss introduces is Aristotle’s “partisan of excellence”, who 
provides an indication when a regime moves from “nobility to baseness” or from the 
latter to the former.  In providing a judge, who decides when a regime is good or bad, 
Strauss satisfies the first criterion for the affirmation of the political.  Strauss also 
addresses the “legal question”, which appears after a change of regime, admitting that 
Aristotle did not answer legal questions that arose after the change of regimes.  Strauss 
argues that one can figure out from Aristotle the necessary answers to legal problems, 
because Aristotle was “a sensible man”.  In giving an example of a legal problem, 
Strauss turns to tyranny, arguing that in tyrannical regimes, honourable contracts (those 
benefiting the city) should be recognized and fulfilled by the new regime that 
overthrows the tyranny.  Thus, Strauss’s reply to those concerned with legality, and the 
limits of legality, takes the form of adaptable justice through the actions of the political 
philosopher, or through the actions of “sensible” readers of Aristotle, who belong to a 
group – the partisans of excellence.  For Strauss, the key characteristic of this group is 
not faith, but reason, which is guided by the idea of the good and the just.  Thus, in 
responding to Schmitt’s concept of the political, Strauss sees justice as essential for 
judging the various regimes and hence, necessary for the city, as well as demonstrating 
that the philosophic life of virtue, defined as the search for the ultimate good, is the 
standard used to recognize good and bad regimes.468  
 
                                                 
468 Ibid., pp. 47 & 48. 
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Strauss outlines the city prior to introducing the regimes.  In the second last paragraph 
of chapter one, Strauss argues that “the supremacy of the regime” is understood through 
the term, “loyalty”, where loyalty to the “bare country” is different from loyalty to “the 
country informed by the regime”.  For Aristotle, the regime, or what the city looks up 
to, is a higher form than the country.  In addressing Schmitt’s failure to understand 
modern tyranny, Strauss gives an example of a Fascist or a Communist who, desiring to 
be loyal to the United States (“a liberal democracy”), undermines its regime of liberal 
democracy, because that person desires to replace it with either a Fascist or Communist 
regime.  Strauss does not draw attention to the aim of the Fascist, or Communist, as 
being sacred, or highly revered, as he did when mentioning Communism in his 
“Introduction”, but Strauss, in his second example introduces another unidentifiable 
person, “someone”, as one who might hypothetically suggest that by constitutionally 
changing “the Constitution” the regime “would cease to be a liberal democracy and 
become either Fascist or Communist”.  Given this change, “every citizen of the United 
States” would then be expected to become either a Fascist or a Communist.  However, 
Strauss argues that no sensible person would teach such a doctrine, especially if he, or 
she, were a loyal liberal democrat, because it would “undermine loyalty to liberal 
democracy”. 469  This lesson is aimed at Carl Schmitt in his failure to remain loyal to 
liberal democracy.  Here, Strauss is referring to Schmitt as an hypothetical liberal 
democrat, who claims that he wanted to curb the Fascist and Communist threat to 
Germany by giving the executive more dictatorial power, prior to 1933.470  Yet, Schmitt 
gave his full blessing to “the Enabling Act of March 24, 1933”, which legally changed 
the Weimar constitution and gave Hitler dictatorial powers.  Even in 1934, after Hitler 
                                                 
469 Ibid., pp. 47 & 48. 
470 See Gottfried, Paul Edward, Carl Schmitt – Politics and Theory, op. cit., pp. 28 & 29.  Gottfried shows 
that Schmitt was an enemy of the Nazis prior to 1933 and that he tried to support the constitution against 
both the Communists and Nazis by appealing to Article 48 of the constitution that “provided for the 
excise of exceptional powers by the president when a threat to the public order existed”. 
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had killed one of Schmitt’s political friends, General Kurt von Schleicher, Schmitt still 
“spoke of Hitler’s ‘saving’ the new German state”.471  Hence, Schmitt is the “someone” 
in The City and Man, who teaches that “the Constitution could be constitutionally 
changed so that the regime would cease to be a liberal democracy and become either 
Fascist or Communist”. 472  Furthermore, like the hypothetical person Strauss mentions, 
Schmitt also demanded that all citizens be loyal to the new “regime”, as seen in his act 
of joining the Nazi Party in May of 1933.  As mentioned previously, in 1941, Strauss 
had blamed Schmitt for aiding the rise of the Nazis through constant criticism of the 
Weimar constitution. 473  In The City and Man, and in the context of mentioning a 
“Fascist”, Strauss condemns Schmitt for not knowing “what he is doing”, in supporting 
actions that undermined liberal democracy, because “no one loyal to liberal democracy 
who knows what he is doing would teach this doctrine precisely because it is apt to 
undermine loyalty to liberal democracy”.474   
 
This argument is made more credible when one knows the structure of the book, since 
the discussion of the “Fascist” takes place in Strauss’s fifth division dedicated to the 
regime, the common ground between Schmitt and Strauss.  It is no accident that 
Strauss’s discussion of liberal democracy and the “Fascist” is immediately followed by 
the hidden sixth division, which takes up the issue of the Platonic art of writing, 
indicating that Strauss, like Plato, is addressing someone special.475  What makes 
Strauss’s sixth division so difficult to discern, for careful readers, is that it does not 
appear at the end of a paragraph, as did all the other divisions in Strauss’s chapter on 
                                                 
471 Ibid., p. 30. 
472 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., p. 48. 
473 Strauss, Leo, “German Nihilism”, op. cit., p. 362. 
474 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., p. 48. 
475 On p. 54, and in the 6th division on the art of writing, Strauss states, “The model for the good writing is 
the good conversation”, arguing that good writers address “one or more men known to the author”. 
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Aristotle.476  Instead, it appears just prior to the sentence referring to Schmitt’s book, 
Legality and Legitimacy. More importantly, the sixth division that still falls within 
Strauss’s Aristotle chapter takes up the chief characteristic of the best regime, which 
both Aristotle and Plato agree upon – that it “necessarily ‘lives’ in speech”.  Thus, 
Strauss’s message to Schmitt is that Schmitt did not possess knowledge of the best 
regime that outlines the limits of the political, and this is the reason why he supported 
the Nazi regime.  According to Strauss, had Schmitt known that the best regime exists 
only in speech, he would not have given his loyalty to the Third Reich. 477   
 
In addressing Schmitt’s failure to recognize the Nazi tyranny, Strauss only mentions 
“Fascist”, or “Fascism”, three times in the main body of his book.  They appear in the 
penultimate paragraph of his Aristotle chapter, just prior to mentioning “legality and 
legitimacy”, while “the best regime” occurs five times – three times in the last 
paragraph that begins his response to Schmitt in the form of Plato’s best regime.  Again, 
it is no accident that in the fifth division, regarding regimes and Strauss’s discussion of 
“the partisan”, Strauss speaks twice of the “tyrant”.  In his discussion of partisans and 
patriots, Strauss’s example regarding the status of the legality of contracts when regimes 
change, refers specifically to “the deposed tyrant”.  Here, Strauss’s argument is that the 
standard used to judge the contracts made by a tyrant must be justice, or the common 
good that results from those contracts.  In short, Strauss points to justice as a way of 
judging tyranny, just after mentioning “the partisan of excellence”, or what Strauss 
really means - the political philosopher.478   
 
                                                 
476 Given that Strauss understood the art of careful writing, it is likely that he structured his 32nd and 33rd 
paragraphs to remind readers of his 1932 encounter with Schmitt and Schmitt’s 1933 mistake in not 
realising that the best regime transcends “liberalism” as well as Fascism.   
477 Ibid., pp. 47 - 49.   
478 Ibid., pp. 46 & 47. 
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In the same paragraph, and in the context of mentioning “legitimacy” seven times, 
Strauss only refers to three legitimate regimes in claiming the neutrality of “natural 
law”.  They are: 1) democracy, 2) aristocracy and 3) monarchy.  Here, Strauss does not 
mention tyranny.  In contrast to Schmitt, Strauss, in following Aristotle, does not 
consider tyranny a legitimate regime, and hence, excludes tyranny from his list of 
legitimate regimes mentioned in the immediate context of the words “legality and 
legitimacy”.  In hypothetically speaking of “one” “Someone” and “no one” in the 
context of the three mentions of “Fascist” or “Fascism”, 479 Strauss further implies that 
he is referring to Schmitt and Schmitt’s ignorance of the ultimate lesson of the political, 
mentioned in Strauss’s “Introduction” to The City and Man – “the iron rule of a 
tyrant”. 480  Strauss suggests that Schmitt’s support of Hitler, and German Fascism, was 
the direct result of his ignorance of the nature of tyranny, resulting from his oversight of 
the true legitimacy of Plato’s best regime that is found only in speech.  In the last 
paragraph of “On Aristotle Politics”, Strauss uses the word, “contemplation” three 
times, clearly suggesting the trans- liberal solution he promised in 1932.  It is not 
accidental that Strauss makes his most obvious reference to Schmitt in The City and 
Man take place in the context of the introduction to the chief characteristic of Aristotle 
and Plato’s best regime, which occurs within the hidden sixth division, related to the art 
of reading. 481   
 
 
                                                 
479 Ibid., p. 48.  What is odd, is that in the first mention of “Fascist”, the word is misspelled (minus an “s” 
in the first syllable) a fact that has escaped the notice of Strauss’s editors, having not been corrected in the 
various reprints of the book.  This is the only misspelled word in The City and Man.  Could the missing 
“s” indicate the first letter of Schmitt’s name, given Strauss’s observation about mistakes that a great 
writer makes that would “shame an intelligent school boy”?  See Strauss’s “On the Forgotten Kind of 
Writing”, in What is Political philosophy? And Other Studies, op. cit., p. 223.   
480 Ibid., p. 5. 
481 Ibid., p. 48.  Strauss uses the term, “liberal democracy” three times in the context. “Contemplation” is 
also found three times.  In highlighting the difference between liberalism and the polis, Strauss argues 
that “true happiness” transcends the city (as does liberalism) through virtue, rather than through freedom.   
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Conclusion 
 
Chapter five has demonstrated that there is overwhelming evidence that Strauss is 
addressing Schmitt’s criteria in affirming the political, particularly when a reader 
discovers Strauss’s hidden structure of The City and Man.  In formulating six criteria 
from Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political, Strauss begins with what is “first for us” at 
the moment, addressing the concept of culture (as did Schmitt) that appears as the 
second of seventeen divisions in the book.  In tracing culture back to its foundation, 
particularly to its political foundations, Strauss argues that it is the modern replacement 
for the polis, or the city.  Similarly, by recovering the polis and the regimes, Strauss 
points towards the best way of life, described as a public goal that is not neutral 
(criterion three) and “concrete opposition” (criterion two), while int roducing an order 
(the best regime) of the human things, which is based on “pure and whole knowledge”.  
Strauss requires the recovery of the natural polis for his second step in the recovery of 
the Socratic idea of a regime.  Once the arguments for the existence of the regimes are 
produced, Strauss then presents his argument for the existence of “the best regime” as a 
solution to Schmitt’s tendency to leave the political defined as conflicting pious groups 
or “partisans”.  Before discussing Strauss’s best regime, as his final answer to Schmitt’s 
call for an affirmation of the political, the next chapter of this thesis, chapter six, 
elucidates Strauss’s arguments concerning nature and the Socratic ideas that form the 
basis of Strauss’s answer to Schmitt’s sixth criterion. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
STRAUSS’S RECOVERY OF NATURE AND HUMAN NATURE 
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter Six will demonstrate that the Greek idea of “nature” is the foundation to 
Strauss’s answer to Schmitt’s criteria for re-establishing the political over the domains 
of culture, conflicting pieties and economics.  Chapter Six will especially address 
Schmitt’s sixth criterion concerning “the order of the human things” and Strauss’s call 
for a return to “undamaged, noncorrupt nature”. 482  For Strauss, the recovery of nature 
presupposes knowledge and the possibility of a reasoned account of the political.  
Strauss argues that this knowledge takes the form of philosophy that leads to natural 
right, defined as the quest for the best order, or regime (politeia).  This chapter will 
discuss Strauss’s answer to Schmitt’s criteria for the affirmation of the political through 
three themes: 1) the definition of nature, as argued by Aristotle and Plato; 2) Strauss’s 
political interpretation of the Platonic ideas and 3) Thucydides’s divine law. 
 
1. Strauss’s Concept of Nature  
 
Strauss’s letter to Schmitt in 1932 provides further evidence that he goes well beyond 
Schmitt’s concept of the political.  Strauss, in clarifying Schmitt’s concept of the 
political, explains to Schmitt that “The tendency to separate (and therewith the grouping 
of humanity into friends and enemies) is given with human nature; it is in this sense 
destiny, period.  But the political thus understood is not the constitutive principle of the 
state, or ‘order’, but only the condition of the state”.  It was not until he wrote The City 
                                                 
482 Strauss, Leo, “Notes on Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political”, in Meier, Heinrich, Carl Schmitt 
and Leo Strauss - The Hidden Dialogue, Lomax, Harvey J., trans., op. cit., p. 119. 
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and Man that Strauss gave his clearest meaning of the “constitutive principle of the state 
or order” as founded on nature and natural right.483 
 
Strauss begins his “Introduction” to The City and Man with a reminder that his book is 
a response to a moral “crisis of the West”, arguing that the West had lost “faith” in the 
principles that guide liberal democracy.  Strauss presents The City and Man as an 
answer to the “crisis” of faith, which is linked to the disappearance of nature that acts as 
a universal standard for judging regimes.  In turning to nature, Strauss endeavours to 
give an alternative to Schmitt’s historical providence that provides a basis for evaluating 
the regimes.  Nevertheless, Strauss does not desire to undermine the biblical Faith of his 
decent readers, who listen to “the Divine message of the City of Righteousness, the 
Faithful City”.  Strauss wants to “consider to what extent man could discern the outlines 
of that City if left to himself”.  In his “Introduction” to The City and Man, Strauss 
announces that his aim is to show that political philosophy “is the rightful queen of the 
social sciences, the sciences of man and of human affairs”. 484   
 
Strauss makes a case for the central importance of the political, defined as “the human 
things”, which is tied to the first criterion regarding the good and evil things.  The 
connection to Schmitt’s first criterion regarding “evil” is demonstrated through 
Strauss’s interpretation of the Roman philosopher Cicero, arguing that the “human 
things” are the “good and bad things”, especially the “just and noble things and their 
opposites”.  Strauss reminds readers that Cicero speaks of Socrates’s turning to the 
human things as a turn, not from “heaven”, but from three things: 1) “the whole nature” 
2) “the kosmos” and 3) “the nature of all things”.  However, in underlining the 
                                                 
483 Meier, Heinrich, Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss – The Hidden Dialogue, Lomax, Harvey J., trans., op. 
cit., p. 125, “Letter Two”.  Strauss’s emphasis. 
484 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., p. 1. 
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universalism of nature, Strauss concludes Cicero’s argument stating, “the study of the 
nature of man is part of the study of nature”. 485  Strauss explains that Cicero argues that 
pre-Socratic philosophy centred on studying “the divine or natural things”, but that it 
had to “be compelled to turn back to human things from which it originally departed”.  
Hence, Strauss argues tha t there must be an emphasis on taking seriously the 
authoritative opinions held by the various cities.486   
 
According to Strauss, the traditional view is that the first to turn to the political were the 
Greek sophists and not Socrates.  In refuting the traditional view, or the conventional 
view, Strauss uses Plato’s Laws.  From the Laws, Strauss argues that “nature” was 
understood by the sophists to be “first things”, as “distinguished from human action”.  
The Athenian Stranger, in the Laws, argues that the “first things” were not things at all, 
yet, they were responsible for “the coming into being and perishing of everything that 
comes into being and perishes”.  In explaining the importance of the early Greek 
discovery of nature, the Athenian Stranger, in Plato’s Laws, argues that the opposite of 
nature is understood as three synonymous expressions: “nomos”, “law” and 
“convention”. 487  Strauss relates that the Athenian Stranger explains that the definition 
of nomos only includes the opinions that humans agree upon, i.e. what they establish in 
agreement as to the being of things.  Strauss argues that nomos depends upon the 
existence of chance and that convention (nomos) emerges through its being “held” or 
“accepted” by society. 488  Reminding readers of Schmitt’s pious groups, or nations, 
Strauss explains that the nomos is defined as the agreement on the existence of the gods, 
                                                 
485 Ibid., p. 13.  My emphasis.  The centre of the three is the “cosmos”, which implies “order”.  In 
substituting “bad” for Schmitt’s word, “evil”, Strauss suggests that he does not accept the biblical 
teaching regarding Original Sin.  For Strauss, the philosopher and the noble and good people (“hoi 
kaloikagathoi - hoi aristoi”) are capable of blameless conduct. 
486 Ibid., p. 14. 
487 Ibid., p. 14.   
488 Ibid., p. 15. 
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or god, held by a group.489  Strauss clearly argues that nomos does not mean human 
creation, since he concludes that nomos does not occur by “human making proper”.  In 
this way, Strauss explains that the Athenian Stranger is able to reassert the possibility of 
the existence of the gods, or god, and therefore, is able to support an argument for the 
affirmation of the political as one based on faith.  The Athenian Stranger argues that 
only the sophists drew the conclusion that the “gods are only by law or convention”.  In 
defending Schmitt’s affirmation of the political, Strauss excludes him from the class 
defined as sophists, as the Athenian Strange r argues that political science was not 
considered a serious study by the sophists, because it had “little to do with nature”.  
Although Schmitt did not distinguish “nature” and “nomos” in his concept of the 
political, Strauss excludes him from sophistry because of his acceptance of the biblical 
belief in God’s (Divine) “Right” and Original Sin.490  For Strauss, the biblical God that 
stresses God’s mysterious ways represents the only serious alternative to nature.491  As 
someone who does not possess the truth, Strauss tacitly admits he must be open to 
Schmitt’s religious foundations that point to biblical revelation.  This is why Strauss 
continues to address Schmitt’s arguments, rather than Schmitt the man, as late as 1964.  
Nevertheless, Strauss neither thinks that a concept of conflicting faiths provides a useful 
way of judging defective communities, nor does he think that political life is best served 
by guidance through faith alone.  Instead, Strauss turned to nature, natural justice and 
human nature as the foundation of the best regime that acts as a standard for political 
activity.  
 
                                                 
489 This explains why Strauss ends his book with the words, “quid sit deus” (“what is a god?”).  Strauss 
argues that Socrates questions the “nomos”, and hence, the gods of the city, by asking the fundamental 
question, what is?  By asking such questions concerning the “nomos” demonstrates that the charge of 
impiety, brought against Socrates, was a just one. 
490 Ibid., p. 14.  
491 Strauss, Leo, “Progress or Return? The Contemporary Crisis in Western Civilization”, in Strauss, Leo, 
Jewish Philosophy and the Crisis of Modernity, Green, Kenneth Hart, editor, op. cit., pp. 116 & 128.  
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However, in the Laws, the Athenian Stranger argues that the sophists thought the “just 
things”, or the noble things, were part of “nomos”, or “radically conventional”, and that 
the tyrant’s life, defined as having more than others and “lording it over others”, was the 
life “according to nature”. 492  For Strauss, the “only political art to be taken seriously”, 
by the sophists, was the art of rhetoric.493  Nevertheless, Strauss points out that the 
Athenian Stranger disagrees with the sophists, arguing that there “are things which are 
just by nature” and subsequently, political science is necessarily “the most serious 
pursuit” that presupposes the fundamental difference between convention and nature.  
Believing in divine justice, Schmitt and Strauss are in agreement against the sophists, 
although Schmitt does not accept natural justice, because he agrees with the modern 
distinction between history and nature, in which “history (the realm of freedom and of 
values) is of a higher dignity than nature (which lacks purposes and values)”. 494 
 
The whole foundation of Strauss’s Socratic argument in The City and Man regarding 
“nature”, and hence, human nature, stands or falls on the existence of the “soul”, 
according to the evidence given by the Athenian Stranger in the Laws.  As Strauss 
states, “. . . the soul is not derivative from the body or inferior in rank to it but by nature 
the ruler over the body”.  According to Strauss’s Stranger, the sophists failed to 
comprehend the “fundamental difference between body and soul”.  He goes on to say, 
“Justice is the common good par excellence” and that the “status of the just things 
depends on the status of the soul”. 495  In interpreting Plato’s Republic, Strauss argues, 
“More precisely, knowledge of the virtues derives from knowledge of the human soul: 
                                                 
492 Ibid., p. 14. 
493 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., p. 17. 
494 Ibid. pp. 15 & 16.  Divine Right, for Schmitt, is part of fate, or historical destiny, or at best the rewards 
that await us in heaven. 
495 Ibid., p. 16.  This analysis of the Laws takes place in the chapter, “On Aristotle’s Politics”, indicating 
Strauss’s desire to connect the key political works of Plato with Aristotle’s Politics, particularly 
concerning the best regime. 
  
 
202
each part of the soul has its specific perfection”. 496  Socrates argues that the soul is 
comprised of “three kinds of natures” and the same three are also present in “the city”, 
or polis.  The three include “desire, spiritedness or anger (440a5, c2), and reason, just as 
the city consists of the money-makers, the warriors, and the rulers”. 497  Thus, the highest 
part of the soul, the rational part, naturally rules over the lower parts - anger and desire, 
both in the soul and in the polis.  In linking the political to the nature of the soul in his 
interpretation of Plato’s Republic, Strauss, argues, “A man is just if the rational part of 
his soul is wise and rules (441e)”.498   
 
One needs to read Strauss’s essay “On Natural Law” for further insight into what 
Strauss means by the nature of the soul as presented in Plato’s Republic.  In turning to 
the philosopher, whose soul is in the best rational order, Strauss states, “The individual 
[the philosopher] is well-ordered toward his fellow citizens if he assigns to each what is 
intrinsically good for him and hence what is intrinsically good for the city as a whole”.  
Although Strauss is initially ambiguous as to whether the philosopher receives the 
“good” from the city, or the individual citizens from the philosopher, he argues that it is 
impossible for the philosopher to assign “to each what is good for him by nature” in the 
existing cities.  This implies that only the philosopher receives “what is intrinsically 
good” (“by nature”) from the city.  Even with the limitation of philosophic rule in the 
existing cities, Strauss argues, “this natural order [the ranking of prudence, moderation, 
justice and courage] is the standard for legislation (Laws 631b-d)”.  He concludes that 
“only the wise man or the philosopher can be truly just”, through the perfection of the 
natural order of the soul.  More importantly, for Strauss, nature, as seen in the “natural 
order” of the soul, is the grounding for the philosopher’s aim at “the good”, as the 
                                                 
496 Ibid., p. 26.  
497 Ibid., p. 109.   
498 Ibid., p. 109. 
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ultimate foundation of political science and the means to legislate good laws in the best 
city (society).  Hence, a reader can work out that the title, The City and Man, means that 
Strauss intends Socrates to represent the singular “Man”, whose natural order of the soul 
is a model for the (Socratic) best city, or what Strauss calls the best regime.  Strauss also 
implies that the fundamental way of life of Socrates, the search for the truth, would be 
distinct from the way of life of the city, since the city already possesses the truth 
regarding the highest things (the gods).499   
 
According to Strauss’s understanding of Plato’s Republic in his article “On Natural 
Law”, a city and an individual can only be healthy, if they are in “good order (cf. 444d-
e)”.500  Strauss argues that the “good order” is the “natural order of the virtues as the 
natural perfections of the human soul (cf. Laws 765e-766a), as well as the natural order 
of the other things by nature good”.  Although Strauss does not spell out a list of these 
virtues, it is obvious that the highest virtue is wisdom.  The best political order, 
according to Strauss’s understanding of Plato’s Republic, is where philosophers rule 
absolutely over a communist community, which is “according to nature, as 
distinguished from and opposed to the conventional order (Republic 456-c; cf. 428e)”.  
However, he stresses that natural communism must be pure through communizing three 
things: property, women and children, but only applying to “those citizens who give the 
commonwealth its character”. 501  In The City and Man, in his chapter “On Plato’s 
Republic”, Strauss agues that communism is limited only to the “upper class”, because 
only they are capable of “music education”, “i.e. by a most severe training of the soul” 
that counters the “desires of the body”.  Strauss argues that Plato’s communism in the 
                                                 
499 Strauss, Leo, “On Natural Law”, in Strauss, Leo, Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 
138 & 139.   
500 Ibid., p. 138. 
501 Ibid., p. 139. 
  
 
204
Republic is “intelligible only as a reflection of the superiority of philosophy to non-
philosophy”, because things of the mind can be shared in common, as opposed to things 
of the body.  In the same context, Strauss concludes, “only the philosopher’s life is 
just”.502  In his article “On Natural Law”, Strauss also argues that it is natural right, or 
natural justice, that supports the best regime, “in which those who are best by nature and 
training, the wise men, rule the unwise with absolute power, assigning to each of them 
what is by nature just, i.e. what is by nature good for him”.  However, Strauss argues 
that, in the Republic, Plato does not think such a communist society, that turns out to be 
the best regime, could ever exist.  He states, “The actualization of the best regime 
proves indeed to be impossible or at least extremely improbable; only a diluted version 
of that political order which strictly corresponds to natural right can in reason be 
expected”.  In understanding Plato’s blueprint for a perfect society, found in the 
Republic, as “impossible or at least extremely improbable”, Strauss indicates his 
preference for a moderate, law-abiding regime, such as a liberal democracy. 503  His 
warnings against Stalinism and “Communism”, in the “Introduction” of The City and 
Man, suggest that Strauss does not take seriously Plato’s communist city as the perfect 
solution to our modern political problems.504  In the Republic, Strauss notes that Plato’s 
inclusion of the expulsion of all parents, over the age of ten, from an existing city, 
provides some evidence of the comedy behind Plato’s proposals; hence, Strauss’s final 
argument that Socrates’s best city “necessarily ‘lives’ in speech”. 505  Nevertheless, the 
key implication, for Strauss, is that natural justice “determines the best regime”, in 
                                                 
502 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., pp. 114 & 115. 
503 Strauss, Leo, “On Natural Law”, in Strauss, Leo, Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy, op. cit., p. 
139.  See Strauss’s Liberalism Ancient and Modern, op. cit., pp. 3 – 75. 
504 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., pp. 3 – 6.  See Strauss, Leo, Political Philosophy: Six Essays 
by Leo Strauss, Gildin, Hilail, editor, Pegasus, Bobbs-Merrill, U.S.A., 1975, p. 98.  Strauss argues that 
liberal democracy has its roots in classical political philosophy.  In Strauss, Leo, Liberalism Ancient and 
Modern, op. cit., pp. 23 & 24, Strauss praises “democracy” for its openness to “human excellence”.  This 
contrasts with Schmitt’s criticism of liberal democracy and his praise of dictatorship that excludes the 
question of justice and human excellence. 
505 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., pp. 49 & 126. 
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which the philosophers assign “to each of them what is by nature just, i.e. what is by 
nature good for him”.506  However, in The City and Man, Strauss explains that the 
potential conflict caused by philosophers assuming dictatorial power is avoided, 
because the philosophers do not desire to rule and that they would have to be forced to 
rule the city, which is highly unlikely, since few people recognize the qualities of the 
philosopher.507  Thus, in answering Schmitt’s reliance on the political as the potential 
for war through raising the question, “what is Right?”, Strauss suggests that the 
philosopher lives peacefully in contemplation of the best regime in speech, although, as 
the exception, the philosopher satisfies Schmitt’s demand for the Ernstfall, or the 
potential for war.  Without philosophy, Strauss seems to imply, many of those most 
gifted for the life of contemplation may become tyrants and pose a threat to legitimate 
and peaceful communities.  However, in Strauss’s interpretation of the best regime that 
only exists in speech, the philosopher rules absolutely, thus avoiding the potential for 
war that would exist if the philosopher tried to rule existing cities. 
 
In realizing the impossibility of the natural rule of philosophers over nations or cities, 
Strauss’s political response to Schmitt is one of moderation and attachment to the rule 
of law.  Strauss points out that Socrates confirms that this best regime is “extremely 
improbable”, or “impossible”, because human bodies demand “a natural title to rule” – 
(“Laws 739c; Republic 464d”).  According to Strauss’s understanding of Plato, the 
demands of a human body are natural and dominate in all political associations, often 
causing people to disagree and act unjustly.  Hence, for Strauss, human conflict is 
natural.  In accepting Plato’s explanation of injustice, Strauss agrees with Schmitt that 
moral evil will always exist in the world.  Furthermore, in Strauss’s opinion, forcing 
                                                 
506 Strauss, Leo, “On Natural Law”, in Strauss, Leo, Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy, op. cit., p. 
139. 
507 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., pp. 124 & 125. 
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ordinary people to live like philosophers would be unnatural and unjust; hence, the 
necessity of diluting wisdom (the best city in speech), with the consent of the many 
unwise through the rule of law, or nomos.508  Although Strauss believes that “Plato and 
Aristotle” affirmed “the perfect political order” and that their regime was natural, he 
was convinced that modern technology had made it absolutely impossible even to return 
to the self-sufficient polis.  In rejecting the polis as a practical solution to counter 
Schmitt’s reliance on “concrete” groups, represented by faiths, Strauss, in a private 
letter to Karl Löwith, confirms that Plato’s best regime “is the perfect political order”, 
although the polis “cannot be restored”. 509 
 
In the seventh division of The City and Man, which addresses Plato’s Republic, Strauss 
again concludes that Socrates’s “just city” in speech cannot be brought into physical 
being.  According to Strauss, “It is impossible because it is against nature” that 
injustice, ignorance and evil should disappear from the world.  Thus, evil is part of 
nature, and hence, Strauss satisfies Schmitt first criterion regarding the necessity of evil 
as the foundation of the political.  However, Strauss distinguishes between the “just 
city” (the “city of pigs”) and the best regime found in the “good city” – the soul - which 
is possible and is according to nature.  Strauss argues that the “just city” is against 
nature, since “It is against nature that there should ever be a cessation of evils, for it is 
necessary that there should always be something opposed to the good, and evil 
necessarily wanders about the mortal nature and the region here”. 510  This quotation is 
footnoted not to Plato’s Republic, but to Plato’s Theaetetus.  In turning to the general 
context of Strauss’s reference to the Theaetetus, readers of the Theaetetus learn that 
                                                 
508 Strauss, Leo, “On Natural Law”, in Strauss, Leo, Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy, op. cit., p. 
139.  My emphasis.  In The City and Man, Strauss says that “the best regime is not possible” – p. 131. 
509 Löwith, Karl and Strauss, Leo, “Correspondence Concerning Modernity”, Independent Journal of 
Philosophy, vol. 4, 1983, pp. 107 & 108.  Strauss’s emphasis.   
510 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., p. 127.   
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Socrates also tells Theodorus that “one ought to try to flee from here as soon as 
possible” and that “Flight (is) assimilation to a god as far as possible, and assimilation 
(is) to become just and holy with intelligence”, implying that philosophy is the only 
prudent response to evil in the world.511  In his footnote to the Theaetetus, after his 
quotation above in The City and Man, Strauss also asks readers to compare the 
Theaetetus with the Laws.  In Strauss’s reference to the Laws, Plato has the Athenian 
Stranger argue that the soul “is the cause of things good and bad”, that the “soul 
manages” “heaven” and manages all things “that are in motion”.  In addition, the 
Stranger asks his friends, Kleinias and Megillus, in conversation, “One or several? 
Several; I will answer for both of you.  Presumably we should assume no less than two, 
anyway – one that does good, and another capable of doing the opposite”.  Hence, in 
turning to nature, and using Plato’s Republic, the Theaetetus and the Laws, Strauss 
argues that there are two forces active in the natural world – good and evil.512  In other 
words, Strauss satisfies Schmitt’s first criterion on the necessity of “evil” for the 
affirmation of the political, without excluding the idea of the good.513   
 
Nevertheless, in contrast to Schmitt’s universal enmity, Strauss’s emphasis on nature 
leads to natural friendships, not enmities, since, he argues, what unites human beings in 
friendship is “the union in pure thought”.  According to Strauss, Aristotle calls this “the 
most perfect, the most intimate union” that is possible among friends, a union that 
transcends cities, places and history (time).514  Furthermore, in the context of Strauss’s 
discussion of the soul, it is significant that he is silent on enemies, since Socratic 
philosophy transcends the political in the final analysis, whereas there is no escaping the 
                                                 
511 Plato, Plato’s Theaetetus, Benardete, Seth, trans., University of Chicago Press, U.S.A., 1986, 176a-b, 
pp. 1.42 & 1.43. 
512 Plato, The Laws, Pangle, Thomas L., trans., op. cit., pp. 294 & 295. 
513 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., p. 49.  The duality (“2”) includes good and evil. 
514 Ibid., pp. 16 & 17. 
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political for Schmitt, since there is no nature, and no contemplative life, in his definition 
of the political.  For Strauss, Socrates teaches that friendship is natural, although Strauss 
agrees with Schmitt that there is still a potential for war, seen in the potential conflict 
between the philosopher and the city and the necessity of warriors in Plato’s and 
Aristotle’s best city.  Whereas ordinary cities rest on orthodox beliefs, the philosopher 
questions those views and is seen as a subversive by good citizens, even though the 
philosopher rules in the best regime in speech.  Furthermore, Strauss argues that the 
philosopher enters the existing cities to lure away young and talented potential 
philosophers, an activity that the city opposes.  The citizens want their talented youth to 
dedicate themselves to the good of the city, not to the good associated with the 
philosophic life.  Strauss also notes that even in Socrates’s best (most just) city, war will 
not disappear and hence the need for an educated warrior class to defend the city from 
other cities.515   
 
Understanding the hidden structure of The City and Man confirms that Strauss is 
responding to Schmitt’s concept of the political. Strauss’s fourth, and central, division 
of his Aristotle and Plato chapters, i.e. the centre of the seven divisions, specifically 
addresses “nature” as its theme.  The most striking aspect of Strauss’s discussion on 
nature is its concentration on the modern replacement of classical “nature”, which 
Aristotle originally defined as being connected to “happiness”, or “optimism”.  
According to Strauss, for Aristotle, the natural inequalities found among human beings, 
is “proof that the city is the natural association par excellence”.  Strauss argues that only 
in the city, “one is tempted to say” can the “natural rank” of our “needs” be fulfilled in 
“the life of excellence”.  By this, Strauss means that our bodily and spiritual needs can 
                                                 
515 Ibid., pp. 96, 110, 112, 123 & 124. 
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be listed in a hierarchy from least important to most important, the highest being that 
“man is by nature meant for the life of human excellence”, which means the life 
dedicated to philosophy. 516  For Strauss, this highest “end” in the natural rank of our 
needs, is “universal”, even though it “is very rarely achieved”.  In the same context of 
his division on “nature”, and in the same paragraph that refers to “the life of human 
excellence”, Strauss first mentions “the best regime”, thus connecting the best regime to 
nature and the life of excellence (philosophy).517  In contrast to Schmitt’s political 
theology, Strauss argues that certain human beings can be “happy” and good in this life.  
The key to Aristotle, according to Strauss, is that “nature” is friendly towards human 
beings and supplies the necessities for the best life.  Nevertheless, Strauss does not deny 
that, “the nature of man is enslaved in many ways so that only very few, and even these 
not always, can achieve happiness or the highest freedom of which man is by nature 
capable”.  Thus, Strauss, in citing Aristotle, concludes that the various laws established 
by human beings, in the cities, were the result of chance “rather than human reason”.  
The implication is that Socrates had recognized a connection between philosophy 
(“human reason”) and the laws (nomos) of the cities in solving the political problem of 
who, or what, should rule society.  However, in his first chapter of The City and Man, 
Strauss attempts to give an explanation of what Socrates meant by “human reason”.  
According to Strauss, the relationship between the city and philosophy ultimately 
defines “human reason” through a new interpretation of Socrates’s discovery of the 
ideas.518 
 
 
 
                                                 
516 Ibid., p. 41. 
517 Ibid., p. 44. 
518 Ibid., pp. 41 & 42.   
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2. Nature and the Platonic Ideas 
 
To comprehend Strauss’s argument supporting a return to nature, via what appears first, 
as the universal guide to the political, one needs to examine his interpretation of Plato’s 
“ideas”.  The ideas are Strauss’s political substitute for Schmitt’s reliance on fate, or 
destiny, as the order of things and serve as his link between nomos (“men’s opinions”) 
and nature.  In the seventh division dealing with Plato’s Republic, Strauss claims that no 
one, so far, has made the “doctrine of ideas” understandable, by giving it “a clear 
account”.  The reason that Strauss gives, is that “the doctrine of ideas” is “very hard to 
understand”.  Without stating that he will give “a clear account”, Strauss presents his 
arguments concerning the ideas as those clarifying their “central difficulty”.  Strauss’s 
explanation of the ideas as problems takes shape in three statements.  An “idea” is 1) 
“primarily the looks or shape of a thing”, implying 2) “a kind or class of things which 
are united by the fact that they all possess the same looks, the same character or power, 
or the same nature”; and 3) “therewith it means the class-character or the nature of the 
things belonging to the class in question”.  Strauss means that things can be placed in 
separate groups through shared characteristics by asking the question, “what is 
something?”, or what Strauss means by trying “to find out ‘What’ or the ‘nature’ of a 
thing or a class of things”.  By raising the fundamental question (what is something?) 
and in discovering that it belongs to a distinct group, or class of things, qualifies that 
thing to be called an idea.  For example, in answering the question regarding the na ture 
of justice, Strauss indicates that the idea of justice – the distinct political virtue – can be 
called “the idea of justice”, because it means that it is according to nature.519   
 
                                                 
519 Ibid., pp. 119 & 120.  My emphasis.  In reducing the ideas to Hippodamus’s “3”, Strauss indicates that 
his explanation of the ideas is adequate, but not perfect. 
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In raising the question, “what is political?” in his first chapter on Aristotle, Strauss 
continues the question raised by Schmitt in 1932.  In response, Strauss returns to fourth 
century B.C. Athens to remind Schmitt of the chief character in Plato’s Republic – 
Socrates.  Strauss points to Aristotle’s discussion on the failure of the first political 
philosopher, the town planner, Hippodamus, to understand the political as “entirely 
according to nature”.  Strauss argues that Hippodamus’s quest for “clarity and 
simplicity”, together with his ambition, stopped him seeing that “the political things are 
in a class by themselves”.  Strauss implies that Hippodamus did not discover the 
Socratic ideas defined as the division among the various classes of things.  Strauss 
highlights Hippodamus’s plan to reward innovation, where inventors of useful things 
for the city were to be rewarded.  Strauss argues that Hippodamus failed to understand 
that political stability required that the law (nomos) must not be changed and that its 
being obeyed, and respected, had something to do with long established customs.  
Strauss argues that “The law, the most important instrument for the moral education of 
‘the many’, must then be supported by ancestral opinions, by myths – for instance, by 
myths which speak of the gods as if they were human beings”, or wha t Strauss calls 
“civil theology”.  The reason Strauss gives is that the “city as a whole is characterized 
by a specific recalcitrance to reason” and needs a special kind of rhetoric.  This partly 
explains why philosophy has to become political, as it must protect the divine opinions 
found in the city.  In this way, Strauss intends to emphasize the importance of “ancestral 
opinions”, for the health of all societies.  Here, Strauss is in agreement with Schmitt 
regarding the significance of the sacred opinions of the cities in defining the political. 
Yet, Strauss also realizes that the good life is the philosophical life that questions those 
sacred opinions. Thus, in raising questions regarding the most important opinions of the 
city, the philosopher undermines the city’s respect for law and order.  To overcome this 
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problem, Strauss implies that the philosopher needs to exercise caution in the way he, or 
she, speaks and writes in public.520   
 
Strauss’s general caution may be one reason why he returns to the moral opinions of the 
city to re-establish political philosophy, but it is not the most important reason.  
Strauss’s interpretation of the “what is” question elucidates the “essential” differences 
among the things (opinions) that come to light, particularly in political life.  He further 
argues that the whole of things is made up of parts, or what he calls “classes of being”.  
Strauss understands that the true cause of things is always in “the class itself”, 
confirming that the “class character, is the cause par excellence”.  This is what Strauss 
means when he examines Aristotle’s return to “common sense”, or to “sanity”, seen in 
the “heterogeneous parts” that first come to light as “men’s opinions”.  According to 
Strauss, these opinions have “a certain order” and the most important ones are the 
“authoritative opinions”, representing the law that “makes manifest the just and noble 
things”.  Strauss also argues that the laws are the laws of the city and represent “the 
divine things” of the gods and that Socrates, noted for his piety through his “knowledge 
of ignorance”, did not investigate “the divine things”, but only “the human things” 
found in the law (nomos).  This means that Socrates was “compelled to go the way from 
law to nature, to ascend from law to nature”, but with “caution” and with a new 
“awareness”, or prudence, since questioning the law undermines the law. 521   
 
In turning to the law (nomos), Strauss admits that Socrates noticed that authoritative 
opinions contradicted one another and that he was “compelled” to move cautiously 
beyond the important opinions back to “nature” via “dialectics”, or the art of friendly 
                                                 
520 Ibid., pp. 19 & 22. 
521 Ibid., pp. 19 - 22. 
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conversation.  The nature behind opinion became obvious, in speech, if the opinion 
examined contained no contradictions in the argument.  However, Strauss stresses that 
Socrates was only concerned with “the human things”, primarily regarding justice and 
nobility and how they related to nature.  In turning only to “human wisdom” Strauss 
maintains that, for Socrates, there was no final knowledge of the whole and hence, 
“only partial knowledge of parts” and this meant that political philosophers were not 
able to transcend “the sphere of opinion”.  By this he means they were always forced to 
return to the fundamental question – “what is something?” – which also included 
examining the most authoritative opinions of the city.  Strauss argues, since the whole is 
elusive, “the beginning or the questions retain a greater evidence than the end or the 
answers”.  Strauss argues that the starting point of political philosophy must include an 
investigation of the divine opinions of the pre-philosophic city.  This is Strauss’s 
common ground with Schmitt’s opinion that the political is connected to the various 
faiths of the cities.  In order to respond to Schmitt, on the grounds of the sacred opinions 
of the city, Strauss turns to Thucydides, where the divine law of nature confronts the 
divine law, which represents the ancestral (divine) opinions of the pre-philosophic 
city.522   
 
3. Thucydides’s Divine Law  
 
In his essay, “Progress or Return?”, Strauss argues that, “it is necessary to consider the 
right way as the divine law theios nomos” and that the quest for first things becomes the 
scientific investigation of “a natural order”.  He indicates that “the divine law” (sacred 
                                                 
522 Ibid., pp. 19 – 21 & 241.  On p. 241, Strauss defines the first opinions that come to light in the city as 
ones that are “inherent in the city as such, in the pre-philosophic city”, i.e. “according to which the city 
sees itself as subject and subservient to the divine in the ordinary understanding of the divine or looks up 
to it”. 
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ancestral custom) is “only the starting point, the absolutely essential starting point, for 
Greek philosophy, but it is abandoned in the process”, and if retained, only done so for 
the education of the people.523  Strauss suggests that Thucydides’s presentation of “the 
divine law” can refer to philosophic “interplay of motion and rest”, as opposed to “the 
divine law” that points to the sacred ancestral customs of a city or society. 524  The 
philosophic notion of “the divine law” is one based on nature that is similar to religion, 
as it is universal.  It is crucial to recognize that Strauss distinguishes “the divine law”, 
regarding the ancestral customs of a city, from the “the divine law” of nature as part of 
his response to Schmitt, who only sees the political in terms of highly esteemed faiths.  
Strauss indicates that Socrates and Thucydides were part of the “spirit of daring 
innovation” that included “active doubt of the divine law”, although the divine law 
provided the link to the divine, or what Strauss calls Thucydides’s “wisdom”.  In 
understanding the relationship between “the divine law” (ancestral piety) and “the 
divine law” of human nature in Thucydides, according to Strauss, requires that one 
becomes “wise oneself” and can “recognize wisdom in others”. 525   
 
In his article, “Preliminary Observations on the God in Thucydides’ Work”, Strauss 
refers to the philosophic notion of the divine law as “the divine” (“to theion”), but 
admits that Thucydides does not give a “precise meaning of the expressions” of “the 
divine law” and “the divine”, except that Thucydides “clearly disapproves of breaches 
of the divine law, whereas he refrains from passing judgment on the Athenians’ 
theology as stated by their ambassadors on Melos”.  The Melians had once been 
Athens’s ally and were part of the Athenian empire, but now desired their independence 
                                                 
523 Strauss, Leo, “Progress or Return? The Contemporary Crisis in Western Civilization”, in Strauss, Leo, 
Jewish Philosophy and the Crisis of Modernity, Green, Kenneth Hart, editor, op. cit., pp. 112, 113 & 114.  
I have corrected the misspelling of “theos” to “theios”.  
524 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., p. 161. 
525 Ibid., p. 231. 
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from Athens.  The Athenians insisted that they must submit to Athens, the greater 
power, or die.  The Athenian argument is that weak cities must submit to more powerful 
cities.526  In The City and Man, Strauss argues that Thucydides accepts the divine law of 
nature, which supports “the natural right of the stronger”, described by Strauss as “a 
universal doctrine” that applies to both Sparta and Athens.  Strauss also thinks 
Thucydides means that “the natural right of the stronger” also points to the limits of a 
city’s expansion and that the Spartan regime had an “invisible” empire, which it had 
established “much earlier than the Athenian empire”.  He argues that this “natural right 
of the stronger” did not always lead to an expansionist policy and did not undermine 
Sparta’s moderation.  Strauss believes the Spartan empire had reached “its natural 
limits” and her empire was no longer “an object of surprise and offence” to other Greek 
cities.  In the same context, Strauss even suggests that the famed moderation of the 
Spartans was based on a natural cause – the fear that her large number of slaves would 
revolt.  Spartan leisure, needed for the pursuit of the art of war, was supplied by her 
domination of a very large group of slaves (Helots).  Thus, Strauss argues that 
Thucydides teaches that nature provides an order of things, or a divine law, which can 
be recognized through studying the political affairs of cities, such as Sparta and Athens.  
Although Strauss points out that Thucydides is sympathetic to the ancestral beliefs 
supporting decent political life, he argues that Thucydides’s understanding of politics is 
based on nature, especially human nature.527  However, Thucydides’s truths about 
nature were for the select few, or those considered “wise”.  Strauss sees Thucydides’s 
whole work as an emphasis on “becoming wise oneself” in order that “one can 
                                                 
526 Strauss, Leo, “Preliminary Observations on the Gods in Thucydides’ Work”, in Strauss, Leo, Studies 
in Platonic Political Philosophy, op. cit., p. 96. 
527 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., pp. 191 & 192.  In referring to “the Helots”, Strauss cites 
Thucydides: VIII 40.2, 24.4; I 101.2, 118.2; IV 41.3, 80.3-4 & V 14.3. 
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recognize wisdom in others”. 528  This explains Thucydides’s caution in presenting the 
nature of things.  Robert Bartlett suggests that Thucydides’s respect for “the divine 
law”, or “the depth of the human attachment to nobility and justice”, is essential for the 
health of political life, because “most individuals, let alone whole cities” cannot 
understand “the world in terms of nature or necessity and compulsion”.  He argues that, 
if Thucydides’s divine law is true, i.e. there is a natural right of the stronger as argued 
by the Athenians at Melos, then Thucydides’s support for the divine law relating to the 
ancestral laws becomes essential in preventing great injustices among the cities, to say 
nothing of a degeneration into the chaos of civil war.  He observes that “the divine law 
supports respect for the human law” and a belief in the gods, in terms of punishment 
and restitution, is essential for the survival of a community, suggesting that part of 
Thucydides’s “humanity or generosity” was “to see to it that all do not understand 
themselves to act on the basis of shrewd calculation, nor perhaps even on that of self-
interest rightly understood”. 529 
 
In The City and Man, Strauss uses the words, “the divine law” to refer to two different 
things.  The meaning of “the divine law” can relate to the philosophic understanding of 
nature, especially of motion and rest, while Strauss also uses “the divine law” to refer to 
the bonds of society, such as customs and prohibitions, which are linked to the gods.  
Regarding the philosophic definition of the divine law, he states, “One could say that 
according to the Athenians this law is the true divine law, the law of the interplay of 
motion and rest, of compulsion and right, compulsion obtaining among unequals and 
right obtaining among cities of more or less equal power”. 530  In accepting Thucydides’s 
                                                 
528 Ibid., p. 231.   
529 Bartlett, Robert C., The Idea of Enlightenment - A Post-Mortem Study, University of Toronto Press, 
Canada, 2001, pp. 102 & 105. 
530 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., p. 187.  My emphasis. 
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divine law that points to a universal human nature, Strauss satisfies Schmitt’s criterion 
that calls for the recognition of the Ernstfall (the potential for war) and the problem of 
“Right” seen in Strauss’s rare use of “the natural right of the stronger”. 531  Thucydides, 
according to Strauss, sees the desire to rule, and accumulate an empire, as something 
natural and part of human nature, but the same universal rule, described as the divine 
law, also defines the limits of empire.  It does so, Strauss believes, by showing the 
natural limits that human beings can strive for, and thus points to what is right.532  
However, he warns his readers that “If however the divine law properly understood is 
the interplay of motion and rest, one must study his work in the light of the question of 
how that divine law is related to the divine law in the ordinary understanding”. 533   The 
best case study of the relationship between “the divine law” (ancestral customs) and 
“the divine law” (relating to nature) is Strauss’s discussion of the disaster at 
Mycalessus.534  
 
In contrast to Schmitt’s reliance on an historical necessity that excludes justice, Strauss 
concludes that Thucydides “clearly disapproves of breaches of the divine law”, as seen 
in the example of the mass murder of school children and all the inhabitants at 
Mycalessus.  Strauss argues that Thucydides condemns the actions of a group of 
Athenian allies (Thracian mercenaries), who acted in a way that was against the customs 
of any civilized city.  Strauss refers to the killings as a “lamentable disaster” and one 
that involved “senseless and cowardly butchery of women, children and beasts”, 
indicating that the killings were a breach of the divine law, or ancestral customs.535  
Nevertheless, in total contrast, Strauss points out that Thucydides does not judge the 
                                                 
531 Ibid., p. 191. 
532 Ibid., pp. 191 & 193.    
533 Ibid., p. 161. 
534 Ibid., p. 150. 
535 Ibid., p. 150.  See Thucydides’s history: VII 29.4 – 5, 30.3. 
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“theology” that the Athenians used in convincing the Melians to surrender or die.536  It 
seems that Strauss thinks that Thucydides distinguishes “senseless” killing from 
calculated killing, given that the Athenians wanted to make the Melians an example for 
other cities wishing to be independent of Athenian power.  In another part of the 
chapter, Strauss again refers to the disaster at Mycalessus, but this time he only 
mentions “the murder” of “the children attending a Greek school” in the context of 
writing about the “most savage and murderous barbarism” that was still present in the 
build up of “Greekness”, or civilization.  Furthermore, Strauss, in only referring to “the 
children attending a Greek school”, implies that the murder of school students was an 
attack on knowledge itself, the very thing that defines Athenian wisdom and greatness.  
In the same context of mentioning the school children, Strauss states, “The peak of 
Greekness is the peak of humanity”. 537  Previously, in his section entitled, “The Case for 
Athens: Daring, Progress, and the Arts”, Strauss had concluded that “human wisdom 
rather than anything else is the core of Greekness”.  Thus, even though Strauss argues 
that the unjust action of the mercenaries, in the pay of the Athenians, was against the 
law (nomos) of civilized Athens, he also suggests that it was an unnatural act that 
attacked the very soul of humanity – Greek education, defined as the peak of human 
wisdom.538   
 
In addition to Strauss’s first mention of the school children and inhabitants of 
Mycalessus, Strauss argues that Thucydides is sympathetic to those obeying “the divine 
law”, or those devoted “to law-bred virtue”, such as the Athenian leaders, Nicias and 
                                                 
536 Strauss, Leo, “Preliminary Observations on the Gods in Thucydides’ Work”, in Strauss, Leo, Studies 
in Platonic Political Philosophy, op. cit., p. 96. 
537 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., p. 157. 
538 Ibid., pp. 158 & 230.  The fact that Strauss refers to the murder of the school children as barbaric, 
shows that, for Thucydides, barbarism is always present in history, since barbarism is a part of human 
nature that is not eliminated by the development of civilization and nomos. 
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Demosthenes, who were involved in the Sicilian invasion.  Upon capturing Nicias and 
his “fellow commander, Demosthenes”, the Sicilians killed them.  Strauss suggests that 
Nicias and Demosthenes, as followers of “the divine law”, or ancestral customs, did not 
deserve their “fate”.  In raising the question of the unjust death of both Athenian 
leaders, Strauss argues that the issue Thucydides raises is one “between the dedication, 
guided by law and surely also by divine law, to virtue and a good end, between desert 
and fate” that “points to the rule of just gods”.  After mentioning the “rule of just gods”, 
Strauss suddenly drops his discussion on the role of the gods in determining the fates of 
individuals.  However, Strauss implies that, according to Thucydides, given the 
undeserved fate of both pious leaders, it is apparent that just gods do not rule.  A reader 
of Strauss’s discussion on Nicias and Demosthenes’s fate may also reach a conclusion 
that Thucydides did not believe the gods ever existed.539 
 
Nevertheless, in the second section of chapter three, devoted to the divine law, Strauss 
admits that the “first impression” a reader receives is that Thucydides’s horizon is the 
city’s horizon, described as “the unwritten laws, the divine law”, which Strauss 
identifies with “the gods of the city”.  In implying that Pericles disregarded “the divine 
law” in his Funeral Speech, Strauss draws attention to Thucydides’s order of events, 
where Pericles’s speech is immediately followed by the plague that particularly affected 
the Athenians.  Strauss also notes that the Melian dialogue is immediately followed by 
the Athenian disaster in Sicily, suggesting to readers that, according to Thucydides, 
breaches of “the divine law” are severely punished.540  However, it is not the gods who 
punish those who breach “the divine law”, but rather the divine law of nature, or what 
Strauss refers to as Thucydides’s understanding of “the true divine law, the law of the 
                                                 
539 Ibid., p. 150. 
540 Ibid., p. 153. 
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interplay of motion and rest, of compulsion and right”. 541  Strauss argues that 
Thucydides thought that excessive greed and the concern for one’s private good were 
the human (natural) reasons why the Athenians lost the Sicily campaign.542  According 
to Strauss, Thucydides’s examination of the human causes made him “a philosophic 
historian”, whose understanding is “not radically alien to that of Plato and Aristotle”. 543  
Thus, Strauss sees a common link throughout the three thinkers, particularly regarding 
the existence of nature that transcends history and provides an alternative to Schmitt’s 
belief in Original Sin.544 
 
Strauss’s Thucydides chapter demonstrates that the six criteria for the affirmation of the 
political are satisfied by a political historian, who “sees political life in its own light” 
and examines “actual cities, statesmen, commanders of armies and navies, citizens and 
demagogues as distinguished from founders and legislators”.  Nature provides a content 
that is not neutral and one that offers an answer to the question of right, particularly 
regarding the natural right of the stronger and the natural right associated with wisdom.   
In choosing Thucydides as the third thinker in The City and Man, Strauss comes closest 
to Schmitt’s concept of the political as potential war among concrete groups, or nations, 
with different pieties.  This is most evident in the war between Athens and Sparta, 
which Strauss calls the “most intense” and “bloody war both foreign and civil”, where 
groups are involved in “life and death struggles”. 545  Furthermore, in Strauss’s 
introduction to his analysis and discussion of Thucydides, he uses Schmitt’s favourite 
                                                 
541 Ibid., p. 187.  See also pp. 159 & 230.  On pp. 228 & 229, Strauss says “not the gods but nature sets 
limits to what the city can reasonably attempt”. 
542 Ibid., p. 167.  Hermocrates saw clearly the Sicilian “enemy by nature” in the Athenian “desire for the 
wealth of all Sicily”.  On p. 199, Strauss argues that the Sicilian invasion “could have succeeded but for 
the fact that Pericles’ successors were concerned more with their private good than with the common 
good”.   
543 Ibid., p. 236. 
544 Ibid., p. 153. 
545 Ibid., p. 139. 
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thinker on the political, Thomas Hobbes, to confirm Thucydides’s credentials as an 
excellent authority on the political.  In the eighth division of The City and Man, entitled, 
“1. Political Philosophy and Political History”, Strauss seems to remind Schmitt that, 
“when the tradition stemming from Aristotle was being decisively shaken, Hobbes 
turned from Aristotle to Thucydides”.  Strauss also points out that, for Hobbes, 
Thucydides was “the most politic historiographer that ever writ” and that, as an 
historian, he “presents the universals silently”.  Strauss believed that Hobbes considered 
Thucydides to be a philosophic historian, particularly because Thucydides argues that 
universal human nature explains politics at its most intense.546   
 
If human nature does not change, as Strauss’s interpretation of Thucydides shows, then 
universalism, in the form of nature, takes on the same meaning that it had for Schmitt 
regarding Original Sin and historical providence.  The difference between Schmitt’s 
support for historical providence, i.e. destiny or fate as the foundation of the political 
and Strauss’s argument for nature, is reaffirmed by Strauss in recognizing Thucydides’s 
distinction between “nomos”, or convention, and “physis”, or nature, the same 
distinction that Aristotle and Plato made.  Strauss argues the case for Thucydides’s 
acceptance of the distinction between nature and convention (nomos) in the sixteenth 
division, entitled, “9. The Questionable Universalism of the City”, using the centre of 
Diodotus’s speech that argues, “Men do not realize that punishment does not deter men 
from crimes because nature compels men to commit crimes or because nomos is 
powerless against physis.  They expect more from nomos now than in the olden times”.  
In focusing on Diodotus’s speech to the Athenians, Strauss argues that Diodotus is a 
mask for Thucydides, stating, “Still, Diodotus’ speech reveals more of Thucydides 
                                                 
546 Ibid., pp. 143 & 144. 
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himself than does any other speech”.  Hence, Strauss argues that Thucydides 
understands human actions in terms of an unchangeable human nature.  Strauss points 
out that Thucydides does not believe that human beings are “wiser” or “gentler” “than 
they were in older times”, because of their physis or nature.  This is the same message 
Strauss gives in his discussion on the murder of the school children at Mycalessus.  
Strauss argues that, according to Thucydides, cities do progress in terms of art that give 
rise to “power and wealth”, but “The progress of art is accompanied by a progress of 
nomos – of law doing violence to nature, if only concealing nature”.  Strauss concludes 
that Thucydides argues that “The belief in progress must be qualified with a view to the 
fact that human nature does not change”, 547 thus reminding readers of Strauss’s 
“Introduction”, where he warns readers that “an unchangeable human nature might set 
absolute limits to progress”.  According to Strauss’s understanding of Thucydides, in 
recognizing universal human nature, one must discover the difference between the law 
(nomos) and nature (physis).548   
 
In specifically addressing human nature, Strauss discusses the natural cause of the 
Athenian disaster in Sicily as one relating to greed and the fact that the successors of 
Pericles were “concerned more with their private good than with the common good”.  
Strauss argues that “the Sicilian expedition would have succeeded if the Athenian 
demos had trusted Alcibiades (VI 15.4)”, although Strauss suggests that the very nature 
of the Athenian democracy, that includes an attachment to piety, dooms the attemp t to 
conquer Sicily.549  Strauss argues that “not indeed the gods, but the human concern with 
the gods, without which there cannot be a free city, took terrible revenge on the 
                                                 
547 Ibid., pp. 231, 234 & 235.  See Thucydides: III 45. 
548 Ibid., p. 7.  My emphasis. 
549 Ibid., p. 199.  Their aversion to making Alcibiades a tyrant is supported in their myth about the 
foundation of Athenian democracy that required the expulsion of the tyrant Hippias. 
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Athenians”. 550  Thus, Strauss agrees with Schmitt that piety is an important 
characteristic necessary for the freedom of all cities.  However, Strauss points out that 
Thucydides understands piety as part of human nature, rather than something that exists 
because there are gods.  Strauss’s interpretation of Thucydides demonstrates that the  
rulers of Melos rejected the philosophic insight into the nature of human beings, 
described as the divine law, just as it was rejected by the uneducated Athenian demos in 
agreeing to invade Sicily, with Nicias as a commander.  Strauss further demonstrates 
that the Athenians acted like Melians in appointing the extremely pious Nicias, the 
parallel to Melian leadership, to give their invasion of Sicily legitimacy in the eyes of 
the gods.  Strauss also implies that the tyrannical Alcibiades might have won the battle 
for Sicily, if the Athenian demos consistently supported the divine law regarding the 
right of the stronger by nature.  However, the same divine law of human nature forced 
Alcibiades to accept a dual leadership with a man dedicated to the divine law of the city.  
The consequences were, of necessity, tragic.  Strauss suggests that forcing the joint rule 
of nomos (Nicias) and physis (Alcibiades) in the face of the Ernstfall (the invasion of 
Sicily) meant disaster for the Athenians in Sicily. 
 
In highlighting the problem of human nature, Strauss also raises the issue of the political 
problem of eros, or passionate desire, by focusing on Alcibiades’s and the Athenian 
ambition for empire, as well as their greed for the wealth of Sicily.  Strauss had 
established, in his chapter “On Plato’s Republic”, the goodness of eros in pursuing the 
truth, or the philosophic life, but in his Thucydides chapter, Strauss discusses its 
political consequences.  Strauss’s argument in the fourteenth division, entitled “7. The  
Dialogue on Melos and the Disaster in Sicily”, is not a discussion of the gods, but a 
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discussion of excessive desire, and that “having more at the expense of other cities”, 
encouraged the city of Athens to possess an empire.  This injustice, caused by the  
unlimited desire for wealth, led to Athens becoming a tyrant city.  At the same time, 
Strauss argues that unrestrained eros incited individual citizens to develop the same 
desire at “the expense of his fellow citizens”, undermining the common good within 
Athens itself.  In contrast to the Athenian eros, Strauss believes that Thucydides seems 
to “support the ‘Spartan’ praise of moderation and of the divine law”, but that 
Thucydides did not accept such praise “in the last analysis”. 551  Strauss contends that 
Thucydides believed that the “grandest imperial enterprise ever undertaken”, namely, 
the invasion of Sicily, would have been successful had the Athenians allowed 
Alcibiades to become “a tyrant”. 552  Nevertheless, Strauss argues that political eros 
leads to tragedy, because “eros is of necessity tragic or, as Plato seems to suggest, the 
city is the tragedy par excellence”.553  Unlike philosophic eros that aims at knowing 
more about nature, Strauss implies that political eros leads to the acquisition of material 
things that eventually promotes enmity and leads to war.  In this sense, it is tragic, and 
comes close to Schmitt’s concept of the political as the potential for war among groups.  
Furthermore, Strauss implies that the Athenians believe that the best way of life is found 
in the possession of an empire and in the pursuit of unlimited wealth.  In this way, 
Strauss confirms Schmitt’s friend and enemy concept, since the Athenians consequently 
accumulated many enemies, and this led to war.  However, unlike Schmitt, Strauss adds 
the dimension of eros to his explanation of the political that is linked to human nature.  
Strauss also demonstrates that it is a factor in recognizing the political (the quest for the 
best way of life) both in ordinary political life and in the pursuit of philosophy.    
 
                                                 
551 Ibid., pp. 196 & 197. 
552 Ibid., p. 199. 
553 Ibid., p. 226. 
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Although eros is an important part of Strauss’s interpretation of Thucydides’s teaching 
regarding the political exploits of the Athenians, Strauss again confirms that it was 
human nature that caused the Athenian disaster in Sicily.  For Strauss, it was the 
election of the pious follower of the divine law (ancestral beliefs), Nicias, “who came 
closest to holding the ‘Spartan’ or ‘Melian’ view”, and not the impiety of the erotic 
Alcibiades that sealed the Athenian fate in Sicily.  Part of the problem, according to 
Strauss, was that both Alcibiades and Nicias were concerned with their private good that 
reflected the workings of divine law, or human nature.  In Strauss’s opinion, Nicias 
could have saved the Athenian army in Sicily by leading it back to Athens, but failed to 
do this, fearing that he would be blamed for the disaster in Sicily and be put to death.  
Strauss suggests that the Athenians would have charged him with treason, “having been 
bribed by the enemy”.  In a rare mention of “enemy” and “enemies” – the crux of 
Schmitt’s concept of the political – Strauss relates that Nicias knew “the natures of the 
Athenians”, preferring to remain in Sicily and “die at the hands of the enemies as an 
individual (‘privately’) rather than to perish through the Athenians (‘publicly’) on a 
degrading charge and unjustly (VII 47-48)”.  Thus, Strauss implies that the Athenian 
demos was really Nicias’s mortal enemy, just as it was Alcibiades’s enemy, and that 
knowledge of what constitutes the most deadly enemies is based on knowing the 
“natures” of those enemies, rather than in accepting Schmitt’s definition as the potential 
for war among groups with conflicting faiths.554 
 
                                                 
554 Ibid., pp. 198 & 200.  In the same discussion of Nicias, Strauss uses Schmitt’s key word, “legitimate” 
in referring to “man’s more legitimate concern for his safety and honour which comes into conflict with 
public service”.  Strauss immediately cites a footnote to “Machiavelli, Discorsi I 28-31” that deals with 
the vice of ingratitude. 
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that Strauss does address Schmitt’s six criteria, 
especially the articulation of “the order of human things from a pure and whole 
knowledge”.  By pointing to nature, or human nature, as the universal ordering 
principle, as presented by Aristotle, Plato and Thucydides, Strauss argues that there is a 
separation between nomos (the law) and physis (nature). In providing a new 
interpretation of the Platonic ideas, Strauss demonstrates that the access to nature is 
through the investigation of conventions (nomos), made especially clear in 
Thucydides’s discussion of the connection between “the divine law”, or ancestral piety, 
and “the divine law” that is the outcome of a philosophic account of human nature.  
Before recovering the best regime that can be found in all places and at all times, as a 
reply to Schmitt’s sixth criterion, Strauss had to establish the authority of universal 
“nature” and its link to human things, especially to the political, or the question of the 
best way of life.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
THE POLITICAL AS SOCRATES’S BEST REGIME 
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter seven will demonstrate that Strauss recovers Socrates’s best regime in order to 
answer Schmitt’s call for the affirmation of the political, which can be defined as a way 
of life, or regime.  Strauss’s interpretation of the best regime provides a universal 
standard of the political that satisfies all six criteria outlined in Strauss’s “Comments” 
on Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political.  This chapter will further demonstrate that 
Strauss responds to Schmitt’s concept of the political by examining 1) what Strauss 
means by the best regime and 2) how Strauss uses the best regime to respond to 
Schmitt’s argument regarding the potential for war. 
 
1. The Best Regime  
 
Strauss’s new prefaces to his books are extremely clear and helpful in demonstrating his 
understanding of fundamental issues.555  A few years before his death, Strauss wrote a 
new preface to his 1953 edition of Natural Right and History in which he clarifies his 
difference from other thinkers including, by implication, Schmitt.  In the final 
paragraph, Strauss indirectly outlines his fundamental disagreement with Schmitt, and 
others, who appeal for an affirmation of the political that does not take into account 
natural right and the idea of the good.  He states: 
 
                                                 
555 See Strauss, Leo, “Preface to Hobbes Politische Wissenschaft” in Strauss, Leo, Jewish Philosophy and 
the Crisis of Modernity, Green, Kenneth Hart, editor, op. cit., p. 453, where Strauss, in a new “Preface” 
for his German translation of his Hobbes book, openly describes Schmitt’s significance in strengthening 
his “interest in Hobbes”. 
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“Nothing that I have learned has shaken my inclination to 
prefer ‘natural right’, especially in its classic form, to the 
reigning relativism, positivist or historicist.  To avoid a 
common misunderstanding, I should add the remark that 
the appeal to a higher law, if that law is understood in 
terms of ‘our’ tradition as distinguished from ‘nature’, is 
historicist in character, if not in intention.  The case is 
obviously different if appeal is made to the divine law; 
still, the divine law is not the natural law, let alone natural 
right”. 556 
 
In this “Preface”, Strauss relates that throughout his life he never strayed from his  
“inclination” to natural right, or justice, in “its classic form”, in preference to “the 
divine law”.  As Strauss concludes, “the divine law is not the natural law, let alone 
natural right”.  By “the divine law”, Strauss means the ancestral laws that are based on 
either biblical faith or attached to the gods of the various societies.  In arguing that 
Strauss’s preference for justice, or natural right, as found in the best regime, is the core 
of his answer to Schmitt, one needs to examine the best regime in terms of “its classic 
form”.  Its “classic form” comes to light most clearly in his book, The City and Man, as 
his most comprehensive reply to Schmitt’s demand for the affirmation of the political 
taking into account the six criteria.  Strauss indicated that the difference between 
Schmitt and him involved answering the question regarding the right way of life – i.e. 
                                                 
556 Strauss, Leo, Natural Right and History, op. cit., p. vii.  Since Strauss died in 1973, these are his final 
words on the central importance of, and his “inclination” to, “natural right”, especially “its classic form” 
in his political philosophy.  Strauss argues that his view regarding natural right was “confirmed by the 
study of Vico’s La scienza nuova seconda” – a book that Strauss claims reconsiders natural right. 
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either a return to faith as the basis of the political, or a return to nature and natural right 
in the form of the best regime.557   
 
Socratic political philosophy, as represented by Strauss’s interpretation of Aristotle, 
Plato and Thucydides, provides an alternative to Schmitt’s reliance on political 
theology, or conflicting faiths that are connected to history.  Furthermore, in his 1971 
“Preface”, Strauss states that “the last ten years” of his life have been dedicated to the 
study of “classic natural right” with particular emphasis on “Socrates”. 558  Therefore, 
since The City and Man was published in 1964, Strauss had already decided that 
Socrates provides a better guide to the political than Schmitt’s faith based political 
theology.  As demonstrated in the title of the final book that he supervised for 
publication before his death in 1973, Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy, Strauss 
revealed his preference remained the same.559   
 
For Strauss, the most reasonable answer to Schmitt’s concept of the political, defined as 
the right faith, or the best way of life, is presented as Socrates’s best regime.  Since the 
best regime is based on reason, and hence knowledge, Strauss argues that his 
interpretation of Socrates’s best regime provides an answer to Schmitt’s sixth criterion 
that requires an articulation of “the order of human things from a pure and whole 
knowledge”.  As the best order of the human things, it represents the life of 
contemplation, peace and the true standard of natural justice, according to Strauss’s 
understanding of Plato and Aristotle.  Strauss shows, in his analysis of Aristotle’s 
Politics and Plato’s Republic, that the best regime exists only in speech, because it can 
                                                 
557 Ibid., p. vii. 
558 Ibid., p. vii. 
559 Strauss, Leo, Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy, op. cit., published in 1983.  There are also 
seventeen parts to this book, remembering that 17 is the number representing nature for Strauss.   
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exist in the soul of the best human being of any race and of any sex at any time, or in 
any place.  For Strauss, the best regime for Aristotle and Plato indicates the “essential 
limits, the nature, of the city” – meaning the impossibility of solving the political 
problem – i.e. in providing for a perfectly just society.  He argues that in seeing the 
limits, “one need not have answered the question regarding the whole, it is sufficient for 
the purpose to have raised the question regarding the whole”. 560  
 
As already demonstrated in the previous chapter, the arguments for the best regime 
presuppose an argument in favour of nature, or more specifically, a consistent argument 
that points to a universal human nature in contradistinction to the present acceptance of 
the truth of “culture”.  Strauss’s first chapter of The City and Man, elucidating 
Aristotle’s argument regarding the polis, or the city, is part of Strauss’s solution to 
Schmitt’s search for an independent and a superior political alternative to the concept of 
“culture”.  In recovering the meaning of the political in terms of the polis, or the city, 
Strauss argues that Aristotle demonstrates that the city is natural and that human beings 
possess reason that includes the perception of justice, or natural right.  More importantly 
for Strauss, by developing one’s ability to read and think, one can figure out the best 
way of life, or the good life, that leads to self-sufficiency and happiness, as a 
complement to biblical revelation. 561  Strauss implies that Aristotle argues that the polis 
exists by nature and can be discovered through political philosophy at any time and in 
any place.  His preference for the best regime and the polis is based on his assumption 
that all human beings are not equal in regard to understanding. 562  This is why Strauss 
does not think there can be a genuine unity among all human beings, and that any 
                                                 
560 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., pp. 138 & 157.  Strauss implies that there can never be a just 
regime on earth. 
561 Ibid., p. 1.  Strauss argues that the best city, which is according to nature, is the same as “the City of 
Righteousness, the Faithful City”. 
562 Ibid., pp. 17, 37 & 38. 
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attempt to establish a world state would lead to a world tyranny.  In his book, On 
Tyranny, Strauss argues that the “few” “wise men” in any world state would not wish to 
rule and that “the Universal and Final Tyrant” would be “an unwise man”, who poses 
“as the highest philosophic authority”.  According to Strauss, the leader of the world 
state would persecute the philosophers, substituting “suspicion and terror for law”. 563  
Strauss’s opinion regarding the world state comes from his discussion of the 
relationship between the philosopher and the city that is outlined in Plato’s Republic.  In 
The City and Man, Strauss argues that the philosopher, knowing that the best regime 
only exists in speech, does not seek to rule, or impose the best regime on existing 
regimes.  Similarly, while preferring the polis to any other political arrangement, 
Strauss realizes that it cannot be restored in the modern world.564  Furthermore, since 
evil always exists in the world, according to Strauss and Schmitt, the world will never 
be a harmonious place.  Nevertheless, in raising the issue of Aristotle and Plato’s 
concern with “the good”, in The City and Man, Strauss denies the comprehensiveness of 
Original Sin. 565  By finding an alternative to Original Sin, Strauss allows for the 
possibility of the existence of exceptionally good human beings, such as philosophers 
and Aristotle’s group of noble and good people (“hoi kaloikagathoi - hoi aristoi”).  For 
Strauss, the highest good, defined as “the order of human things”, is the best regime that 
comes to light through the philosophic life, or more specifically, through political 
philosophy discovered by Socrates.566 
 
                                                 
563 Strauss, Leo, On Tyranny, op. cit., p. 211. 
564 Strauss, Leo and Karl Löwith, “Correspondence Concerning Modernity”, vol. 4, op. cit., pp. 107 & 
108.  See also Strauss, Leo, “Kurt Riezler” in What is Political Philosophy? And Other Studies, op. cit., 
pp. 237 & 238.  Here, Strauss states, “One might wonder whether there is another alternative to 
cosmopolitanism than the political philosophy of Plato and of Aristotle who taught that the natural 
political community is, not the nation, but the city; the nation would thus appear as a half-way house 
between the polis and the cosmopolis”.  He goes on to say that an attempt to explain “the truth underlying 
nationalism” requires a recognition of the classical alternative found in the polis.   
565 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., pp. 29, 31, 105, 119 & 120.  
566 Ibid., pp. 26 & 29. 
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As demonstrated in chapter five of this thesis, Strauss chooses Aristotle to commence 
The City and Man, because, he argues, the Politics begins with what is “first for us”, or 
what Strauss calls the “primary” things associated with “common sense”.567  According 
to Aristotle, the city, as a polis, is the natural foundation of the political, and points to 
the goodness of human beings in their recognition of “the good”, through government 
by regimes that claim to provide that good, especially in terms of justice.  The existence 
of a number of regimes: democracy, monarchy and oligarchy in both Greek and non-
Greek cities, confirmed for Strauss, that the political, as the claim to the best way of life, 
is effectively seen in the various claims to rule.568  Strauss argues that Aristotle saw a 
connection between the justifications of the various regimes and the one “best regime” 
that is universal and best for all time and all places.569  In recognizing Schmitt’s unique 
biblical challenge in the form of political theology, Strauss turned to the practical 
question of who, or what, should rule or what Strauss calls the “theologico-political 
problem”. 570   
 
In his book, The City and Man, at the very beginning of the sixth division, Strauss 
concludes:  
 
                                                 
567 Ibid., p. 12. 
568 Ibid., pp. 13 & 48.  See also Strauss, Leo, The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism - An 
Introduction to the Thought of Leo Strauss, Pangle, Thomas L. , editor, University of Chicago Press, 
U.S.A., 1989, op. cit., p. 98.  Strauss states, “Now, the quest for the best regime is only the political form 
of the quest for the good life”. 
569 Ibid., p. 49.  See Strauss, Leo, What is Political Philosophy? And Other Studies, op. cit., pp. 34 & 87.  
On p. 34, Strauss states, “Classical political philosophy is guided by the question of the best regime”.  On 
p. 87, Strauss states, “By the best political order the classical philosopher understood that political order 
which is best always and everywhere” – Strauss’s authority is Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 1135a4-5.  
Aristotle states, “. . . though the only one [regime] that is everywhere according to nature is the best kind” 
– see Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics,  Sachs, Joe, trans., Focus Publishing, R. Pullins Company, 
U.S.A., 2002, p. 94. 
570 Strauss, Leo, Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, op. cit., pp. 1, 3, 6 & 31.  The question seems tied to the 
question regarding the character of “the divine”.  See Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., p. 241 - 
“the question quid sit deus”. 
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“We have come to distinguish between legality and  
legitimacy: whatever is legal in a given society derives its 
ultimate legitimation from something which is the source 
of all law ordinary or constitutional, from the legitimating 
principle, be it the sovereignty of the people, the divine 
right of kings, or whatever else.  The legitimating 
principle is not simple justice, for there is a variety of 
principles of legitimacy.  The legitimating principle is not 
natural law, for natural law is as such neutral as between 
democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy”. 571   
 
The true legitimating principle, Strauss concludes in the same context as the quotation, 
is Plato and Aristotle’s best regime, and it provides the standard for judging all other 
regimes.  Strauss goes on to explain that each of the three regimes listed has its own 
“notion of justice”, but he implies that only the best regime provides a standard of 
universal justice.  Significantly, Strauss silently excludes tyranny as a legitimate regime, 
primarily because it excludes natural right, or natural justice.  In excluding natural right, 
or natural justice, Strauss sees tyranny as unnatural.572  In contrast to Strauss’s position, 
Schmitt argues in The Concept of the Political that, “no reasonable legitimacy or 
legality can exist without protection and obedience”.  Schmitt’s authority is Hobbes, and 
the basis for Hobbes’s statement on protection and obedience is “human nature as well 
as divine right”.573  However, Strauss does not speak of “human nature”, in the above 
quotation relating to regimes, but he does refer to the “divine right of kings” and 
                                                 
571 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., p. 48.   
572 Ibid., p. 48.  In On Tyranny, Strauss states, “the classics understand tyranny as the opposite of the best 
regime” – See Strauss, Leo, On Tyranny, op. cit., p. 192. 
573 Schmitt, Carl, The Concept of the Political, Schwab, George, trans., op. cit., p. 52. 
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“natural law”.  Strauss does not speak of natural right, unless the reader understands 
Strauss’s introduction of “the best regime” in the same paragraph as Strauss’s substitute 
for “natural law” and the equivalent of natural right.  In this rare statement on natural 
law in The City and Man, Strauss agrees with Schmitt’s rejection of the universalism of 
natural law, because it represents a rigid and unchangeable standard for the political and 
hence, fails to allow for the Ernstfall.  Strauss’s justification for rejecting it is based on 
the argument that natural law is “neutral” among the three legitimate regimes, since all 
three regimes have their own idea of justice.  Being neutral, natural law does not satisfy 
Schmitt’s criteria for the affirmation of the political, because a decision must be made 
on a content that is not neutral.  Nevertheless, Strauss silently informs the reader that all 
are concerned with justice, as “in each case a specific notion of justice” is involved and 
hence, that universal commonality of justice points to a universal justice, i.e. to natural 
right that adapts to the exception.  For Strauss, the exception is the Socratic (non-
neutral) best regime that is equivalent to natural right and can be used to judge all other 
regimes.574   Since the best regime is equivalent to the highest in human wisdom, 
Strauss argues that those who understand the best regime can use it to meet exceptional 
circumstances, including the potential for war.  It can be implied from Strauss’s 
argument that Schmitt would not have supported the Nazi regime if he had possessed 
knowledge of the best regime.  It is not by chance that Strauss’s admission of the 
problematic nature of justice is a partial agreement with Schmitt that takes place in the 
context of Strauss’s most explicit reference to Carl Schmitt, where he uses the title of 
Schmitt’s book, Legalität und Legitimität (Legality and Legitimacy),575 the legitimating 
principle of Schmitt’s foundation of the political (“divine right”)576 and in the context of 
Strauss’s introduction to the best regime.  The subtlety is highlighted through Strauss’s 
                                                 
574 This argument is supported in Strauss, Leo, Natural Right and History, op. cit., p. 23.   
575 Schmitt, Carl, Legalität und Legitimität, op. cit. 
576 Schmitt, Carl, The Concept of the Political, Schwab, George, trans., op. cit., p. 52. 
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inclusion of Schmitt’s title in his sixth division dedicated to the art of good writing, 
appearing within Strauss’s chapters on Plato and Aristotle.577   
 
Furthermore, in the same context as chapter two, Strauss lists three examples of the 
“legitimating principle”, the central example being “divine right of kings”.  As already 
stated, Strauss concisely answers Schmitt’s rejection of “natural law” by arguing that 
natural right, or changeable justice, is found only within “the best regime”, based on the 
legitimating principle that “the best regime” is “the highest end of man”, or way of life. 
As such, its end is “true happiness” and self-sufficiency and that it is “the same for the 
individual and the city”, although the city “is capable at best only of an analogue of the 
contemplative life”.  According to Strauss, if the best regime is a way of life that is a 
search for wisdom, then it satisfies Schmitt’s second criterion that demands flexibility in 
facing the dire emergency or Ernstfall.  Strauss does not exclude the rule of 
“enlightened statesman”, such as Pericles, Xenophon or Diodotus, especially in extreme 
times of extreme danger.578  In this context of Strauss’s mention of “natural law” and its 
neutrality, the reader knows that Strauss is addressing Schmitt, because Strauss 
mentions “liberalism” twice in the final paragraph in his climactic explanation of the 
best regime. Here, Strauss indicates that philosophy allows the individual to transcend 
“the city”, as does “liberalism”, but unlike liberalism, limits “this transcendence only to 
the highest in man”, meaning that philosophers pursue “true happiness” rather than 
“happiness however understood”.  Strauss rarely mentions the word “liberalism” in The 
City and Man and uses it as the link between the end of his “Comments” and the present 
                                                 
577 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., p. 48.   
578 Ibid., pp. 23, 28, 231 – 234.  Strauss also had a great admiration for the political wisdom and the 
“human excellence” of “the magnanimous statesman” - Winston S. Churchill.  See Jaffa, Harry V., editor, 
Statesmanship – Essays in Honor of Sir Winston Spencer Churchill, Carolina Academic Press, U.S.A., 
1981, p. ix. 
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argument that the best regime transcends liberalism and thus, affirms the political from 
an horizon other than liberalism.  Hence, in raising the issue of liberalism, Strauss 
attempts to demonstrate that he solves Schmitt’s dilemma in not being able to escape the 
systematics of liberalism by his interpretation of Plato’s regime that transcends history, 
and hence, the liberal horizon.  What makes the argument that Strauss is directly 
challenging Schmitt so compelling, is that Straus s does not use the word, “liberalism” 
anywhere else in The City and Man.579   
 
Since the discovery of the best regime is part of the art of reading, Strauss purposely 
hides the start of the sixth division, by not beginning with a new paragraph as he had 
done previously, i.e. when he ended his divisions in the Aristotle chapter with a full stop 
and a long dash.  As previously mentioned, Strauss’s characteristic full stop and long 
dash come within the second last paragraph of his Aristotle chapter, rather than at the 
obvious beginning of his second chapter “On Plato’s Republic”.  In blurring the break 
between Aristotle and Plato in the context of the best regime, Strauss quietly 
demonstrates his opinion that Aristotle and Plato agree on the argument supporting 
natural right that comes to light as Socrates’s best regime.  In his final paragraph in the 
Aristotle chapter, that is also in the sixth division on Plato’s art of writing, Strauss 
prepares his reader for the connection between the best regime and Plato’s discussion of 
the best regime in the Republic, as he argues, “whereas of the best regime it is known 
only that it necessarily ‘lives’ in speech”.  As demonstrated earlier, in hinting that he is 
addressing Schmitt’s arguments through the reference to a “Fascist” and Schmitt’s 
book, Legality and Legitimacy, Strauss intends that “the best regime” provides a 
                                                 
579 Ibid., pp. 48 & 49. 
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standard for recognizing tyranny and injustice, especially the kind that came to power in 
1933 in Germany, with the full support of Schmitt.580   
 
In linking Aristotle to Plato’s discussion of the best regime found in the Republic, 
Strauss states, “. . . the guiding question of Aristotle’s Politics is the question of the best 
regime”.  Strauss uses the final paragraph in his chapter on Aristotle to refine the 
meaning of “the best regime” that “comes to sight only as the limit of the political”.  
According to Strauss, the “principle” behind the best regime is the highest aspiration of 
a human being, namely “true happiness”, but “happiness” is meant to be synonymous 
with “contemplation” and “the contemplative life”, which means the philosophic life.  
Originally, according to Strauss, Aristotle blurs the best city and the “individual” into 
one, arguing that the city and the individual both aspire to “the highest end of man, 
happiness”.  However, Strauss argues that “the best life of the individual” transcends all 
cities, and that Plato and Aristotle were in agreement regarding the limits of the just 
city.  Strauss speaks of “examples” of “men of the highest excellence (Plato and 
Aristotle)”, who lived in the best regime, even though it was only a theoretical one, 
concluding, “whereas of the best regime it is known only that it necessarily ‘lives’ in 
speech”.  Unlike Schmitt’s reliance on a mysterious fate, Strauss argues that the best 
regime can be “known” through “contemplation”, i.e. through the philosophic life that is 
superior to the political life, thus satisfying Schmitt’s sixth criterion. 581 
 
Furthermore, in his Aristotle, Plato and Thucydides chapters, Strauss answers Schmitt’s 
call for concrete evidence of the political as “the best regime”.  What makes it concrete, 
for Strauss, is that it is based on the distinction between convention and nature.  The 
                                                 
580 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., pp. 45 – 49.   
581 Ibid., p. 49. 
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best regime is according to nature.  Strauss’s interpretation of Aristotle’s practical 
solution, in the form of a “polity”, is a synthesis of the oligarchic regime with the 
democratic regime, as the best practical solution for existing cities.  However, Strauss 
does not discuss the problems in recovering a regime, or polity, that presuppose the 
existence of a class of wealthy noble and good human beings (“hoi kaloikagathoi - hoi 
aristoi”) and a large slave population, although he stresses the need for compromise, 
pointing out that “The very nature of public affairs often defeats reason”.  He does argue 
that in “the best polity” Aristotle believes that the slave population can be given 
freedom, and citizenship, as most are not slaves by nature.  Strauss’s interpretation of 
Aristotle’s natural slave is one who “is a slave by nature if he is too stupid to guide 
himself or can do only a kind of work little superior to the work done by beasts of 
burden”.  In this context, where he discusses Aristotle’s “best polity”, Strauss suddenly 
turns to Xenophon in raising the problem of ruling both “hoi kaloikagathoi - hoi aristoi” 
(the noble gentry) and ordinary soldiers.  Strauss argues that the Greek general, 
Xenophon, was a good, practical ruler of human beings, because Socrates had educated 
him regarding “the sternness of politics”.  According to Strauss, Xenophon ruled the 
noble and good people, under his command in fighting the Persians, by means of 
persuasion; however, he ruled his ordinary soldiers through fear of punishment.  
Xenophon was an Athenian, who attempted to aid the younger Cyrus of Persia to obtain 
the Kingdom of Persia.  In failing to topple the ruling monarch, Xenophon and 10,000 
mercenary Greeks were forced to flee Persia by land.  Xenophon was elected general 
and successfully led the Greeks to the safety of their homeland.  Strauss calls his special 
education, “the full political art”, arguing that it is the same as Aristotle’s theme in the 
Politics that shows “the necessity of laws with teeth in them”.  Strauss argues that 
Xenophon knew how to instil his soldiers “with respect and fear of himself” and was 
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successful in disciplining them.  Given Strauss’s discussion of Xenophon, especially 
regarding the limits of Reason ruling in the cities, Strauss does not think that the best 
regime, or Aristotle’s polity, is possible, but he does suggest that the next best thing to 
philosophic rule is one where good laws are strictly administered by rulers such as 
Xenophon. 582  From these observations, it seems that Strauss does not propose a 
blueprint to replace liberal democracy, but merely outlines the problems that need to be 
addressed by those interested in the political things.  Strauss’s discussion of Aristotle’s 
polity, and his best regime, are controversial, because they begin with the premise that 
human beings are not equal regarding intelligence or wisdom.  If Strauss is correct, then 
the argument leads to the conclusion that rule is necessary and natural.  The necessity of 
rule raises the question of the best regime.  What are common to both “the best regime” 
in speech and Aristotle’s “polity”, according to Strauss, is that they are based on nature 
and that their recognition depends on intelligence and chance, rather than on Schmitt’s 
historical reliance on “destiny”.  Strauss’s digression on Xenophon’s military virtues, in 
the first division on Aristotle, provides a link to the chapter on Plato’s Republic.583   
 
In Strauss’s discussion of the best regime in chapter two, “On Plato’s Republic”, it 
appears that a warrior class is central to the survival of the best regime.  In presenting 
Plato’s best regime that includes male and female warriors, Strauss makes allowances 
for Schmitt’s first two criteria regarding “evil” and the “dire emergency”, or the 
                                                 
582 Ibid., pp. 22 & 23. 
583 Ibid., pp. 48 & 49.  On page 37, Strauss suggests that both Plato and Aristotle agree that the “two 
‘mothers’ of all other regimes” are “democracy and monarchy”.  In the context of Schmitt’s subtle book 
title that appears as, “legality and legitimacy”, Strauss is silent on oligarchy and tyranny, only mentioning 
“democracy, aristocracy and monarchy”.  Strauss also makes an intentional grammatical error by using 
the comparative, “between”, instead of “among” for more than two things, suggesting that monarchy and 
aristocracy are of one kind. 
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potential for war.584  Towards the end of his life, Strauss confirms his interpretation of 
the best regime in The City and Man, concluding that the “cessation of evils that 
Socrates expects from the establishment of the best regime will not include the cessation 
of war”. 585  As already pointed out, Strauss denies that the just city is possible by nature 
because of the existence of moral evil.586  Part of the problem, for Strauss, is that 
philosophers, or the wise, prefer not to rule the cities.  Here, he rejects the possibility of 
political rule by philosophers, because he argues that philosophers do not want to rule, 
being more attracted to “the eros for knowledge as the one thing needful” that promises 
“the most pleasant and blessed possession”.  According to Strauss, the philosophers are 
too busy and “have no leisure for looking down at human affairs, let alone for taking 
care of them”.  Philosophers look down on the “human things” as “paltry”.  
Furthermore, Strauss sees Plato as rejecting the suggestion that most human beings 
would recognize the philosophers’ claim to rule absolutely, particularly since “the good 
citizens” are “passionately opposed to philosophy (517a)”. 587  The other problem with 
philosophy, according to Strauss, is that it undermines the respect for the law, because it 
questions those laws in the search for the truth.  Strauss had learned from Aristotle’s 
example of Hippodamus that, if the law were undermined or changed regularly, then the 
citizens would no longer respect it, thus leading the city into political instability. 588  
Strauss calls the law, “the most important instrument for the moral education of the 
many” that is supported “by ancestral opinions” and “myths”, particularly those myths 
associated with the gods.  If philosophers undermine the laws, then they undermine the 
                                                 
584 Ibid., pp. 110 – 114.  On p. 111, Strauss admits the truth of Schmitt’s concept of the political, stating, 
“the opposition of ‘We and They’ is essential to the political association” and “human spiritedness seems 
to include a sense that one is in the right”.   
585 Strauss, Leo, Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy, op. cit., p. 172. 
586 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., p. 127.  Strauss cites “Theaetetus 176a5-8; cf. Laws 896e4-
6”. 
587 Ibid., pp. 124 & 125. 
588 Ibid., pp. 23 & 24. 
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gods, who represent the highest authority for the city.  Furthermore, Strauss had learned 
from Aristotle and Plato that “the city as a whole is characterized by a specific 
recalcitrance to reason”, and hence, the philosopher requires the art of rhetoric “as a 
servant to the political art”. 589  Thus, Strauss and Schmitt would agree on the 
importance of the right faith held by the majority of citizens within the various cities 
and the maintenance of that faith. 590  Nevertheless, Strauss argues that the best regime 
provides a theoretical standard for judging the rationality of the various competing 
faiths that claim to be right.591   
 
2. War and the Best Regime  
 
Chapter two of The City and Man, which focuses on Plato’s Republic, is Strauss’s reply 
to Schmitt’s concept of the political that relies on an interpretation of Plato’s theory 
regarding public and private enemies.592  In contrast to Schmitt, Strauss presents Plato’s 
discussion of the political as one that focuses on the theme of justice and not war.  
Strauss outlines Socrates’s three practical definitions of justice that lead to natural right 
(universal justice), namely those that appear in the first book of the Republic.  They 
appear in this order: 1) “justice consists in paying one’s debts” (Cephalus)593; 2) 
“helping one’s friends and harming one’s enemies” (Polemarchus)594; and 3) “justice is 
the advantage of the stronger” (Thrasymachus).595  Apart from being the important 
central definition, Strauss argues, “Polemarchus’ opinion properly understood is the 
only one among the generally known views of justice discussed in the first book of the 
                                                 
589 Ibid., p. 22. 
590 Ibid., pp. 124 & 125.  Strauss’s emphasis. 
591 Ibid., p. 34. 
592 Schmitt, Carl, The Concept of the Political, Schwab, George, trans., op. cit., pp. 28 & 29. 
593 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., p. 68. 
594 Ibid., p. 70. 
595 Ibid., p. 74.   
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Republic which is entirely preserved in the positive or constructive part of the work”.  
Strauss points to the guardian class in Socrates’s perfect, communist city, which is 
described by Socrates as, “by nature friendly to their own people and harsh or nasty to 
strangers”. 596    Strauss’s support of Polemarchus’s definition of justice – helping 
friends and harming enemies - is tentative since Socrates refutes it, finally arguing that 
the most just person knows how to judge friends from enemies, but prefers to help “the 
wise”, and harms no one.  Strauss intended this definition to provide a less dangerous 
example for political leaders than Schmitt’s definition that stresses an admiration for 
potential war among nations and groups.  Nevertheless, Socrates points to the need for 
warriors even in the best regime (in speech) because of the presence of evil; hence, 
Strauss’s partial (theoretical) agreement with Schmitt’s concept of the existence of 
friends and enemies.  As Strauss relates from the Republic, “The good city is 
characterized above all by the rule of those best in philosophy and with regard to war 
(543a5)”, indicating that important connection between war and philosophy – a 
connection Schmitt ignores.597  However, since Strauss equates the best regime with the 
philosophic life and natural justice, the standard for judging regimes remains the 
standard of peace (rest), not war.  Although Polemarchus’s definition is the most 
publicly spirited one cited by Strauss, he does point out that Socrates refutes 
Polemarchus’s definition of justice and concludes that harming no one is the final 
definition of justice that is based on a life dedicated to knowledge.  Strauss’s emphasis 
on the contemplative life, peace, justice and friendship, where the wise will harm no 
one, remains his central standard to judge all regimes.598  
 
                                                 
596 Ibid., p. 73.  Strauss places great emphasis on good writers who list things using an odd number so that 
a central item can be highlighted as the most important. 
597 Ibid., p. 112. 
598 Ibid., pp. 70 - 73. 
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Unlike Schmitt’s admiration of the potential for war, Strauss indicates that any 
revolutionary activity in overthrowing a decent regime (a constitutional democracy) 
would lead to disaster.  Some of those present in Plato’s Republic became victims of a 
revolution to restore “an aristocratic regime dedicated to virtue and justice” to Athens.  
At the very beginning of his seventh division “On Plato’s Republic”, Strauss notes that 
it was the “Thirty Tyrants” who murdered “Polemarchus, Lysias and Niceratus”, after 
the action portrayed in the Republic.  As Strauss states, “. . . in the Republic he 
[Socrates] discusses justice in the presence of victims of an abortive attempt made by 
most unjust men to restore justice”.  Strauss footnotes this quotation by describing 
Polemarchus as a “magistrate in charge of lawsuits in which metics were involved”, 
perhaps also alluding to Schmitt’s profession as a lawyer.  In other words, according to 
Strauss, the whole dialogue was aimed at demonstrating the impossibility of 
establishing the best regime, or any regime that attempts to solve the political problem, 
especially through warfare or violence.599  For Strauss, the political problem cannot be 
solved on the level of politics.600  In presenting the drama of Plato’s Republic, in The 
City and Man, Strauss provides a political lesson similar to Schmitt’s own failure to 
help restore order in Germany through his support of injustice, represented by Hitler and 
the Nazis.  Strauss knew that Schmitt had actively supported the Nazi regime, a regime 
based on violence and militarism, and that Schmitt nearly became its victim after 
attracting the attention of the S.S.  Schmitt was saved from the S.S., and certain death, 
only by the personal intervention of Herman Göring.  In calling attention to the political 
fate of “Polemarchus” (“the War Lord”), Strauss seems to underline the dire practical 
                                                 
599 Ibid., p. 63. 
600 Strauss, Leo, Spinoza's Critique of Religion, Sinclair, E. M., trans., op. cit., p. 6. 
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consequences of Schmitt’s concept of the political – the friend and enemy concept - that 
relies on faith alone.601   
 
Whatever the practical limitations of the best regime, it remains Strauss’s complete, 
theoretical answer to Schmitt’s criterion regarding the best way of life for an individual, 
i.e. the philosophic life, assuming that individuals choose to live in communities or 
cities, whether visible or invisible.  If the attraction of living in a city is natural, and 
philosophers must live in a city to live well, then Strauss implies that the philosophers 
must take the political seriously in order to discover the best regime and help preserve 
the conditions for philosophy.  Thus, it explains why the regimes are so important for 
Strauss’s understanding of Socrates and why there is a connection between Socrates and 
the question of who, or what, should rule, described as the “theologico-political 
problem”.  This leads to the necessary confrontation, or potential conflict, between the 
philosopher and the city – hence, Strauss’s title, The City and Man.  Therefore, in some 
agreement with Schmitt’s friend and enemy concept, Strauss admits that there is a 
possibility of conflict between the city and the philosopher, because the philosopher 
undermines the city’s most authoritative pieties.  Given this fact, Strauss argues that the 
Socratic philosophers needed to justify their “regime”, or way of life, before the tribunal 
of the city.  This is why Strauss pays attention to the rhetorician, Thrasymachus, who is 
best at representing the city’s anger and defending its thesis that the city’s laws benefit 
those in power.  According to Strauss, the chief characteristic of the city is its thumos, 
spiritedness or anger, caused by its concern with the things that belong to it, especially 
the gods.  In keeping with the theme of friendship, not enmity, Strauss makes it clear 
                                                 
601 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., p. 63.  See Gottfried, Paul Edward, Carl Schmitt – Politics 
and Theory, op. cit., p. 31.  According to Gottfried, “Göring intervened against Heinrich Himmler to keep 
the S.S. from launching a fuller investigation of his appointee to the Prussian State Council” – see also 
Balakrishnan, Gopal, The Enemy – An Intellectual Portrait of Carl Schmitt, Verso, U.S.A., 2000, pp. 204 
& 207. 
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that Thrasymachus is a friend of Socrates, and had never been his enemy.  Furthermore, 
in the fifth book of the Republic, Socrates describes a city that requires Thrasymachus 
to become one of its citizens.602  For Strauss, Thrasymachus, as the master of rhetoric, 
becomes a link between philosophy and the city and solves the threat posed by the 
philosopher, who questions the sacred laws of the city.  Rhetoric hides the hubris of 
philosophy, while at the same time satisfying the religious needs of the city. 603  
 
When Strauss presents Socrates’s clash with Thrasymachus, he gives the reader a 
glimpse of natural right within philosophic activity.  Strauss states, “. . . by presenting 
Socrates’ taming of Thrasymachus as an act of justice, it lets us see justice”. 604  Since 
both Thrasymachus and Schmitt do not believe in natural justice, Strauss seems to 
imply that, The City and Man is a “theologico-political treatise” aimed at taming the 
political ambitions of political theology, by demonstrating that natural justice, in the 
form of the best regime, does exist universally through shared friendship in speech.  
Although Thrasymachus supported tyranny and injustice, Strauss points out that 
Socrates calls him his “friend”, but there is no such indication that Strauss is Schmitt’s 
friend, even though Strauss takes seriously the challenge of political theology. 605  
Strauss indicates in a private letter that The City and Man is part of an obligation to 
defend philosophy, in contrast to his “real work” of interpreting Aristophanes.606  In 
keeping with the suggestion that the political is linked to compulsion, Strauss reminds 
readers that the Republic is Socrates’s least voluntary dialogue, pointing to 
                                                 
602 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., p. 116.  Here, Thrasymachus becomes a “citizen” of the 
“good city”.  Strauss argues that Socrates becomes “the friend of Thrasymachus” when Thrasymachus, 
who represents or “plays the city”, hears that philosophy for the young will be banned – p. 124, and on p. 
129 Strauss calls Thrasymachus “Socrates’ friend”. 
603 Ibid., p. 78. 
604 Ibid., p. 138. 
605 Ibid., p. 129. 
606 Strauss, Leo, On Tyranny, op. cit., p. 309. 
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Polemarchus’s forceful arrest of Socrates at the beginning of the dialogue.  This 
compulsion gives way to the persuasion that Adeimantus and Polemarchus use to keep 
Socrates in the Piraeus – to share in the spectacle of the introduction of a new goddess 
that includes a novel torch race on horse back dedicated to the goddess.  Similarly, 
Schmitt’s return to religion, as the foundation of the political, forces Strauss to defend 
what he sees as the best way of life in the context of asking the fundamental question, 
“quid sit deus”, or “what is a god?”.  In order to answer that question, Strauss believes 
that he, like Thucydides, must begin with the religious beliefs that appear in pre-
philosophic society, thus explaining his continued response to Carl Schmitt and his 
political theology. 607   
 
As seen in chapter two, Strauss’s experience with Weimar forms part of his political 
philosophy that denies there are any final solutions to the human problem.  Thus, he 
argues that Socrates remaining in the Piraeus was a political act of “duty” aimed not 
only at curbing “the extreme political ambition” of Glaucon, but also promoting 
political philosophy in its Socratic form.608  Given that Schmitt was dominated by 
“extreme political ambition”, not only in his desire to guide Nazi Germany, but also in 
his re-discovery of political theology founded on the potential war of differing faiths, 
Strauss knew that Schmitt’s polemical arguments could contribute to “fanatical 
obscurantism”, similar to the resoluteness that Strauss saw in Heidegger’s philosophy.  
This is one reason why Strauss’s response to Schmitt takes the form of a book entitled, 
The City and Man.  Schmitt’s polemics against liberalism provide a persuasive 
argument that Schmitt’s concept of the political contributes to tyranny, especially given 
Strauss’s condemnation of Schmitt’s writings in 1941, and given that a notion of the 
                                                 
607 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., pp. 63, 64 & 241.   
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best regime plays no role in adjudicating the regimes, or faiths, in Schmitt’s order of 
things.  In addition, Strauss must have foreseen how popular Schmitt’s arguments 
would become in the climate of modern nihilism that includes the disillusionment with 
modern liberalism that Strauss associates with the “crisis of the West”, defined as the 
lack of “faith” in Western Civilization.  Schmitt’s growing popularity in Europe over 
the last decade, and his respect in Germany, add weight to Strauss’s early recognition of 
the potential of Schmitt’s influence.609  In fact, in his 1941 lecture on “German 
Nihilism”, Strauss spends a third of it referring to Schmitt’s arguments.  The most 
obvious suggestion that Strauss was addressing Schmitt is Strauss’s mention of Ernstfall 
in the context of agreeing with Schmitt that morality, as the “serious life”, comes to 
light in a “closed society” and not in an open one.  Although Strauss agrees with some 
of Schmitt’s arguments, he points out that “the decline of reverence for old age” and 
“the emancipation of youth”, together with “progressive education” contributed to the 
dangerous character of German nihilists that finally led to German militarism. 610  
Therefore, it is possible that Strauss’s confrontation with Schmitt, in The City and Man, 
is intended to be an act of duty (and education) in preserving what Strauss argues is 
nothing short of philosophic freedom.  He does this by presenting an interpretation of 
Plato and Aristotle’s best regime that transcends the political, while undermining any 
notion that it is meant to be a blueprint for revolution or a recovery of militarism. 611   
 
                                                 
609 Strauss, Leo, Natural Right and History, op. cit., p. 6.  “The inescapable practical consequence of 
nihilism is fanatical obscurantism”.  Strauss linked German nihilism to the rise of German militarism and 
the Nazis.  Schmitt’s admiration of enmity and wars of faith are central to the danger that Strauss 
perceives in Schmitt’s concept of the political – cf. Strauss, Leo, “German Nihilism”, op. cit., pp. 362 & 
369. 
610 Strauss, Leo, “German Nihilism”, op. cit., pp. 358 & 361.  Strauss’s emphasis.  
611 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., pp. 64 & 65.  As previously mentioned, only Polemarchus 
becomes a follower of philosophy.  According to Strauss, the whole of the Republic is designed to 
moderate Glaucon’s “extreme political ambition”, as well as demonstrating “the taming of Thrasymachus 
as an act of justice” – see pp. 63, 65 & 138.  
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In a private letter to a friend, Helmut Kuhn, Strauss states, “Plato’s best polity is the 
order of human things dictated by natural right”.  According to Strauss, this presupposes 
the existence of the soul and that “the order of the soul”, or what Strauss calls “the order 
of the virtues”, is the “doctrine of natural right” understood as “the all comprehensive” 
and natural virtue that takes the form of “law” and “prudence”. 612  As mentioned before, 
Schmitt denies the existence of natural right in political life, but Strauss thinks he has a 
practical version of natural right, as the best regime, for non-philosophers, particularly 
regarding Aristotle’s polity, or regimes ruled by noble and good people (“hoi 
kaloikagathoi - hoi aristoi”).  Nevertheless, in some agreement with Schmitt’s concept 
of the political, Strauss points out the political nature of Polemarchus’s definition and 
its superiority to Polemarchus’s father’s (Cephalus) definition of justice.  Strauss argues 
that Polemarchus’s definition of justice is noble, since it “means public-spiritedness or 
concern with the common good”, and “full dedication to one’s city as a particular city 
which as such is potentially the enemy of other cities, or patriotism”.  Here, Strauss 
stresses the natural importance of the cities forming friend and enemy divisions.  He 
argues that Polemarchus’s definition is based on the fact that “justice is full dedication 
to the common good” and that “one withhold nothing of his own from his city”.  Hence, 
according to Strauss, it is possible to have a transprivate, or public obligation, based on 
a non-neutral content, but still include justice.  Nevertheless, according to Strauss, 
Polemarchus’s warrior city must be a communist one – a conclusion that Schmitt, and 
Strauss, would reject.613  Once again, Strauss sees his task as one that demonstrates the 
impossibility of the best regime, preferring to conclude his definition of justice with a 
reminder that the philosopher harms no one.  For Strauss, the best way of life, described 
                                                 
612 Strauss, Leo, “Letter to Helmut Kuhn”, Independent Journal of Philosophy, vol. 2, 1978, p. 24.  
Strauss refers to Plato’s Republic 501b that “must be read in conjunction with” 484c 8-d and 597b -d 
concluding that natural right is “the same as the idea of justice”.   
613 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., p. 73. 
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as the philosophic life, transcends the city and politics.  Strauss argues that his 
interpretation of the Republic shows the limits of the political life without having 
answered the question regarding God or “the whole”. 614  Strauss suggests that the most 
important section of the Republic is the one that examines philosophy, arguing that only 
the philosopher is truly just, because “only in the philosopher does the best part of the 
soul, reason, do its work well” and only in “philosophy do justice and happiness 
coincide”. 615  Furthermore, the philosopher refuses to rule in the best city, or any city. 616  
In short, Strauss demonstrates that the perfect city is both impossible and unnatural in 
deed, although the best regime naturally exists in speech.  Strauss argues, “the trans-
political cannot be understood as such except if the city is understood” and that the city 
only can be understood through recognizing its limits.  Strauss points out that Socrates 
shows the equality of the sexes, but “explicitly abstracts from the difference between the 
sexes in regard to procreation” and hence, the natural demands of the human body.  He 
notices that Socrates drops his discussion of communism, i.e. his proposal to abolish the 
family in order to regulate procreation for the common good.  Strauss argues that such a 
proposal would be too hard “for Socrates to prove that possibility”, thus arguing that 
Socrates accepts the notion that “men seem to desire naturally to have children of their 
own”.  He concludes, “Since the institution [communism] in question is indispensable 
for the good city, Socrates thus leaves open the question of the possibility of the good 
city, i.e. of the just city, as such”. 617  Furthermore, Strauss questions whether the natural 
attraction of parents for their children can be overcome in compelling every one over 
the age of ten out of the city. 618  According to Strauss, Socrates’s proposals are not 
serious ones, particularly since many of the proposals disguise the problem of eros and 
                                                 
614 Ibid., p. 138.  Unlike Schmitt, Strauss remains on the level of reason and does not rely on faith. 
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the demands of the bodies of the citizens in the city.  For Socrates, in the best city, the 
communist group replaces privacy and eros with patriotism and justice, and Strauss 
argues that Socrates does not think that this is possible.  The reason Strauss gives is that 
there can never be a “cessation of evils” even in the best city – the just city. 619  In 
addition, regarding the equality of the sexes, Strauss points out two problems which 
surface in warfare, where males and females join together in defending the best city.  In 
following Plato, Strauss states, “. . . men are stronger than women (451e1-2, 455e1-2, 
456a10-11, 457a9-10)”.  He argues that the natural physical difference between the 
sexes is “most relevant for fighting”.  Strauss also argues that the death of female 
fighters would be a greater loss to the best city, because of the special function females 
have in procreation. 620  Hence, Strauss argues that the strict requirements of the best city 
are unnatural and are included to demonstrate “the nature of political things”.  The 
political is limited by what is possible.  Nevertheless, Strauss does not believe that Plato 
failed to provide readers with some guidance concerning justice, arguing that “Socrates’ 
taming of Thrasymachus” is a demonstration of justice, as is Socrates’s attempt to 
moderate Glaucon’s and Adeimantus’s political idealism.  Finally, Strauss argues that 
one need not have divine knowledge, or divine faith, i.e. having “answered the question 
regarding the whole”, in grasping the limits of the perfect city.  In illustrating the limits 
of human nature, Strauss is able to answer Schmitt’s criterion that the political must be 
based on knowledge.  However, that does not mean that Strauss and Schmitt disagree on 
the issue of how groups function in political life.621   
 
In some agreement with Schmitt, Strauss argues that all political groupings, including 
erotic groupings, are “exclusive”, although Strauss suggests that erotic lovers can hide 
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and avoid conflict with the city, whereas, cities cannot hide or seclude themselves “from 
the world”, and hence, from their enemies.  In agreement with Schmitt, Strauss points 
out that cities, or nations, cannot help having friends and enemies.  Potential war is a 
necessary fact, given the nature of all cities.  Thus, even in accepting both “the best 
regime” and other “legitimate” regimes, such as constitutional democracies that are just, 
Strauss argues that all “political association” is “exclusive” and all of them cannot avoid 
potential war with other cities.  In clearly suggesting that he is specifically addressing 
Schmitt’s friend and enemy concept of the political in the third chapter of The City and 
Man, Strauss argues that “the city” always “separates itself from others by opposing or 
resisting them; the opposition of ‘We and They’ is essential to the political association”.  
In the same context, he also indirectly reminds readers of the fifth criterion addressing 
the question, “what is right?”, agreeing with Schmitt that, “every act of human 
spiritedness seems to include a sense that one is in the right (404c)”.  Strauss’s final 
answer to Schmitt concerning “what is right?” in judging among the actual competing 
political groupings, or nations, is the standard of the best regime, where the “quest for 
knowledge of the idea of the good” replaces the quest for “the idea of justice”.  The 
right way of life, defined as the best regime, according to Strauss, is the life dedicated to 
Socratic political philosophy. 622   
 
Conclusion 
 
Chapter Seven has demonstrated that Strauss answers all of Schmitt’s criteria for the 
affirmation of the political, without having to rely on Schmitt’s understanding of the 
political that is based on conflicting faiths.  Strauss’s final answer, regarding the sixth 
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criteria, takes the form of “knowledge” of Plato’s best regime, which exists only in 
speech.  According to Strauss, since the best regime exists only in speech,  it is only 
accessible through contemplation, or the philosophic life.  In presenting the best regime, 
as an order based on knowledge, i.e. one based on nature, the “good” and reason, 
Strauss provides a non-neutral content that can provide a decision that includes the dire 
emergency (Ernstfall), as well as a standard for judging existing regimes.  In arguing 
that the best regime is connected to natural justice, Strauss also includes the fifth 
criterion regarding the right faith, or the question, “what is right?”.  However, Strauss 
knows that in order to challenge Schmitt’s concept of the political, he must also 
examine the political in its pre-philosophic state.  To do so, Strauss turns to political 
history, or more specifically, to Hobbes’s favourite historian - Thucydides.  By 
including an historian in The City and Man, who takes seriously “the divine law”, or the 
cities ancestral piety, Strauss meets Schmitt on Schmitt’s preferred ground, namely, the 
political as defined simply as conflicting pieties in the concrete world that we 
experience as history. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
THE POLITICAL AS THUCYDIDES’S BEST REGIME 
 
Introduction 
 
At the beginning of the third chapter of The City and Man, Strauss states, “The best city 
described in the Republic (and in the Politics) is at rest.  But in the sequel to the 
Republic, Socrates expresses the desire to see the best city ‘in motion’, i.e. at war”, 
meaning that he would like to view an account of Athens totally involved in a war with 
Sparta and other cities.  Thucydides presents Athens on the verge of war and involved in 
“the greatest war known to him”.  In examining Thucydides’s account of Athens’s total 
commitment to war, Strauss suggests that readers can discover Thucydides’s best 
regime.623  Strauss commences his chapter entitled, “Thucydides’s Peloponnesian War”, 
describing Thucydides’s account of the war, as “political life at its most intense, in 
bloody war both foreign and civil, in life and death struggles”,624 reminding readers of 
Strauss’s “Comments”, where he highlights Schmitt’s definition of the political, as “the 
real possibility of physical killing of men by men”. 625  This chapter demonstrates that 
Strauss, in addressing Schmitt’s distinction between groups of friends and enemies in 
the state of a dire emergency, or Ernstfall, uses the cities, Athens and Sparta, and the 
speeches of Athenagoras, Brasidas, Diodotus, and Hermocrates from Thucydides’s 
history, to present the best regime that only exists in speech.  
 
 
 
                                                 
623 Thucydides presents Athens both at war and at peace as a reflection of the duality of human nature. 
624 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., pp. 139 &140. 
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Strauss’s Thucydidean Best Regime  
 
Before turning to Thucydides’s characters in demonstrating the best regime, it is 
necessary to discover Strauss’s continuation of the theme of the best regime from his 
earlier chapter, “On Plato’s Republic”.  In the second paragraph of his chapter on 
Thucydides, Strauss indicates that Thucydides is the fourth missing person in Plato’s 
dialogue, Timaeus, and that “Socrates seems to call for the assistance of a man like 
Thucydides who could supplement political philosophy or complete it”.  In Strauss’s 
footnote one citing Plato’s Timaeus, the reference explains that Socrates sets out his 
desire to hear something like a Thucydidean history, that “sees political life in its own 
light”.  Strauss argues that Socrates wanted to see “the best city in motion” or at war, as 
expressed in “truthful speech”.  By this, he means to see Athens at war with its enemies, 
although Strauss points out that Thucydides and Plato knew the Athenian regime was 
“defective”. 626  Strauss argues that what makes Thucydides’s history true for all times is 
its presentation of “the universal” “in the ‘singulars’ of his time”, meaning that 
Thucydides discovers universal human nature that can be discovered in the historical 
actions of his time.627  According to Strauss, “By studying the Peloponnesian war 
Thucydides grasps the limits of all human things”, including the cities engaged in war.  
Through examining the limits of the cities, particularly Sparta and Athens, Thucydides 
is able to provide a composite picture of what would constitute the best regime.628  
Strauss also points to Thucydides’s grasp of “the limits of all human things” and hence, 
“the nature of all human things”, a feature that makes the history of the war “a 
possession for all times”.  Hence, “nature” provides insight into the order of the human 
things, joining Plato and Aristotle to Thucydides in accepting “nature” as the basis of 
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wisdom that constitutes Strauss’s reply to Schmitt’s emphasis on faith. 629  Although 
Emil Kleinhaus does not see Strauss’s response to Schmitt, he does argue that The City 
and Man is Strauss’s attempt to “prejudge” fascism and communism by presenting a 
“classical tradition” that “evinces a deep belief in moderation and the natural limits of 
politics”.  Kleinhaus argues that Strauss’s works on Thucydides were a response to 
those “students who listened to Heidegger attribute the rise of Nazism to destiny” and 
were consequently “less likely to resist it”.  Thus, Strauss also counters Schmitt’s belief 
in historical destiny, as the foundation of the political, by continuing the theme of nature 
in his Thucydides chapter, especially human nature that allows for political choices.630   
 
To continue the theme of the best regime in the third chapter of The City and Man, 
Strauss has to maintain a link between Socrates, Plato and Thucydides.  In the beginning 
of the Timaeus, Socrates addresses three characters present in the dialogue, Timaeus, 
Hermocrates and Critias, noting that the fourth guest from “yesterday” is missing.  In 
wishing to hear an account of the best city at war, Socrates excludes himself, because it 
would be beyond his capability “to celebrate our city and its citizens as they deserve”. 631  
Strauss suggests that it is possible that Socrates draws attention to Thucydides, who is 
absent in the Timaeus, as one who could give an account of Athens and “supplement 
political philosophy or complete it”. 632  Benardete also agrees with Strauss that 
Socrates’s “more precise request” for the city in motion was aimed at the fourth, 
missing interlocutor, Thucydides.633  In linking Plato and Thucydides together, Strauss 
                                                 
629 Ibid., p. 157. 
630 Kleinhaus, Emil A., “Piety, Universality, and History: Leo Strauss and Thucydides”, Humanitas, vol. 
XIV, no. 1, 2001, p. 91. 
631 Plato, Timaeus, Cornford, Francis M., trans., The Library of Liberal Arts, Macmillan, U.S.A., 1959, 
pp. 5 & 6.  Strauss’s footnote “1” refers to 19b3-d2, 20b3.  Socrates calls on all four (including the 
missing Thucydides) to provide the “sequel”.  As Cornford notes, Timaeus was from Locri in southern 
Italy, which Socrates argues in the Laws (638b) is the best city in the West, p. 6, footnote 2.  
632 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., p. 140. 
633 Benardete, Seth, “Leo Strauss’ The City and Man”, op. cit., p. 13. 
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argues that Thucydides agrees with Plato “regarding the good and bad and noble and 
base” and hence, Strauss indicates that his choice of Thucydides satisfies the first 
criterion regarding the presence of moral evil.634  Furthermore, in contrast to Schmitt’s 
reliance on faith as the foundation of the political, Strauss, in presenting Aristotle, Plato 
and Thucydides, prefers “human wisdom” that “is the core of Greekness”. 635  In 
referring to Athens, which allows the best regime to be recognized through the 
encouragement of wisdom, especially the wisdom of Thucydides, Strauss speaks of 
Thucydides’s history as bringing “to light the sempiternal and universal nature of man 
as the ground of the deeds, the speeches, and the thoughts which it records”.  In the 
same paragraph, Strauss immediately identifies “moderation” and “piety” as the key 
elements of a good regime, or what he calls “the universalism of the city”.  However, he 
concludes “not the gods but nature sets limits to what the city can reasonably attempt.  
Moderation is conduct in accordance with the nature of human things”.  Thus, Strauss 
clearly argues that Thucydides’s best regime, in speech, is based on nature and that 
nature points to moderation as one of the crucial virtues of the best regime.636     
 
In chapter three of The City and Man, Strauss refers to a Corinthian’s first speech to the 
Spartans (I 68-71) that is meant to incite the Spartans to make war upon the Athenians.  
Although Strauss distances Thucydides’s own judgement from the Corinthian contrast 
between the Spartan character and the Athenian, the Corinthian’s praise of Sparta 
appears similar to “Thucydides’ favorable judgment on Sparta – a judgment whose 
major premise is the goodness of moderation, justice and piety”. 637  Strauss uses the 
Corinthian’s speech to contrast the existing regimes that point to the best regime.  This 
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interpretation is supported by Seth Benardete’s commentary on Strauss’s The City and 
Man.  Benardete argues that Thucydides uses “elusive patterns”, which appear as 
dualities, similar to Strauss’s section headings - “The Case for Sparta” and “The Case 
for Athens”.  According to Benardete, these dualities “seem to be the Thucydidean 
equivalents of the best regime of political philosophy”. 638  Benardete emphasizes the 
importance of democracy, by quoting Strauss from his second chapter on Plato in The 
City and Man, “democracy is the only regime other than the best in which the 
philosopher can lead his peculiar way of life without being disturbed”. 639  In his Plato 
chapter, Strauss argues that “every way of life, every regime can be found in it 
[democracy]”, implying that, although democratic Athens is not the best regime, 
Thucydides’s Athenian regime provides an adequate study for the discovery of the best 
regime, as the order of the human things based on knowledge.640   
 
Strauss indicates that one can discern aspects of Thucydides’s best regime in contrasting 
the two cities, Athens and Sparta, calling Sparta “a good regime”.  He argues that, “we 
arrive at the conclusion that this great Athenian preferred the Spartan manner to the 
Athenian manner”, seemingly undermining the fact that the best regime comes to light 
in Athens, either in Diodotus’s speech, or in the Athenian (Thucydides’s) history.  
Strauss notes that the Athenian Thucydides admires the “Spartan manner” that 
represents the “ancestral” belief in the gods (the divine law), going so far as concluding 
that Thucydides clearly “preferred” the stable, Spartan regime that lasted for 400 years.  
Strauss argues that Thucydides’s judgement, in favour of the Spartans, is in striking 
contrast to the more “resplendent” praise given to Athens by Pericles in his Funeral 
Speech, although the love of beauty, and the admiration of the noble that Pericles 
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640 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., p. 131. 
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praises, demonstrate some of the characteristics of Thucydides’s best regime that has 
wisdom as its core.  Strauss makes the point that Pericles praised the Athenian regime, 
“not democracy as such”. 641  Nevertheless, Strauss does not suggest readers should be 
convinced by Pericles’s excessive praise of the Athenian regime.  Strauss states, “A 
sound regime is a moderate regime dedicated to moderation”, defining “a sound 
regime” as one where “a fairly large group united by civic virtue of a fairly high level 
rules in broad daylight, in its own right”. 642  In stressing Thucydides’s reserved 
admiration for the Spartan regime, Strauss concludes, “It is not Thucydides’ fault if his 
readers are more impressed by the brilliant than by the unobtrusive”.  Hence, in 
Thucydides’s seeming preference for the Spartan regime, Strauss implies that the best 
regime must include respect for the divine law, defined as the respect for ancestral 
customs, justice, peace (rest), moderation and stability.  It seems that Strauss answers 
Schmitt’s concept of the political, defined as the potential for war, by highlighting 
Thucydides’s seeming preference for a warrior state, such as Sparta, that represents the 
virtues of peace, justice, moderation and respect for the ancestral laws – all necessary 
virtues for the best regime.643  However, in the final analysis, Strauss points out the best 
regime is “not with Sparta, but with the moderation and piety by which Sparta claimed 
to be guided and which reveals itself less ambiguously in Nicias than in Sparta”.  
Strauss thought that Thucydides was aware of the limitations, and hypocrisy, of the 
actual city of Sparta, but argued that “the universalism of thought” allowed that Sparta’s 
professed virtues were true for the universal, best city.  In pointing to the pious 
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Athenian, Nicias, Strauss indicates that the best regime is more clearly found in the 
virtues of individuals, rather than in the existing regimes of Thucydides’s world.644 
 
Nevertheless, in focusing on Sparta, Strauss addresses the best regime within Schmitt’s 
framework of the political, but unlike Schmitt, Strauss stresses Thucydides’s claim that 
peace is ultimately superior to war, although Thucydides needed to study Athens in 
motion to understand human nature.  Strauss implies that Thucydides agrees with 
Schmitt, suggesting that “the omnipresence of War puts a much lower ceiling on the 
highest aspiration of any city toward justice and virtue than classical political 
philosophy might seem to have admitted”.  This is why Thucydides seems to choose 
Sparta as symbolic of the best regime.  Yet, it turns out that the best regime must 
include aspects of Athens as well as aspects of Sparta.  Thucydides’s own history is 
partly due to his being educated under the Athenian regime, the regime most accepting 
of philosophy. 645  The accumulation of wisdom, or philosophy, requires not only peace, 
but also daring and innovation.  Strauss points to the Corinthian’s first speech to the 
Spartans (I 68-71) where the Corinthian described Athenians as “always restless, 
innovating, quick to invent and to execute, daring beyond their power, full of hope and 
so on”.  Although the Athenian regime tolerates Greek wisdom in the form of 
philosophy, Strauss’s discussion of the Corinthian speech demonstrates that Athens is 
unstable and prone to force its neighbours to defend themselves.  If Strauss thought that 
Thucydides believed that the Athenian regime was the best regime, then Schmitt would 
be correct in arguing that the potential for war is the universal truth among groups, or 
nations, and therefore, there is no transcendence of the political.646  However, according 
to Strauss, Thucydides states, “. . . war is a violent teacher, i.e. a teacher of violence by 
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violence”, meaning that only in peace can people “have better thoughts”.  This implies 
that the  best regime, according to Strauss’s interpretation of Thucydides, is a peaceful 
one, but can only be grasped through speech that presupposes peace and leisure.647  For 
Thucydides, the cities were at peace for most of the time,648 and only in peace is 
“moderation, justice, and piety” praised.  Again, this answers Schmitt’s emphasis on the 
potential war and the Ernstfall.  In an indirect reply to Schmitt’s concept of the political, 
Strauss argues that the warrior city of Sparta is portrayed by Thucydides as very slow to 
declare war on Athens and is noted for a respect for “the superior wisdom of the laws” 
and moderation in general.  Strauss lists the various positive features of the Spartan 
regime outlined by Thucydides: “moderation, tranquillity or restfulness, satisfaction 
with what they possess, hence clinging to immutable laws and aversion to being away 
from home”.  In addition, Strauss lists their “old-fashionedness”, “reliability”, “trust 
among themselves” and their avoidance of “insolent pride”.  All these characteristics 
begin to form a composite picture of what Strauss understands as Thucydides’s best 
regime in motion, but no actual city satisfies Thucydides’s complete picture of the best 
regime.649  As Strauss points out, Thucydides “surely never speaks in his own name of a 
virtuous city whereas he speaks of virtuous individuals”, indicating that virtue is a 
crucial aspect of the best regime and that Thucydides’s best regime is similar to 
Aristotle and Plato’s regime, the focus being on individual wisdom. 650   
 
Strauss’s interpretation of Thucydides’s best regime also comes to light through the 
actions, and speeches, of key characters portrayed in Thucydides’s book.  Strauss 
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particularly mentions the role of the Syracusan demagogue, Athenagoras, as “an indirect 
characterization of the Athenian democracy”.  Michael Palmer argues that 
Athenagoras’s speech to the Syracusan assembly is “the highest praise [of democracy] 
found in Thucydides”. 651  Strauss asserts that the democratic characters in Athens, at the 
time of the invasion of Sicily, were similar to Athenagoras’s character.  The Athenian 
democrats were responsible for the re-call of Alcibiades to be tried for impiety, and 
hence, were responsible for the Athenian failure to secure Sicily.  In using Athenagoras 
and his counterparts in Athens, Strauss indicates that democracy is not the best regime, 
because the majority of citizens, including some of its leading citizens, are not wise.  
Strauss points out that in Book Six (36-40), of Thucydides’s history, Athenagoras 
dismissed crucial reports indicating that the Athenians were about to invade Sicily.  In 
rejecting the reports, he saw them as a ploy by the Syracusan oligarchs to terrorize the 
democracy, so that the young oligarchs could take control of Syracuse.  Strauss argues 
that Athenagoras thought that the Athenians were “much too clever” to launch such a 
disastrous and “hopeless enterprise” in Sicily; however, Athenagoras was unaware that 
“the Athenian invading force did come with the full approval of the Athenian 
multitude” and that it could have been successful, had Alcibiades remained with the 
Athenian fleet.  Whatever Athenagoras’s limitations, Strauss has him defending, and 
praising, the regime of democracy, implying that Athenagoras raised the question of the 
best regime as the wise rule by the majority of citizens within the city.  According to 
Strauss, Thucydides had Athenagoras make “the clearest and most comprehensive 
exposition of the democratic view in his work”.  Strauss shows that Athenagoras argued 
that democracy was “fair and wise”, providing for the common good by giving both the 
rich and the poor a chance to judge “the wisdom of the speakers”.  In presupposing that 
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everyone can be wise and recognize wisdom in others, Strauss implies that Thucydides 
points to the criterion absolutely necessary for the recognition of the best regime – 
wisdom.  However, in pointing out the failure of the unwise Athenagoras to perceive the 
Athenian threat to invade Sicily, Strauss suggests that Thucydides did not think that the 
best regime could be democratic.  Furthermore, in portraying the political leader, 
Athenagoras, as unwise in his speech to his unwise fellow citizens, Thucydides points to 
the extreme rarity of wisdom in political life, implying that the best regime exists only 
in speech.  Strauss also draws attention to the failure of the wise Hermocrates to 
persuade the Sicilians that they were about to be invaded by Athens, indicating that, 
when wisdom does appear, it rarely rules, implying that the best regime is not likely to 
be found in any city, Greek or non-Greek.652   
 
In the same context of mentioning Athenagoras, Strauss reminds readers of the 
limitations of democracy in regard to the recognition of wisdom.  The Syracusan 
assembly (in the seventeenth year of the war) rejected Hermocrates’s wise speech, 
which explained that the Athenians desired to subdue Sicily to enrich themselves.  
Instead, the Assembly was persuaded by Athenagoras to ignore Hermocrates’s 
warnings.  However, Strauss points out that Hermocrates’s first speech at Gela, in the 
eighth year of the war, was “a masterpiece of statesmanly foresight”, because he was 
able to see the Athenian invasion “many years before the event”.  Hermocrates’s goal 
was to end the civil strife of conflicting factions and unite them against “the common 
enemy, their enemy by nature”.  In contrast to Schmitt’s discussion of Cromwell’s, and 
England’s, enmity against Spain as divine based, Strauss uses Hermocrates’s argument 
determining enemies as one based on “nature”, as seen in the “desire” for “wealth”.  
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Strauss argues that Hermocrates’s wisdom was based on an “understanding of human 
nature”, where “aggrandizement” was viewed as natural to both the city and the 
individual.  Although Strauss does not mention that Hermocrates’s speech at Gela 
convinced the Sicilians to end their internal war, Strauss reminds readers of his later 
speech in the seventeenth year of the War and its failure to persuade his fellow citizens 
to unite against Athens.  In the face of an imminent Athenian invasion of Sicily, 
Hermocrates composed a speech warning his fellow Syracusan citizens of the Athenian 
invasion; however, it was unsuccessful against Athenagoras’s limited wisdom that was 
“unable to look beyond the party strife within Syracuse”.  The democratic Athenagoras 
thought that Hermocrates’s speech was a plot by the Syracusan oligarchs to “make 
themselves masters of the city” by scaring the democrats into submission.  Strauss 
points out Athenagoras’s failure to comprehend that democratic Athens would invade 
Sicily was due to his inability to appreciate that Athens was a special kind of democracy 
“exercising quasi-tyrannical rule over her so-called allies”.  Only if the Syracusan 
Assembly had been truly “fair and wise”, would it have recognized itself as something 
like Thucydides’s best regime, which must include wisdom and a knowledge of human 
nature, especially regarding tyranny.   Hence, in discussing the theoretical superiority of 
democracy, where all citizens are considered wise, and in presenting Hermocrates’s 
failure against Athenagoras, Strauss provides another glimpse into Thucydides’s best 
regime that transcends ordinary politics, residing, in this case, only in the speeches of 
politicians, who were not Athenians or Spartans.  The fact that the speakers are not 
Athenian demonstrates not only that the best regime can come to light in places, which 
are not Greek, but also the universality of such a regime.653   
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For Thucydides, according to Strauss, the best regime is inseparable from wisdom, or 
becoming wise, which requires knowledge of nature and human nature.  Since wisdom 
rarely ruled, according to Strauss’s interpretation of Thucydides, the only concrete 
regime that could produce moderation, and justice, had to be a mixed regime.  This 
explains Strauss’s discussion of the Alcibiades led regime that appeared in Athens in 
411 B.C., which Thucydides described as the best regime in his life-time.  The 
moderation of the Athenian polity was connected to the war with the Spartans, the threat 
of civil unrest and the threat posed by the Persian king.  However, Strauss is adamant 
that Thucydides did not think the best regime was possible on the basis of his discussion 
regarding Athenagoras’s speech.  In drawing attention to the failure of Athenagoras, 
Strauss concludes that Thucydides “prefers a mixture of oligarchy and democracy to 
either of the pure forms” and that in raising the claim that democracy is the best regime, 
Thucydides “cannot deny that it is necessary to raise the question of the best regime”.  
Thus, it appears that the best regime of Thucydides’s life-time was only a reflection of 
the highest rule that points to wise individuals rather than to groups or cities.654   
 
In turning to the speeches of other characters in the Thucydides’s book, Strauss 
contrasts the Spartan Brasidas with the Athenian demagogue Cleon, in exposing the 
lack of wisdom in Cleon’s understanding of imperialism.  Strauss argues that 
Thucydides “loathes Cleon”, because he “betrays the soul of Athens” that represents 
“generous compassion”, “pleasure deriving from speeches” and the nobility represented 
by the “thought of everlasting glory” that were essential to Athenian imperialism.  
Cleon believed Athenian imperialism took the form of expediency and what was 
profitable for Athens.  In contrast, Thucydides praises Brasidas for his justice, and lack 
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of violence, in pursuing a successful Spartan policy.  Strauss reminds readers that 
Brasidas is “the only Thucydidean character praised by the author for his mildness”.  
Strauss states, “He surpasses the other Spartans not only by his intelligence, initiative, 
ability to speak, and justice but also by his mildness (IV 81, 108.2-3, 114.3-5)”.  Strauss 
calls him “the Athenian among the Spartans”, just as he sees Cleon as “the Spartan 
among the Athenians”.  Strauss also points out Brasidas’s piety, arguing that he is “the 
only Thucydidean character who ever makes a dedication to Athena and apparently 
sacrifices to her (IV 116.2, V 10.2; cf. II 13.5)”.  In pointing out Brasidas’s unusual 
piety, Strauss seems to imply that, since Brasidas worships the Goddess of Wisdom 
(Athena), his piety (moderation) is connected to his intelligence.  In contrast to 
Brasidas’s moderation, Strauss points out that Cleon’s character is best understood in 
his demand that the Athenians kill all the Mytileneans, because they rebelled against 
Athenian rule.  Strauss suggests that his speech to the Athenians, countering any 
generosity towards the Mytileneans, was like that of a Spartan appealing to “the wisdom 
of the law, i.e. to unchangeable laws of questionable goodness”.  Here, Strauss indicates 
that the best regime, the rule of wisdom, must transcend even the law, or nomos, hence, 
implying that Thucydides is making a hidden criticism of Spartan piety and Sparta’s 
reliance on ancestral law as a defence of the superiority of its regime.  According to 
Strauss, Cleon also told the Athenians that any speech that called for Athenian 
generosity towards the Mytileneans was only motivated by a desire to demonstrate the 
speaker’s own cleverness.  Strauss says that Thucydides “does pass judgment on 
Cleon’s violence”, because, as an Athenian, he should have known better.  In contrast, 
Thucydides portrays Brasidas, who displays superior intelligence, piety, moderation and  
justice, as more of what it means to be an Athenian, although Brasidas was born and 
educated in Sparta.  Without stating it, Strauss almost suggests that Brasidas was the 
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synthesis of the very best of Athens and Sparta.  Nevertheless, Strauss suggests that 
Brasidas’s political success had something to do with his justice, as well as his respect 
for speeches, both of which were connected to his intelligence.  In contrast to Brasidas’s 
speech before the battle of Amphipolis, Strauss draws attention to Cleon’s failure to 
make a speech prior to engaging with Brasidas’s forces.   Instead, Strauss points out 
Cleon’s condemnation of the Athenians for “being ‘lookers-at’ of speeches and of 
sophists”.  Strauss relates that his “contempt of speeches” was “severely punished” at 
the battle at Amphipolis against Brasidas (Book V 7.3-4, 10.2-5).  Cleon subsequently 
lost the battle and was killed.  Therefore, in using Brasidas and Cleon, Strauss implies 
that the Thucydidean wisdom, which underpins the best regime, comes to light through 
a respect for speeches and justice.  This contrasts with Schmitt’s criticism of liberalism, 
which promotes discussion (speeches) and his emphasis on decisionism that is found in 
historical necessity, which consequently excludes natural justice.655  
 
In turning to the superiority of speeches that reveal the best regime, Strauss also 
mentions Diodotus’s speech opposing Cleon’s speech calling for the killing of the 
Mytileneans.  Strauss argues, “Still, Diodotus’ speech reveals more of Thucydides 
himself than does any other speech”, suggesting that it comes closest to outlining the 
foundation of the best regime.  Strauss states that Diodotus’s speech to save the 
Mytileneans was inspired by “moderation and mildness”, meaning that Diodotus’s 
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speech was an act of justice in saving the Mytileneans and in preserving the Athenian 
empire.  Earlier, the Athenians had made a hasty decision, ordering all the Mytileneans 
be put to death for rebelling against the Athenian hegemony, but now they had second 
thoughts.  However, Cleon was determined that the Athenians should not change their 
minds regarding the fate of the Mytileneans.  In discrediting any attempt to counter his 
proposal, Strauss points out that Cleon prevented Athens from receiving “good advice”, 
because he made the citizens suspicious and fearful of the motivation of other speakers.  
Strauss points out that Diodotus’s first task was to make the Assembly amenable to 
further advice, through listening to more speeches.  In explaining Diodotus’s speech,  
Strauss calls attention to Schmitt’s concept of the political, where one distinguishes 
between enemies and friends.656 
 
Strauss indicates that Diodotus’s demand for “complete equality” in the assembly did 
away with the distinction with which “democracy stands or falls”, i.e. the distinction 
between “the friends of the demos” and “the enemies of the demos”.  Unlike Schmitt’s 
friend and enemy concept, Strauss had Diodotus discern the battle between the friends 
and enemies as one between “honest men” who support the demos, as opposed to 
“corrupt men” who oppose the demos, indicating that Diodotus saw virtue, or the lack of 
virtue, as essential in discerning who is a friend and who is an enemy.  In insisting that 
all members of the assembly be virtuous, Strauss suggests Diodotus was presenting 
Thucydides’s best regime, which transcends enmity, democracy and the demos.  This is 
supported by Diodotus’s insistence that the assembly must be composed of friends who 
are “equally competent”.  Furthermore, he insisted tha t the speeches to the assembly 
should be regarded as distinct from the desire of the speaker to increase his prestige.  
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Although Strauss does not say that Diodotus was outlining Thucydides’s best regime, he 
insists that Diodotus’s outline of “the problem of democracy” was to “point to the 
regime in which only moderate and sensible men, in no way tainted by ambition, would 
have a say”.657  In other words, members of Thucydides’s (Diodotus’s) best regime 
would recognize the superior wisdom, and justice, of the speaker, implying that reason, 
justice and friendship were the essential characteristics of the best regime.  Like 
Hermocrates, Strauss had Diodotus argue that “human nature does not change”, but 
unlike Hermocrates’s failure to persuade the city of Syracuse during the Ernstfall (the 
state of emergency caused by the imminent Athenian invasion), Diodotus was 
successful in persuading the Athenians to follow his advice and save the Mytileneans.  
Much of Diodotus’s success in the assembly was attributed to his ironic argument that 
focused on physis, especially human nature, perhaps also another indication that the best 
regime must be based on nature.   However, Diodotus presented nature as pointing to 
the limitation of “progress”, where “human physis” ruled supreme, and noting, “no city 
is likely to consist chiefly of perfectly wise and virtuous people”.  In raising the issue of 
having “to deceive the assembly and to lie to it”, Diodotus (Thucydides) did not think 
that the best regime was possible, because there were too few “perfectly wise and 
virtuous” people.  This explains why Strauss’s presentation of Aristotle and Plato’s best 
regime, and his portrayal of the Thucydidean best regime, ultimately resides within 
speech, but more importantly, within the speeches of outstanding, and rare, 
individuals.658   
 
Apart from demonstrating the best regime within Thucydides’s speeches, Strauss 
reminds readers that Thucydides speaks of the actual existence of the best regime - an 
                                                 
657 Ibid., p. 232.  My emphasis. 
658 Ibid., p. 233 – 235. 
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Athenian regime led by a student of Socrates – and a regime that came about only in 
Thucydides’s lifetime in 411 B.C.659  According to Strauss, the recall of Alcibiades, 
during the greatest motion (war) was crucial in understanding the concrete existence of 
Athens’s best regime, and like the presence of Pericles in the formation of Athenian 
policy, Alcibiades’s existence at the time depended “on elusive chance”. 660  Strauss 
shows that Thucydides did not expect the wise to rule in any city on earth, yet, 
Thucydides suggests that the moderation generated when the democrats, the oligarchs 
and Alcibiades ruled, came closest to what one could call the best regime.  Even though 
the regime lasted only a few months, the historical existence of this regime did not 
detract from its universal example as a moderate and just regime, according to Strauss.  
As mentioned before, Strauss argues that Thucydides confirms that he preferred a mixed 
regime, comprised of oligarchy and democracy, although Strauss leaves open 
Thucydides’s preference for the rule of the wisest.  Strauss does this by suggesting that 
“it is not clear” whether Thucydides might “unqualifiedly prefer that mixture to an 
intelligent and virtuous tyranny” as the best regime, given that Thucydides did not 
consider an aristocratic regime, led by noble and good people (“hoi kaloikagathoi - hoi 
aristoi”), a possibility.  Although Strauss does not explicitly go into details regarding 
Thucydides’s preferred tyranny, given his presentation of the virtuous and intelligent 
characters, Brasidas and Diodotus, one could make a case that Thucydides supported 
such a regime.  In contrast to his cryptic comment on Thucydides’s preferred tyranny, 
Strauss does go into some detail regarding the regime of 411 B.C.661   
 
                                                 
659 Ibid., pp. 152, 153 & 237 (Thucydides “VIII 97.2”).  Strauss calls this mixed regime a “polity”.  In the 
same paragraph he indicates his preference for moderation, concluding that a “sound regime is a moderate 
regime dedicated to moderation”. 
660 Ibid., pp. 153, 199 & 227 (footnote 89). 
661 Ibid., pp. 237 & 238.  See Thucydides, Book 8: 97.  The Athenians recalled the 400 and established the 
rule of the 5,000, including Alcibiades and other exiles.  Strauss means aristocratic as Plato and Aristotle 
understood it.  
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Strauss presents his interpretation of the best regime in Athens, in 411 B.C., as the result 
of chance and nature, rather than through historical necessity.  In replying to Schmitt’s 
concept of the political that requires a concrete foundation, Strauss concludes his 
chapter on Thucydides by stating, “whereas Plato rais es and answers the question of the 
best regime simply, Thucydides answers the question as to the best regime which 
Athens had in his lifetime (VIII 97.2)”. 662  This concrete regime was the actual polity 
formed under the leadership of Alcibiades in 411 B.C., which was “a mixture of 
oligarchy and democracy”.  As Clifford Orwin argues, Thucydides thought that the rule 
of the 5,000 was “a better regime than the democracy that Pericles guided”, even though 
it was formed by the oligarchs, who had lost faith in “the vigorous prosecution of the 
war abroad”.  In seeming to undermine Strauss’s statement regarding the polity being 
the best regime, Orwin argues, “it was not able to resolve the fundamental problems of 
Athens” and that it was better characterized as the result of “sordid intrigue” within the 
oligarchy itself, whose members aimed at saving their own skins, and not something 
that was established “to preserve freedom and empire”. 663   
 
Nevertheless, despite Alcibiades’s failings and the cynicism of the oligarchs, a Socrates 
educated Alcibiades contributes to Strauss’s interpretation of Thucydides’s best “polity” 
(politeia), that occurred in Thucydides’s lifetime.664  In place of rule by the wise, 
Thucydides’s best regime, or “polity”, according to Strauss, is a mixture of oligarchy 
and democracy, and it was this combination that replaced the immoderate rule of the 
400 without recourse to Athenian “democracy”.  This took place during the greatest war 
                                                 
662 Ibid., p. 237. 
663 Orwin, Clifford, The Humanity of Thucydides, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 
U.S.A., 1994, pp. 190 & 191. 
664 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., pp. 152, 227 & 237.  Strauss’s Aristotelian terminology and 
description of the “polity” points to the unity, which Strauss argues that Aristotle and Thucydides share, 
regarding the best regime. 
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(motion) when Athens was fighting for her survival, but Strauss does not discuss the 
common fear, or self- interest, that motivated the members of the polity.  However, 
Strauss links Athens’s failure in Sicily, and her desperate circumstances, to the return of 
Alcibiades in Athens.  Since Strauss thought that Thucydides’s criterion for a good 
regime was moderation, Strauss seems to raise the question how a partly wise, but very 
immoderate, Alcibiades was able to lead the moderate polity in the dire emergency.    
Strauss suggests that the polity could not have taken place without the presence of 
someone talented like Alcibiades, implying that chance and political wisdom were 
essential for the best regime to appear.  In the first paragraph of the section, entitled: “9. 
The questionable Universalism of the City”, and in a footnote, Strauss argues that the 
cause of the change in the Athenian regime, “from the democracy to the polity of 411 
(VIII 97)” was connected to “the return of Alcibiades from Sparta to Athens (86.4-8)”.  
Strauss also concludes, “the impious Alcibiades (53.2) restores moderation in Athens 
(cf. also 45.2, 4-5)”.665  
 
In contrast to Strauss, Robert W. Connor minimizes the role of Alcibiades in 
Thucydides’s best regime, arguing that Thucydides’s mention of the polity “may allude” 
to “the desirability of a moderate restriction in the franchise”, “a balancing of various 
institutions of government” and a way to get cooperation between the supporters of 
Athens and those stationed on Samos.666  Steven Forde argues that the re-call of 
Alcibiades was tied to the needs of the polity, particularly in facing “its dire 
predicament” when Athens needed its most talented leader.667  Forde’s argument 
supports Strauss’s reply to Schmitt that Thucydides’s best regime, in his life-time, was 
                                                 
665 Ibid., p. 227 (footnote 89). 
666 Connor, Robert W., Thucydides, Princeton University Press, U.S.A., 1984, p. 229. 
667 Forde, Steven, The Ambition to Rule – Alcibiades and the Politics of Imperialism in Thucydides, 
Cornell University Press, U.S.A., 1989, p. 159. 
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in response to the “dire emergency” (Ernstfall) or the potential for war.  Given the threat 
to Athens’s survival, Strauss interprets the character of the Athenian “polity” as one of 
moderation, which is also Thucydides’s criterion for a “sound regime”, defined as “one 
in which a fairly large group united by civic virtue of a fairly high level rules in broad 
daylight, in its own right”. 668  However, what Strauss implies, is that the reason behind 
the restoring of the rule by the 5,000 hoplites, is a combination of necessity and a 
chance event that includes the presence of a superior intelligence, seen in the character 
of Alcibiades.  Emil A. Kleinhaus points out that Thucydides’s emphasis on “the power 
of compulsion and chance”, which is essential for the formation of the best regime of 
the 5,000, is Strauss’s way of uniting Plato and Thucydides in their belief that 
“philosophy is fragile and that idealism is dangerous”. 669  Michael Palmer argues that it 
was the first regime that could “accommodate the ambitions of both Alcibiades and the 
Athenians”, but with Alcibiades as its predominant leader.670  Furthermore, in a 
supplementary article on Thucydides, Strauss indicates Alcibiades’s humanity, or 
justice, in saving Athens when the Athenians on Samos demanded that they invade the 
seaport of Athens, the Piraeus.  According to Strauss, only an Alcibiades could have 
restrained them from a course of certain ruin.671   
 
As Strauss concludes, in his later article on Thucydides, “There seems to be a 
connection, not made explicit by Thucydides, between the first good Athenian regime 
that existed during Thucydides’ lifetime and Alkibiades’ unquestioned predominance”.  
In his article, Strauss does not refer to the 411 B.C. regime as “the best regime”, but 
                                                 
668 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., p. 153. 
669 Kleinhaus, Emil A., “Piety, Universality, and History: Leo Strauss and Thucydides”, op. cit., p. 90. 
670 Palmer, Michael, Love of Glory and the Common Good – Aspects of the Political Thought of 
Thucydides , op. cit., p. 114. 
671 Strauss, Leo, “Preliminary Observations on the Gods in Thucydides’ Work”, in Strauss, Leo, Studies 
in Platonic Political Philosophy, op. cit., p. 104. 
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describes it as first “good regime” to appear “during Thucydides’ life”, indicating that 
Strauss seems to have realized that it was not Thucydides’s best regime in the last 
analysis.  However, Strauss does single out Alcibiades’s gifts in advising his former 
enemies.  Alcibiades was forced to reside in Sparta, Athens’s mortal enemy, during the 
peak of the Athenian empire, i.e. during the Athenian invasion of Sicily.  Having been 
elected one of three commanders of the Athenian invasion force, Alcibiades, after 
embarking on his journey, was indicted on a capital charge of impiety, for his part in the 
desecration of the Hermes statues.  Alcibiades’s enemies did not want him to defend 
himself before the assembly, in case he might persuade the assembly of his innocence.  
Alcibiades fled to Sparta to avoid being put to death by the Athenians and became 
Athens’s enemy, as he used his superior political knowledge to aid the Spartans in 
defeating the Athenians in Sicily.  Later he was forced to flee from Sparta and became 
the adviser to the Persian king in dealing with both the Spartans and the Athenians.  
Since wisdom is essential for the existence of the best regime, Strauss seems to suggest 
that the superiority of Alcibiades’s political wisdom is characterized by its universalism, 
in being useful to both Greek and non-Greek cities.  In pointing to Alcibiades’s superior 
wisdom, Strauss also suggests that Thucydides would not be against a regime that was 
ruled by one person possessing superior political wisdom.  However, in Thucydides’s 
“good regime” of 411 B.C., the coming together of all three elements (Alcibiades, the 
oligarchs and the democrats) was a matter of chance and did not guarantee the longevity 
of that regime, as Thucydides demonstrates.  Once again, Strauss argues that 
Thucydides’s “good regime”, defined as the best polity, is found more in speech than in 
the short- lived regime that Thucydides claims is the best regime in his life-time.  
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Finally, in highlighting Alcibiades’s failures, Strauss again demonstrates the limits of 
political wisdom in ruling the city. 672   
 
Conclusion 
 
Through Thucydides’s speeches, Strauss shows how the discovery of the best regime, 
based on nature, provides an answer to the order of the human things that is founded 
upon knowledge of the highest order – wisdom, or knowledge of human nature.  
Furthermore, chapter eight has demonstrated how the Ernstfall, or dire emergency, is 
addressed through Strauss’s selection of Thucydides’s speeches on war that divides 
cities into friends and enemies.  In his response to Schmitt’s suggestion of a return to 
faith as the foundation of the political, Strauss presents the pre-philosophic cities that 
are influenced by piety, a piety based on universal human nature.  Strauss continues his 
recovery of the political, that takes the form of the best regime in speech, by turning to 
Thucydides’s outstanding characters, Brasidas, Hermocrates, Alcibiades, Diodotus and 
Athenagoras, who provide partial glimpses into what constitutes Thucydides’s best 
regime.  Through those characters, and the regimes of Sparta and Athens, Strauss 
presents aspects of Thucydides’s best practical regime, finally choosing a regime that 
was a mixture of democracy, oligarchy and intelligence (Alcibiades), preferring it to the 
pure forms of oligarchy and democracy.   Nevertheless, in presenting wise and virtuous 
individuals within political life, Strauss also suggests that Thucydides favoured the rule 
of one person, as a possible best regime, something similar to Aristotle and Plato’s 
agreement regarding the rule of the wise.673   
 
                                                 
672 Ibid., p. 104. 
673 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., p. 238. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
1. A Summary of the Thesis 
 
This thesis has demonstrated that Strauss’s articulation of his life-long interest in “the 
theologico-political problem”, or “who or what should rule?”, that first appears in his 
1932 response to Carl Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political, continues in Strauss’s 
1964 publication of The City and Man.  It has been shown that Strauss, in satisfying 
Schmitt’s six criteria for the recovery of the political, attempts to demonstrate that 
political philosophy provides a better, and safer, guide to the political life than Schmitt’s 
political theology, particularly in recognizing the problem of tyranny.  The thesis has 
demonstrated that in discovering the structure of The City and Man, and in discovering 
Strauss’s art of writing, one can perceive The City and Man as Strauss’s considered 
reply to Schmitt’s understanding of the political.   
 
The central issue, for Strauss and Schmitt, is what, or who, should rule society.  This is 
Strauss’s guiding theme in The City and Man, rather than an attempt to demonstrate that 
biblical revelation refutes philosophy as the best way of life.  This thesis demonstrates 
that Strauss argues that Schmitt’s recovery of the political as faith based, is dangerous 
and immoderate, especially since Schmitt admires fighting more than what is fought 
over.  Strauss argues that Schmitt provides no rational base on which to judge the 
competing faiths that claim to be the right way of life, especially in their claims to rule.  
In addition, Strauss understands that the dangers of Schmitt’s political theology come 
from its universalism through a reliance on history as metaphysics, rather than history 
defined as what has happened over time.  Although Strauss does not specifically use 
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Weimar, and Schmitt’s joining of the Nazi Party in 1933, to refute Schmitt’s arguments 
concerning the political, they remain in the background when Strauss counters Schmitt’s 
political theology with Plato’s and Thucydides’s best regime.  In responding to 
Schmitt’s six criteria for the affirmation of the political, Strauss must recover “nature” 
as the trans-historical “content” that is not neutral.  By returning to nature, especially 
human nature, he provides the universalism that characterizes Plato’s best regime in 
speech, Aristotle’s best regime, and the Thucydidean best regime in speech.  In 
recovering the best regime, Strauss provides Schmitt with a standard of universal justice 
(natural right) that allows for the exception – the political philosopher – to cope with the 
Ernstfall (“dire emergency”), that also includes a content demanding the recognition of 
moral evil.  Wisdom, as the exception itself, provides a flexible basis to meet the 
Ernstfall.  Since the best regime is either founded on wisdom, or knowledge, Strauss 
argues that he has satisfied Schmitt’s sixth criterion regarding the order of the human 
things that must be based on “pure and whole knowledge”.   
 
In first recovering Plato’s and Thucydides’s idea of nature, especially human nature, 
Strauss argues that he provides readers with a universal standard that exists at all times 
and in all places.  With the recovery of nature, and the Platonic ideas that presuppose 
the possibility of knowledge, Strauss satisfies the sixth criterion that calls for a “pure 
and whole knowledge” of the order of the human things.  According to Strauss, the 
pursuit of knowledge presupposes a complete whole (the good) that resembles the 
divine, or god, but one that can be grasped in parts, by the use of reason.  Whereas 
Schmitt remains in the realm of the sacred opinions of the city, that vary according to 
historical periods, Strauss argues that political philosophy begins with those highly 
esteemed opinions and subjects them to rational investigation.  In transcending the 
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political that includes the sacred beliefs of the city, Strauss also recognizes that the 
question of the political is connected to the question, what is a god? (“quid sit deus”).  
This is why Strauss turned to Thucydides and the distinction between “the divine law”, 
relating to the ancestral belief linked to the gods, and “the divine law”, relating to the 
laws of nature as discovered by philosophy.  In linking Thucydides to Socrates, Strauss 
demonstrates that the political implies that the philosophic quest remains an unending 
search for the truth about the human things and god.  Since Strauss argues that there can 
be no final knowledge, the divine, or the good, always remains somewhat mysterious.  
In demonstrating the limits of the political through the best regime that takes the form of 
the philosopher-king’s refusal to rule, and the limits of Socratic knowledge of the good, 
Strauss argues that he promotes discussion and rule of law, together with the virtues of 
wisdom and moderation, in providing a guide to the political life.674   
 
More specifically, in presenting his book as a “theologico-political treatise”, Strauss 
confirms the serious challenge of Schmitt’s political theology that is based on an 
interpretation of biblical revelation and Original Sin.675  In addressing Schmitt on the 
common ground of the regimes, or ways of living, Strauss argues, in The City and Man, 
that Aristotle, Plato and Thucydides satisfy Schmitt’s six criteria, through the 
introduction of nature and the best regime.  What provides the common ground between 
Schmitt’s concept of the political and Strauss’s return to “Greek philosophy”, in 
Strauss’s opinion, “is the problem of divine law”.  However, according to Strauss, 
political philosophy and political theology “solve that problem [of divine law] in a 
                                                 
674 Ibid., p. 241. 
675 Strauss, Leo, “Progress or Return? The Contemporary Crisis in Western Civilization”, in Strauss, Leo, 
Jewish Philosophy and the Crisis of Modernity, Green, Kenneth Hart, editor, op. cit., pp. 115 & 116.  
Strauss states, “Western spiritual history, one could almost say, is the conflict between the biblical and the 
philosophic notions of the good life”, which is an “unresolved conflict” that “is the secret of the vitality of 
Western civilization” – p. 116. 
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diametrically opposed manner”.676  Strauss confirms this public statement in a private 
letter to his Christian friend, Eric Voegelin, written in 1951.  He agrees with Voegelin 
that “the Bible and philosophy” share a common interest in the “theioi nomoi” (divine 
laws).  Strauss further states that “it is the problem of the multitude of the theioi nomoi 
(divine laws) that leads to the diametrically opposed solution of the Bible on the one 
hand and of philosophy on the other”.  Ultimately, the faith underlying Schmitt’s 
concept of the political is a Christian one and is focused on the historical event of the 
Incarnation.  Thus, Strauss’s letter helps identify the beginning of “the theologico-
political problem” as Schmitt’s emphasis on conflicting faiths that require some sort of 
universal adjudication – either biblical revelation, or political philosophy.  For Schmitt, 
his interpretation of the political as Christian faith informed by history, makes the right 
faith the only legitimate, and final, judge of the political, while Strauss’s answer lies in 
his interpretation of the Socratic life dedicated to the pursuit of wisdom, in harming no 
one, in promoting peace and natural justice, and advising moderation in political life.677   
 
In The City and Man, Strauss begins his answer to Schmitt using Aristotle’s notion of 
“common sense”, or citizen morality, as well as using him to recover nature and the 
Greek polis.  In restoring the Greek understanding of the distinction between physis 
(nature) and nomos, (law or convention), Strauss attempts to show Schmitt the 
universality of nature that provides an alternative basis for more moderate politics than 
one based on faith and historical necessity.  Since Strauss understood that the most 
serious “political” challenge to political philosophy comes from faith, in the form of 
political theology, he chose to respond to Schmitt only when he had “deepened” his 
                                                 
676 Ibid., pp. 106 & 107.  Strauss also defines “justice” as “obedience to the divine law”. 
677 Strauss, Leo & Voegelin, Eric, Faith and Political Philosophy: The Correspondence Between Leo 
Strauss and Eric Voegelin, 1934 – 1964, Emberley, Peter, & Cooper, Barry, editors, op. cit., p. 78 (dated 
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“understanding of natural right and history”, especially his knowledge of “Socrates”. 678  
Although Strauss chose Athens over Jerusalem in The City and Man, it does not follow 
that he rejected the existence of the biblical God.  Strauss admits that the philosopher 
must be open to the possibility that biblical revelation is true.  In Natural Right and 
History, Strauss states, “The mere fact that philosophy and revelation cannot refute each 
other would constitute the refutation of philosophy by revelation”. 679  This confirms 
Strauss’s introduction to The City and Man that speaks of political philosophy, as “the 
indispensable handmaid of theology” and the best regime as akin to “the Divine 
message of the City of Righteousness, the Faithful City”. 680  In his essay entitled, 
“Progress or Return?”, Strauss argues, “philosophy must admit the possibility of 
revelation.  Now that means that philosophy itself is possibly no t the right way of life”.  
However, the central issue of this thesis is not whether revelation, or biblical faith, is 
superior to Socratic political philosophy.  In discovering the structure and Strauss’s art 
of writing in The City and Man, the thesis has shown that Strauss believes that Socratic 
political philosophy, and Thucydidean nature, provide a better guide to political life 
than Schmitt’s reliance on the need for conflicting faiths within providential history. 681 
 
In turning to Plato’s Republic, Strauss provides readers with an interpretation of the soul 
that contains a hierarchy of “goods”, the highest, being reason.  The existence of the 
soul is essential if Strauss’s interpretation of Plato’s best regime is to be understood.  By 
including reason as the key to the universal existence of the soul, Strauss thinks that he 
has satisfied Schmitt’s final criterion concerning “the order of the human things, from a 
pure and whole knowledge”.  In addressing the theologico-political problem, defined as 
                                                 
678 Strauss, Leo, Natural Right and History, op. cit., pp. vii  & 75. 
679 Ibid., p. 75. 
680 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., p. 1. 
681 Strauss, Leo, “Progress or Return? The Contemporary Crisis in Western Civilization”, in Strauss, Leo, 
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who, or what, should rule human beings, Strauss is in agreement with Schmitt’s call for 
a return to the regimes, but in going further than Schmitt, he argues that the best regime 
is the standard for judging all regimes.  However, in answering Schmitt’s six criteria, 
Strauss argues that he provides a rational understanding of human nature that leaves 
open the need to investigate, and test, the truth or reasonableness of other faiths that lay 
claim to guide political life.  At the same time, Strauss’s concentration on the art of 
careful writing confirms his argument that the pursuit of knowledge is crucial in 
surpassing the political, as well as being central to the transcending of Schmitt’s liberal 
horizon.  
 
Strauss chose Thucydides to illustrate the limitations of Schmitt’s political theology by 
turning to a pre-philosophic, historical setting that provided detailed evidence of enmity 
and warfare among groups.  However, Strauss demonstrates that Thucydides is 
ultimately more concerned with “the nature of peace” than war, particularly since 
Thucydides’s own wisdom became possible only through forced exile, which excluded 
his participation in war.  Since wisdom is the highest object of Thucydides’s history, it 
excludes the total emphasis that Schmitt puts on war and the division of groups into 
friends and enemies.  Thus, Thucydides joins the ranks of Aristotle and Plato in making 
leisure, whether forced or voluntary, the necessary condition for producing works that 
reflect the highest wisdom regarding the quest to know the best way of life.  Although 
Thucydides’s wisdom comes to light through the examination of the greatest war, or 
motion, Strauss argues that Thucydides ultimately believes that the best way of life is 
characterized by peace, even though it seems over-powered by war.  In investigating the 
greatest war, Thucydides understands war (motion) to form a duality with peace (rest) 
that is part of his philosophic presentation of human nature.  As Strauss summarizes his 
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interpretation of Thucydides’s history, “Rest, not motion, peace, not war is good”, 
although war seems dominant in political life among cities or societies.682  Thus, in 
using the concrete situation of war, Strauss meets Schmitt on the level of the cities’ gods 
(faith) that are pre-philosophic and decis ive for ordinary groups of citizens.  Even here, 
Strauss points to universal nature (the divine), or Thucydides’s understanding of human 
nature, as well as his presentation of the best regime through the speeches, and actions, 
of characters such as Alcibiades, Diodotus, Hermocrates and Athenagoras.  
Furthermore, in choosing Thucydides, the historian, Strauss moves closer to Schmitt’s 
reliance on fate as historical fate, although Strauss implies that Thucydides’s emphasis 
on compulsion, or necessity, is different from Schmitt’s reliance on the field of 
providential history.   
 
2. The Limitations of the Thesis 
 
The greatest limitation of this thesis is the one relating to the nature of Strauss’s 
unorthodox manner of writing.  This is why a number of sections within the thesis 
specifically address Strauss’s way of writing.  It is difficult to demonstrate, 
conclusively, that Strauss is responding to Schmitt’s political arguments in The City and 
Man, particularly when Strauss begins his book by denying the authority of orthodox 
methods as the best way to discern the meaning of the political. 683  The greatest problem 
is how a reader deals with Strauss’s cryptic comments that tend to hide his more 
revealing thoughts.  In his sixth section of The City and Man, Strauss argues that “good 
writing” implies that every word is carefully chosen by the author and that the “proper 
work” of such writing, “is to talk to some readers and to be silent to others”.  Although 
                                                 
682 Strauss, Leo, The City and Man, op. cit., p. 156. 
683 Ibid., pp. 9 – 12. 
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Strauss does not inform the reader that his work qualifies as “good writing”, it has been 
demonstrated that Strauss intended his book to be regarded as well written and carefully 
constructed.684   
 
In addressing the issue of Strauss’s failure to mention Schmitt by name, this thesis has 
demonstrated that Strauss addresses Schmitt’s criteria regarding the affirmation of the 
political, rather than Schmitt the man.  There is no conclusive evidence that Strauss 
preferred not to mention Schmitt by name because of Schmitt’s active role in the Nazi 
regime.  Strauss had written on Martin Heidegger, a thinker known for his pro-Nazi 
support and continued sympathy.  One may construe Strauss’s silence on “Schmitt” as 
educational, requiring intensive reading and careful attention to details.  However, it is 
possible that Strauss sought not to identify Schmitt, because Strauss considered 
Schmitt’s ideas dangerous and detrimental to moderate politics and liberalism itself.  
Furthermore, Strauss’s caution in identifying Schmitt was also linked to Schmitt’s 
association with Christianity.  If Strauss made it too obvious that he was confronting 
Schmitt in The City and Man, readers could receive the impression that he was 
attacking Christianity, rather than the limitations of Christianity in political life.  As 
seen on the first page of The City and Man, Strauss goes out of his way to indicate that 
he has no intention of undermining “the Faithful City”, or “the Divine message of the 
City of Righteousness”.685  Strauss’s prudence in keeping potentially dangerous ideas 
under cover is supported by his own discussion of “the literary question”, which he 
defines as, “the question of the relation between society and philosophy”, or the tension 
between unsettling ideas and society’s need for stability. 686  Furthermore, as this thesis 
has demonstrated, Strauss shares similar views with Schmitt, and given Strauss’s stress 
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on caution and prudence, it could well be that Strauss did not want to be closely 
identified with someone who was banned from teaching after the Second World War for 
pro-Nazi activities.  One must also consider that, in 1941, Strauss had condemned 
Schmitt’s writings for contributing to the rise of Hitler.  However, the crucial issue is 
that Strauss was very intent on making sure his works did not contribute towards the 
destruction of Christianity as a way of life, and he certainly demonstrates, in The City 
and Man, that he did not want to “knowingly or ignorantly” pave the way to yet another 
tyranny. 687   
 
3. The Theoretical Significance of the Findings 
 
As stated previously, the overall goal of this thesis is not to question Strauss’s 
interpretation of Plato, Aristotle and Thucydides, but to show that Strauss thought 
highly enough of Schmitt’s 1932 arguments on the affirmation of the political to 
respond to his criteria in 1964, using those classical thinkers.  The City and Man is 
Strauss’s theologico-political treatise and his comprehensive reply to Schmitt’s, The 
Concept of the Political, defined as who, or what, should rule society.  In an age where 
rationalism, especially classical rationalism, is under attack, according to Strauss, 
political theology becomes an alternative choice for serious scholars.  In agreement with 
Schmitt regarding the importance of the regimes in understanding the political, Strauss 
attempts to recover classical rationalism, in order to provide an alternative political 
science that is guided by the theme of the best regime and what Strauss calls “common 
sense”. 688  What makes this argument particularly significant is that none of the 
commentators on Schmitt and Strauss has discovered Strauss’s response to Schmitt’s 
                                                 
687 Strauss, Leo, “German Nihilism”, op. cit., p. 362. 
688 Strauss, Leo,  The City and Man, op. cit., p. 12. 
  
 
284
criteria in The City and Man.  In discovering the six criteria for the recovery of the 
political in both Schmitt’s and Strauss’s early works on the political, and in discovering 
Strauss’s structure of The City and Man, this thesis provides a coherent interpretation of 
The City and Man.  
 
In elucidating Strauss’s response to Schmitt in The City and Man this thesis provides an 
incentive for further research into Strauss’s other works, to ascertain if Strauss 
continues his response to Schmitt after 1965, particularly since Strauss addressed 
theology through his study of the Greek poet, Aristophanes, while he addressed the 
divine law in his book on Plato’s Laws.  Finally, since few commentators understand, or 
agree on, what Strauss meant by his lifetime occupation with “the theologico-political 
problem”, this thesis will contribute to the ongoing debate on the meaning, and 
significance, of that problem, in the light of his response to Schmitt’s political theology. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
1 Strauss’s Divisions within The City and Man 
 
According to Seth Benardete, the whole division of The City and Man is as follows: 
Chapter One (“On Aristotle’s Politics”) five distinct parts - “1) Aristotle as the founder 
of political science (pp. 13 - 29); 2) city and culture (pp. 30 - 35); 3) democracy (pp. 35 
- 41); 4) nature (pp. 41 - 45); 5) regime (pp. 45 - 49)”.  I argue that the first division is 
on p. 48, after the word, “defensible--”, not p. 50 that begins chapter 2. 
 
Chapter Two - “On Plato’s Republic” is divided into two parts: how to read Plato (pp. 
50 - 62) and the Republic (politeia) (pp. 62 - 138). 
 
Chapter Three - “On Thucydides’ War of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians” is 
divided up according to Strauss’s sub-titles: 
1.  “Political Philosophy and Political History” (pp. 139 - 145). 
2.  “The Case for Sparta: Moderation and the Divine Law” (pp. 145 - 154). 
3.  “The Case for Athens: Daring, Progress and the Arts” (pp. 154 - 163). 
4.  “The Speeches of the Actors and the Speech of Thucydides” (pp. 163 - 174). 
5.  “Dike” (pp. 174 - 182). 
6.  “Ananke” (pp. 182 - 192). 
7.  “The Dialogue on Melos and the Disaster in Sicily” (pp. 192 - 209). 
8.  “The Spartan Manner and the Athenian Manner” (pp. 209 - 226). 
9.  “The Questionable Universalism of the City” (pp. 226 - 236). 
10.  “Political History and Political Philosophy” (pp. 236 - 241).689 
 
There are 17 divisions within the book.  The “central” division is “The Case for Sparta: 
Moderation and the Divine Law” (pp. 145 - 154).  Strauss argues that the number 17 is 
the designation for “nature” (physis).690   
 
In addition, the simple breakdown of paragraphs is as follows: 
1. “Introduction” – 18 paragraphs. 
2.  “I On Aristotle’s Politics” – 33 paragraphs. 
3. “II On Plato’s Republic” – 78 paragraphs.  
4. “III On Thucydides’ War of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians” – 82 
paragraphs. 
 
 
                                                 
689 Benardete, Seth, “Leo Strauss’ The City and Man”, op. cit., p. 2.  Benardete discovered that a full stop 
and a long dash, “.—”, separate the different themes.  See pp. 29, 35, 41, & 45.  The 6th division occurs on 
p. 48, not at the beginning of chapter two as Benardete suggests. Hence, the discussion of regimes, 
including the best regime, according to Aristotle, blends into the next chapter “On Plato’s Republic”. 
690 Strauss, Leo, On Tyranny, op. cit., p. 275. 
